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ABSTRACT 
In this comparative study of the form and theology of Flannery O'Connor and 
Simone Weil I interrogate how Weil's philosophical writings and her theology 
illuminate O'Connor's use of both narrative and non-fictional forms, and her 
Catholicism. The Introduction analyses how Weil's concept of superposed reading 
provides a new method of approaching both O'Connor, her writings, and O'Connor 
studies, and focuses on how such apparently different women interconnect. Chapter 
One explores how both Weil and O'Connor attempt to write their theologies on the 
souls of their readers yet are each subject to constraints imposed by form. Weil's 
concept of locating equilibrium between incommensurates is discussed, and her 
distinctively philosophical approach to fictions and fictionality is used to investigate 
O'Connor's notion of prophetic fictions and the writer's role. Chapter Two assesses 
how both writers revivify Christian paradoxes. Weil's monstrous concept of 
affiiction, and O'Connor's use of the grotesque genre to jolt secular man into an 
awareness of the sacred are scrutinised. Chapter Three studies how both writers 
consider an encounter between God and man is possible through the action of grace. 
My Conclusion interrogates how Weil's work can deepen our understanding of 
O'Connor's writings, and examines how successful O'Connor is at realising a truly 
Christian literature. I conclude that despite being a writer of powerful fictions, 
O'Connor can not be totally successful in her mission as writer-prophet because 
ultimately fiction escapes orthodoxy. 
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INTRODUCTION: SUPERPOSED READINGS 
'Every being cries out silently to be read differently' according to Simone Wei1. 1 
The Weilean tenn 'reading' involves the activity of interpretation, usually subjective 
emotional responses, or confonnity to public opinion which generate incorrect 
judgements of individuals, texts, and events. 'We read, but also we are read by 
others' she maintains, which is a 'mechanical process. More often than not a 
dialogue between deaf people' (GG 121-122). Accurate interpretation requires a 
superior quality of attention, a change of perspective that facilitates 'Superposed 
readings,2 in which two or more distinct elements are viewed simultaneously, and 
alternative realities are recognised beyond surface appearances. 
Flannery O'Connor 'cries out' loudly to be read differently in two ways. First, she 
personally demands her audience read her fictions differently, and second, despite 
the voluminous critical material available, O'Connor's work calls for new 
interpretations. Preoccupied by what she considers the incorrect explications of her 
narratives by readers deaf to her Christian concerns, O'Connor demands her 
audience changes its perspective to accord with her own 'anagogical vision', which 
operating on an equivalent principle to Weil's superposed readings, combines both 
literal and spiritual realities in a single vista.3 'The novelist must be characterized 
not by his function but by his vision', O'Connor insists, and this 'anagogical vision' 
is the kind 'that is able to see different levels of reality in one image or in one 
situation'. and is concerned 'with the Divine life and our participation in it' (MM 
72). But believing she is read by a hostile audience unwilling or unable to hear her 
Christian message and perceive this superposed reality. O'Connor claims 'you have 
to make your vision apparent by shock - to the hard of hearing you shout. and for the 
almost blind you draw large and startling figures' (MM 34). 
But have too many of O'Connor's critics been deafened and blinded by her 
non-fictional fonns of communication: the lectures. essays, letters. and book reviews 
in which she so emphatically states her anagogical intent in the narratives? Has too 
large a portion of O'Connor criticism itself become a mechanical process in which 
O'Connor's comments about her fictions have been so successful in reorientating 
the critical debate. that her readers too readily accept the stories as prophetic 
Christian parables. rather than complex, ambiguous narratives which offer both 
spiritual readings and alternative literal interpretations which undercut them? Frank 
Kennode's distinction between 'outsiders' who generate literal, 'carnal' 
interpretations of texts, and 'insiders', an elect band of critics who produce profound 
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'spiritual' readings through a process of 'aural circumcision',4 is useful here in 
examining O'Connor's work. the state of O'Connor criticism, and how a study of 
Simone Weil can make a contribution to it. 
According to Kermode there is 'seeing and hearing, which are what naive listeners 
and readers do~ and there is perceiving and understanding, which are in principle 
reserved to an elect' (Kermode, Genesis, 3). The elect obtain their insider status by 
affirming the superiority of latent over manifest senses, and by a process of 'aural 
circumcision'. in which the next generation of elect interpreters is initiated into 
access to, and control of, these privileged spiritual interpretations.5 Amongst these 
initiates there is 'a preference for spiritual over carnal readings - that is, for 
interpretations that are beyond the hearing of outsiders', he argues (18). Due to prior 
expectations of unity, all readers search for textual consonance, but while outsiders 
only recognise the most obvious literal features, elect interpreters search for occult 
relations not manifested in the narrative. Locating latent senses in a text requires a 
'moment of interpretation or act of 'divination' in which an 'impression point' is 
discovered.6 This crucial juncture 'gives sense and structure to the whole', there 
may be one or several such moments, but they can only be justified if reconciled 
with the whole narrative or oeuvre (16, 17). 
O'Connor's preference for what she considers the 'intelligent reader' capable of 
perceiving profound (religious) meanings in her narratives, rather than the 'average 
reader', who is merely amused by their surface levels (MM 95), corresponds to 
Kermode's concept of insider and outsider exegetists. Similarly, her equation of the 
'legitimate' use of the grotesque genre with prophecy, and insistence that what 
makes narratives, and specifically her own narratives successful is an anagogical 
action or gesture which makes 'contact with mystery' (111): this amounts to a 
demand that her readers perform an act of divination in order to discover the 
impression point in her texts, and perceive the spiritual rather than see only the 
manifest. 7 But are such interpretations supported by the narratives, or reliant on 
aural circumcision, in which O'Connor's non-fictional work prepares an elect group 
of literary disciples to maintain her anagogical readings - which are actually 
alienated from the outsiders who see and hear, rather than perceive and understand? 
According to Ben Satterfield 'it was O'Connor who told the critics how to read her, 
and they responded like so many Pavlovian dogs,. 8 So are her anagogical readers, in 
their desire to make acts of divination, acting like Pavlovian critics and substituting 
O'Connor's claimed interventions of grace in the stories for unsubstantiated 
epiphanies? If as Kermode argues, 'Carnal readings are much the same. Spiritual 
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readings are all different' (9), after over forty years of O'Connor criticism have 
anagogical interpretations of her work become themselves carnal? 
In response to these questions I have three points to argue. First, the process of 
'aural circumcision' is evident in much of O'Connor's non-fictional work, and many 
of her critics' commentaries, and this has played a significant part in promoting the 
merits of exclusively anagogical interpretations of the fictions, which readings of 
the narratives frequently do not justify.9 Second, an over-reliance on O'Connor's 
statements of Christian orthodoxy and intention to communicate her religious 
beliefs to her audience, often results in readers neglecting to acknowledge 
O'Connor's equally significant observations on the need for her narratives to be 
considered as fictions, not just theology. to Consequently her over-zealous disciples 
often ignore the ambiguities within the stories, and by flattening their truly 
multi-layered structure into one-dimensional religious tracts, ironically, contravene 
O'Connor's intention to combine both literal and mystical realities in a single text. 
Third, precisely because her fictions are more than religious dogma, and her 
non-fictional writings are themselves contradictory, 11 O'Connor's work resists the 
imposition of any single interpretation, and therefore does offer latent, 'spiritual' 
readings. Her oeuvre 'cries out' to be read in all its complexity, and requires a 
combination of both insider and outsider interpretations, which when balanced, 
provide the superposed readings her writings deserve. 12 
Simone Weil's work provides such an equipoise between the insider/spiritual, and 
outsider/ carnal perspectives, and in doing so offers a framework for the different 
interpretations O'Connor studies call for. By adopting Weil's superposed reading 
strategy this thesis will provide a comparative interrogation of the fonns and 
theologies of these at once very different yet similar writers, using Weil' s concepts 
to focus attention on O'Connor's, and provide original readings of her narratives. 
But exactly how can a Jewish, French philosopher illuminate the writings of a 
Catholic, American fiction writer? My argument for bringing these writers together 
has four strands. First. O'Connor herself recognised the relevance ofWeil's life and 
work to her fiction. Both women shared parallel experiences of marginalisation, 
illness and premature death, and because Wei!, as Christian without a Church, and 
as a startlingly monstrous yet comic figure embodies the type of religious 
consciousness and grotesquerie O'Connor is so interested in depicting. this study 
will begin by examining how such apparently different women are linked. Second, 
because O'Connor is not just a fiction writer but also a theological, philosophical 
author, by analysing WeiI's polemic, contradictory mode, and her distinctively 
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philosophical criteria for the spiritual value of fictions, I propose to assess both 
O'Connor's fictional and non-fictional work. O'Connor's employment of a narrative 
form intended to function as both entertainment and theology will be examined, and 
how her contradictory extra-fictional writings have an impact on the stories and 
their reception. Third, as Weil's mystical philosophy shares many similar concerns 
and concepts vital to O'Connor's theology, yet WeWs rejection of institutionalised 
Catholicism is very different to O'Connor's acquiescance to the Catholic Church 
and its dogma, I will analyse how as both spiritual insider and outsider Wei! and her 
work can illuminate O'Connor's religious thought and its representation, or 
non-representation in the narratives. Fourth, while my primary aim is to use Weil 
and her work to shed light on O'Connor, another valuable justification for a 
comparative study of these writers, is that O'Connor's life and work can also 
illuminate Weil, and in providing useful and interesting insights into the philosopher 
and her work, add another dimension to both Weilean and O'Connor studies. 
In correspondence that spans her writing career,13 O'Connor expresses her 
fascination with Weil, insisting that from 'what I have read about her I think she 
must have been a very great person. She and Edith Stein are the two 20th-century 
women who interest me most' (HB 93). Convinced she existed 'in an unbelieving 
age but one which is markedly and lopsidedly spiritual', O'Connor found Weil 'the 
example of a religious consciousness without a religion which maybe sooner or later 
I will be able to write about' .14 Contending that her predominantly secular audience 
requires startling figures to coerce it into appreciating the efficacy of the 
supernatural, she insists 'when you can assume that your audience holds the same 
beliefs as you do, you can relax a little and use more normal means of talking to it, 
when you have to assume that it does not, then you have to make your vision 
apparent by shock' (MM 34). 
O'Connor's fiction revolves around grotesque protagonists whose violent conflicts 
between atheism and belief are intended to reveal the intervention of grace in a 
profane world. With her intense spiritual struggle between acceptance and 
repudiation of the Catholic Church, her claims to have experienced life-changing 
mystical experiences, yet with absurd moments interspersed throughout her life, 
O'Connor considers Weil's existence 'almost a perfect blending of the Comic and 
the Terrible' which epitomises her grotesque fictional narratives. Believing that 
comedy and terror 'may be opposite sides of the same coin', O'Connor claims that 
in her experience, 'everything funny I have written is more terrible than it is funny. 
or only funny because it is terrible, or only terrible because it is funny' (HB 105). 
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Weil's terrible yet occasionally comic life began when she was born in Paris on 3rd 
February 1909. Her middle class, Jewish family were assimilated into French, 
Catholic culture, and she enjoyed a privileged bourgeois education at the Lycees and 
prestigious Ecole Normale Superieure. Weil's brother Andre's mathematical genius 
instilled in her an inferiority complex, and she considered suicide at the age of 
fourteen. An indication of her tendency towards self-abasement, this episode is 
important because it eventually resulted in Wei!' s conviction that anyone, 'though 
practically devoid of natural gifts, can penetrate to the kingdom of truth reserved for 
genius, if only he longs for the truth and perpetually concentrates all his attention 
upon its attainment'. IS 
Her thought pivots on the Platonic conception that ultimate reality, which consists of 
the Good, Truth and Beauty, are intelligible. Plato's philosophy pervades both 
Weil's early work on oppression and liberty, and her subsequent mystical thought. 
Weil's lectures to her students at the Lycee for girls at Roanne (1933-34) are 
permeated with references to Plato, as are all her notebooks. which span the decade 
1933-43. However, her most sustained and eloquent analysis of Plato's work is 
contained in the essays: 'God in Plato', 'The Symposium of Plato', and 'The 
Republic', all published posthumously.16 Her Platonic assurance that supernal 
realities are intellectually attainable was reinforced by the teachings of Weil's 
philosophy professor, Alain, (a pseudonym for Emile Chartier), at the Lycee Henry 
IV between 1925 and 1928. The central tenets of his philosophy are the acquirement 
of reality and truth through the assertion of contradiction, opposition to religious 
institutions and dogmas as restrictions to individuality, and his conception of 
Christianity as Platonic rather than Hebraic. Plato's philosophy, combined with 
Alain's schema, constitute the most profound intellectual influences on Weil's own 
work. 7 Weil's Platonism is unusual in a twentieth century more distinguished by the 
existentialist angst of her compatriots and contemporaries. Albert Camus and Jean 
-Paul Sartre. But although Platonism constitutes the keystone of her philosophy, 
characteristically Wei! superposes it with both similar and radically different 
philosophies, including a form of existentialism. I? 
A brilliant student, WeiI won the school's philosophy prize in 1927, coming top of 
her class (with Simone de Beauvoir in second place). But her intellectual abilities 
were not combined with the capacity for effective social interaction. As her friend 
Simone Petrement has observed, Weil's 'charm remained hidden from most people. 
who saw in Simone only a totally intellectual being.' Giving 'the impression of a 
burning, almost indiscreet curiosity', Weil's ruthless pursuit of intellectual 
arguments allied with her determined social conscience and deliberate lack of 
11 
femininity 'evoked the image of the revolutionary intelligentsia', irritating both the 
educational authorities and her classmates, and making her an object of derision 
(Petrement 26-29). Celestin BougIe, the Director of Studies at Henry IV referred to 
her somewhat maliciously as 'the categorical imperative in skirts', 18 but even the 
sympathetic Petrement acknowledges that due to Weil's fierce intransigence, and 
the emotional self-restraint which prevented her from displaying any inner feelings 
or vulnerability; 'it would be true to say that when she was a student, she had not yet 
attained full humanity'(30). 
Alain's prescient summary of Weil's abilities and potential was: 'An excellent 
pupil; a rare strength of mind, wide culture. Will succeed brilliantly if she does not 
embark on obscure paths. In any case she will attract attention'(McLelIan 16). 
Attempting to circumvent this penchant for notoriety, BougIe insisted 'We'll put the 
Red Virgin as far away as possible so that we won't hear any more about her'(131), 
and after passing her agrega/ion at the Ecole Normale Superieure in 1931, Wei! was 
refused her request to be given a teaching post in an industrial area. However, 
although placed in provincial Le Puy, she remained a high profile political activist. 
Beginning her career as a philosophy teacher at twenty-two, she became an active 
socialist, involved in trade union activities and demonstrations. Transferred to 
Auxurre because her political actions embarrassed the authorities at Le Puy, Weil's 
unconventional teaching methods (a restrictive syllabus fused with political 
broadsides), were popular with her pupils but criticised by the Academy's 
Inspector. 19 After the failure of her class to gain satisfactory examination results 
and the consequent abolition of the philosophy course, Wei! was sent at her request 
to the Lycee in Roanne, where she continued to synthesise teaching and politics. 
Convinced that the 'respect accorded language and the men who are best able to use 
it has been indispensable to human progress', Wei! considered it essential to 'give 
the workers the ability to handle language and especially the written 
language'(petrement 88.89) if they were to attain the necessary knowledge and 
culture required to elevate them from a life of oppression. So she began teaching 
evening classes at the Saint Etienne Labour Exchange, often missing her train back 
to Auxurre, and forced to spend the night on cafe benches. Yet despite her dedicated 
socialism, Weil became increasingly disillusioned by the inability of organised 
groups to effectively alter the living conditions of the working class. Sympathetic to 
Communist ideals, she remained sceptical about the Soviet regime's success, 
infuriating Trotsky by insisting Soviet workers were subjugated by the very system 
intended to empower them. 20 
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Although she wrote numerous articles for trade union journals, and extensive 
treatises on Marxism and social oppression which culminated in Oppression and 
Liberty (completed in 1934), her magnus opus of this period, Wei! never joined a 
political party. (As women were only enfranchised in France in 1944 she was 
actually never eligible to vote.) Writing in 1942, she provides a reason for her 
reluctance to join organisations, insisting that her 'natural disposition is to be very 
easily influenced, too much influenced, and above all by anything collective'(WFG 
55). But at the same time Weil claims she is preordained to remain an outsider, and 
this doesn't contradict her attraction to various groups as 'my capacity to mix with 
all of them implies that I belong to none' (55). This simultaneous attraction to the 
communal, and determination to preserve her individuality prefigures Weil's 
attitude to the Catholic Church. But it was her decision to spend several months in 
1934 as a factory worker, which links Weil's early preoccupations with the 
mechanics of an oppressive society, and her later concentration on the workings of 
supernatural grace. 
A consistent concern to convert her intellectual, evangelical principles into action, 
combined with her admiration for, and attempts to share the lot of the underclass, 
ensured that Weil strove to engage in manual labour. But suffering from the violent 
headaches which began four years earlier and would continue until her death, she 
was overwhelmed by the severe physical conditions, intellectual monotony, and 
requirement to submit to unjust orders.21 Whether her migraines were 
psychosomatic, or caused by a physical condition remains unclear.22 However, what 
is certain is the extent to which Weil was traumatised by her factory episode, 
evident from her frequent references to it during later years as the moment when 'I 
received forever the mark of a slave,.23 Weil's concept of malheur or affiiction, 
draws directly on her factory experiences in its central preoccupation with 
submission to, and endurance of, the workings of blind necessity. In her seminal 
essay on this subject, 'The Love of God and Amiction', she insists one is 'entirely 
subject to this blind necessity in every part of one's being' .24 
However, despite considering she had an affinity with the victims of economic 
hardship, WeWs privileged social status ensured that when she was physically and 
mentally incapable of continuing the factory experiment, her parents took her on 
holiday to Spain and Portugal to recuperate. A recurring pattern throughout Weil's 
life consists of her attempts to belong to, and assist what she considered 
disadvantaged groups, only to inflict on herself such physical or emotional damage 
that she too eventually required aid. A self.professed pacifist, she joined the Spanish 
Civil War to fight the Fascists, only to be seriously (and embarrassingly) burned by 
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stepping into a pot of boiling oil, and returned to the safety of France by her 
parents.25 One of several startlingly contradictory actions, Weil's 
pacifist-combatant status, although on the surface hypocritical, actually typifies her 
ability to superpose apparently irreconcilable opposites: revolutionary/reactionary, 
medievalist/existentialist, atheist/Christian mystic. 
Weil considers contradiction and absurdity an integral part of experiential reality: 
Our life is nothing but impossibility, absurdity. Each thing that we 
desire is in contradiction with the conditions or the consequences 
attaching to that thing; each assertion that we make implies the 
contrary assertion; all our feelings are mixed up with their opposites. 
The reason is that we are made up of contradiction, since we are 
creatures, and at the same time God, and at the same time infinitely 
other than God. (NB 411) 
Spiritual development is founded on the same principle. 'Radical impossibility 
clearly perceived, absurdity-is the gate leading to the supernatural' Weil insists (NB 
412-13), and the ludicrous incidents in her life are interlinked with profound 
religious experiences which increasingly became the major focus of her attention. In 
her 'Spiritual Autobiography' (1942), she notes that while an agnostic, she had 
three important contacts with Catholicism that culminated in a mystical experience 
which changed her life. The first occurred while she convalesced in Portugal after 
her unsuccessful factory work. Becoming suddenly convinced that Christianity 'is 
preeminently the religion of slaves', she could not resist 'belonging' to it, she claims 
(WFG 67). Secondly, in 1937 while on holiday in Italy, she visited the chapel of 
Santa Maria degli Angeli in Assisi, contending 'something stronger than I was 
compelled me for the first time in my life to go down on my knees' (67-68). Finally, 
after asking once again to be relieved from the teaching duties she had only 
intermittently completed due to ill health, Weil spent ten days at the Benedictine 
abbey of Solesmes in 1938. While suffering intense migraines, she insists the 
thought of Christ's Passion 'entered into my being once and for all' (68). During her 
stay another visitor recommended she read the English metaphysical poets, and 
while reciting George Herbert's poem 'Love' when experiencing a severe headache, 
Weil claims to have had the first of several mystical experiences, later assuring her 
friend Fr. Perrin, 'Christ himself came down and took possession of me' (69). 
As an atheist/agnostic Weil's declared contact with God was totally unexpected, and 
constitutes an 'impression point' in which as Kermode maintains, it is possible to 
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'perceive in a life some moment that gives sense and structure to the whole' 
(Genesis 16). In Weil's case, although her claimed mystical experiences cannot be 
authenticated, they undoubtedly occupy a pivotal position in relation to her life and 
work. Her writings between 1933-1938 contain virtually no references to the 
supernatural, and are concerned instead with the practical problems of creating a 
more just society.26 However, her major work written after this date and up to her 
death in 1943 is concentratedly spiritual. Published posthumously, (here listed with 
the original French publication date followed by its English translation) Gravity and 
Grace [1947] (1952), The Need for Roots [1949] (1952), Waiting for God [1950] 
(1951), First and Last Notebooks [1950, 1951] (1970), Intimations of Christianity 
Among the AnCient Greeks [1951, 1953J (1957), The Notebooks of Simone Weil 
[1951, 1953, 1956] (1956), and Letter to a Priest [1951] (1954); are saturated with 
meditations on God, and concerned with how to obtain 'entry into the transcendent' 
(FLN335). 
Like St. Augustine's ConfeSSiOns, Weil's writings after this pivotal mystical 
encounter, especially her 'Spiritual Autobiography', take this moment of conversion 
as the key to her whole life.27 Equally interesting is Weil's mystical narrative 
apparently describing her encounter with God, which closes her Notebooks (NB 
638-39). Philosophical discourse is abandoned in this text, and unlike any of We ii's 
other written forms, this narrative, as Nevin rightly notes, 'might be called WeB's 
version of a gospel episode, with herself cast at the center, with Christ as "He'" 
(Nevin 276), 
It is extraordinary that Weil never informed her family and friends about such a 
crucial moment in her life, only confiding in new acquaintances years later • Fr. 
Perrin in 1941, and Jot! Bousquet the following year. Perrin became Weil's spiritual 
advisor and the recipient of several long and significant letters and essays, including 
Weil's 'Spiritual Autobiography', 'The Love of God and Affliction', and 'Forms of 
the Implicit Love of God', all written in 1942. Her disagreements with Perrin over 
the nature of the Catholic Church are essential to the development of Weil's 
theology, and despite her opposition to his acceptance of Catholic dogma, he was 
one of the few close friends she had, and influential to her thinking. Maintaining 
that Perrin provided her with 'the most compelling and pure inspiration', Weil 
credits him with developing her ability to reconcile rational attention with faith.28 
Bousquet, paralyzed by a wound sustained in the First World war, bedridden, and 
forced to endure constant pain from his spinal injury, literally embodied Weil's 
concept of affliction. Although they only met once, according to Petrement, this 
single conversation 'was enough to create a deep friendship' .29 
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That Weil so successfully kept important areas of her experiences completely 
distinct from each other suggests an ability to compartmentalise her life into 
interior, spiritual concerns, personal relationships, and professional work. The most 
significant segment of her work constitutes the development of her theology, and in 
addition to her meditative notebooks, the major spiritual texts demonstrate how 
essential to her this was. Merging Catholic doctrine, Greek philosophy and 
literature, Pythagorean mathematics, Eastern religions and myths, these writings 
attempt to reconcile human amiction with God's perfection. But although her 
religious experiences provide the impetus for these texts it is important to recognise 
that Weil's mystical writings are not solely products of a personal spiritual 
experience, but are also integrally linked to the socio-historical events of her time. 
The complexities within Weil's life are paralleled by the cultural tunnoi! through 
which she lived. A child during the First World War and the Russian Revolution, 
Weil's teaching career took place during the economic instability of the 1930s, the 
Spanish Civil War, and Hitler's rise to power. Her visit to Solesmes occurred just 
after the Anschluss in Austria, and what she considered her first mystical experience 
took place two months after Hitler's Munich agreements. With the outbreak of the 
Second World War and the Fall of France, WeiI was forced to flee Paris and took 
refuge in the South under the Vichy regime. However she was still prevented from 
teaching, or publishing her work, because of her status as a Jew, despite her 
controversial protest to the Minister of Education denying her Jewishness, and 
insisting that although she professed 'no religion and never have', she considered 
herself closest to the Catholic tradition.30 
In the same year Weil began to write her essay 'The Iliad, Poem of Might' (1939). 
Although ostensibly a commentary on the Iliad as an example of the inexorable 
workings of necessity and fate, it is also apparently an analysis of the Nazi 
occupation; with Troy representing the predicament of Vichy France. Eventually 
published in 1941 under the pseudonym 'Emile Novis', this text constitutes an 
example of the 'superposed readings' Wei! advocated, and would undoubtedly have 
been perceived as such by her audience in the Free Zone. As Jean-Paul Sartre, 
himself a member of the Resistance, and a writer whose wartime works gave 
encoded encouragement to his countrymen observes in 'For Whom Does One 
Write?': 
people of the same period and community, who lived through the 
same events, who have raised or avoided the same questions, have 
the same taste in their mouth; they have the same complicity, and 
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there are the same corpses among them. That is why it is not 
necessary to write so much: there are key words.31 
The key words in Weil's philosophy. and her stress on the need to define a 
vocabulary by which to link the superposed realities of the sacred and profane will 
be analysed in Chapters Two and Three. At this point it is important to note the key 
moments in Weil's life, and superpose their often contradictory events. 
During the year her Iliad essay was published. Weil joined a Resistance network in 
Marseilles. assisting refugees, and helping to distribute an anti-Fascist publication 
called Cahiers du Temoignage Chretien. According to her Resistance contact Malou 
David. 'Simone did not merely help "some" Jews in difficulty, or merely distribute 
"some" periodicals, she was the very basis of the organization and distribution' in 
Marseilles (MCLellan 179). After the group was betrayed by a traitor, Weil was 
interrogated three times by the police, but eventually released due to lack of 
evidence (Petrement 408-411). Despite her Resistance work Wei! wrote prolifically, 
and it was during this period that she met Perrin. Bousquet, and Gustave Thibon -
who pennitted her to stay on his fann at Saint-Marcel d' Ardeche, and indulge her 
desire for manual labour by working on the harvest. Weil's friendship with Thibon 
is important for two reasons. First, before she began her journey to the United States 
in 1942 she left him her notebooks for safekeeping during her exile. In a letter from 
Oran she informed Thibon, 'If you hear nothing of me for three or four years you 
can consider that you have complete ownership of them', and his arrangement of 
excerpts from these notebooks comprises Gravity and Grace, the first major 
publication of We ii's work.32 Secondly, as an exercise in teaching him Greek, Weil 
translated the Our Father, and repeating it daily, she began to pray for the first time 
in her life. This incident is significant because it apparently marked an 
intensification of Weil's spiritual experiences. She later claimed to Perrin that 
'during this recitation or at other moments, Christ is present with me in person but 
his presence is infinitely more real, more moving, more clear than on that first 
occasion when he took possession of me' (WFG 72). 
Returning to Marseilles, Weil wrote most of Waiting For God and Intimations of 
Christianity Among the Ancient Greeks between January and April 1942. It is no 
coincidence that her concepts of affiiction. decreation, and violent grace developed 
while she became increasingly isolated within her own country because of the racist 
repression of the Holocaust, itself made more unbearable due to the collaboration of 
the Vichy regime. As Chapter Two will demonstrate. the axis around which her 
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theology revolves is the afflicted's exclamation 'My God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me?' and the silence which follows. This has an extra resonance when it is 
considered that her 'Spiritual Autobiography' and the final letters to Perrin were 
completed in an internment camp in Casablanca in May 1942, while she waited to 
embark for exile in New York and London. 
Just as conversion is the focus of the majority of religious autobiographies, Weil's 
professed mystical experiences are central to the increased level of spirituality she 
describes in her own 'Spiritual Autobiography'. But equally important in this text is 
Weil's less traditional emphasis on her own individuality and rejection of 
conversion in its institutionalised sense. Baptism into the Catholic church is not a 
necessary prerequisite for further spiritual progression. 'I have never once had, even 
for a moment, the feeling that God wants me to be in the Church. I have never even 
once had a feeling of uncertainty' (74), she categorically infonns Perrin. Her 
correspondence with him is distinguished by its personal tone, and a willingness to 
reveal her inner thoughts, and Weil's often melodramatic and self-indulgent 
remarks, what Thibon tenns 'a negative preoccupation with self, are apparent in 
these letters (Perrin and Thibon 138). 
Linked to this negativity is Weil's rigorous asceticism, and despite her refusal to 
convert to Catholicism, as McLellan notes 'she held as finnly to chastity (together 
with poverty and obedience) as any in a religious order' (McLellan 271). In fact, as 
Ann Loades has observed, Weil 'resists disorder in her own society like a Medieval 
mystic, by fasting and by the intensity of her desire to merge herself with the 
humanity of a suffering Christ,.33 The extreme degree of Weil's self-abnegation 
and orientation towards affliction is entirely consistent with the typical behaviour of 
mystics, and the 'emotional susceptibility' or 'neurotic temperament' which 
William James posits as 'the chief condition of the requisite receptivity' to spiritual 
experience.34 Weil's emotional neuroticism sometimes leads to an arrogant and 
eccentric prejudice. For instance, there is a dichotomy between Weil's spiritual 
aspirations and her consistent anti-Semitism. Throughout her life she was actively 
involved in endeavouring to restore social equilibrium by acting as a counterweight 
to oppression - joining factory workers and trade unionists, and attempting to 
participate in the Spanish Civil War. But Weil's work attests to a bizarre antipathy 
to Hebraic civilization.35 
One of her most overtly biased texts, Letter to A Priest, was written from the safety 
of exile in New York. It is interesting to note in this work (as in Waiting/or God) 
the tension between Weil's opposition to Catholic dogma and her own dogmatism. 
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Although primarily an attempt to clarify her position on Catholicism, Letter to A 
Priest is also scathingly anti-Semitic. Containing unsubstantiated accusations of a 
conspiracy theory, it claims that the authentic Greek and Eastern origins of 
Christianity were systematically erased by the Israelites.36 Although it is 
understandable that she felt no affinity with a Jewish culture into which she had 
never been assimilated, it is surprising that for someone so concerned with the 
suffering of others this prejudice is intensified during the Holocaust. It is difficult to 
comprehend that in September 1942 Weil could write: 'If some Hebrews of 
classical Jewry were to return to life and were to be provided with arms, they would 
exterminate the lot of us-men, women and children, for the crime of idolatry'. 3 7 Her 
prejudice is largely based on academic argument rather than physical contact with 
the Jewish community, but this intellectual aversion to Hebrew culture leads to a 
racist discourse that is disturbingly reminiscent of Nazi ideology. 
During her work for the Free French, Wei! received a proposal from /'Organisation 
civile et militaire, recommending that after the war the status and influence of Jews 
in French society should be reduced through a series of prohibitive statutes. 
Interestingly, Weil's 'Commentary' on this paper is not only sympathetic, but 
intensifies its racist rhetoric. The existence ofa Jewish minority 'does not constitute 
a good~ so the object must be to provoke its disappearance, and every modus vivendi 
must be a transition towards this objective', she writes. But for any 'fanatical 
racists' who insisted on retaining their Jewish identity, 'the problem would be to 
find a criterion to pick them out so as to deprive them of French nationality.' This 
would involve 'purifying' the nation by removing Jews from positions of public 
instruction-the identical measure inflicted on Weil by the Nazis.38 Whether or not 
her attitude would have altered had she lived to see the horrifying consequences of 
the Final Solution, and the newsreel footage (a consummate depiction of Weil's 
concept of affiiction) which was to haunt Flannery O'Connor, remains unfortunately 
unknown. However, not surprisingly, when WeWs work began to be published only 
two years after the end of World War Two, its anti-Semitic content angered and 
appalled the Jewish community.39 
Whilst highly critical of Judaism, Weil refused the 'eager welcome' offered by a 
'Catholic circle' keen to adopt her, informing Perrin she did not want to find herself 
'''at home" in any human milieu whatever it may be' (WFG 54). Although 
conceding that to belong to such a group would actually be 'delightful', Wei! insists 
'I feel that it is not permissible for me. 1 feel that it is necessary and ordained that I 
should be alone, a stranger and an exile in relation to every human circle without 
exception' (54). Cutting through Weil's somewhat melodramatic stance here, it is 
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important to note as Springstead does, that she 'was neither born into nor brought up 
within the Church. In this sense she did not go outside the Church~ she chose to stay 
there' (Springstead, Love 8). 
Ironically for such an anti-Semite, Weirs definition of her identity as that of an 
outsider replicates the stereotypical caricature of a wandering, exiled Jew.40 Her 
restless migrations a combination of enforced retreat from the Nazis, and a desire to 
assist the Allied fight against them, the motivation for Weil's trip to New York was 
her belief that it constituted her only route to the Free French organization in 
London. She arrived in July 1942, but frustrated by her inability to leave 
immediately for England, she inundated her friends in London with some typically 
impracticable proposals for her involvement in the Resistance. Writing to Maurice 
Schumann, an active member of the Free French, she enclosed her 'Plan for an 
Organization of Front-Line Nurses', which urged the formation ofa mobile band of 
nurses who would 'be always at the points of greatest danger', to give first aid 
during battles (SL 146). Including herself among these women who would need to 
'offer their lives as a sacrifice', Weil believed such 'formations are necessarily the 
product of a religious inspiration', and would constitute valuable propaganda (147, 
150). Following this idealistic proposition with the request that she be parachuted 
into France as a secret agent, Weil assured Schumann she 'would accept any degree 
of risk (including certain death if the objective was sufficiently important)' (154). 
Her desire to return to France with 'a mission-preferably dangerous' (145), is 
symptomatic of her consistent attempts to assist the amicted while decreating 
herself. 'The suffering all over the world obsesses and overwhelms me to the point 
of annihilating my faculties' she writes, 'and the only way I can revive them and 
release myself from the obsession is by getting for myself a large share of danger 
and hardship' (156). But Weil's plans were inept-she had no medical qualifications, 
and her characteristically Jewish physical appearance would have made it 
impossible fo her to exist incognito in occupied France. As Thibon has confirmed, 
'her racial type was too recognizable to allow this' (GG xvii). 
Eventually joining the Free French in December 1942, Weil was commissioned by 
General de Gaulle to write a report on how a French peacetime society should be 
founded, and from her own turbulent experiences and migrant exile, she produced 
The Need for Roots (1952), a text which connects WeWs early concerns with the 
creation of a just society. and her subsequent concentration on individual 
spirituality. During this period she wrote copiously, but increasingly depressed by 
her inability to obtain active service, and what she perceived as the neglect of her 
philosophical work, Weil eventually resigned. Whether or not her dejection would 
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have been al1eviated had she lived to see the tide of war change in the Allies' favour 
can not be known. After all her efforts to reach the Free French in London, she only 
worked for four months, and weakened by her insistence on eating no more than the 
rations available in Occupied France she contracted tuberculosis, and was admitted 
to hospital in April 1943. The original diagnosis predicted recovery in two months, 
but either unwilling or unable to eat, WeWs condition deteriorated, and after being 
transferred to Grosvenor Sanatorium in Ashford, Kent, she died on 24th August 
1943 aged thirty-four. 
The inquest into WeWs death was held on 27 August, and the Coroner's verdict was 
suicide. Finding cause of death was cardiac failure 'due to starvation and pulmonary 
tuberculosis', he concluded 'The deceased did kill and slay herself by refusing to eat 
whilst the balance of her mind was disturbed' (McLellan 266). However, Weil 
consistently stated her opposition to suicide. 'One must give one's life for those one 
loves, but one must not kill oneself', she wrote in 1942 (FLN 331). Petrement insists 
that Weil's friends in London thought the inquest and its conclusions 'an absurdity' 
(petrement 526), pointing out, 'it is actually possible that by dint of depriving 
herself', Wei! could 'only take in very small amounts of food' (527), and her death 
was unintentional. A letter Wei! wrote on 26 July 1943, appearing to indicate she 
had some hope of rejoining her parents and continuing her work, offers some 
credence to this view. 
1 am convinced that even a temporary gluing together could only be 
accomplished by my parents, not by anyone else. If it ever should 
take place, 1 will dedicate what little energy and life thus granted to 
me to thinking and writing down what 1 have in me. (531) 
But typically contradictory, in the same sentence Weil considers her life may yet 
contain 'some activity in the cannon-fodder line' (531). 
Although her ultimate intentions remain uncertain, Weil's death was a culmination 
of life-long tendencies towards self-immolation and decreation, based on her 
assurance that the essential truth she sought would only be acquired through 
physical amiction. 'Life for me means nothing, and never has meant anything, 
really, except as a threshold to the revelation of truth' , she wrote while in London. 'I 
have the inner certainty that this truth, if it is ever granted to me, will only be 
revealed when I myself am physically in amiction' (SL 178). Whatever the 'truth' of 
Weil's amiction and death, it is ironic considering her anti-Semitism, that as Loades 
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observes, 'one might regard her as someone who inflicted on herself by accident, 
the kind of death she might have come to in a concentration camp,.41 Without her 
parents to retrieve her from yet another crisis, Weil's apparent urge towards 
self-destruction remained unchecked. 
Continuing her trait of keeping important aspects of her life separated from her 
family, she continued to write studiously cheerful letters to them until days before 
her death. However, a sense of desperation is apparent in one of the last letters Weil 
wrote to her parents (18 July 1943), when she describes her frustration at not being 
able to communicate her thoughts due to the inability of her audience to read her 
work correctly. 
I too have a sort of growing inner certainty that there is within me a 
deposit of pure gold which must be handed on. Only I become more 
and more convinced, by experience and by observing my 
contempories, that there is no one to receive it [ ... ] They listen to me 
or read me with the same hurried attention which they give to 
everything, making up their minds definitely about each hint of an 
idea as soon as it appears. (SL 196) 
Requiring the ability to balance objectively several ideas simultaneously, Weil's 
concept of 'reading' incorporates the difficulties incurred in making an accurate 
assessment of another person's character, without being influenced by personal 
prejudices. Justifiable interpretations require being 'continually ready to admit that 
another person is something other than what we read' (NB 43). It is 'a question of 
uprooting' stale perspectives (312), and by suspending judgement for a moment, 
becoming capable of perceiving the various levels of being which constitute a 
human individual. What distinguishes the elevated levels of existence from their 
lower counterparts is, 'in the higher states, the co-existence of several superposed 
planes' (312). 
Flannery O'Connor shared the same preoccupations with transmitting her ideas and 
the notion that this process was obstructed by her readers, complaining 'there will 
always be people who refuse to read the story you have written' (MM 95). 
Subsequent chapters will utilise Weil's theory of superposed readings to interrogate 
O'Connor's narratives and her similar anagogical vision in detail, but at this 
juncture I intend to use this concept to interpret O'Connor's life, distinguishing 
connections with, and distinctions from, Weil's experiences. By using Weil and 
O'Connor to illuminate each other, I propose to highlight their complex characters, 
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and how it is necessary to balance the contradictions in both women's personalities, 
to 'read' them, and their work accurately. 
Born in Savannah, Georgia, on 25th March 1925, the same year in which Wei! 
began her studies with Alain, Mary Flannery O'Connor enjoyed the same privileged 
economic status as Weil, which allowed her to concentrate on her writing career. 
O'Connor was also part of a minority culture, as a member of a wealthy Catholic 
family in the predominantly Protestant South.42 However, when her father became 
ill and suffered business difficulties, O'Connor and her mother moved to 
Milledgeville, where their relatives owned considerable property, and were socially 
prominent. Just before she became sixteen her father died of lupus erythematosus, 
the incurable hereditary disease which became active in her during 1950. Unlike 
Weil, her education was provincial, and she completed high school in 1942. After 
graduating from Milledgeville's Georgia State College for Women, she completed a 
Master of Fine Arts degree at the State University of Iowa, submitting a collection 
of short stories as her thesis in 1947. 
In the year in which O'Connor left high school, Weil was detained in an internment 
camp, and exiled. O'Connor's life, in contrast to Weil's experiences, was physically 
unaffected by World War Two, although later references in her letters and narratives 
to newsreel revelations of Holocaust atrocities emerge as evidence that these 
incidents were enduring intellectual concerns. 'Anything is credible after such a 
period of history. I've always been haunted by the boxcars, but they were actually 
the least of it', she insists in 1963 (H8 539). In her short story 'A Circle in the Fire' 
published nine years earlier, Mrs Cope is grateful she is not one of 'those poor 
Europeans [ ... ] put in boxcars like cattle' ,43 and the impact of documentary film of 
concentration camps on O'Connor's psyche is graphically displayed in 'The 
Displaced person' (1954), when Mrs Shortley recalls seeing such a film showing 
a small room piled high with bodies of dead naked people all in a 
heap, their arms and legs tangled together, a head thrust in here, a 
head there, a foot, a knee, a part that should have been covered up 
sticking out, a hand clutching nothing. (CS 196) 
The extent to which O'Connor was 'haunted' by the Holocaust is evident by her 
references to it in several other stories, including one of her last, 'Revelation' 
(1964), when Ruby Turpin dreams repeatedly of the different social classes 
'crammed in together in a box car, being ridden off to be put in a gas oven,.44 
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Demonstrating the influence of post-World War Two realities on O'Connor's work, 
these textual references underline that just as it is important to 'read' Wei! via 
superposing her life and philosophy with the historical issues which shaped them, 
O'Connor's emphasis on viewing her stories through specifically theological or 
literary perspectives should not deflect readers from analyzing her narratives within 
their socio-historical context.45 
However it is equally important to note that O'Connor's fascination with Weil is 
part of a wider interest in European theology, philosophy, and literature, O'Connor's 
letters and the books in her personal library demonstrate her intellectual engagement 
with such German theologians as Max Picard, Romano Guardini, and Karl Adam, 
Paul TiUich and Rudolph Bultmann; French philosophers Gabriel Marcel, Etienne 
Gilson, and Jean-Paul Sartre; and French fiction writers Leon Bloy and Georges 
Bernanos,46 But the three European writers most essential to O'Connor after Weil, 
and who had the most direct influence on her work were all French: the philosopher 
Jacques Maritain, the fiction writer Francois Mauriac, and the scientist-theologian 
Pere Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. De Chardin's ideas had an impact on O'Connor's 
life and fiction, and Mauriac's notion of the author - text - reader relationship was 
important to O'Connor's concept of her role as a writer.47 But it was through 
reading Maritain's Art and Scholasticism that O'Connor obtained her understanding 
of 8t. Thomas Aquinas' aesthetics, which became vital to her notion of the 
autonomous purity of art.48 
O'Connor's long-term friendships with American Catholic authors such as Robert 
Lowell, Allen Tate, and most notably Caroline Gordon Tate, were important to her 
development as a writer. Caroline Gordon Tate, herself personally in touch with 
Maritain and his ideas, was as friend, correspondent, literary critic, and unofficial 
editor of O'Connor's manuscripts, a formative influence on O'Connor and her 
work,49 'Whenever I finish a story I send it to Caroline before I consider myself 
really through with it. She's taught me more than anybody', O'Connor maintains 
(HB 260). Writing stories from childhood onwards, O'Connor claims Edgar Allan 
Poe as another major influence on her writing. 'Many years ago I read a volume of 
The Humorous Tales of Edgar Allan Poe, and I think that started me thinking of a 
writing career', she insists, and her early work displays the comic grotesquerie 
which she would develop in her mature fiction,50 On several occasions she draws 
parallels between her own texts and Nathaniel Hawthorne's 'romances', insisting 
she felt 'more of a kinship with him than with any other American', claiming in 
1963 that she wrote '''tales'' in the sense Hawthorne wrote tales',51 
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As a member of the Writer's Workshop at Iowa, O'Connor concentrated on writing 
her 'tales', beginning the practice, which she continued for the rest of her career, of 
writing a prescribed number of hours each day without interruption. She took a 
seminar in literary criticism taught by Austin Warren, and chose Cleanth Brooks and 
Robert Penn Warren's Understanding Fiction, as a supplementary text. The 
formative influence of such New Critics on her work is apparent in O'Connor's 
lectures and essays. She insists on focusing critical attention on the text rather than 
psycho-social considerations, demands an organic unity of form and content, and 
that the quality of her fiction be assessed independently of her theological concerns. 
'The meaning of a story does not begin except at a depth where adequate motivation 
and adequate psychology and the various determinations have been exhausted', she 
claims (MM 41-42), 'a piece of fiction must be very much a self-contained dramatic 
unity. This means that it must carry its meaning inside it' (75). In 1962 she wrote to 
a friend, 'I agree that I must be seen as a writer and not just a Catholic writer, and I 
wish somebody would do it' (HB 464). The plethora of contradictory assertions 
which subvert these statements will be examined in later chapters, but it is important 
to recognise that O'Connor's preoccupation with, and dissemination of, New 
Criticism's major tenets constitutes a significant area of her literary theory. 52 
After winning the Rinehart-Iowa Fiction Award in May 1947, O'Connor accepted 
an invitation from the Yaddo Foundation to continue working on her first novel, 
Wise Blood, at its artists' colony near Saratoga Springs, New York. After extending 
her stay at Yaddo into 1949, O'Connor became involved in a political controversy 
when she joined colleagues in alleging that a Communist journalist was receiving 
preferential treatment that threatened the colony's survival. According to 
O'Connor's friend, Sally Fitzgerald, 'The evidence they had was largely 
circumstantial, and some of it was subjective' (11-12), and when details of the 
incident were leaked, over forty writers signed a petition to support the director's 
actions, attacking O'Connor and her friends. The director was retained, and 
O'Connor left Yaddo early. Living in New York until September, she moved into 
Sally and Robert Fitzgerald's house in Connecticut to finish writing her novel. 
The Yaddo incident is important in two respects. Firstly, it indicates the emerging 
anti-Communist paranoia that was to dominate American politics during the 1950s, 
the period in which O'Connor produced the majority of her work. Secondly, this 
event appears to have contributed to O'Connor's own conservatism. According to 
Sally Fitzgerald, this 'episode left a deep impression on her, especially the 
unexpected and violent attack from the organised left', which she judged 'to be an 
evil' (12). The animosity between left and right-wing political factions and 
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O'Connor's response to it, typified the Cold War tensions of her era. Winston 
Churchill's speech in Missouri, on 5th March 1946, in which he proclaimed that 'an 
iron curtain has descended across the continent',53 was followed in 1948 by the 
Soviet blockade of Berlin, and the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia. 
The Yaddo controversy occurred in the same year in which the Soviet Union 
detonated its first atom bomb, and due to the prevalent anti-Communist hysteria it 
was assumed that this technological leap could only have been acquired by 
espionage. 54 The significance of the nuclear age to O'Connor is evident in her 
lecture 'The Nature and Aim of Fiction', when she insists, 'the fiction writer always 
writes about the whole world, no matter how limited his particular scene. For him, 
the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima affects life on the Oconee River, and 
there's not anything he can do about it' (MM 77). Her sense of this 'global village' 
is similar to Weil's personalization of international events, but whereas Weil's 
concern is intensely emotional and engage, O'Connor remains more detached and 
resigned. 
She completed the preliminary draft of Wise Blood in 1950, the year Senator Joseph 
McCarthy accused the State Department of harbouring Communists~ instigating his 
notorious anti-Communist witch-hunt, assisted by the actions of the House of 
Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities.55 The effects of such Cold 
War propaganda are evident in O'Connor's letters, when in 1956 she mentions 
preventing publication of her work, 'in any Russian-occupied country', because they 
would probably use the Misfit to represent the Typical American Business Man' 
(HB 151). In 1961, the year of the Cuban missile crisis, she flippantly informs a 
friend, 'We talk about the shelter and put it in a different place every day and 
haven't put it anywhere yet. And at night I dream of radiated bulls and peacocks and 
swans' (449). As so often in O'Connor's imagination, the comic and the terrible are 
inseparable. 
However 1950, despite its dramatic national, and international events (notably the 
commencement of the Korean war), was the year in which O'Connor's life altered 
fundamentally, when she became seriously ill for the first time with lupus. This was 
the 'impression point' in her life. While hospitalised for several months, O'Connor 
revised the initial draft of Wise Blood, and continued making extensive rewrites 
throughout the year - despite being re-admitted to hospital several times due to the 
severity of her illness. In 'On Her Own Work' she maintains 'It is the extreme 
situation that best reveals what we are essentially' (MM 113), and just as Weil's 
concept of amiction developed during a personal crisis, it is not surprising that Wise 
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Blood is permeated by an apparent disgust with matter. O'Connor herself recognised 
the connection between the novel and her disease, insisting that 
during this time I was more or less living my life and H. Mote's too 
and as my disease affected my joints I conceived the notion that I 
would eventually become paralyzed and was going blind and that in 
the book I had spelled out my own course, or that in the illness I had 
spelled out the book. (HB 117-118). 
Forced to remain in the South because of her illness, O'Connor moved with her 
mother to 'Andalusia', a farm owned by relatives and situated a few miles from 
Milledgeville, Georgia.56 Regina O'Connor exerted a deep influence on her 
daughter's life and work, O'Connor's letters revealing a dominating figure who 
bears a striking resemblance to O'Connor's fictional farm widows. This similarity is 
at least in some instances the result of O'Connor's art being a deliberate imitation of 
aspects of her domestic life. Observing how her mother and the dairyman's wife 
were preparing for the arrival of a refugee family to work on the farm, she notes 
they 'have been making curtains for the windows out of chicken-feed sacks' (30). 
Acknowledging that she aims 'to give my great reading audience a shot of the 
details some time' (41), O'Connor includes this identical incident in 'The Displaced 
person' (1954) (CS 196). But more significant than such factual details are 
O'Connor's duplication of her mother's personality traits in her archetypal female 
matriarchs. 'Noblesse obleeege with a vengeance' is how O'Connor describes her 
mother's management of the farm (HB 232), and like her fictional counterparts 
combining pretentiousness with practicality rather than intellectualism, as O'Connor 
notes, all the time her mother is reading her manuscripts, '{ know she would rather 
be in the yard digging'(340). 
Regina's attitudes to social decorum and her daughter's fiction provoke either wry 
amusement, muted rebellion, or repressed anger. In June 1956 O'Connor writes, 'I 
corne from a family where the only emotion respectable to show is irritation' 
(163-64), and her relationship with her mother is punctuated by conflicts rather than 
displays of affection. O'Connor relishes appearing defiant, quoting Regina's 
condemnation of her behaviour, and stressing their political differences. 57 She 
obviously enjoys exasperating her mother by contravening the image of Southern 
femininity which Mrs O'Connor would like her to cultivate. Admitting to regularly 
wearing a particular sweatshirt, because it was 'my policy at that point in life to 
create an unfavourable impression' (94), three years later O'Connor informs the 
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Fitzgeralds that her mother 'is afraid my poor white trash look will disgrace you' 
(272). But significantly, these rebellions are not sustained. Unlike Simone Weil, 
whose masculine dress code was provocatively different to the social norm, 58 
O'Connor conforms. 'My urge for such has to be repressed, as my mother does not 
approve of making a spectacle of oneself when over thirty' (94). 
Five years later she concedes 'You can't get ahead of Mother' (423), and despite her 
self-image as a dissenter, O'Connor's capacity for self-expression appears to have 
been thwarted by Regina's oppressive personality. 59 The 'parental presence never 
contributes to my articulateness' she observes to a friend, 'J might have done better 
at answering some of your questions had I entertained you in the hen house' (195). 
This inarticulateness is apparent when she is confronted by Mrs O'Connor's 
disapproval of her fictional subject matter. 
The other day she asked me why I didn't try and write something that 
people liked instead of the kind of thing I do write. Do you think, she 
said, that you are really using the talent God gave you when you don't 
write something that a lot, a LOT, of people like? This always leaves 
me shaking and speechless, raises my blood pressure 140 degrees, 
etc. All I can say is, if you have to ask, you'll never know. (326) 
The replication of similar mother-daughter conflicts in O'Connor's texts, lends 
credence to critical opinions which infer that her narratives demonstrate the 'female 
schizophrenia of authorship' Gilbert and Gubar have identified.60 The extent to 
which O'Connor's texts are dialogic, will be analyzed in subsequent chapters. But 
O'Connor's tendency to emphasise the humorous aspects of both her illness, and 
relationship with Regina, while populating her fiction with physical and emotional 
cripples, suggests that Josephine Hendin's conclusion that O'Connor was 'a woman 
who lived out a fiction and wrote down her life', is at least partially justified. 61 
The majority of O'Connor's letters make light of her deteriorating health. 'I'm 
informed that its crutches for me from now on out [ ... 1 so much for that. I will 
henceforth be a structure with flying buttresses', she informs 'A' (151). Just as Weil 
did not reveal details of the mystical 'impression point' in her life until several 
years later, O'Connor evaded informing 'A' about the exact nature of her disease 
until she had been writing to her for a year, finally telling her friend she had lupus 
on 28 July 1956 (168). This suggests how painful to O'Connor the subject was 
despite her flippant remarks, and that she shared the same tendency as Wei! to 
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compartmentalise her life. That O'Connor's correspondence with 'A' assisted her in 
coming to terms with, and discussing her illness is apparent when only a few months 
later she was able to frankly inform Maryat Lee about it the first time they met. 62 
O'Connor found consolation for her disease in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's notion 
of 'passive diminishments,.63 In his book The Divine Milieu, de Chardin clarifies 
'diminishments' as the ill fortune that may cause illness and accidents etc., and 
intellectual or moral weaknesses. These diminishments can be transfigured into 
positive forces for good if they are both struggled against and accepted. 'This hostile 
force that lays [the victim] low and disintegrates him can become for him a loving 
principle of renewal, if he accepts it with faith while never ceasing to struggle 
against it', he claims (Divine Milieu 92). However, despite intellectually embracing 
this positive concept of suffering, the emotional trauma instigated by O'Connor's 
reluctant return to Georgia is apparent in a letter written in 1957. 
This is a Return I have faced and when I faced it I was roped and tied 
and resigned the way it is necessary to be resigned to death, and 
largely because I thought it would be the end of any creation, any 
writing, any WORK from me. (HB 224) 
But as she acknowledges in the same letter, 'it was only the beginning' (224), and in 
the same year she discovered she had lupus Wise Blood was published after five 
years work,64 and O'Connor began writing 'A Good Man Is Hard to Find', 'The 
Life You Save May Be Your Own', 'The River', and 'A Late Encounter with the 
Enemy', all published in 1953, and included in O'Connor's first collection of short 
stories, A Good Man Is Hard to Find and Other Stories (1955). 
Weil's exile from her country, and O'Connor's enforced homecoming, produced 
periods of prolific writing. In the same manner Weil used letters as a form of 
contact, and expression of ideas, O'Connor's voluminous correspondence is 
evidence that she possessed an urge to communicate, as well as narrate.65 Her 
letters are almost as eclectic as Weil's notebooks, containing details of her literary 
interests, spiritual concerns, world news, and local events. But in contrast to the 
relentless seriousness of Weil's meditations, O'Connor's correspondence is 
permeated with humorous anecdotes, directly quoted Southern dialect, and 
comically bizarre clippings from newspapers.66 Between 1952 and her death in 
1964, O'Connor wrote to an extensive number of correspondents, but it is her letters 
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to 'A',67 and Maryat Lee which are most significant, revealing her literary and 
spiritual ideas, and her contradictory personality. 
O'Connor and 'A' shared an interest in Simone Weil, and in September 1955 when 
she was reading Waitingfor God and Letter to A Priest, while discussing Weil in a 
letter to 'A', O'Connor writes 
if I were to live long enough and develop as an artist to the proper 
extent, I would like to write a comic novel about a woman - and what 
is more comic and terrible than the angular, intellectual proud 
woman approaching God inch by inch with ground teeth? (105-06) 
Often critical of O'Connor's religious perspective, 'A' became a Catholic before 
eventually abandoning her faith (to O'Connor's great displeasure), and in an early 
letter to 'A' it is apparent that this intense spiritual struggle is what intrigues 
O'Connor about both her friend and Weil. 'I have thought of Simone Weil in 
connection with you almost from the first [ ... ] your effort not to be seduced by the 
Church moves me greatly'. she writes (93). While a strident defender of 
institutionalised Catholicism, O'Connor is clearly fascinated by people who resist 
assimilation into the community of the Church. Apparently riven by her allegiance 
to the Catholic Church, and a desire to prove that this does not involve relinquishing 
her individuality. she insists 'I don't find it an infringement of my independence to 
have the Church tell me what is true and what is not in regard to faith, and what is 
right and what is wrong in regard to morals' (489). Weil's strident opposition to 
such a Catholic theory of faith highlights the difference between her notion of the 
relationship between individual and Church, and O'Connor's. According to Weil, 
the Thomist concept of faith 
implies a 'totalitarianism' as stifling as that of Hitler, if not more so. 
For if the mind gives its complete adherence not only to what the 
Church has recognised as being strictly necessary to faith, but 
furthermore to whatever it shall at any time recognise as being such, 
the intelligence has perforce to be gagged and reduced to carrying out 
servile tasks. (LP 39) 
Although she insists on the capacity of individual limitations (physical affiiction and 
mental constraints) to contain the potential for spiritual and intellectual progression, 
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to be regulated by a collective organization such as the Catholic Church is in Weil's 
thinking automatically restrictive. Clearly opposite to her condemnation of doctrine 
as intellectually stifling, is O'Connor's assertion that 
there is no reason why fixed dogma .should fix anything that the 
writer sees in the world. On the contrary, dogma is an instrument for 
penetrating reality. Christian dogma is about the only thing that 
guards and respects mystery. (MM 178) 
This viewpoint is consistent with O'Connor's assertion nine years earlier in 1955, 
that religious beliefs are not artistically restrictive. 'I have never had the sense that 
being a Catholic is a limit to the freedom of the writer, but just the reverse', she 
contends (HB 114). However it is important at this juncture to recognise that the 
frequency of O'Connor's defensive statements about her religion suggests they may 
conceal a real fear that her faith does in fact compromise her independence. Hinting 
at this possibility in a letter to 'A' written in 1956 she observes 
I can't climb down off the high powered defense reflex [ ... J If you 
were Pius XII, my communications would still sound as if they came 
from a besieged defender of the faith, I know well enough that it is 
not a defense of the faith, which don't need it, but a defense of 
myself who does. The Church becomes a part of your ego. (131) 
In WeWs case, it is her decision to remain outside institutionalised Catholicism that 
appears linked to her equally fierce egoism. Critical of Perrin's 'imperfection', 
which she attributes to his allegiance to the Catholic Church as an institution, Weil 
offers herself as a model example of the 'intellectual honesty' he should cultivate. 
'When I let you have a written sketch of my spiritual autobiography, I had a reason. 
I wanted to make it possible for you to see for yourself a concrete and certain 
example of implicit faith', she rather immodestly informs him (WFG 96,94). 
Weil's arguments with Perrin are paralleled by O'Connor's disagreements with 'A' 
on religious and literary issues. 'Your writing forces me to clarify what I think on 
various subjects or at least to think on various subjects and is all to my good and to 
my pleasure' she informs 'A' (HB 103), and Weil's notebooks appear to perform the 
same interrogative function for her. On 28th December 1956 O'Connor informs' A', 
'reading them is one way to try and understand the age [ ... J These are books that I 
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can't begin to exhaust' (189). Her letters to 'A' are important because they do 
'clarify' her literary and theological concerns, but unlike WeWs correspondence 
with Fr. Perrin, O'Connor does not interrogate her beliefs themselves. Weil's 
theology develops through testing her ideas against Perrin's Catholic perspective, 
but although occasionally claiming to have doubts about her religious convictions, 
O'Connor is never specific about them in her letters. 'I think there is no suffering 
greater than what is caused by the doubts of those who want to believe. I know what 
tonnent this is', she contends, but without elaborating further, claims 'I can only see 
it, in myself anyway, as the process by which faith is deepened' (353-54). 
Maintaining her propensity to enjoy appearing controversial, writing to 'A', 
O'Connor claims she is 'a Catholic peculiarly possessed of the modern 
consciousness, that thing Jung describes as unhistorical, solitary, and guilty',68 a 
more accurate description of Weil. Yet typically, she refrains from being truly 
unorthodox by carefully modifying this statement immediately afterwards, insisting 
she possesses this Jungian consciousness 'within the Church', and consequently 
bears 'the necessary burden of the conscious Catholic' (90). Significantly, in over 
eight years correspondence with Fr. James McCown, O'Connor never challenges 
Catholic dogma, declaring she has the 'usual Catholic desire not to be a heretic' 
(171-72), Checking that a lecture she intends to give is theologically sound, she 
even requests him to obtain pennission for her to read Gide and Sartre.69 Clearly, 
O'Connor employs different discourses in different contexts.'O 
Although her correspondence with 'A' concentrates on religious issues, these letters 
also manage to tease out of O'Connor some noticeably rare, and veiled references to 
sexuality in both her fiction, and personal life. Referring to 'A"s 'uncanny' ability 
to identify what she terms 'the lacking category' in her narratives, O'Connor insists 
I associate it a good deal beyond the simply virtuous emotions~ 1 
identify it plainly with the sacred. My inability to handle it so far in 
fiction may be purely personal, as my upbringing has smacked a little 
of J ansenism even if my convictions do not. (117) 
She later responds defensively to 'A"s assumption she is romantically 
inexperienced.'1 but what is significant here is how O'Connor transfonns a debate 
on sexuality into a discussion oftheological issues. As with her later arguments with 
Maryat Lee on racial politics, O'Connor evades confronting subjects she finds 
disconcerting, by enveloping them in her spiritual perspective. While O'Connor 
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considers sexual relationships 'the centre of life and most holy', Weil perceives 
personal detachment as an alternative route to a higher reality. 'Attachment is a 
manufacturer of illusions and whoever wants reality ought to be detached', she 
claims (GG 14), 'To love purely is to consent to distance between ourselves and that 
which we love' (58). The rigorous self-discipline, and almost masochistic denial of 
affection this demands, is symptomatic of her more severe personality, yet Weil's 
notebook entries demonstrate her struggle to adhere to such rigorous intellectual 
stipulations, at the expense of human consolation. Conducting a dialogue with 
herself, while acknowledging she needs 'the inspiration of friendship', Wei! urges 
herself not 'to be imprisoned by any affection. Preserve your solitude [ ... ] Other 
affections ought to be severely disciplined' she writes in her notebooks.72 
O'Connor's letters are also dialogic, displaying contradictions in her thinking which 
contravene the stated orthodoxy of the lectures and essays, but it is her fiction which 
most dynamically explores the conflicting elements of her personality. Claiming to 
write about Protestant rather than Catholic protagonists, because 'they express their 
belief in diverse kinds of dramatic action' which best suits her requirements as a 
writer, O'Connor admits that another reason is 'the prophet is a man apart. He is not 
typical of a group' (HB 517). Declaring the fierce independence of Southern 
Fundamentalists both 'painful' and 'grimly comic', she apparently attempts to 
nullify their implicit challenge to her Catholic ego, absorbing them into her 
congregation by designating them 'crypto-Catholic'. 73 The characteristics 
O'Connor identifies as typical of her Fundamentalist prophets are strikingly similar 
to Weil's exaggerated individualism and dramatic combination of the comic and 
terrible, and just as the questions posed by Wei! and 'A' allow her to examine her 
religious consciousness, O'Connor suggests that her Protestant characters function 
as an interrogative element in her fiction. Writing to John Hawkes in 1959 she 
claims 
there are some of us who have to pay for our faith every step of the 
way and who have to work out dramatically what it would be like 
without it and if being without it would be possible or not. (349-50) 
The theoi'ogical doubts which O'Connor specifically resists acknowledging in her 
nonfictional work, can be interrogated when dramatised in her narratives. 
In 'The Catholic Novelist in the Protestant South' she maintains the 'two 
circumstances that have given character to my own writing have been those of being 
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Southern and being Catholic' (MM 196), and her Fundamentalist protagonists are 
intrinsically products of O'Connor's Southern milieu. But by using them to convey 
her Catholic theology, she demonstrates the consistent tension between her 
admiration for, and attraction to individualism, and a conflicting dependence on the 
communal as the basis for constructing her identity. In this she is diametrically 
opposed to Simone Weil, who is drawn to Catholicism, Communism, Trade 
Unionism, and even Fascism (WFG 53), but whose sense of self is reliant on 
maintaining her separation from such organised groups. Being French is the only 
impersonal identifying categorization which Weil acknowledges, yet this only 
becomes an issue when she is threatened with, or actually isolated from her 
homeland, and she makes plain her patriotism is ultimately reserved for her 
spiritual rather than her terrestrial country. 74 
For someone to whom retaining a sense of individuality is important, O'Connor's 
constant definition of herself via the groupings of Southern and Catholic is 
problematic. Resenting the 'label' she believes is 'pasted' on Southern writers, 'and 
all the misconceptions that go with it' - most notably the notion that the majority are 
'unhappy combinations of Poe and Erskine Caldwell' (MM 37,28) O'Connor wants 
to be considered at once a Catholic, Southern, writer, and yet more than that. Whilst 
using her lectures and essays to emphasise her regional and religious roots, she 
simultaneously wishes to be considered beyond the restraints of such thematic 
ghettoism. But the superposed (or in O'Connor's terminology 'prophetic') vision 
required to achieve this is made more difficult by her essential dialogism. Exactly 
how to 'read' O'Connor is complicated by the conflict between her individualist and 
collective tendencies, and a consistent desire to be controversial delimited by 
orthodoxy. 
O'Connor's interest in Wei! and 'A' allows her the vicarious pleasure of rebellion 
against Catholic orthodoxy, and analogously her friendship with Maryat Lee is 
important because it reveals her relationship with her Southern community. Lee's 
controversial opposition to racism enables O'Connor to be in contact with radical 
politics, while remaining conservative herself. 75 Revealing the nature of their 
friendship, she notes (16 June 1964), 'It's fortunate we didn't get together at that 
age. We would have blown something up. I would have found the matches and let 
you light the fuse' (HB 584). O'Connor first wrote to Lee in 1957, the year in which 
the National Guard was used to enable desegregation of the school system in Little 
Rock, Arkensas despite violent protests.76 When the NAACP's argument against 
the 'separate but equal' education system was accepted by the Supreme Court in 
1954, the South's historical racial tensions were intensified?7 and it is significant 
34 
that O'Connor wrote 'The Artificial Nigger' (1955) in the same year. Continuing to 
redefine disturbing issues in a theological context, she negates the historically 
specific suffering generated by segregationism. aiming instead in this story to 
suggest 'the redemptive quality of the Negro's suffering for us all' (78). The 
Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott dominated Southern politics in 1956, and the 
extent of the cultural turbulence caused by the Civil Rights movement is apparent 
when O'Connor requests Lee visits Georgia, 'before we secede from the Union. The 
Russian moon [Sputnik] is just a light diversion for us' (246). 
Just as O'Connor's correspondence with 'A' clarifies her theology, the letters to 
Lee reveal her position on the race issue. Sally Fitzgerald delicately refers to 'an 
area of sensibility' in O'Connor 'that seems to have remained imperfectly 
developed'. Explaining that the Negroes on the O'Connor farm were 'primitive', she 
tactfully suggests 'they perhaps served as trees obscuring her view of the social 
forest' (xviii, xviv). Actually, as with Weil. there is a disparity between O'Connor's 
intellectual concerns, and her practical prejudices. She insists that after hearing a 
bus driver make a racist remark to some coloured passengers, she instantly became 
an integrationist.78 But two years later, when Maryat Lee suggests O'Connor meet 
James Baldwin in Georgia, she reacts with near panic. 
No I can't see James Baldwin in Georgia. It would cause the greatest 
trouble and disturbance and disunion. In New York it would be nice 
to meet him; here it would not. I observe the traditions of the society 
I feed on • it's only fair. Might as well expect a mule to fly as me to 
see James Baldwin in Georgia. (329) 
The incident highlights a crucial distinction between Weil and O'Connor. Weil is an 
activist, committed to physically assisting the victims of affliction - Simone de 
Beauvoir has observed how she envied Weil for 'having a heart that could beat right 
across the world' (petrement 51). But O'Connor resists direct intervention even in 
her own region. unwilling personally to confront her society, and risk the type of 
notoriety that distinguishes Wei!. 
Although aware of the implications of racism, O'Connor constantly emphasises 
what she perceives as its comic elements?9 Yet demonstrating a more subtle 
awareness of race relations, she claims to C. Ross Mullins, 'the Negro is not the 
clown he's made out to be. He's a man of very elaborate manners and great 
formality which he uses superbly for his own protection and to insure his own 
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privacy,.80 In some ways O'Connor's consistently flippant attitude to the race 
issue, appears an attempt to disguise her genuine apprehensiveness about 
desegregation.81 
O'Connor's short story 'Everything That Rises Must Converge' (1961), which won 
first prize in the O. Henry Awards, was written and published in the same year that 
the Freedom Riders defied segregation laws throughout the South. Applying 
Teilhard de Chardin's notion of convergence to the desegregation debate, O'Connor 
insists the text 'expresses what I have to say on That Issue'. 82 On 28th August 1963, 
at the climax of the 'March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom', Martin Luther 
King gave his 'I have a Dream' speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. Only 
four days after King told the protesters, 'I have a dream that one day on the red hills 
of Georgia, sons of former slaves and sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit -
down together at the table ofbrotherhood',83 O'Connor returned to That Issue. In a 
vitriolic statement she declared, 'The topical is poison. I got away with it in 
"Everything That Rises" but only because I say a plague on everybody's house as far 
as the race business goes' (HB 537). Increasingly defensive, in May 1964, she wrote 
to Lee, 'About the Negroes, the kind I don't like is the philosophizing prophesying 
pontificating kind, the James Baldwin kind. Very ignorant but never silent' (580). 
Such caustic criticism is similar to Weil's anti-Semitic rhetoric, but can be at least 
partially explained by the influence of Regina's reactionary discourse. 84 
O'Connor attempts to justify the South's racial prejudices (and possibly her 0\\'11), 
by insisting 'bad manners are better than no manners at all', and consistently 
equating 'manners' with charity.85 Again examining in the narratives issues which 
she resists discussing in her non-fictional work, 'Judgement Day" O'Connor's final 
story published posthumously in 1965, depicts a Negro's militant opposition to these 
Southern 'manners'. Completed only a couple of weeks after the Civil Rights Act 
became law on 2 July 1964, the text displays a more sophisticated awareness of race 
relations than O'Connor's belligerent letters to Lee suggest. As a reworking of 
O'Connor's first short story, 'The Geranium' (1946), 'Judgement Day' reflects the 
impact of the Civil Rights movement on O'Connor's work. In the first story the 
Negro character assists Old Dudley into his daughter's apartment, but in the later 
text, Tanner'S request for help elicits a violent response from his black neighbour, 
resulting in the old man's death. O'Connor's idealistic intention in 'The Artificial 
Nigger' (1950) to suggest that the Negro's suffering as redemptive (another 
conversion of a disturbing issue into specifically theological terms); develops in 
'Everything That Rises Must Converge' (1961) and 'Judgement Day' into a more 
plausible appraisal of racial tensions. The apocalyptic tone of Tanner's 'You idiots 
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didn't know it was Judgement Day, did you?' (CS 549), suggests that O'Connor's 
combination of humour and irritation when discussing racial politics disguises a 
more serious concern. 86 
O'Connor's defensiveness about her religion and the race issue, is paralleled by 
attempts to deny her status as an intellectual. 'I'm not an intellectual and have a 
horror of making an idiot of myself with abstract statements and theories', she 
writes in 1957 (BB 202). Scathingly critical of such intellectual abstractionism in 
her fiction, her narrators consistently disapprove of intellectuals such as Hulga in 
'Good Country people' (1955), Asbury of 'The Enduring Chill' (1958), Rayber in 
The Violent Bear It Away (1960), Julian in 'Everything That Rises Must Converge' 
(1961), and Sheppard of 'The Lame Shall Enter First' (1962). Like Rayber who 
'couldn't do nothing, couldn't act', 87 they are apparently immersed in the same 
'logic, definitions, abstractions, and formulas' O'Connor considers damaging to 
Catholics because they contribute to an evasion of reality (MM 205), 
O'Connor's correspondence, book reviews and personal library supply 
incontrovertible evidence of her own widespread academic interests. 88 Yet she 
deliberately employs backwoods dialect and misspellings to subvert profound 
comments, cultivating the perception of herself as a provincial eccentric.89 In a 
letter to Maryat Lee (24 February 1957), O'Connor admits that when questioned 
about what motivates her writing, 'My inclination at such a point is always to get 
deathly stupid and say, "Ah jus writes"',9° Her complex persona is evident, when 
although apparently embarrassed to be considered an intellectual, O'Connor is 
simultaneously intellectually patronizing, as when she declares 'those ladies under 
the dryer all consider themselves intelligent' (BB 271). Though constantly 
reiterating her irritation at becoming a local celebrity, O'Connor apparently enjoyed 
the feeling of superiority it gave herY1 As early as 1955 she wrote to Sally 
Fitzgerald, 'my talent lies in a kind of intellectual vaudeville. 1 leave them not 
knowing exactly what I have said but feeling that they have been inspired' (80). Her 
attitude here contrasts with Simone Weil's, who although also a consummate 
academic and anti-intellectual, actively attempted to diffuse the separation between 
herself and her audience. especially the uneducated workers she admired.92 
O'Connor frequently attempted to detach herself from what she considered 
unsympathetic audiences, delivering the majority of her lectures to local groups, 
and Southern or Catholic colleges, seemingly because she felt less intellectually 
threatened. '1 do fine talking to people who don't know anything but I couldn't say 
anything at Cornell that they hadn't already heard before' she reveals to a friend.93 
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This evasion of challenging confrontations is a consistent trait which O'Connor 
acknowledged to Lee shortly before her death. 'Strategic retreat. I been doing it all 
my life and it works very well' (574). But despite being intimidated by sophisticated 
academic audiences, O'Connor persevered with giving lectures because of their 
financial rewards,94 and more importantly. because they granted her access to the 
physical and intellectual world beyond the confines of Milledgeville. As she 
explained in 1954, 'while I don't go in for this sort of thing, I go for leaving town 
occasionally and need almost no persuasion to do so' (CW 922). 
The limitations imposed by O'Connor's Southern exile were matched later in her 
career by a feeling of communicative inadequacy. In 1963, she observed, 'I've been 
writing for nearly twenty years and the one overwhelming sense I have had, 
constantly, is of my own inarticulateness' (HB 511). This could account for her 
dread of interviews,95 but O'Connor's physical inferiority complex may provide 
another reason. The massive cortizone injections required to treat her disease caused 
facial swelling and temporary hair loss. Understandably she loathed having her 
photograph taken,96 and the humorous references to her appearance fail to disguise 
a self-consciously grotesque image of herself. Wei! shares this self-image, but hers 
is characteristically self-imposed and melodramatic, as when she likens herself to 
'the color of dead leaves', or 'certain unnoticed insects' (WFG 101). 
O'Connor's lack of confidence ensured that she was apprehensive about reviews, 
particularly critical responses to The Violent Bear It Away, eventually published in 
1960, after seven years work.97 Intensely irritated by some of the confused reviews 
the novel received, she attributed them to the misunderstanding of her intentions, 
and responded with caustic condemnation.98 O'Connor's obsession with reader 
perceptions, and her notion of an audience predominantly unwilling or unable to 
understand her fiction, is clearly connected to her insecurities .. a sense of 
inarticulacy, and fear of being misinterpreted. In an interview given in 1962, she 
told Joel Wells she could wait one hundred years for the right type of readers,99 but 
what O'Connor perceived as adverse reactions to her work, and a feeling that she 
was creatively exhausted, contributed to a growing sense of frustration. In a letter 
written in 1963 to Sister Marlella Gable, O'Connor confides 'I've been writing 
eighteen years and I've reached the point where I can't do again what I know I can 
do well, and the larger things I need to do now, I doubt my capacity for doing' (HB 
518). 
Both O'Connor and Weil became increasingly depressed by their physical and 
mental limitations, but responded differently. Weil's inability to return to France, or 
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have her work taken seriously by the Free Frencht prompted an apparently negative 
response, in which she literally decreated herself. In the last few months of her life 
Weil appears to have abandoned herself to her depression in a way that O'Connor 
did not. In a letter to Schumann she writes: 
I feel an ever increasing sense of devastation, both in my intellect and 
in the centre of my heart, at my inability to think with truth at the 
same time about the amiction of men, the perfection of God, and the 
link between the two. (SL 178). 
Feeling her superposed vision failing, she wrote only short letters to her family, and 
her very brief London notebook during this period. O'Connor adjusted to her 
disease in a more positive manner, her adoption of de Chardin's concept of 'passive 
diminishments' apparently allowing her to perceive personal limitation as a less 
tortuously self-destructive process than Weil's notion of decreation. Although Weil 
contends that amiction provides evidence of God's love for man she is emotionally 
devastated by its onslaught. O'Connor, although acknowledging the alienation 
caused by physical constraints: 'sickness is a place [ ... ] and its always a place where 
there's no company, where nobody can follow' (HB 163), also perceives suffering as 
a positive experience of God's love. 'Sickness before death is a very appropriate 
thing, and I think those who don't have it miss one of God's mercies', she claims 
(163). But unlike Weil, O'Connor was able to reconcile her intellectual 
understanding of suffering with its personal physical consequences, and at greater 
peace with herself. managed to write prolifically during the final months of her life, 
producing some of her finest work despite being seriously ill. Frantically working 
on the manuscripts of 'Revelation' (1964), 'Parker's Back' (1965), and 'Judgement 
Day' (1965) in hospital, O'Connor prepared her final collection of short stories, 
published posthumously as Everything That Rises Must Converge (1965). 
In contrast to Weil, the ultimate outsider, O'Connor died at home in Milledgeville 
on 3 August 1964, aged thirty-nine. She lived only five years longer than Weil, and 
both women's premature deaths make it difficult to estimate the extent to which 
their writing careers would have developed. Weil's unfinished essay 'Is There a 
Marxist Doctrine?', written in London during 1943, graphically indicates how time 
ran out for her, the manuscript.abruptly breaking off in mid sentence. 100 But more 
significantly, Jacques Cabaud notes how Weil 'dreamed of undertaking a big work, 
under the title The Descent o/God, which according to her publishers, was to be an 
annotated anthology of the "most beautiful non-Christian texts upon the love of 
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God'" (Cabaud 224). Unfortunately never completed, all we possess to indicate 
something of Weil's intended project are several of her essays written about this 
time, later published as Intimations o/Christianity Among the Ancient Greeks. 
O'Connor never wrote her novel about a female heroine - how different would be 
our assessments of her work if she had? Although she had been working on a 
proposed third novel, 'Why Do the Heathen Rage?, it was never finished. A fragment 
of this text was published in EsqUire in July 1963, and substantiates the comments 
O'Connor made in the previous year that she needed new inspiration, having 
exhausted her 'original potentiality', and 'being now in need of the kind of grace 
that deepens perception, a new shot of life or something' (HB 468). The 
manuscripts for 'Why Do the Heathen Rage? contain characters named or closely 
resembling previous protagonists: Julian, Tilman, O.E. Parker and Asbury, including 
plot-lines and situations from previous stories. For example 'The Enduring Chill' 
(1958) is reworked as a flashback second chapter of the novel. 101 
As O'Connor and Wei! had portions of their work and correspondence published 
after their deaths by editors, the absence of authorial control ensures it is difficult to 
assess how representative of their form and theology this material is. In their 
Foreward to Mystery and Manners (1984), Sally and Robert Fitzgerald acknowledge 
the extensive 'rearrangements' and 'transpositions' they performed to structure 
O'Connor's disparate manuscripts into one volume. 102 In addition, the 
correspondence in The Habit 0/ Being is marked by numerous ellipses indicating 
editorial deletions, and the letters which O'Connor wrote to her mother are not 
included - consequently an essential element of her most intimate personal thoughts 
remain unknown,l03 whereas Weil's are more readily accessible via her notebook 
entries. 
However, the problems generated by posthumous editing are particularly relevant to 
Weil, as the majority of her writings were published after her death. The 
fragmentary form ofWeil's notebooks lend themselves to selective readings, and La 
pesanteur et la Grace, originally issued in France in 1947, constitutes a distortion of 
her notebook entries. Edited by her Catholic friend, Gustave Thibon, it reproduces 
the areas of Weil's more Christian thinking, while excluding or under-representing 
the major influences of Eastern religions, Greek philosophy, literature and 
Pythagorean mathematics on her work. 104 When Fr. Perrin's collection of Weil's 
letters and essays was published as L 'Attente de Dieu (1950), the image ofWeil as a 
Catholic manque was unduly reinforced. 1 05 This Catholicisation of Wei! led Pope 
John XXIII and his successor Paul VI to be both interested in, and influenced by her 
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life and work. 106 Only when a more comprehensive selection of Weil's writings 
became accessible, was the eclectic nature of her theology finally appreciated. 
Considering the congruence between areas of Simone Weil and Flannery 
O'Connor's lives, and the problems their early deaths create for posthumous editing, 
it is entirely appropriate that both writers achieved increased recognition for their 
work during the same year. In 1988, forty-five years after her death, the publication 
by Gallimard of Weil's Oeuvres completes began with the first volume Premiers 
ecrits philosophiques (see Nevin 454). Including a large quantity of unpublished 
material, this series testifies to the prodigious amount of work Weil produced during 
her short life, and how much fertile ground her philosophy still supplies for 
academic research. 
The inclusion of Flannery 0 'Connor Collected Works in the prestigious Library of 
America Series firmly established her place in the canon of American literature, as 
only the second twentieth-century author to be included by 1988 (William Faulkner 
being the first). To what extent the enhancement of O'Connor's reputation is 
dependent on her limited fictional oeuvre or the secondary material of essays, 
lectures and letters, will be discussed in subsequent chapters. However, as with the 
new edition of Weil's work, the inclusion of previously unpublished material, 
notably twenty-two largely unedited letters, has provided scope for renewed 
scholarly analysis. 
These landmark editions of both Weil and O'Connor's work demonstrate a 
sustained interest in both writers, which has steadily increased rather than 
diminished since their deaths. Reprints of Weil's books become more frequent, 
O'Connor's stories are increasingly anthologised, while the disproportionate amount 
of books, articles and theses written about her short novels and stories multiply. 
Currently, O'Connor is literally a marketable, as well as a literary commodity. the 
widely available O'Connor memorabilia testifying to her 'celebrity' status. 
But does such over-exposure (academic and otherwise) contribute to reductive 
readings of O'Connor's fiction by imprinting these one-dimensional images of an 
easily definable-Southern, Catholic, eccentric writer onto the consciousness of her 
audience? Has the literary canonization of O'Connor been matched by an undue 
deification of her authorial intentions. in which her literary and theological concerns 
(so emphatically delineated in her non-fictional writings), are accepted too readily 
as successfully implemented within the narratives, rather than subjected to rigorous 
investigation? 
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To interrogate these issues and answer the questions they raise demands a degree of 
detachment difficult to attain after over forty years of O'Connor criticism. Writing 
in 1955, O'Connor notes that Caroline Gordon Tate 'is always telling me that the 
endings are too flat and that at the end I must gain some altitude and get a larger 
view' (HB 78). By using Simone Weil's superposed philosophy, this thesis will 
endeavour to provide the elevated, expansive perspective which O'Connor's work 
deserves, beginning in Chapter One with an analysis of each writer's preferred 
forms of communicating their ideas. 
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 
1. Simone WeiI, Gravity and Grace, trans. by Emma Craufurd (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, ARK edition, 1987), p.121. Further references to this edition 
(hereafter GG) are given after quotations in the text. See also: 
Reading - except where there is a certain quality of attention - obeys 
the law of gravity. We read the opinions suggested by gravity (the 
preponderant part played by the passions and by social conformity in 
the judgements we form of men and events). With a higher quality of 
attention our reading discovers gravity itself, and various systems of 
possible balance. (Ibid., p.122) 
2. 'Superposed readings: To read necessity behind sensation, to read order behind 
necessity, to read God behind order', ibid., p.123. 'Truth: many readings at once? 
An infinite number? But readings, not just opinions or thoughts', in Simone Weil, 
The Notebooks o/Simone Weil, trans. by Arthur Wills, 2 vols (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1956), I, p.4S. Further references to this edition (hereafter NB) are 
given after quotations in the text. 
3. Mystery and Manners: Occasional Prose, selected and ed. by Sally and Robert 
Fitzgerald (London: Faber and Faber. 1984), p.72. Further references to this edition 
(hereafter MM) are given after quotations in the text. 
4. The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 2-3. 
S. Kermode identifies this process in Chrisfs explanation of the purpose of his 
parables to the disciples in Mark 4: 11-12: 
To you has been given the secret of the kingdom of God, but for 
those outside everything is in parables; so that they may indeed see 
but not perceive, and may indeed hear but not understand; lest they 
should turn again, and be forgiven. (Genesis, p. 2) 
6. Ibid., p.16. Kermode obtains the term 'impression point' from Wilhelm Dilthey's 
Gesammelte Schriften (1913-1958), vols V, VI (Die geistige Welt). See ibid., p.147. 
7. For O'Connor's comments on the 'legitimate' uses of the grotesque genre and its 
links to prophecy see her lecture 'Some Aspects of the Grotesque in Southern 
43 
Fiction', MM, pp. 36-50. For her stress on the anagogical gesture as the key to 
successful fiction, and how closely it relates to Kermode's notions of divination, 
impression point, and insider and outsider readers see O'Connor's loaded comments 
on her short story 'A Good Man Is Hard to Find' and how to interpret it, given 
immediately before she read the story to an audience: ibid., pp.1to·114. For 
example: 'in this story you should be on the lookout for such things as the action of 
grace in the grandmother's soul and not for the dead bodies', ibid., p.l13. 
8. 'Wise Blood, Artistic Anemia, and the Hemorrhaging of O'Connor Criticism', 
Studies in American Fiction, 17.1 (1989),33·50 (p.42). 
9. See O'Connor's 'The Fiction Writer and His Country' for an example of her aural 
circumcision, MM, pp.25.35. Carol Shloss, amongst others, has noted how this 
essay radically altered the critical climate: 
Since then criticism often has taken statements of faith in her essays 
as the key to correlative spiritual meanings in her fiction. Working in 
the manner of biblical exegetes, armed with this privilaged and 
extraneous knowledge, such critics rarely display doubt that 
submerged meanings of a certain type exist. 
See her finely argued Flannery 0 'Connor's Dark Comedies: The Limits of Inference 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), p.14. Book length studies by 
the aurally circumcised include: Carter W. Martin, The True Country: Themes in the 
Fiction of Flannery O'Connor (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969); 
David Eggenschwiler, The Christian Humanism of Flannery 0 'Connor (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1972); and most recently Margaret Earley Whitt, 
Understanding Flannery O'Connor (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1995). 
to. 'It is the nature of fiction not to be good for much unless it is good in itselr 
O'Connor maintains, MM, p.8l. She acknowledges that the 'writer has no rights 
except those he forges for himself within his own work', in Richard Gilman, 'On 
Flannery O'Connor'. in Conversations with Flannery 0 'Connor, ed. by Rosemary 
M. Magee (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1987), pp. 51-57 (p.57) (first 
publ. in The New York Review of Books, 21 August 1969,24·26). Further references 
to this edition (hereafter CFO) are given after quotations in the text. 
11. See for example O'Connor's superposed comments on the writer - text· reader 
relationship. 'It is what writer, character, and reader share that makes it possible to 
write fiction at all', MM, pp.204·205. Yet the 'writer is only free when he can tell 
the reader to go jump in the lake' she insists, in Betsy Lochridge, 'An Afternoon 
with Flannery O'Connor', in CFO, pp.37-40 (first pub!, in The Atlanta Journal and 
Constitution Magazine, I November 1959, 38-40). For a useful analysis of 
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O'Connor's dialogism in both her non-fictional work and the narratives, see Robert 
H. Brinkmeyer, Jr., The Art and Vision of Flannery 0 'Connor (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1989). 
12. Overviews of O'Connor criticism which provide a basis for the superposed 
study of different critical opinions are found in Suzanne Morrow Paulson, Flannery 
o 'Connor: A Study of the Short Fiction (Boston: Twayne, 1988)~ Brian Abel Ragen, 
'Grace and Grotesques: Recent Books on Flannery O'Connor', Papers on Language 
and Literature, 27.3 (1991), 386-398~ Michael Kreyling, ed., 'Introduction', in New 
Essays on Wise Blood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 1-24. 
See also Sura P. Rath, 'Introduction', in Flannery 0 'Connor: New Perspectives, ed. 
by Rath and Mary Neff Shaw (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), pp. 1-11; 
and Sarah J. Fodor, 'Marketing Flannery O'Connor: Institutional Politics and 
Literary Evaluation', ibid., pp.12-37. The value to O'Connor criticism of 
superposing carnal and spiritual readings is apparent in Frederick Asals' comment 
on Josephine Hendin's The World of Flannery 0 'Connor (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1970): 'How recognize the enlivening effect of Josephine Hendin's 
book when the main stimulus was to ferocious dissent?', Flannery 0 'Connor: The 
Imagination of Extremity (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1982), p. 4. Despite 
his friendship with O'Connor and therefore insider status, John Hawkes in his article 
'Flannery O'Connor's Devil', in Sewanee Review, 70 (1962), 395-407, by offering 
an essentially outsider's response: attributing to O'Connor's authorial attitude a 
diabolic impetus, acts as a catalyst for eloquent defences of O'Connor's work. 
Preston M. Browning's Flannery O'Connor (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1974), argues persuasively it is precisely the coincidence of the 
demonic and sacred in O'Connor's fiction which produces its power. By arguing 
against the ferocious outsider article by Satterfield, Jonathan Witt provides a 
balanced reading of Wise Blood in 'Wise Blood and the Irony of Redemption', 
Flannery 0 'Connor Bulletin (hereafter FOCB), 22 (1993-1994), 12-24. A fine 
recent study which acknowledges the impact of the type of aural circumcision I am 
associating with O'Connor, and analyses the superposed, contradictory nature of 
O'Connor's non·fictional and narrative forms, perceiving her work as 'spiritual' in 
Kermode's sense, is Joanne Halleran McMullen's Writing Against God: Language 
as Message in the Literature of Flannery 0 'Connor (Macon, Georgia: Mercer 
University Press, 1996). 
13. In a letter to Sally and Robert Fitzgerald in Summer 1952, O'Connor states she 
has read 'a good bit' about Simone Weil, and she was still receiving books on Weil 
from her friend 'A' in July 1963. The Habit of Being: Leiters of Flannery 
o 'Connor, selected and ed. by Sally Fitzgerald (New York: First Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 1979, 1988), p.40, p.530. Further references to this edition (hereafter HB) 
are given after quotations in the text. 
14. MM, p.l59, HB, p. 189. Initially O'Connor considered Weil's life more 
interesting than her philosophy. 'The life of this woman stiU intrigues me while 
much of what she writes, naturally, is ridiculous to met, letter to 'A' (24 September 
1955), ibid., p. 105. But after reading more of Weil's work O'Connor's interest in 
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Weil's ideas is apparent. When reading the Notebooks she informs 'A' in December 
1956: 
Reading them is one way to try to understand the age [ ... J I am more 
than a little obliged to you. These are books that I can't begin to 
exhaust, and Simone Weil is a mystery that should keep us all 
humble, and I need it more than most. (Ibid., p.189) 
Still absorbed in Weil's Notebooks a month later she observes there 'are remarkable 
things there and if! really Oml the complete Simone Weil I feel very rich', letter to 
'A' (12 January 1957), ibid., p.196. 
15. Simone Wei!, 'Spiritual Autobiography' (1942), Waiting for God, trans. by 
Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p.64. Further references to this 
edition (hereafter WFG) are given after quotations in the text. 'Attention' is a key 
concept in Weil's philosophy which I examine in subsequent chapters. 
16. For details of Weil's lectures at Roanne see: Simone Weil, Lectures on 
Philosophy, trans. by Hugh Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
Further fererences to this edition (hereafter LPY) are given after quotations in the 
text. Weil's essays on Plato, together with several about Greek literature, and 
Pythagorean geometry are contained in Simone Weil, Intimations of Christianity 
Among the Ancient Greeks (London: ARK Paperbacks, 1987). Further references to 
this edition (hereafter IC) are given after quotations in the text. 
17. For an excellent analysis of Weil's Platonism and its importance to her 
understanding of Christian theology, see Eric O. Springstead, Christus Mediator: 
Platonic Mediation in the Thought of Simone Wei/ (Chico, California: Scholars 
Press, 1983). Informative studies on the impact of Alain's work on Weil's 
philosophy include Thomas R. Nevin, Chapter Two: 'Le Maitre', in Simone Wei!: 
Portrait of a Self-Exiled Jew (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1991), pp.39-56~ and Simone Petrement, Chapter Two: 'The Encounter with Alain', 
in Simone Weil: A Life, trans. by Raymond Rosenthal (Oxford: A.R. Mowbray, 
1977), pp.25-42. On Weil's similarities with and differences to Sartre and Camus 
see Eric O. Springstead, Simone Weil and the Suffering of Love (Cambridge, MA: 
Cowley, 1986), p.4; on Camus and Weil see Neal Oxenhandler. Lookingfor Heroes 
in Postwar France: Albert Camus, Max Jacob, Simone Wei! (Hanover: University 
Press of New England. 1996). See Robert Coles, Simone Weil: A Modern 
Pilgrimage (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1987), p.l51 on WeWs Protestant 
rather than Catholic existentialism; and on French existentialism see Eric Matthews, 
Twentieth Century French Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
pp.58·107. 
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18. David Mclellan, Simone Weil: Utopian Pessimist (London: PAPERMAC, 
Macmillan, 1989), p.25. 
19. See Jacques Cabaud, Simone Wei/: A Fellowship in Love (New York: Channel 
Press, 1964), pp.73.81 for an account of this period. 
20. For an account of Weil's meeting with Trotsky at her parent's apartment in 
Paris, see McLellan, p.65. 
21. For a detailed examination ofWeil's factory work and its impact on her life and 
philosophy see Petrement, pp.214-247. 
22. According to Petrement, 'the doctors could never discover the cause of the 
ailment, but her symptoms did correspond to larval sinusitis' (Petrement, pp.69.70). 
The possible link between Weil's physical and psychological states, the potential for 
her ill-health and extreme asceticism to be symptomatic of anorexia nervosa and 
sexual repression are analysed by several critics. See Coles, Pilgrimage, pp.23.41 
and Ann Loades, 'Simone Wei! • Sacrifice: A Problem for Theology', in Images of 
Belief in Literature, ed. by David Jasper (London: Macmillan, 1984). pp.122·137. 
Also: Judith Van Herik, 'Simone Weil's Religious Imagery: How Looking Becomes 
Eating', in Immaculate and Powerful: The Female in Sacred Image and Social 
Reality, ed. by Clarissa W. Atkinson, Constance H. Buchanan and Margaret R. 
Miles (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), pp.260.282~ P. E. Cruise, 'The Problem of 
Being Simone Weil', Judaism, 35.1 (1986),98-106. 
23. WFG, p.67. See also Weil's letter to JOe Bousquet (12 May 1942), written seven 
years after her factory work. 'The combination of personal experience and sympathy 
for the wretched mass of people around me [ ... ] implanted so deep in my heart the 
affliction of social degradation that I have felt a slave ever since', in Simone Weil, 
Seventy Letters, trans. and arranged by Richard Rees (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), p.140. Further references to this edition (hereafter SL) are given after 
quotations in the text. 
24. The Simone Wei! Reader, ed. by George A. Panichas (Mt. Kisco, New York: 
Moyer Bell, 1977), p.455, p.462. Further references to this edition (hereafter SWR) 
are given after quotations in the text. 
25. For an account of this incident, and Weil's disillusionment with the Spanish 
Civil War, se~ Cabaud, pp.136-143. 
26. For example see Weil's Pre-War Notebook. The first page is concerned with 
'Fonns of power • or rather the pursuit of power', white it closes with the 
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consummate terrestrial concern, 'Confirm whether or not the advanced modern 
agricultural technique exhausts the soil? Study also the question of artificial 
manures'! in Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks, trans. by Richard Rees 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.l·62, (p.3, p.62). Further references to 
this edition (hereafter FLN) are given after quotations in the text. 
27. See Book X of st. Augustine's Confessions, trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 179·220 for how he selects his conversion as the 
impression point, or key to his whole life. See T. R. Wright, Theology and 
Literature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 92·110 for a discussion of how spiritual 
autobiographies such as the Confessions constitute a theological fonn with 
distinctively literary traits. 
28. WFG, p.74. Weil informs Perrin: 
you have forced me to face the whole question of the faith, dogma, 
and the sacraments, obliging me to consider them closely and at 
length with the fullest possible attention, making me see them as 
things toward which I have obligations that I have to discern and 
perform. I should never have done this otherwise and it is 
indispensable for me to do it. (WFG, pp.73~74) 
29. Petrement, p.456. For Perrin's personal recollections of Weil see his preface to 
Attente de Dieu (paris: Fayard, 1966), and J.M. Perrin and Gustave Thibon, Simone 
Weil As We Knew Her, trans. by Emma Craufurd (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1953). Petrement's claim that Weil and Bousquet had a deep friendship is sustained 
by the long letter Wei! wrote to him after her visit (12 May 1942), which expresses 
her admiration for Bousquet's ability to endure amiction without being corrupted by 
it - a central tenet of her mystical philosophy. SL, pp.136-42. 
30. See 'What Is a Jew?' (November 1940): 
The concept of heredity may be applied to a race, but it is difficult to 
apply it to a religion. I myself, who professes no religion and never 
have, have certainly inherited nothing from the Jewish religion. Since 
I practically learned to read from Racine, Pascal, and other French 
writers of the 17th century, since my spirit was thus impregnated at 
an age when I had not heard talk of "Jews", I would say that if there 
is a religious tradition which I regard as my patrimony, it is the 
Catholic tradition. (SWR, p.80) 
31. John-Paul Sartre, What is Literature?, trans. by Bernard Frechtman (London: 
Methuen, 1986), p.50. 
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32. For details of Thibon's friendship with Weil, and his receipt of her notebooks, 
see his 'Introduction' to GG, pp.vii-xxxvii. 
33. Ann Loades, 'Simone Weil and Antigone: Innocence and Affiiction', in Simone 
Weil's Philosophy of Culture: Readings Toward a Divine Humanity, ed by Richard 
Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.277-94 (p.291). 
34. William James, The Varieties of ReligiOUS Experience (London and Glasgow: 
[n.pub.] [1902] 1960), pp.43-45, quoted in T. R. Wright, p.94. . 
35. See Weil's many comments in her Notebooks including: 
To speak of "God as educator" in connection with this people is a 
heinous sort of joke. Is it surprising that there should be so much evil 
in a civilization - our own which is corrupted at its roots, in its very 
inspiration, by this atrocious lie? The curse of Israel weighs upon 
Christendom. The atrocities, the exterminations of heretics and of 
unbelievers-all this was Israel- (and is so stil1, up to a certain point...) 
Totalitarianism is Israel. (NE, pp.S70-71) 
'The Jews-that handful of uprooted individuals-have been responsible for the 
uprooting of the whole terrestrial globe', she claims, ibid., p.S7S. 
36. Weil concludes that 'the Hebrews must have distorted history, as Semites and 
murderers of the Canaanites' , and asserts that: 
there is one thing which is a practical certainty, namely, that people 
have wanted to hide something from us, and they have succeeded in 
doing so. It is not by chance that so many texts have been destroyed, 
that so much obscurity surrounds so essential a party of history [ ... ] 
There has probably been a systematic destruction of documents. 
In Simone WeB, Letter to A Priest, trans. by A.F. Wills (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1953), p.41, p.84. Further references to this edition (hereafter LP) are 
given after quotations in the text. 
37. LP. p.1S. Just how much Weil knew about the Holocaust remains unclear. While 
working for the Free French in London, a Dr. Kac claims he discussed the atrocities 
with her, and 'She took refuge in a complete dumbness. When I pressed her. she 
showed herself profoundly irritated [ ... ] After thirty years, I still see her frozen stare. 
r felt I was facing two machine guns'. he maintains. Quoted by Paul Giniewski, 
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Simone Weil ou la haine de so; (Paris: Berg International, 1978), pp.48-49. Referred 
to by Nevin, pp.243-244. Yet Malou David's insistence that Weil actively assisted 
Jewish refugees in Marseilles, demonstrates that she had knowledge of the 
Holocaust beyond her own experiences, and therefore her anti-Semitism is itself 
contradictory. 
38. Quoted from Simone Weil's manuscripts: No. 658, 'Bases d'un statut des 
minorites franyais non chretiennes et d'origine etrangere', 'Ecrits de Londres et de 
Marsaille', the unpublished Simone Weil Papers, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris. See 
Nevin, pp.244-46. 
39. When La pesanteur et la grace was published in 1947, Wladimir Rabi has noted 
how 'we [the Jews] had emerged from the greatest catastrophe of our history', and 
Weil's references to Judaism 'constituted an insupportable outrage. I believe it is 
fair to say that almost no one, excepting a few rare individuals, ever got over the 
vexation and grief they felt then.' Quoted in Nevin, pp.252-53. Some Catholics were 
similarly appalled by what they considered the Catholic community's over-eager 
acceptance of Weil. See Georges Frenaud. 'Simone Weil's Religious Thought in the 
Light of Catholic Theology', Theological Studies, 14.3 (1953), 349-76 for a detailed 
analysis of Weil's unorthodoxy. 
40. The actions of the Jewish, French philosopher Henri Bergson, who was also 
sympathetic to Catholicism, provide an interesting socio-historical context in which 
to judge both Weil's refusal to join the Catholic Church and her anti-Semitism. As 
Eric Matthews notes, in 1937 Bergson 
said the only thing which was keeping him from being received into 
the Catholic Church was his desire to identify with his own Jewish 
background at such a time of anti-semitic persecution [ ... ] He died in 
occupied Paris in 1941, from pneumonia contracted while he was 
queuing in bitterly cold weather to register as a Jew. (Matthews, 
pp.15-16) 
41. Loades, Images, p.126. 
42. Stanley Edgar Hyman considers O'Connor 'an outsider as a woman, a 
southerner, and a Roman Catholic in the South', and believes this 'multiple 
alienation from the dominant assumptions' of American culture was advantageous 
to her as writer. See his Flannery 0 'Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1966), p,46. For useful counterpoints to O'Connor's views on Catholicism, 
and discussions of the extent to which Catholic American culture is or is not a 
source of marginalisation from the rest of American society, see James T. Fisher, 
The Catholic Counterculture in America, 1933-1962 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1989). See also: Andrew M. Greeley, The Catholic Myth: The 
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Behavior and Beliefs of American Catholics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1990); and Eugene Kennedy, Tomorrow's Catholics, Yesterday's Church (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1988). 
43. Flannery O'Connor, The Complete Stories (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 
p.178. Further references to this edition (hereafter CS) are given after quotations in 
the text. 
44. Ibid., p.492. For an informative discussion of O'Connor's Holocaust imagery 
and its relation to her fiction see Marshall Bruce Gentry, Flannery 0 'Connor's 
Religion of the Grotesque (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1986) 
45. For example see the excellent analysis of the Cold War period and its relation to 
O'Connor's work in Jon Lance Bacon, Flannery O'Connor and Cold War Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Thomas Hill Schaub, 
American Fiction in the Cold War (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1991). 
46. See O'Connor's numerous comments on these writers including those in HB pp. 
100, 107,231, 196-97,463, 570; and the books she owned by each author listed in 
Arthur F. Kinney, Flannery 0 'Connor's Library: Resources of Being (Athens: The 
University of Georgia Press, 1985). For discussions of the impact of European and 
specifically French writers on O'Connor and her work see: Ted R. Spivey, Flannery 
o 'Connor: The Woman, the Thinker, the Visionary (Macon, Georgia: Mercer 
University Press, 1995); Henry M. Russell, 'Racial Integration in a Disintegrating 
Society: O'Connor and European Catholic Thought', FOCB 24 (1995-96), 33-45; 
and Stephen L. Tanner, 'Flannery O'Connor and Gabriel Marcel'. Literature and 
Belief, 17 (1997), 149-57. 
47. See O'Connor on de Chardin: 'The most important non-fiction writer is Pere 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, SJ. who died in 1955 and has so far escaped the Index, 
although a monitum has been issued on him. If they are good they are dangerous', 
HB pp. 570-71. She takes the title of one of her narratives, and the second collection 
of short stories within which it is published, Everything Thai Rises Must Converge, 
from de Chardin's concept of the convergence of man, the universe. and God at an 
Omega point. See his The Phenomenon of Man, trans. by Bernard Wall (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1975), and my following footnote 82. Discussing the problem of 
whether the author has moral responsibility for the impact of his work on his 
audience, O'Connor takes refuge in Mauriac's conclusion 'that all the novelist 
could do was "purify the source" - his mind', and that 'Mauriac says God does not 
care anything about what we write. He uses it', ibid., p.143, p.360. 
48. Art and Scholasticism is 'the book I cut my aesthetic teeth on', according to 
O'Connor, and she takes her notion of the purity of art 'from St. Thomas (via 
Maritain) who allows that art is wholly concerned with the good of that which is 
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made'. Ibid., p.216, p.l57. O'Connor notes with pride that Maritain was 'so much 
taken' with Wise Blood, that he asked its French translator M. Coindreau to discuss 
it with him, ibid., p.4l7. 
49. She writes of Maritain's letter to Caroline Gordon Tate concerning The 
Malefactors, and owns and recommends to others Tate's books The House of 
Fiction, and How to Read a Novel, ibid., pp.l66, 157, 256, 260. As O'Connor's 
mentor, Tate suggested revisions to O'CoMor's manuscripts throughout her career: 
from Wise Blood in 1951 to the short story 'Parker's Back' in July 1964, completed 
shortly before O'CoMor's death. See O'Connor's many references to Tate in HB 
from p.25 to p.594, and see Spivey, Woman, passim, on Tate as a major influence on 
O'Connor's intellect and work. For a useful comparison of O'Connor's fiction with 
other Catholic American writers, see Ross Labrie, The Catholic Imagination in 
American Literature (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997). 
50. Frank Daniel, 'Flannery O'Connor Shapes Own Capital', in CFO, pp.91-94 
(p.94) (first publ. in The Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta Constitution, 22 July 
1962). See the six stories O'CoMor submitted for her MFA thesis: 'The Geranium', 
'The Barber', 'Wildcat', 'The Crop', 'The Turkey' and 'The Train', all included in 
CS, pp.3-62. For details of the early drafts of these texts, see Stephen G. Driggers 
and Robert J. Dunn, with Sarah Gordon, The Manuscripts of Flannery 0 'Connor at 
Georgia College (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1989), pp.S-l0. Further 
references to this edition (hereafter MFC) are given after quotations in the text. 
51. Letter to John Hawkes (28 November 1961), lIB, p.4S7. Gerard E. Sherry 'An 
Interview with Flannery O'Connor', in CFO, pp.97-102 (p.98) (first publ. in The 
Critic, 21 (June-July 1963), 29~31). 
52. See Ted. R. Spivey, 'Flannery O'Connor, the New Criticism, and 
Deconstruction', Southern Review, 2 (1987), 271-80, and Suzanne Morrow Paulson, 
pp.7-12. 
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55. See John Dumbrell, 'Cold War America, 1945-1960', in America's Century: 
Perspectives on u.s. History since 1900, ed. by lwan W. Morgan and Neil A. Wynn 
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1993), pp.l33-57. 
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56. Not informed she had lupus at her mother's request, and believing she was 
suffering from arthritis, O'Connor planned to return to Connecticut when possible. 
Eventually told she was suffering from the disease which kiUed her father in 1952, 
O'Connor resigned herself to remaining in Milledgeville. In a letter to Robert 
Fitzgerald (July 1952), O'Connor declares, 'I now know that it is lupus and am very 
glad to so know', HB, p.39. See Sally Fitzgerald's account of this period, p.37. 
57. 'My mother says, "You talk just like a nigger and someday you are going to be 
away from home and do it and people are going to wonder where you came from.'" 
Letter to 'A' (24 March 1956), ibid., p.148. O'Connor informs Sally and Robert 
Fitzgerald (November 1952), 'mamma & 1 are on the way to the polls to cancel out 
each other's vote.' Ibid., p.47. 
58. Simone Petrement has noted how Weil 'wore clothes with a masculine cut', 
Petrement, p.26. Recalling Weil's insistence on having a tuxedo rather than a dress 
made for a visit to the Opera, she believes 'there was some element of willfulness in 
her manner of dressing', concluding this was due to 'Simone's revolutionary 
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59. Discussing a visit to Andalusia to interview O'Connor, Gilman maintains that 
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Sally Fitzgerald insists Regina 'is clearly loved' by O'Connor, and very occasionally 
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O'Connor's letters. Writing to Thomas Strich (11 February 1964) about her newly 
acquired record player, O'Connor declares if 'I had known [ReginaJ would enjoy 
this thing so much I would have done something about getting one before now [ ... J 1 
don't know if she listens or not. Every now and then she says, that's pretty.' lIB, 
p.xii, p.564. 
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University Press, 1984), p.78. According to Gilbert and Gubar, 'by projecting their 
rebeIlious impulses not into their heroines but into mad and monstrous women (who 
are suitably punished in the course of the novel or poem), female authors dramatise 
their own self-division, their desire both to accept the strictures of patriarchal 
society and to reject them.' These female characters are 'usually in some sense the 
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author's double, an image of her own anxiety and rage', allowing women writers to 
accommodate 'their own keen sense of the discrepancies between what they are and 
what they are supposed to be.' Ibid. Many critics have analyzed the domestic 
relationships and psychosexual dimensions of O'Connor's fiction, notably Hendin, 
World, Claire Katz, 'Flannery O'Connor's Rage of Vision', American Literature, 46 
(March 1974), 54-67, and Louise Westling, Sacred Groves and Ravaged Gardens 
The Fiction of Eudora Welty, Carson McCullers and Flannery 0 'Connor (Athens: 
The University of Georgia Press, 1985). 
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University Press, 1978), p.147. 
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(1976),39-60 (pp.41-44). 
63. 'The Passivities of Diminishment', in The Divine Milieu (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1968), pp.80-94 (p.92). O'Connor refers to Teilhard de Chardin's 'passive 
diminishments' in a letter to Janet McKane (25 February 1963): 'He means those 
afflictions that you can't get rid of and have to bear. Those you can get rid of he 
believes you must bend every effort to get rid of. I think he was a very great man.' 
HB, p.509. See also a letter to McKane (31 March 1963): 'the patient is passive in 
relation to the disease-he's done all he can to get rid of it and can't so he's passive 
and accepts it'. Ibid., p.512. 
64. O'Connor's habit of making extensive rewrites of her novels ensured progress 
on Wise Blood was extremely slow. The sixth story in her MFA thesis, 'The Train' t 
constitutes the earliest version of the opening chapter of the novel. which she began 
writing in 1947. Published by Sewanee Review, 56 (April-June 1948), 261-271, 
subsequent chapters of Wise Blood: 'The Heart of the Park', and 'The peeler'. were 
published the following year in Partisan Review, 16 (February 1949), 138-51 and 16 
(December 1949), 1189-1206. For details of the numerous Wise Blood manuscripts, 
see MFC, pp.9-72. 
6S. O'Connor's sense of isolation is apparent in a letter to the Fitzgerald's 
(September 1953), when she informs them she feels 'like the world is moving off 
and leaving me in the United States alone', HB, p.63. Over two years later she wrote 
to Fr. James McCo\W (20 February 1956), 'I never mind writing anybody. In fact it 
is about my only way of visiting with people as I don't get around much and people 
seldom come to see us in the country.' Ibid., p.l39. O'Connor asked William 
Sessions (1 September 1957), to let her know what he was studying, and infonned 
him she couldn't 'return information of similar interest as all that happens here of 
importance occurs in the barnyard division.' Significantly she closed the letter with 
'Cheers and Screams. ' Ibid., p.240. 
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66. 'Harcourt sent my book to Evelyn Waugh and his comment was: "If this really is 
the unaided work of a young lady, it is a remarkable product." My mother was vastly 
insulted. She put the emphasis on if and lady. Does he suppose you're not a lady? 
she says. WHO is he?'. Letter to Robert Lowell (2 May 1952), ibid., p.35. 'Miss 
Gum Spirits of Turpentine has just been elected for the year [ ... ] The other one I 
look out for is Miss North Georgia Chick', letter to 'A' (18 April 1959), ibid., p.328. 
O'Connor informs Elizabeth Bishop (23 April 1960), of a clipping received from a 
friend: 'about a boy named Jimmy Sneed, a 13 year old evangelist, who hung 
himself because his mother spanked him for sassing her. A neighbour was quoted as 
saying "He was a good boy. He had been preaching around here some lately and was 
doing fine"'. Ibid., p.391. 
67. O'Connor's friend requested that her identity remain anonymous. Writing to 
Robie Macauley (18 May 1955), O'Connor complained that she seemed 'to attract 
the lunatic fringe mainly', and expressed her desire 'that somebody real intelligent 
would Mite sometime'. Ibid., p.82. O'Connor considered she had found such a 
reader after 'A' wrote to her in July 1955, and they began a correspondence which 
lasted until O'Connor's death in 1964. 
68. Ibid., p.90. This urge to be considered daring is a constant trait. Discussing The 
Violent Bear It Away with 'A' (14 November 1959) O'Connor declares, '1 am not 
afraid that the book will be controversial, I'm afraid it will not be controversial.' 
Ibid., p.358. 
69. 'You said once you would see if you had the faculties to give me permission to 
read such as this. Do you and will you? All these Protestants will be shocked if I say 
1 can't get permission to read Gide.' (20 December 1957), ibid., 259. 'J am afraid 
though they are headed for Sartre-also on the Index. So if you can include him in 
with Gide, I'd be obliged.' (12 January 1958), ibid., p.263. 
70. O'Connor acknowledges in a letter to 'A' (21 April 1956), that a collection of 
stories by J.F. Powers does not equal the first, but candidly admits evading such 
direct criticism in a review she wrote of the book. 'However, who am I to be saying 
that in public? These are the only reviews I have ever Mitten and I make the 
discovery that they are not the place for that kind of absolute honesty. In the first 
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Bulletin, 31 March, 1956, O'Connor wrote: 'In this collection, Mr Powers again 
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Presence of Grace and Other Book Reviews by Flannery O'Connor. compiled by 
Leo J. Zuber, and ed. by Carter W. Martin (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 
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72. FLN, p.12, p.18. Simone Petrement has noted this dialogic facet of Weil's 
personality. 'She forbade herself all weakness with such finn detennination that one 
could mistake for a peculiarity of nature what was in truth a product of her will.' 
Petrement, pp.27 
73. 'The religion of the South is a do-it-yourself religion, something which I as a 
Catholic find painful and touching and grimly comic'. Letter to John Hawkes (13 
September 1959), HB, p.350. Discussing the character Mason Tarwater in The 
Violent Bear It Away, O'Connor insists, 'essentially, he's a crypto-Catholic. When 
you leave a man alone with his Bible and the Holy Ghost inspires him, he's going to 
be a Catholic one way or another, even though he knows nothing about the visible 
Church.' Letter to Sister Mariella Gable (4 May 1963), ibid., p.517. 
74. A 'Christian has only one country that can be the object of such patriotism, and 
which is situated outside this world' Weil contends, and in doing so marks her 
similarity with O'Connor's concept of the Christian writer's 'true country', which is 
'what is eternal and absolute'. See Simone WeiI, The Needfor Roots: Prelude 10 a 
Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind, trans. by A. F Wills, ARK edn (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952, 1987), p.126. Further references to this edition 
(hereafter NR) are given after quotations in the text. MM, p. 27. 
75. Writing to Lee for the first time (9 January 1957), O'Connor obviously delights 
in her mother's disapproval at Lee's driving from Andalusia to the airport in an 
automobile owned by her family'S black gardener, ibid., p.l94. Yet joking about her 
aversion to radical change O'Connor sarcastically writes to Lee: 'That grasshopper 
you left in the cage for me reminded me so much of the poor colored people in the 
jails that I let him out and fed him to a duck. rm sure you'll understand: Ibid., 
p.592. 
76. For details of the impact this incident had on the Southern community see The 
Eyes on the Prize Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, and Firsthand 
Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle, 1954-1990, ed. by Clayborne Carson 
and others (New York: Penguin, 1991), pp.97-106. 
77. For the full text of the Supreme Court's ruling, and details of the white 
Southerners' massive resistance to it, including Judge Tom P. Brady's speech 
condemning the decision, see ibid., pp.61.96. 
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78. 'I rode the train from Atl. and the bus from M'vlle, but no more. Once I heard 
the driver say to the rear occupants, "All right you stove-pipe blonds, git on back 
ther [sic]." At which moment I became an integrationist.' Letter to 'A' (16 
November 1957), lIB, p.253. 
79. Writing of a local Ku Klux Klan meeting, she highlights the absurdity of its 
'portable fiery cross', which had to be plugged in, as it 'was lit by many red electric 
bulbs'. Letter to 'A' (31 January 1957), ibid., p.201. O'Connor jokingly tells Maryat 
Lee (21 May 1962) to journey South, 'at your own expense & let the White Citizens 
Council send you back. You could tell them that you was a little light but a 
guaranteed nigger. This would cut your expenses in half and give you a nice 
vacation in the land of sin and guilt.' Ibid., p.475. O'Connor's view of racial politics 
as at least partially comical seems to be derived from the humorous episodes she 
witnessed at Andalusia involving the African-American workers, and she frequently 
includes anecdotes about them in her letters. For example: 
Louise threw potash water on Shot last week (she keeps a supply for 
this purpose) and Regina told her that one of these days she was 
going to put his eyes out "Yes'm" she says, "I hope I gets at least one 
of them"'. 
Letter to the Fitzgeralds (23 November 1963), ibid., p.550. 
80. 'Flannery O'Connor: An Interview', in CFO pp. 103·107 (p.104) (first publ. in 
Jubilee, 11 (1963),32-35). 
81. O'Connor voices her fears about desegregation in letters to Janet McKane. On 8 
July 1964 she notes, Milledgeville 'passed a peaceful 4th July. with most local 
restaurants either integrated or not tested. I'm cheered that bombshell is past.' fID, 
p.591. Discussing the integration of Milledgeville library with McKane (11 October 
1963), O'Connor tells her that is 'the way things have to be done here - completely 
without publicity. Then there is no trouble. I hope the rest of it can be taken care of 
as well as the library did it, but I have my doubts about it. We shall see'. Ibid., 
p.542. 
82. Letter to Fr. J. H. McCown (4 March 1962), ibid., p.468. See also O'Connor's 
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That Rises Must Converge': 'which is a physical proposition that I found in Pere 
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all the world.' Ibid .• p.438. 
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York: Berkley Books, 1993), pp.280-284 (p.282). 
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84. O'Connor tells Elizabeth and Robert Lowell (1 January 1954), 'mother says 
every nigger she knows has a better-looking car than she does.' HB, p.65. 'She says 
[they] are smart as tacks when it comes to looking out for No.1', letter to the 
Fitzgeralds (11 November 1953), ibid. 
85. MM, p.29. 'Manners are the next best thing to Christian charity' she claims. See 
Sherry, in CFO, p.l02, and also Mullins, ibid., pp.103-104: 
It requires considerable grace for two races to live together, 
particularly when the population is divided about fifty-fifty between 
them and when they have our particular history. It can't be done 
without a code of manners based on mutual charity. [ ... ] The South 
has to evolve a way of life in which the two races have to work it out 
the hard way. 
86. See Alice Walker's positive view of O'Connor's treatment of the race issue in 
the fictions. Discussing the development in O'Connor's depiction of 
African-Americans between 'The Geranium', and 'Judgement Day' written after 
O'Connor's experience of the Civil Rights Movement; Walker claims the 'quality 
added is rage, and, in this instance, O'Connor waited until she saw it exhibited by 
black people before she recorded it'. She maintains O'Connor's detachment 
from the inner workings of her black characters seems to me all to 
her credit, since, by deliberately limiting her treatment of them to 
cover their observable demeanor and actions, she leaves them free, in 
the reader's imagination, to inhabit another landscape, another life, 
than the one she creates for them. This is a kind of grace. 
See 'Beyond the Peacock: The Reconstruction of Flannery O'Connor', in In Search 
o/Our Mothers' Gardens: Womanist Prose (London: Women's Press, 1984), p.54, 
p. 52. See also Ralph C. Wood, 'Where Is the Voice Coming From? Flannery 
O'Connor on Race', FOCB, 22 (1993-94), 90-118. 
87. Flannery O'Connor, The Violent Bear It Away (London: Faber and Faber. 1985), 
p.169. Further references to this edition (hereafter VB) are given after quotations in 
the text. 
88. Carter Martin catalogues O'Connor's one hundred and twenty book reviews, 
written between 1956 and 1964 into the following categories: '50 religious and 
homiletic, 21 biographies and saints' lives. 19 sennons and theology, 17 fiction, 8 
literary criticism, 6 psychology, 6 philosophy and science, 4 history, 4 letters, 4 
periodicals, 3 intellectual history and criticism, 1 art criticism.' See PG p.3. The 
seven hundred and twelve items in O'Connor's personal library reveal her extensive 
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reading in philosophy, theology, literature, literary criticism and history. See 
Kinney, Library, pp. 1-13 .. 
89. O'Connor declared herself 'a very innocent speller' in 1954, and as late as 25 
July 1964~ she wrote to 'A', about the 'interpitations' of 'Revelation' lID, p.69, 
p.594. O'Connor uses her apparently genuine affection for peacocks and poultry to 
emphasise her supposedly non-intellectual, hometown status. 'I am very glad to be 
back with the chickens who don't know I have just published a book' she tells Ben 
Griffith (8 June 1955), ibid., p.29. 
90. Ibid., p.204. When asked during an interview at Vanderbilt University, how she 
wrote a novel, O'Connor replied, 'Well, I just kind of feel it out like a hound-dog.' 
'An Interview with Flannery O'Connor and Robert Penn Warren', ed. by Cyrus Hoy 
and Walter Sullivan, in CFO, pp.19-36 (p.19) (first publ. in Vagabond, 4 (February 
1960),9-17). 
91. 'Around here if you publish the number of whiskers on the local pigs, everybody 
has to give you tea.' Letter to Robie Macauley (2 May 1952), HB, p.35. 'I have been 
discovered by the club ladies of middle Georgia. Last month the Macon Writers 
Club had a breakfast IN MY HONOR and allowed me to address them for 25 
minutes.' Letter to Sally and Robert Fitzgerald (8 May 1955), ibid, p.80 
92. Persuading a factory manager to allow her to contribute an article for the factory 
magazine, Weil attempted to make Sophocles' Antigone accessible to the workers. 
If I have done what I intended it should be able to interest and touch 
everyone, from the manager to the last of the workers. And the latter 
should be able to enter into it with almost no difficulty and yet 
without the feeling that there has been any effort of condescension to 
bring it within his reach. 
In letter to 'B' (April or May 1936), SL, p.49. 
93. Letter to Carl Hartman (2 March 1954), Flannery O'Connor, Collected Works, 
(New York: The Library of America, 1988), p.922. Further references to this edition 
(hereafter CW) are given after quotations in the text. Her lack of confidence is 
evident in a letter to Robbie Macauley (13 October 1953), when O'Connor admits, 
'I offer all my critical opinions on long sticks that can be jerked back at once 
because I really seldom know what I'm talking about', HB. p.63. This attitude may 
explain why out of the one hundred and twenty reviews O'Connor published, almost 
all were written for two local publications, The Georgia Bulletin, and The Southern 
Cross. Only one review, of Teilhard de Chardin's The Phenomenon of Man (1959), 
was written for a secular journal, The American Scholar. See PG pp.129-130. 
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94. In a letter to Maryat Lee (17 April 1957), she declares 'I have a hundred bucks to 
compensate for any damage that may have been done to my nervous system' by a 
lecture at Notre Dame, HB, p.2l5. In 1959 she informs Fr. J.H. McCown that 
Chicago University 'are paying me well and unfortunately I have to earn me bread.' 
Ibid., p.318. 
95. Writing to Cecil Dawkins (9 December 1958), O'Connor declares that at 
interviews, 'I always feel like a dry cow being milked. There is no telling what they 
will get out of you [ ... ] If you do manage to say anything that makes sense, they put 
down the opposite.' ibid .• p.306. Yet this appears to be caused by O'Connor's oral 
inarticulateness. She admits to 'A' (3 October 1959). that during an interview, 'I 
sputtered out a lot of incoherencies, which I will really hate to see when they 
appear.' Ibid., p.352. This is possibly why O'Connor gave the majority of her 
interviews to obscure magazines and journals. 
96. 'I hate like sin to have my photograph taken and most of them don't look like 
me, or look like I'll look after I've been dead a couple of days.' Letter to Janet 
McKane (19 June 1963), ibid., pp.524-525. Writing to the Fitzgeralds (April 1952) 
about the imminent publication of Wise Blood, O'Connor insists 'the jacket is lousy 
with me blown up on the back of it, looking like a refugee from deep thought.' Ibid., 
p.33. 'The one [photograph] I sent looked as in had just bitten my grandmother and 
that this was one of my few pleasures, but all the rest were worse.' Letter to the 
Fitzgeralds (early 1952), ibid .• p.31. 
97. O'Connor writes to Cecil Dawkins (17 July 1959), 'I dread all the reviews, all 
the misunderstanding of my intentions', ibid., p,340. 'I'm afraid it [The Violent Bear 
It Away] will just be dammed [sic] and dropped, genteely sneered at, a few superior 
kicks from one or two and that will be that [ ... ] I expect the worst'. Letter to 'A' (14 
November 1959). ibid., p.358. 'If the modem reader is so far de-Christianised that 
he doesn't recognise the Devil when he sees him. I fear for the reception of the 
book.' Letter to Robert Giroux (5 December 1959), ibid., p.361. The extensive 
rewriting process which preceded publication of The Violent Bear It Away (1960), 
can be seen by studying the relevant manuscripts. See MFC, pp. 78-11 5. 
98. 
Your criticism sounds to me as if you have read too many critical 
books and are too smart in an artificial, destructive, and very limited 
way. [ ... ] Your critique is too far from the spirit of the book to make 
me want to go into it with you in detail. [ ... J My Lord, Billy, recover 
your simplicity. You ain't in Manhattan. Don't inflict that stuff on 
the poor students there~ they deserve better. 
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In letter to William Sessions (13 September 1960), HB, p.407. Writing to Elizabeth 
Bishop (23 April 1960) about The Violent Bear It Away, O'Connor insists it has 
'received considerable attention, most of it simple-minded'. Ibid., p.391. 
99. 'Maybe in fifty years, or a hundred, Catholics will be reading the Bible the way 
they should have been reading it all along. I can wait that long to have my fiction 
understood' Joel Wells, 'Off the Cuff', in CFO, pp.85-90 (p.87) (first publ. in The 
Critic, 21, (August-September 1962),4-5, 71-72). 
100. See Simone Weil, Oppression and Liberty. trans. by Arthur Wills and John 
Petrie, ARK edn (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, 1988), p.195. Further 
references to this edition (hereafter OL) are given after quotations in the text. 
10 1. See File 232 of the manuscripts held at Georgia College. For details of the 
complete Why Do the Heathen Rage? manuscripts, see MFC, pp.133-151. 
102. MM p.ix. Material O'Connor didn't personally revise for publication include 
some of the most significant lectures and essays in MM: 'Novelist and Believer', 
'Catholic Novelists and Their Readers'. 'The Catholic Novelist in the Protestant 
South', and most of 'The Nature and Aim of Fiction', 'Writing Short Stories', and 
'On Her Own Work'. 
103. Sally Fitzgerald has noted how O'Connor and her mother Regina wrote to each 
other daily when O'Connor lived with the Fitzgerald's in Connecticut. No reason is 
given for the absence of O'Connor's half of this correspondence from The Habit of 
Being, but Fitzgerald observes that Mrs O'Connor did not make her daughter's 
letters to her from Iowa available. because she considers 'they are purely personal 
and contain nothing ofliterary interest.' HB, pp.xii, 4. 
104. Thibon acknowledges Weil had 'a deep veneration for the great Hindu and 
Taoistic writings, for Homer, the Greek tragedies and above all for Plato', but he 
excludes most of these aspects of her philosophy from his selection. He realises 
there is a 'danger' of 'trying at whatever cost to bend the thought one is studying 
into conformity with Catholic truth', which constitutes 'a manifest abuse of the 
text', but significantly, Thibon thinks 'that whatever is true or pure in a human life 
or work find's its place naturally in the Catholic synthesis without being forced or 
twisted in order to do so.' GG, p.x, p.xxx. He observes that the entries he has 
selected 'were interspersed with innumerable quotations as well as philological and 
scientific studies', ibid., p.xxxvii, but Thibon's arrangement of the extracts into 
thematic groupings which exclude crucial elements of Weil's thinking such as 
Buddhism, Hinduism, myth and folklore, amounts to the type of textual 
manipulation he claims to avoid. His classifications are themselves misleading, for 
instance the short section on algebra does not include any of WeWs numerous 
references to the Pythagoreans. 
61 
105. Although Fr. Perrin does not distort the information Weil entrusted to him, her 
respect for him appears to have caused Wei! to moderate her criticisms of the 
Catholic Church. Her genuine admiration for several of the major Catholic 
doctrines: the Incarnation, Trinity and Redemption, are evident, while the more 
hostile discourse prevalent in Letter to A Priest, is less conspicuous. However. when 
Fr. Perrin later discovered the extent ofWeil's criticism of the Catholic Church, he 
removed his eulogistic introduction from Waiting/or God. 
106. David McLellan maintains that Weil's influence on the Catholic Church 
'around the time of the Second Vatican Council was considerable'. McLellan, 
p.268. Noting how Pope John XXIII wrote to Weil's father and considered visiting 
the austere room where she worked, he observes how Pope Paul VI 'counted Weil, 
together with Pascal and Bemanos, as one of the three most important influences on 
his intellectual development', ibid. McLellan obtains the evidence for these 
assertions from P. Hebblethwaite's books John XXIlI, Pope of the Council (London: 
[n.pub], [n.d.]), p.57, and The Year of the Three Popes (London: [n.pub], 1978), p.2. 
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CHAPTER ONE: WRITING ON TilE SOIJL 
In Plato's Phaedrus, Socrates defines the most effective type of discourse as 
dialectic, 'the kind that is written on the soul of the hearer together with 
understanding'. 1 An inward ~eeking after truth combined with the exercise of reason 
allows the soul to recollect essential spiritual truths it had forgotten (anamnesis), 
and in a moment of epiphany or internal unveiling (alethia), root them in the sou1.2 
Superior to writing which is its debased, inflexible relation - incapable of answering 
questions, defending itself, or choosing its audience - dialectic allows its practitioner 
to select 'a suitable soul', and plant in it truths and knowledge. which 'are not 
sterile, but contain a seed from which fresh truths spring up in other minds' (276) 
Successfully communicated to the fertile ground of other souls capable of 
understanding and disseminating its message, dialectical knowledge is guaranteed 
immortality and bestows happiness on its possessor (277). This notion of 
transferring living spiritual truths directly into a soul able to perceive and 
disseminate them has a Christian equivalent in God's Word being granted to those 
individuals in a state of grace. In the parable of the sower, Christ informs his 
disciples that the seed is the Word of God, which in the rich soil of those who hear 
and accept it yields a plentiful harvest.3 
It is significant that both the Platonic and Christian versions of this concept are 
reliant on figurative imagery to explain them. Plato's philosophical designation of 
what constitutes 'good' writing is dependant on a metaphor borrowed from the 'bad' 
writing of mere inscription. Even as it attempts to specify its distinction logic is 
corrupted by metaphor, because as Jacques Derrida notes 'Metaphoricity is the logic 
of contamination and the contamination of logic,.4 Similarly the Christian notion of 
the rational principle governing the universe made manifest in Christ as living logos 
is founded on the Scriptures. parabolic, metaphorical narratives which attempt to 
represent this ultimate Word via the restricted form of human language. 
The essential dilemma of how to write on the soul and discourse about God, the 
limitations and possibilities, similarities and differences between philosophical and 
literary form are central to a comparative study of Simone Weil and Flannery 
O'Connor. Both writers are compelled to inscribe their theologies on the souls of 
their readers, yet subject to constraints imposed by form. As a Platonist, Weil 
considers philosophical dialectic a superior mode for approaching a knowledge of 
ultimate truths, but she relies heavily on figurative imagery and the interpretation of 
narratives to express her ideas.S Indeed the fact she wrote a play and some poetry 
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indicates that philosophical reasoning is not an entirely sufficient form to satisfy 
Weil's urge to develop and communicate her ideas; in the same way that O'Connor 
is a theological, philosophical, and not merely fictional writer.6 The regularity with 
which O'Connor employs other forms (lectures, essays, letters and book reviews) to 
stipulate specifically anagogical readings of her narratives is indicative of the 
~ifficulties she found in writing her Christian ideology on the souls of her audience 
via an innately ambiguous fictional form dependent on reader response? But she 
believes fictions can be prophetic. Equating her role as a Catholic novelist with 
prophecy, O'Connor insists that for the writer-prophet there is 'the prophetic sense 
of "seeing through" reality', and (like Plato's anamneSiS), 'there is also the 
prophetic function of recalling people to known but ignored truths'. 8 
O'Connor's contention that fictions can be revelatory. that they tell truths beyond an 
immediately perceived reality and function as a mnemonic device challenges the 
phonocentric philosophical bias privileging dialectical reason and the spoken word 
as the most appropriate form for accessing and communicating truth. The breach 
between Weil and O'Connor's concepts of art demonstrates a crucial distinction 
between their philosophical and literary perspectives, replicating the divergence 
between the two disciplines (in)famously delineated in the 'old quarrel between 
philosophy and poetry' contained in Plato's Republic.9 As his argument has a direct 
bearing on Weil and O'Connor's aesthetics it is necessary briefly to summarise 
Plato's main points before analyzing Weil's own theories and how they impact on 
O'Connor's work. 
Plato's argument with art and specifically literature can be categorised into four 
elements: first, the relation of art to reality, second, its emotional and psychological 
effect on its audience, third, the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, and 
finally, authorial intention and its censorship. Making a distinction between the 
transcendent Forms of the Good, True and Beautiful that exist in nature and those 
manufactured by both craftsmen and artists, Plato insists the latter reproduce merely 
insubstantial imitations that are progressively distanced from the unique actuality of 
the Forms~ with the artist's representation 'at third remove from reality' (S97e) at 
the lowest level of this vertical hierarchy. 
Reserving his severest criticism for poets who 'have no grasp of truth but merely 
produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat' (601), he considers literature 
ethically dangerous because its ersatz realism contrives to ensure humanity's baser 
instincts appear more interesting and exciting than their morally edifying 
counterparts. Aware of literature's capacity to have profound psychological effects, 
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Plato maintains that portraying immorality and human weakness 'wakens and 
encourages and strengthens the lower elements in the mind to the detriment of 
reason' (605b), encouraging audiences to admire and imitate the faults depicted, 
stimulating uninhibited indulgences in emotions which should be restrained (606d). 
Clearly Plato does not share Aristotle's notion of the cathartic benefits of poetic 
drama and poetry's capacity to be philosophical. 10 However, although doomed to 
remain inferior to dialectic, art can be inspirational in Plato's schema when 
rigorously controlled by moral criteria rather than motivated by a concern with its 
artistic value. As elsewhere in his philosophy goodness and beauty are inseparable 
in Plato's concept of artistic form, and directly linked to ethical content and 
authorial rectitude. Fictions which distort the essential truth that God is good and 
not responsible for evil are 'ugly' (377e, 379c), while the text's aesthetic beauty and 
harmony is dependent on the author's 'goodness of character' (401a). Authorial 
intention should be based on revealing divine justice and mercy, writers must 'say 
that God's acts were good and just, and that the sufferers were benefited by being 
punished' (380b). They must be 'severe rather than amusing', and obey the specific 
orders of the State requiring them 'to portray good character in their poems or not to 
write at all' (398b, 40tb). To ensure no psychological or spiritual damage is 
inflicted, artists must perceive 'the real nature of what is beautiful', and when this is 
achieved they lead their audiences 'into close sympathy and conformity with beauty 
and reason' (401c). 
Sharing Plato's insistence that fictions are inferior to philosophy, Weil believes 
literature has no value apart from its spiritual function of writing on the soul. 
Literary works are perceived as vehicles for communicating earthly and through 
them spiritual realities rather than self-contained, self-justifying entities. Rejecting 
'the sacred privilege of art for art's sake' (NR 24), she insists that the majority of 
fiction writers 'unless they have a philosophical bent in addition to a literary one, 
which is rare', are unworthy of intellectual attention (SWR 293-94). Their 
'conceptions about life and the world and their opinions on current problems can 
have no interest at all, and it is absurd that they should be called upon to express 
them' (294). Concurring with Plato that fiction writers misrepresent reality and cater 
to mankind's baser instincts, Wei! maintains that although authors should replicate 
experiential actuality by giving 'the feeling that it is good which is something 
abnormal', and making 'evil appear as vulgar. monotonous. dreary and boring' (NB 
113), the majority of fictions reverse the realities of good and evil. 'Fictional good is 
boring and flat. while fictional evil is varied and intriguing, attractive. profound, and 
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full of chann'. and consequently 'immorality is inseparable from literature' (SWR 
290). 
The idealistic naivety of considering experiential evil uninteresting will be 
examined in Chapter Two, but here concentrating on Weil's links with Plato, it is 
worth noting that in addition to her insistence on a connection between ethics and 
aesthetics, she is also Platonic in championing the State's right to censor authorial 
freedom. Resembling Plato's severe rather than amusing writer, Weil proposes 
measures disturbingly similar to the repressive authoritarianism of the Fascist 
regime which stifled her own artistic license. In The Need for Roots her own version 
of an ideal State (post-war France) is strikingly Platonic in its subjugation of 
authorial autonomy. The 'moment a writer fills a role among the influences 
directing public opinion, he cannot claim to exercise unlimited freedom' (NR 25), 
she insists. To 'protect the population from offenses against the truth', Weil 
proposes special courts able to suppress publications, publicly condemn and 
sentence to prison or hard labour those responsible for persistent and 'proven 
dishonesty of intention' (36). These reactionary measures would not undermine 
public liberty but 'only mean satisfaction of the human soul's most sacred 
need-protection against suggestion and falsehood' (36-38). 
As these remarks demonstrate, Weil considers some narratives not only fictional but 
dangerously fictitious. In doing so she underlines an important ambiguity in the 
meaning of 'fictionality' stemming from the Greek term for fiction (pseudos) , 
which embodies the dual sense of fictions as both 'what is not true', and narratives. 
In its twentieth century terminology 'fiction' retains this double connotation as a 
deliberately, deceptively false invention, and/or an imaginative creation. I I Weil is 
extremely interested in fiction(s) and a substantial portion of her writings are 
concerned with analyzing fictionality in each of its dual aspects, which in her own 
schema she divides into two types: ontological and literary. What makes Weil's 
theory of fictionality particularly relevant to a study of O'Connor's narratives is that 
it highlights the areas in which their thinking is both similar and distinct. First, 
Weil's concept of being fictional, and the need to transcend this state to achieve 
spiritual knowledge is comparable with O'Connor's notion of secularity. Second, 
Weirs philosophical view that literary fictions only write on the soul when their 
fictionality is overcome, is markedly different from O'Connor's literary notion that 
narratives have the capacity to be prophetic precisely because they are fictions. 
Initially I want to analyze Weil's concept of, and proposed remedies for ontological 
fictionality. In her essay' Morality and Literature' (published posthumously in 1944) 
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she explains this as mankind's endemic capacity to be fictional by evading the 
confrontation of painful realities which are a necessary part of human life, and vital 
to spiritual growth. While most literary narratives generate immorality by reversing 
the actualities of good and evil, human individuals replicate this process by 
shunning what is manifestly real and living fictionally. 
The substance of our life is almost entirely composed of fiction. We 
fictionalize our future and unless we are heroically devoted to truth, 
we fictionalize our past, refashioning it to our taste. We do not study 
other people; we invent what they are thinking, saying, and doing. 
(SWR292) 
Weil offers two solutions to rectify this state: first physical, and second intellectual. 
To escape the 'waking dream peopled by our fictions' (292), mankind must be 
forcibly returned to reality and coerced into abandoning the 'armour of lies' by 
which men 'can only appear to elevate themselves above human misery by 
disguising the rigours of destiny in their own eyes' (lC 54). The most harrowing 
awakening to what is real is achieved by confronting, and ultimately consenting to 
the violent suffering caused by physical amiction. As Weil's concept of amiction 
comprises a crucial part of her theology this form of writing on the soul will be 
analyzed in detail in Chapter Two. At this juncture it is necessary to concentrate on 
her intellectual method of overcoming ontological fictionality, which constitutes the 
exhaustive contemplation of contradictions. Although also relevant to her theology, 
Weil's theory of contradictions is a crucial part of her philosophical form, and must 
be comprehended before her theories of reading, language, textuality and literary 
fictions can be adequately analyzed. 
Contradiction is for Weil the mental equivalent of physical amiction. Just as the 
body confronted by corporeal suffering is forced to acknowledge its limitations and 
through them discovers what is real rather than a spurious, fictionalised reality, so is 
the intellect which meditates on contraries. 'We must touch impossibility in order to 
emerge from the dream state' (FLN 410) she claims. Contradictions 'are the only 
realities: they are the criterion of the real' (GG 89), because they make us 
'experience the fact that we are not All. Contradiction is our wretchedness, and the 
feeling of our wretchedness is the feeling of reality' (NB 411). Only through the 
intensely human reality of limitation can a higher spiritual Reality be approached. 
'There is no entry into the transcendent until the human faculties' have 'come up 
against a limit', with the individual forced to wait at this threshold, attention fixed, 
67 
in 'a state of extreme humiliation' (FLN 335). This concentrated and relentless 
contemplation of impossibility which Weil terms 'attention',12 constitutes the 
'proper method of philosophy', which 'consists in clearly conceiving the insoluble 
problems in all their insolubility and then in simply contemplating them, fixedly and 
tirelessly, year after year, without any hope patiently waiting' (335). 
What on the surface appears a somewhat futile exercise, is for Wei! a dynamic 
process of using reason to gradually approach an understanding of mystery. Her 
philosophical form is founded on dialectical thinking. 'Method of investigation: as 
soon as we have thought something, try and see in what way the contrary is true' 
(GG 93). This active search for contradictions is perceived as a way of writing on 
the soul. Access to truth, and eventually a transcendental Truth via concentrating on 
contraries is the basis ofWeil's philosophy, because she revisions impossibility and 
constraint as not the nullification of intellectual and spiritual progress, but 
paradoxically its beginning. Radical impossibility 'is the gate leading to the 
supernatural' (NB 413). the 'links that we cannot forge are evidence of the 
transcendent' (GG 87), and consequently contradiction 'is the lever of 
transcendence' (FLN 134). But this leverage only occurs when attempts to reconcile 
the contraries are legitimate, and Weil is careful to discriminate between defective 
and correct efforts to locate solutions. 
The illegitimate use of contradiction involves 'coupling together incompatible 
thoughts as if they were compatible' (OL 173). This delusive attempt to unite the 
opposites consists of being prematurely satisfied with an erroneous, 
one-dimensional solution to linking the contraries. 'Bad union of opposites (bad 
because fallacious) is that which is achieved on the same plane as the opposites' 
(GO 91), she insists. This is caused by evading the immensely difficult and painful 
process required in the legitimate use of contradiction. The 'right union of 
opposites' she argues, 'is achieved on a higher plane' (91). Involving 'a wrenching 
apart' which 'is impossible without extreme suffering' (92), because it requires 
tearing the individual out of a subjective viewpoint and into a more objective 
perception. When achieved a 'sort of unsticking process takes place', and by 
continuing to focus on the contradiction 'one finally reaches detachment' (NB 411). 
The multi-dimensional impartial vision necessary to the proper correlation of 
contraries constitutes a form of superposed reading. As we observed in the 
Introduction to this thesis , superposed reading involves a great deal more than its 
more orthodox notion of purely textual exegesis, although this too is an important 
area of its use. Superposed reading in the Weilean sense includes interpreting the 
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whole UnIverse, including other people and even ourselves, with complete 
neutrality. Learning to transcend the restrictively partisan readings which prejudice 
and distort our view of what is real is a crucial factor in solving the problem of 
ontological fictionality. We must be 'continually ready to admit that another person 
is something other than what we read-perhaps something altogether different' (43). 
Paradoxically this requires non-reading. 'What distinguishes the higher states from 
the lower ones is, in the higher states, the coexistence of several superposed planes', 
and it is 'a question of uprooting our readings of things, of changing them, so as to 
arrive at non-reading' (312), Weil claims. This requires attention in which above all 
'our thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive in 
its naked truth the object that is to penetrate it' (WFG 112). Non-reading is actually 
a prelude to the truest of readings, which require not only balancing multiple 
interpretations of an external event, person, or intellectual problem, but also 
incorporating a detached contemplation of our own involvement in this reading 
process. 'To read, and read at the same time one's own reading' (42) is the ultimate 
goal, because only then does objectivity replace subjectivity. 
This dispassionate view of reality is achieved when superposed reading is 
successfully applied to contradictions, which in Weil's work are divided into two 
major types: first paradoxes, and second, incommensurates. Derived from the Greek 
for 'beside' or 'beyond opinion', paradoxes are a legitimate use of contradiction and 
correlation by which Wei! attempts to escape biased readings and overcome 
ontological fictionality.13 Central to her philosophical thinking, paradoxical 
statements are a crucial aspect of her written form. 
But the most vital type of contradiction allowing the superposed thought upon which 
Weil's philosophical form is based is incommensuration, the comparison of things 
which have no common measure. Drawing her ideas on incommensuration from 
Pythagorean mathematics, Weil's major essay 'The Pythagorean Doctrine' provides 
a sustained analysis of how Pythagoreanism manages to assimilate irrational 
numbers by providing mediation on a higher plane to numbers rationally deprived of 
it. As this mathematical concept became a corner-stone of WeWs philosophical 
form it is necessary to briefly outline its main points. 
Believing the rational, intelligible principle governing the universe (the logos) to be 
located in proportion, the Pythagoreans perceived reality as a harmony between 
opposing forces: limit and infinity, unity and diversity, and were concerned to 
identify the proportional means which unite these contraries. Basing their thought on 
a cosmology which allocated all created things a number with the divine represented 
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by One, they were interested in how square root numbers have a bond with unity, 
and through mediation share an equality of relations ego 113 = 3/9. But confronted by 
the fact that not all numbers conform to this equation, they extended the definition 
of logos beyond mathematical ratios between rational numbers to include ratios 
involving incommensurates • the alogos. These logos alogos, having no common 
measure cannot be formulated, and therefore remain inexpressible. But although the 
Greeks could not alter the incommensuration between the two numbers, they did 
manage, as Eric O. Springstead notes, to 'transcend the limitations of the natural and 
irrational numbers by conceiving an order of numbers that incorporates both but is 
not reducible to the definitions of either'. 14 
This discovery proved revelatory to Weil, and she swiftly recognised the potential of 
applying such Pythagorean principles to other areas of her thought. 'Since it is 
possible in this way to equalize the notions in the case of two completely different 
pairs of magnitudes one could hope to be able also to apply the notion of ratio to 
psychological and spiritual matters', she writes in her Notebooks (162), and it is in 
Weil's theology that the concept of an equilibrium of incommensurates is most 
keenly pursued. A 'logos alogos is a scandal, an absurdity, a thing contrary to 
nature' (Ie 162), yet the fact that proportion can be discovered at a higher level of 
cognition 'forces the mind to deal in exact terms with those relationships which it is 
incapable of representing to itselr, and is consequently 'an admirable introduction 
to the mysteries of faith' (164) which are 'not of the order of truth but above it' (LP 
57). 
The 'basis of the supernatural is asymmetry, non-reciprocal relations' (FLN 194). 
and the intense struggle to conceive links between incommensurates is 'at the 
intersection between the natural and supernatural part of the soul', having the 
capacity to 'in a way give birth to reality' (Ie 188) imitating God's wisdom in 
creating the universe. Using a Hegelian analogy Weil contends that just as when we 
see only the visible angles and surfaces of a box we conceive through it a cube, 
humanity must cultivate this 'sort of transference of the sense of reality' (200) to 
approach divine mysteries. These secrets cannot be known directly but can be 
inferred by extension or 'resemblance' (201). providing we reorientate our 
viewpoint to perceive what is mysterious through the literal. By proceeding from 
'easily grasped thoughts about the sensible world' it becomes possible to prove there 
is 'an authentic, rigorous certainty concerning the incomprehensible mysteries' 
(164-65). 
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Weil's paradoxical concept of mystery as simultaneously accommodating certainty 
and incomprehensibility is made possible by the valid use of incommensuration. The 
greatest mysteries are conceived as those in which incommensurates, whilst 
remaining impossible to comprehend, are not only connected but display a mutual 
dependency. (The symbiotic relationship between God and ontic and moral evils is 
an example of this, see Chapter Two.) These ultimate contradictions allow mankind 
to realise with certainty that a transcendent unity does exist, yet remains 
unfathomable not due to an innate opacity, but because the human intellect is too 
limited fully to understand the connection. No less real because mankind is unable 
to discern them, when these enigmatic truths are recognised, they allow thoughts to 
be elevated beyond intelligence to a higher level of knowledge. 
The notion of mystery is legitimate when the most logical and 
rigorous use of the intelligence leads to an impasse, to a contradiction 
which is inescapable in this sense: that the suppression of one term 
makes the other meaningless and that to pose one term necessarily 
involves posing the other. Then, like a lever, the notion of mystery 
carries thought beyond the impasse, to the other side of the 
unopenable door, beyond the domain of the intelligence and above it. 
(FLN 181) 
The correct use of contradiction and correlation is vital to overcoming ontological 
fictionality and offers a method of intellectual progression towards an ultimate 
Truth. It facilitates 'a contact between the mind and that which is not thinkable. It is 
supernatural, but real' (OL 173). Yet it is important to note that Weil considers this 
breakthrough to gnosis unachievable by purely human means and dependent on 
supernatural assistance. 'We cannot by suggestion obtain things which are 
incompatible. Only grace can do that' (NB 435), she insists. Human effort is 
essential and must be concentrated on attempting to locate connections between the 
opposites, because like 'a ladder', each correlation 'raises us to a higher level where 
resides the connection which unifies the contraries' (412). But human reason is 
exhausted before this connection can be fully understood, and the intellect can only 
accept its incapacity whilst acknowledging 'in the domain of the transcendent 
contradictories are possible', and 'like doors on which one must knock again and 
again, because in the end they will open' (FLN 269). Grace is the key. One 'should 
fix the soul's gaze on that limit with the longing for that which lies beyond [ ... ] 
Grace will accomplish the rest, causing one to go up and emerge' (NB 527). 
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Mysteries finally have divine rather than human solutions, because a higher, 
unnatural reason exists. In her New York notebook Weil clarifies a distinction 
between two different kinds of rationality - supernatural and natural - based on her 
familiar hierarchical model. Supernatural reason is not surprisingly superior, with its 
logic 'more rigorous than that a/natural reason' (FLN 109). What is 'contradictory 
for natural reason is not so for supernatural reason', but crucially, 'the latter can 
only use the language of the fonner' (109). 
The action of writing on the soul is inextricably allied to the human vocabulary by 
which it must, in its philosophical, literary, or theological forms attempt an 
explanation of the inexplicable. stretching words to their limits of inference in order 
to discourse about divine realities. IS Weil's advocation of the superposed reading of 
contradictions constitutes an effort to read spiritually by moving beyond the 
confines of a horizontal, literal perspective. Her endemic use of unconventional 
analogies, metaphors and paradoxes mirrors this linkage of contraries by stimulating 
the perception of a connection between entities which conflict or are not nonnally 
associated with each other. The more startling the connection the greater its ability 
to defamiliarise (in the Fonnalist sense) habitual viewpoints and stimulate an 
alternative vision. 16 But although Wei! communicates her spiritual notion of truth 
through a vibrantly figurative syntax she is convinced that language must be 
rigorously controlled and defined if it is ultimately to provide an effective medium 
for adequately expressing human, and through them spiritual truths, and participate 
in establishing a more religiously conscious community. 
Wei! was appalled by what she considered 'the enfeeblement of the sense of value' 
rife in the twentieth century and encouraged by such movements as Dadaism, and 
Surrealism: 'a literary equivalent for the sacking of towns' (SWR 288). Attributing 
to writers a 'special responsibility' for the fate of language 'since words are their 
business" Weil's solution to this morally destabilizing tendency to erect 
'nonorientated thought as a model', is to introduce a hierarchy of language to 
prevent the debasement of words by revitalising their spiritual dimensions whilst 
ensuring they are simultaneously relevant to human life (289, 288). 
Weil considers it absolutely crucial that words be a rigorously accurate 
representation of the intellectual and physical realities they represent, because 
language, thoughts, actions and their consequences are integrally connected. 'To 
clarify thought, to discredit the intrinsically meaningless words, and to define the 
use of others by precise analysis-to do this. strange though it may appear, might be a 
way of saving human lives' she writes in her essay 'The Power of Words' (published 
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in 1937) (270-71). Where 'there is a grave error of vocabulary it is almost certainly 
the sign of a grave error of thought' (314). Such inaccuracies allow words to serve 
any purpose, making them susceptible to the dangerous sloganizing of political 
extremism, and when 
empty words are given capital letters then, on the slightest pretext, 
men will begin shedding blood for them and piling up ruin in their 
name, without effectively grasping anything to which they refer, 
since what they refer to can never have any reality. (270) 
Weil's experiences of both Communism and Fascism undoubtedly contributed to 
this pessimism and obsession with linguistic clarity, and it is no coincidence that the 
language of the collective, with its reductive, ill-defined generalizations which mean 
essentially nothing and lead to examples of 'lethal absurdity', is the lowest rung in 
her hierarchy (271). At the intermediate level are properly clarified words useful for 
earthly needs, such as 'right', 'democracy' and 'person'. The highest level of 
language refers to perfection mankind cannot actually conceive: 'God', 'truth" 
'good', 'love', 'justice' and 'beauty'. When legitimately used, these words are not 
limited to any particular concept as they are beyond human understanding (337-38). 
That at its supreme level language is not bound to definite concepts appears to 
contradict Weil's emphasis on linguistic clarity. But her approach is consistent with 
the rest of her thinking on physical, intellectual, and spiritual constraints and the 
surpassing of these boundaries. 'A mind enclosed in language is in prison' because 
it is restricted to the number of connotations each word invokes, remaining 'in 
ignorance of thoughts which involve the combination ofa greater number' (330). To 
escape the confinement of a horizontal signifier-signified vocabulary requires 
linguistic precision and superposed thinking. Yet critically, superposed thoughts are 
'outside language, they are unformulatable, although they are perfectly rigorous and 
clear and although every one of the relations they involve is capable of precise 
expression in words' (330). 
In essence, superposed thinking exceeds the vocabulary available to it. The mind 
circumscribed by language 'can possess only opinions', while in its capacity to 
conceive multiple relationships, the superposed inteJlect escapes subjectivity 
attaining the point where it 'dwells in truth' (331). To achieve this plane of 
cognisance the human mind 'has come to the end of its intelligence, such as it was, 
and has passed beyond it' (331). Writing on the soul is dependent on surmounting 
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the impediments of human form: corporeal suffering and intellectual humiliation. 
and similarly language becomes a bridge to a transcendent reality when not confined 
to human concepts. The revelatory, redemptive power of words is ultimately due to 
the mysteries which exist beyond them. But if appropriately used the highest 
language has a totemic quality. Visible signifiers of ungraspable truths, these words, 
like the logos alogos, have the power to inspire humanity and elevate it towards 
grace. 'Since the proper use of these words involves not trying to make them fit any 
conception, it is in the words themselves, as words, that the power to enlighten and 
draw upwards resides' (337). 
Ultimately it is the Word of God which is revelatory and redemptive, and Chapter 
Three will analyse how Weil and O'Connor paradoxically conceive this Word as 
silence, the ultimate failure of human language. However, Weil considers that texts 
produced by genius can offer 'the ever-flowing source of an inspiration which may 
legitimately guide us', which 'if we know how to receive it', tends to 'make us grow 
wings to overcome gravity' .17 The texts Weil classifies as the product of genius are 
drawn from various discourses: Pythagorean mathematics, Plato's philosophy, 
Eastern and Judaeo-Christian religious writings, and English, French, and Greek 
literature. Finding them inspirational is dependent on reading them all theologically, 
and one of the most interesting facets of Weil's interpretative strategy is how she 
reads non-Christian texts as alternative Christian gospels. Paradoxically, despite her 
concern to promote objective rather than subjective readings, Weil is parochial in 
her biased distortions of these writings. 
By splitting her proposed works of genius into two groups I want first, to examine 
how Weil considers the mathematical, philosophical and religious texts transcend 
their textual status, before second, analyzing her criteria for overcoming literary 
fictionality. The key to understanding the first group of writings is Weil's 
perspective of history, which rejects Judeo-Christian notions of linear, chronological 
progression. 'Past and future are symmetrical' she claims in Leller to a Priest, 
chronology 'cannot playa decisive role in a relationship between God and man, a 
relationship one of the terms of which is eternal' (LP 16-17). Rejecting the orthodox 
Christian concept of the Old Testament as a prefigurement of the New, Weil 
substitutes pagan texts of genius in its place. These non-Christian writings are 
considered not merely texts but prophecies of God, revelations of the same truth 
later contained in the Gospels, and as such, alternative scriptures which transcend 
their textual status to write on the soul. Greek geometry is 'the most dazzling of all 
the prophecies which foretold the Christ' (Ie 171), with references to proportion 
designating 'the relationship of the disciples to Christ and of Christ to His Father' 
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(160). Weil even claims Christ recognised himself 'as being that mean proportional 
of which the Greeks had for centuries been thinking so intensely' (161). 
Locating the 'haunting of the Passion' in Greek civilization (71), she interprets 
Prometheus, Dionysius, Apollo, Artemis, Aphrodite and other mythic figures as 
multiple renditions of the single being of Christ. 18 This tendency to recast Greek 
texts in Christian terms is notable in Weil's readings of Plato,19 whom she 
frequently interprets theologically rather than philosophically. As a 'mystic', his 
wisdom constitutes 'not a philosophy, a search for God by means of human reason'. 
but rather 'an orientation of the soul towards grace' (74,85). Eastern religious 
writings are equally subject to Weil's relentless process of Christianization. The 
Hindu trinity of Vishnu, Brahma and Shiva is perceived as an analogy of the 
Christian Trinity (LP 32), China's Tao (,I am the Way') is interpreted as an image of 
Christ (FLN 322), and she classifies the Egyptian myth of Osiris as a 'prophecy' of 
Christ 'infinitely clearer, more complete and closer to the truth than everything 
which goes by that name in the Old Testament' (19). 
Stressing the connection between pagan civilizations and Christianity, Weil insists it 
is 'a matter of urgency to remedy the divorce' between them if Christianity is to 
'impregnate the whole of profane life as it ought to do' (LP 19,85). Old Testament 
writings, like their non-Judaic counterparts are denied their socio-cultural 
specificity, with Job read palimpsestically as an adaptation of an earlier work about 
dying and reviving gods, and a representation of Plato's 'just man,.20 
This elision of Hebrew culture is most apparent in Weil's readings of the New 
Testament, which she explicitly links to Greek rather than Judaic narratives. The 
gospels 'are the last and most marvellous expression of Greek genius' (IC 52) she 
contends, and in her essay 'God's Quest for Man' Christ's parable of the mustard 
seed (Mark 4:30-32) is read as a representation of both the myth of Persephone, and 
Plato's seed of spiritual knowledge (3). The Christian distinction between the 
'called' and 'Elect' is related to Plato's cave analogy (4). while the accounts of the 
Passion. by showing how even a divine being when made flesh is subject to human 
affliction and feels 'at the moment of deepest agony, separated from men and from 
God', replicate the bare depiction of human misery which 'is the stamp of Greek 
genius' (52). Weil maintains these various 'concordances' between pre-Christian 
and Christian texts do not deny the gospels' historicity, and are 'no threat to the 
faith', but 'on the contrary an overwhelming confirmation of it' (119). Yet Weil's 
subjective readings distort and deracinate the historical and cultural contexts from 
which these writings are derived. Her blatant antipathy to Judaic, and admiration for 
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Greek and Eastern civilizations warps her judgement to the extent that she can be 
accused of fictionalizing these texts.21 
Weil's notions of literary fictionality and the writer's role comprise a vital part of 
her writings and provide important guidelines for interrogating O'Connor's literary 
schema, so I shall now concentrate in detail on Weil's criteria for solving the 
'problem' of literary fictions. Again genius is required, and in its literary form can 
be categorised into four important aesthetic requirements. Literary texts of genius 
must first, overcome their fictional status by accurately rendering experiential 
reality, second, demonstrate a superposed structure, third, recall the reader to 
spiritual truths through depicting suffering and showing that grace comes violently, 
and finally must display crucial epiphanic moments in which individuals 
momentarily defy the forces of gravity by which they are normally constrained, and 
in doing so locate their souls. 
If for Weil human life may be, and usually is fictional, fictional narratives can 
partake of reality. The greatest value literary fictions possess is ironically the 
capacity to overcome their fictional status. Only writers of genius (those with a 
philosophical in addition to a literary perspective) can achieve this by giving their 
readers, 'in the guise of fiction, something equivalent to the actual density of the 
real' (P 292). Art 'is an attempt to transport into a limited quantity of matter. 
modeled by man, an image of the infinite beauty of the entire universe' which when 
successfully achieved 'should reveal its reality to all' (WFG 168). In the cosmos this 
beauty is comprised of 'necessity which while remaining in conformity with its own 
law and with that alone, is obedient to the good' (GG 135). In artistic creations the 
principle is the same.22 In a beautiful poem a word is in a particular place simply 
because 'it is suitable that it should be' (WFG 176). Obedient to the laws 
appropriate to its composition, it is aesthetically good when 'the reader does not 
wish it other than it is'. (176) 
Just as her philosophical form is essentially organic, with contradictions ultimately 
reconciled, Weil's notion of the universe and art is predicated on an awareness of 
multiplicity yet eventual cohesion. Literary forms as microcosms of the cosmos are 
governed by parallel laws of necessity and limitation encapsulated within an aU 
encompassing organic unity that finally reconciles competing internal elements. Art 
is the 'necessary harmonizing of expressive parts' (NB 177), in which the equivalent 
of necessity 
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is the resistance of matter and arbitrary rules. Rhyme imposes upon 
the poet a direction for his choice of words which is absolutely 
unrelated to the sequence of ideas. Its function in poetry is perhaps 
analogous to that of affliction in our lives. (WFG 177) 
Texts of genius make manifest the reality of affliction that experiential existence 
offers but which we are unable to appreciate due to living fictionally. Although 
constructed of words, 'there is present in them the force of gravity which governs 
our souls', ensuring they 'are outside the realm of fiction and they release us from it' 
(SWR292). 
In Weil's second qualification for texts of genius, literature transcends its textuality 
and exposes mankind's ontological fictionality when it displays 'gravity' with 
detachment. This requires a superposed structure in which 'several slopes are 
simultaneously visible and perceptible' (293). The reader 
does not descend any of them. He feels gravity in the way we feel it 
when we look over a precipice, if we are safe and not subject to 
vertigo. He perceives the unity and diversity of its forms in this 
architecture of the abyss. (293) 
What this hierarchical vision reveals is that the two major forms of gravity (the 
indifferent mechanism controlling the natural world, and humanity's perpetration of 
evil) are united in their submission to the brute force of necessity. The capacity of 
this force 'to transform man into a thing is double and it cuts both ways; it petrifies 
differently but equally the souls of those who suffer it, and those who wield it' (IC 
44-45). Despite attempts to evade this force no-one escapes its horrifying power, and 
consequently all are both victims and agents of gravity, sharing in the common 
human experience of enduring suffering against the will. 
This brings us to the third of Weil's criteria. Narratives must depict this most 
essential of human realities, enforced submission to necessity and the terrible 
agonies it inflicts, because only through such sufferings are spiritual truths obtained. 
Weil here incorporates two important features of Greek thought into her theory of 
literature. First, the notion of an arbitrary force which encourages wisdom by 
inflicting suffering equally on the just and the unjust with 'geometric strictness' 
(35), and which is derived from the Greek concept of Nemesis. Second, her 
conviction that affliction endured against the will leads to specifically spiritual 
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knowledge is influenced by the principle of anamnesis. To be jolted into 
remembrance of this sacred wisdom requires suffering against the will, because 
precisely in and through human misery the soul, if it resists corruption. becomes 
capable of divine knowledge. 
There is no value in suffering for its own sake, its function is to make grace possible 
by forcing the ego to reluctantly accept its domination by necessity, Man must 
'consider himself a limited and dependent being' and 'suffering alone can teach him 
this', Weil claims, misfortunes 'break a man by violence, and make him fit, in spite 
of himself to receive wisdom' (57). The crucial, core principle which Weil's 
theories of necessity and affiiction share with the Greeks is that grace is violent. In 
her essay 'Zeus and Prometheus' she quotes a chorus from Agamemnon which 
, concludes: 
By suffering comes understanding. 
So accrues to the heart, drop by drop, during sleep, 
The wage of dolorous memory; 
And even without willing it, wisdom comes. 
From the Gods who sit at the celestial helm, 
grace comes violently. (56-57) 
Believing this • suffering that contains within itself remembrance' functions 'as 
mediation' for the Greeks (NB 390), Weil concludes literary texts of genius share 
this mediatory function. Through their ability to render affiiction, like the reality of 
violent affliction itself, they have the capacity to escape fictionality and write 
metaphysical truths on the soul. Great literature manifests the crucial relationship 
between violence, affiiction, and redemption. There is 'a transmutation of violence 
into suffering', and consequently a 'participation in the work of redemption' (507). 
Vitally, these texts are themselves involved in the redemptive process, and have an 
impact on the soul. This pivotal moment of agonizing ailliction must not be 
cheapened in value by being just fictional. 'The nobleness of suffering is not to be 
spoken of lightly or too often; it can too easily become mere literature in the mouth 
of people who have not suffered pain that can break the very soul', (SL 104) 
A distinguishing factor between the merely literary and texts of literary genius is 
their ability to evoke both the bitterness and beauty of a world dominated by gravity 
but ultimately sustained by grace. All first class art contains a 'core of bitterness'. 
but accurate depiction must include the final of Weil's literary criteria, not only the 
portrayal of extreme suffering, but also, 'sprinkled here and there, luminous 
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moments, brief and divine moments' where 'men find their souls' (NB 258. IC 46). 
In these epiphanic 'moments of grace' the soul 'awakes pure and intact' and 
'realizes itself whole', briefly escaping necessity before being condemned 'to lose 
itself again to the empire of might'. (46) 
In the greatest literature this inexplicable combination of human suffering and the 
mysterious interaction of grace provides a source of meditation and inspiration for 
dealing with the crucial and universal cry of all humanity: 'Why must I suffer?' This 
question resonates through the Weilean canon of literary texts of genius which is 
characterised by a concentration on narratives that are subsumed by depictions of 
suffering. Weil's favourite English and French fictions are significantly their 
author's most harrowing texts, providing the minimum consolation for affliction. 
Omitting to acknowledge the importance of comedy to these writers is typical of 
Weil's severe vision, epitomizing her tendency to distort texts and consequently 
provide subjective interpretations rather than the objective, superposed readings she 
considers essential. Shakespeare's tragedies are all 'second-class except for Lear', 
which is a supreme 'tragedy of gravity' (GG 136, NB 138). Villon is the finest 
French poet because 'his purity of soul is clearly manifest through the heartbreaking 
expression of misfortune', while the greatness of Racine's Phedre is due to the fact 
that 'human misery is revealed in its nakedness'. (NR 225, IC 54) 
In Greek epics such as Sophocles' Antigone and Aeschylus' Prometheus Weil found 
texts more naturally suitable to her vision of mankind weighed down by gravity but 
intennittently illuminated by grace.23 The narrative most important to Weil, and 
the one she considered a superlative example of literary genius is Homer's Iliad, 
and her extensive essay 'The Iliad Poem of Might' is a tour de force on how fictions 
can transcend their fictionality and demonstrate the interrelationship of gravity and 
grace.24 But Weil considers literary writers of genius as rare as the instants of grace 
they depict, and significantly believes these authors are themselves graced. The lIiad 
and the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles 'bear the clearest indication that the 
poets who produced them were in a state of holiness' (NR 224), she claims. Their 
genius resides 'beyond the scope of our effort', and is 'pure to the extent of being 
manifestly very close to the greatness characteristic of the most perfect among the 
saints' (SWR 293, NR 225). This notion of the sanctity of writers of genius is both 
contentious and important, connecting Weil's theories of writing on the soul and 
overcoming fictionality. By insisting on equating genius with sanctity she stresses 
the prophetic function of writing at the expense of its artistic creativity and 
autonomy. Typical of Weirs philosophicaVtheo]ogical approach to literary fictions 
and their reception (texts must transcend textuality, great writers require sanctity, 
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readers must read spiritually), writing on the soul is intimately connected to the soul 
of the writer. 
Weil's concept of the author's role is a crucial area of her literary aesthetics. and 
involves making distinctions between writers of genius and their inferior 
counterparts, whose sole raison d'etre consists of providing the appropriate milieu 
to support the emergence of genius. She considers it imperative to distinguish 
between true and false genius, and significantly uses an analogy from Christ's 
parable urging vigilance against false prophets (Matthew 7: 15-20). 'True greatness 
is the good fruit which grows on the good tree, and the good tree is a disposition of 
the soul akin to holiness' she contends in The Need for Roots (227). Only writers 
sanctified by genius can fulfil their prophetic function, having 'the power to awaken 
us to the truth' (SWR 292). In 'The Responsibility of Writers' Wei! explains that to 
achieve this they 'do not have to be professors of morals, but they do have to express 
the human condition. And nothing concerns human life so essentially, for every man 
at every moment, as good and evil' (289). Because writers and readers participate in 
the actual world at the same time as creating literary worlds, 'it is impossible for 
literature to be exempted from the categories of good and evil' (292). To those who 
contend immorality is not an aesthetic criterion Weil insists 'they must prove as they 
have never done, that aesthetic criteria are the only ones applicable to literature' 
(292). The morality of both text and author is, as we noted when tracing Weil's links 
with Plato, a vital part of her own literary aesthetic. 
'When literature becomes deliberately indifferent to the opposition of good and evil 
it betrays its function and forfeits all claim to excellence' (289), she claims, and it is 
essential to correct 'the usurpation by writers [of non-genius] of the function of 
spiritual guidance, for which they are totally unsuited' (293). Only authors 'of the 
highest order of genius in their full maturity' (293) are capable of avoiding this 
'Messianic delusion' (294). The genuine sanctity of genius is very different from the 
sanctimoniousness of non-genius. 'Writers with pretensions to high morality are no 
less immoral than the others, they are merely worse writers' (291) she insists. Only 
the greatest saints and geniuses may legitimately direct the consciences of their 
readers, but making an exception for priests, Wei} claims that although often 
corrupt, as they have the saints and principally Christ as their inspiration and try to 
imitate them, they are 'able to communicate more good than they themselves 
possess' (295). A writer however has 'only himself to fall back on', and although he 
may 'be influenced' by other authors, 'he cannot draw his inspiration from them'. 
(295) 
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Weil's dismissal of the average writer's religious role is flawed by her exception of 
the non-genius category of priests. This point seriously undennines Weil's 
classically philosophical concept of the inferiority of art, and specifically her 
notions of the writer's role and her equation of immorality with literature. Ifwriters 
of non-genius can also be prophetic, literary fictionality may not be a problem to 
overcome but a medium through which to write successfully on the soul. 
The obvious personal importance to Weil of literary texts such as the Iliad in 
articulating and developing her philosophy, raises the important question of whether 
fictions may be as effective, and possibly even more capable of writing on the soul 
than rational philosophicallogic.25 Weil's implicit recognition that it is, could at 
least partially explain her critical assaults on what she considers inferior writers, and 
her attempts to philosophise fictions. But if the finest fiction writers and their 
narratives are philosophical, are philosophers of genius and their texts in a sense 
fictional? 
This is an important point touched upon by Gustave Thibon. Observing that 'no 
genius is a mere witness: he is not content to discover, he invents; his productions 
are an amalgam of revelation and creation', he argues this should be as acceptable in 
philosophy as literature (perrin & Thibon 141). Allowing 'philosophic myths' would 
'save a great number of things which the bare criterion of fact and fiction would 
eliminate for ever from the works of great thinkers', particularly Weil, with 'her 
unfailing gift for creating myths' (142). Therefore, instead of 
taking what she says literally and accepting or rejecting it according 
to whether of not it fits in with logic or facts, we should find the true 
meaning of the construction of her genius and restore to it its deep 
value which is above all a symbolic and evocative value. (142) 
Controversially, Thibon's argument requires WeB's audience not to judge her 
philosophy by philosophy's most essential criteria: logical discourse. Instead his 
claim for the primarily evocative and symbolic value of her work emphasises its 
prophetic quality, which he equates with a creative rather than rational impulse. 
Fictions, like reality, have various levels and perspectives and consequently 
narratives such as The Divine Comedy are 'untrue in the order of facts and true in 
the order of greatness and beauty'. and therefore he claims 'we should use 
analogous criteria in order to appreciate the "mythical" side' of Weil's 
philosophy.26 Myth is a complex tenn,27 but Thibon apparently suggests that 
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Weil's works can benefit from being read as philosophical narratives or fictions, 
creations which reveal trUths beyond a simple IiteraVfictional, IogicaVilJogical axis, 
and in doing so awaken readers to a profounder reality. 
The suggestion that Weil's philosophy writes on the soul most effectively when read 
as a faction or kind of philosophical fiction is significant because it implies 
fictionality can be an important element of writing prophetically. O'Connor, as 
prophetic writer considers fictions a more successful form for the revelation of truth 
than philosophy. Claiming the Southerner 'knows he can do more justice to reality 
by telling a story than he can by discussing problems or proposing abstractions', she 
insists she lives 'in a complex region and you have to tell stories if you want to be 
anyway truthful about it' (Mullins, CFO 103). However, I want to commence my 
discussion of O'Connor with this point and reverse it, using my analysis of Wei! to 
demonstrate how O'Connor's 'philosophical bent', her essentially theological 
inclination, is integral to her attempt to write on the soul. Because O'Connor as 
writer-prophet addresses many of the same theological issues as Weil, before 
analysing O'Connor's concept of literary fictionality, and the major differences and 
similarities with Weil's schema; it is useful to provide a brief preliminary analysis 
of three particular aspects of Weil's theology. First, Weil's doctrine of creation, 
second, theodicy, and third, her understanding of the nature of grace. 
Weil's doctrine of creation is founded on the principle that the act of creation 
amounts to a voluntary self-diminution through which God is agonisingly distanced 
from himself. 'On God's part creation is not an act of self-expansion but of restraint 
and renunciation'(WFG 145). Between the persons of the Trinity 'there is more than 
nearness; there is infinite nearness or identity. But through the Creation, the 
Incarnation, and the Passion, there is also infinite distance', Weil maintains (SWR 
446). Controversially, the creation coincides with Chrisfs crucifixion. The persons 
of the Trinity are distanced from each other across space, and from the beginning of 
time. God is crucifyingly separated from God by the whole of creation, and allowing 
the existence of a humanity that is 'distinct from himself and worth infinitely Jess 
than himself (WFG 145). God is riven by permitting the autonomy of his creatures. 
Man is at the furthest distance from God, separated by the whole of necessity, and 
the moral evils which result from human existence. Therefore in 'our being God is 
tom asunder. We are God's crucifixion' (NB 564). 
According to Weil, although God is omnipotent, paradoxically he is impotent, 
because he refrains from exercising his sovereign power within the world. He 
effectively abandons it to the forces of necessity.28 Mankind is itself subject to 
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immense torment via the impact of the indifferent mechanism of gravity: affliction 
and evil. But ifas Weil claims, 'God created through love and for love' (SWR 444), 
how is it possible to justify establishing and abandoning a cosmos in which 
horrifying ontic and moral evils exist? Weil's theodicy depends on reconceiving the 
world of necessity and amiction as not merely a separation of God from man, but 
also as the primary source of contact between them. Weil conceives this in two 
ways. First, by considering that the indiscriminate forces of necessity in the natural 
world are ultimately obedient to external parameters imposed by God. 'The brute 
force of matter, which appears to us sovereign, is nothing else in reality but perfect 
obedience', she insists, each 'visible and palpable force is subject to an invisible 
limit which it shall never cross' (NR 272, 274). This concealed 'plexus of limits' 
ensures that although it is pitiless, the 'order of the world is to be loved because it is 
pure obedience to God', and consequently, all human life, including the terrible 
experience of affliction, 'places us in contact with the absolute good formed by the 
divine will' (275, 276). Although there is no answer to why human beings suffer, by 
perceiving, and accepting, the superposed nature of necessity as both brutal force, 
and evidence of God's love, the traumas of ontological existence form a bridge, 
rather than a barrier, between God and man. 
The second way in which Weil considers the forces of necessity a source of contact 
between humanity and God, is by regarding man's affliction as a kinship with 
Christ's agony on the cross, through which mankind can be united with God's love. 
'The mutual love between God and man is suffering' according to Weil, 'God's love 
for us means passion. How could Good love Evil without suffering thereby? And 
Evil suffers too in loving Good' (NB 564). It is Christ, as both God and man, who 
reconciles God's love and man's distress, through the cross. At the instant when he 
feels forsaken by his Father, the crucified Christ is like mankind, at the furthest 
point from God, separated by the immensity of space and time, and questioning why 
he has been abandoned in his agony. Yet by consenting to his affliction whilst 
continuing to love God, Christ spans the universe and is reunited with his Father in 
the Trinity. Through participating in Christ's cross by accepting the reality of his 
own inconsolable distress, man has the capacity to be reconciled with God. Any 
human being 'has his part in the Cross of Christ if he loves truth to the point of 
facing ailliction rather than escape into the depths of falsehood', Weil maintains 
(SWR 464). 'By assimilation with the Christ, who is one with God, the human being 
lying in the depths of his misery, attains a sort of equality with God, an equality 
which is love' (IC 170). 
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The linkage between the incommensurates of God and man through a combination 
of love and affliction, self-loss and redemptive suffering, is essential to Weil's 
understanding of the nature of grace.29 Because mankind is incapable of 
independently raising itself above the restraints of gravity and moving towards God, 
grace constitutes a gratuitous self-communication of God to man, in WeWs schema. 
But she insists 'it would be a mistake to count on grace alone. Energy from this 
world is also needed' (FLN 348). A relationship between God and man is possible 
through first. God's bestowal of grace on humanity, and second. man's capacity to 
co-operate with God's gift by disposing his soul to receive, accept, and cultivate 
grace in the soul. 
God's part in the action of grace takes three principle forms. First, although he has 
abdicated his control of the creation by abandoning it to the forces of necessity, 
God is 'really though secretly present' within the world (WFG 137). in religious 
rituals, the beauty of the world, and in human beings. Second, God descends into the 
souls of all 'those who ask him to come, and he cannot refuse to come to those who 
implore him long. often, and ardently'. Weil claims (111). Third, God crosses the 
infinity of time and space to seize man's soul by violent grace. 'Grace abducts (it is 
a ravishment) then seduces. The soul does not give itself, it is taken,.3D This seizure 
of the soul by violence can itself be divided into two manifestations. First, God tears 
open the soul through man's joy in the beauty of the world, or the impact of 
affliction. Second, God's compulsion on the soul enables man to inflict violence on 
his own will. Man becomes capable of compelling himself to carry out moral 
obligations which raise the soul to a higher level, and eventually, enable man to 
accept the loss of his fictional self, which is necessary to effect a saving reunion 
with God. 
Weil's concept of man's part in co-operating with grace depends on the notion that 
God crosses the universe to make contact with humanity, and man must make the 
return journey to God. Three main responses to God's action are available to make 
this possible. First, man should seek out, and focus his love and attention on the 
bridges through which God makes himself available in the natural world. Second, if 
man assents to the tribulations of human life, and waits obediently, focusing all his 
attention, love, and desire on God, God is drawn into the soul. Third, it is essential 
for man to consent to the violent grace which rends his soul. This requires man's 
unqualified acceptance of the world of necessity and his subjection to affliction, 
acquiescence to the terrible experience of void which this lack of consolation 
generates, and finally; man must tolerate his loss of self, or 'decreation'. 
'De-creation [is] regarded as the transcendent completion of creation' by Weil, 
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because the annihilation of man's egocentric 'I' makes direct contact between God 
and man possible, by bringing full circle God's act of self-renunciation in the 
creation.31 Man becomes a passageway through which God is finally reconnected 
with himself in the supernatural part of the soul. After experiencing such an 
epiphanic encounter with God, man's soul is decisively changed. Although he 
remains subject to the forces of necessity, man himself becomes a mediator for 
God's love within the world. 
Having established the basic tenets of Weil's theology, I will now indicate how 
O'Connor's vital philosophical, theological inclination, is displayed by her concept 
of fictionality as more than literariness. Like Weil, O'Connor perceives fictionality 
in two forms: ontological and literary. To appraise her notion of ontological 
fictionality it is necessary to recognise how O'Connor's notion of being fictional is 
intrinsically connected to how she perceives reality. 
All novelists 'are fundamentally seekers and describers of the real, but the realism 
of each novelist will depend on his view of the ultimate reaches of reality' (MM 
40-41), O'Connor contends. Her own metaphysical perspective is based on Christian 
dogma. 'I see from the standpoint of Christian orthodoxy. This means that for me 
the meaning of life is centred in our Redemption by Christ and what I see in the 
world I see in its relation to that' (32). If for O'Connor the ultimate Reality is 
spiritual, ontological fictionality consists of being secular, and is a consequence of 
modem man being 'increasingly convinced that the reaches of reality end very close 
to the surface, that there is no ultimate divine source, that the things of the world do 
not pour forth from God' (157). Her solution to being fictional is like Weil's, 
dependent on the notion that physical suffering and violent grace facilitates a 
stripping away of grotesquely solipsistic perceptions of self and world, ensuring a 
forcible return to what is real, an epiphanic moment when men find their souls and 
encounter the divine. The idea that 'reality is something to which we must be 
returned at considerable cost' is 'implicit in the Christian view of the world' (112) 
according to O'Connor, and as her concept of ontological flctionality forms an 
essential element of her theology and notion of the grotesque, it will be analysed in 
detail in Chapter Two. In the discussion which follows I will concentrate on 
O'Connor's concept of literary fictionality and its major differences and similarities 
with Weil's schema, concluding with an examination of how WeiI's criteria for 
texts of literary and spiritual genius interrogate O'Connor's concept of the Catholic 
novel, and her attempts to write Christian truths on the souls of her readers. 
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First it is important to identify the reasons why as a prophetic writer O'Connor 
adopts a primarily fictional rather than philosophical or theological form of 
communicating her ideas. Considering prophecy 'a matter of seeing near things with 
their extensions of meaning and thus of seeing far things close up' (44), O'Connor 
believes fictions are uniquely capable of encapSUlating this dual vision. It is 
the peculiar characteristic of fiction that its literal surface can be 
made to yield entertainment on an obvious physical plane to one sort 
of reader while the selfsame surface can be made to yield meaning to 
the person equipped to experience it there. (95) 
Its ability to render both literal and profound levels of meaning ensures that fiction 
is 'so very much an incarnational art' (68), but the 'peculiar problem' confronting 
the prophetic' fiction writer is how to actualise this vision, and 'make the action he 
describes reveal as much of the mystery of existence as possible' by making 'the 
concrete work double time' (98). O'Connor considers the solution to this dilemma 
of endowing fictions with a prophetic dimension is to replicate the form of religious 
narratives. Each time 'the sacred text describes a fact, it reveals a mystery' she 
insists, and this 'is what the fiction writer, on his lesser level hopes to do' (184). To 
be great storytellers 'we need something to measure ourselves against', and these 
'guides' exist in 'the form of stories which affect our image and our judgement of 
ourselves' (202). Philosophical and theological abstractions are inadequate. It 'takes 
a story to make a story', requiring a narrative 'of mythic dimensions. one which 
belongs to everybody, one in which everybody is able to recognize the hand of God 
and its descent' (202). The 'Hebrew genius for making the absolute concrete' 
ensures that the scriptures, by displaying the eternal meaning and consequences 
attached to human life, are a paradigm for the prophetic fiction writer. As the sacred 
myths most commonly shared (especially in the South), the bible narratives provide 
'ties to the universal and the holy', allowing the meaning of an individual's 'every 
action to be heightened and seen under the aspect of eternity' (202, 203). 
Like Weil, O'Connor considers this capacity of fictions to encourage the perception 
of a sacred dimension to human existence their most admirable aspect. But 
O'Connor deviates from Weil's theory of literature in four major areas. First, on the 
value of fictions, second, her approach to immoral fictional content, third, the 
writer's role, and fourth, the uses of comedy. In direct contrast to Weil, O'Connor 
insists that art and specifically fictions have an autonomous value distinct from their 
ability to write on the soul. Influenced by the aesthetics of St. Thomas Aquinas, in 
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'The Nature and Aim of Fiction' she contends that 'all I mean by art is miting 
something that is valuable in itself and that works in itself (65). Claiming that 
contemporary society rejects this notion of art in favour of making 'something that 
will have some utilitarian value' (171), O'Connor believes narratives can be 
mediums for spiritual revelation but only if they are firstly successful as fictions. It 
is 'the nature of fiction not to be good for much unless it is good in itself (81) she 
maintains. Unlike philosophy which is explicitly directed towards the attainment of 
truth, great fictions may contain and reveal truth, but this is not their sole raison 
d'etre. 
The divergence between Wei! and O'Connor's concepts of literature is most 
apparent in their views on immoral fictional content and its relation to the writer's 
role. As we have seen, Weil considers the majority of fiction immoral because it 
reverses the nature of good and evil by making good boring, evil interesting, and 
neglecting to depict the essential oppositional relationship existing between them. 
Sensitive to accusations that the immoral and grotesque content of her fiction 
damages her Christian viewpoint, O'Connor significantly spent the majority of her 
career defending both her motives and narratives from what she termed this 'pious 
argument' (MM 179). Her own explanation for the 'striking preoccupation with 
what is seedy and evil and violent' (178) in Catholic, and specifically her own 
fictions, has three strands. First, due to mankind's Fall this is actually an accurate 
depiction of reality, second, the concentration on evil is a consequence of having to 
demonstrate this reality to readers unwilling or unable to comprehend it, and third, 
the writer is limited by the nature of his vocation and talent. 
Replying to the premise that belief in the Redemption and a consequent optimistic 
vision of goodness as the transcendent reality should preclude depictions of evil in 
Christian fiction, O'Connor insists 'though the good is the ultimate reality. the 
ultimate reality has been weakened in human beings as a result of the Fall. and it is 
this weakened life that we see' (179). Consequently the writer 'has to make the 
corruption believable before he can make the grace meaningful' (HB 516). 
More significant is O'Connor's second justification for the gratuitous use of 
immorality and violence in religious fiction, which shifts responsibility from writer 
to reader. In 'Novelist and Believer' she observes 'if writers with a religious view of 
the world exce] these days in the depiction of evil, it is because they have to make 
its nature unmistakable to their particular audience' (MM 168), O'Connor divides 
her own readers into a hostile secular majority she is 'conscious of writing for' who 
'think God is dead' (HE 92), and a minority Catholic audience she believes equally 
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problematic because it perceives 'nature in literature In only two forms, the 
sentimental and the obscene' (MM 147). 
The Christian author finds in secular life 'distortions which are repugnant to him. 
and his problem will be to make these appear as distortions to an audience which is 
used to seeing them as natural' (33). Yet the 'general intelligent reader today is not a 
believer' (181) she claims, and these distortions are a consequence of readers who 
are unable or unwilling to perceive the universe as the Catholic author does. 
Negativity is therefore a legitimate tactic for \Witing on the souls of a recalcitrant 
secular audience, and is equally defensible when the author is confronted by the 
Catholic reader who is a victim of 'the parochial aesthetic' and a 'cultural insularity' 
which ensures he has 'reduced his conception of the supernatural to pious cliche' 
(145, 147). This Manichean tendency to separate nature and grace is considered by 
O'Connor to be a major source of misreadings of immoral fictional content. Unable 
to read such work in its religious context Catholic audiences are 'constantly being 
offended and scandalized' by fictions which are actually 'permeated with a 
Christian spirit' (151). 
O'Connor's third defence for the immoral content such readers find objectionable is 
that the writer's vision is limited by his vocation, which is itself constrained by the 
extent of his talent. Vocation is 'a limiting factor which extends even to the kind of 
material that the writer is able to apprehend imaginatively', because although he can 
choose his subject 'he cannot choose what he is able to make live' (27). The 
Christian writer must not destroy his 'gift' from God by 'trying to use it outside its 
proper limits' (27), which are circumscribed by his perception and ability to render 
it. The competing tensions of beliefs and artistic vocation are reconciled by 
concentrating on aesthetic demands. 'If writing is your vocation, then, as a writer, 
you will seek the will of God first through the laws and limitations of what you are 
creating~ your first concern will be the necessities that present themselves in the 
work' O'Connor maintains in 'The Church and the Fiction Writer' (153). By 
developing what Jacques Maritain terms the 'habit of art', writers can cultivate 'a 
certain quality or virtue of the mind' (64-65), which allows them to be faithful to 
both their art and concept of truth. 
Yet despite O'Connor's attempt to reconcile the grotesque content of her narratives 
with her Christian vision through her concept of vocation, she remains preoccupied 
with this problem of balance throughout her career, and the realization of a tension 
between her fiction and religion is central to O'Connor's notion of the writer's role. 
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In 'Catholic Novelists and Their Readers' she outlines the Christian writer's 
dilemma. 
Just how can the novelist be true to time and eternity both, to what he 
sees and what he believes, to the relative and the absolute? And how 
can he do all this and be true at the same time to the art of the novel, 
which demands the illusion of life? (177) 
O'Connor attempts to harmonise her negative vision of a grotesquely fallen world 
with her positive belief in man's eternal potential for redemption, by abdicating 
authorial responsibility for immoral and grotesque fictional content, explaining its 
use via a combination of proclaiming the inadequacies of her readers, and the 
necessity of conforming to the aesthetic requirements of fictional form. Weil' s 
views on authorial responsibility and spiritual guidance are useful here in 
illuminating O'Connor's position. Weil's theory of the author's role is a direct 
challenge to O'Connor's stance in two major ways. First, Weirs insistence that only 
the sanctity of genius is an antidote to the innate immorality of literature and is 
essential to enable the prophetic function vital to writing on the soul, disputes 
O'Connor's claim that authorial morality is not vital to prophetic vision. Second, 
Weil's contention that writers who depict baseness and immorality are directly 
responsible for weakening spiritual values, and consequently it is vital to correct the 
usurpation of the spiritual role from all but writers of genius, questions the validity 
of O'Connor's assertion that the Christian writer can not be held responsible for any 
spiritual corruption his work may incite. 
O'Connor's alternative to Weil's first point takes two forms. First she denies that 
prophetic vision requires sanctity by championing the autonomy of fiction, but 
second, claims when prophetic vision is allied to the Catholic Church's viewpoint 
the conflicting demands of fiction and belief can be successfully amalgamated. 'The 
Catholic novelist doesn't have to be a saint; he doesn't even have to be a Catholic; 
he does, unfortunately, have to be a novelist' O'Connor contends (172). Invoking St. 
Thomas Aquinas in her defence of the independence of prophetic vision she insists 
it 'is a quality of the imagination' that 'does not have anything to do with the moral 
life of the prophet. It is the imaginative vision itself that endorses the morality' (00 
365). Acknowledging this was 'a lucky find' (365) for both developing and 
substantiating her own imaginative vision, she again relocates the issue of morality 
within literary rather than theological criteria, conveniently allowing her to 
champion both without being limited to either. 
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Yet by extending the notion of prophetic vision to include a collective religious 
viewpoint O'Connor attempts to maintain her autonomy of art stance whilst allying 
herself to the ideal of sanctity Weil considers essential. In their attempts to use 
literal realities to suggest deeper subtexts all fiction writers are characterised by 
prophetic vision. However the Catholic novelist's is 'not simply a matter of his 
personal imaginative gift; it is also a matter of the Church's gift' (MM 179). A 
major function of the Catholic Church is to transmit 'the prophetic vision that is 
good for all time' and when this is included in the novelist's personal vision 'he has 
a powerful extension of sight' (180). But adherence to dogma 'cannot fix what goes 
on in life or blind the believer to it' (150), and to a certain extent O'Connor agrees 
with the Weilean notion that writers with pretensions to high morality are merely 
worse writers. When the author's personal view of reality is sacrificed in favour of 
an over-reliance on the Church's collective vision its consequence is another 
contribution to 'that large body of pious trash' typical of Catholic literature (180). A 
conflict between individual and Church perspectives is therefore desirable (and 
eventually inevitable), but when these 'two sets of eyes' are successfully integrated, 
authorial freedom is maintained and simultaneously the Church provides the 'reality 
of an added dimension' (150). an intensification of the fiction writer's innate 
prophetic vision. 
O'Connor's view of the author-Church relationship also provides her with a reply to 
Weil's second contention that writers who depict immorality are responsible for the 
spiritual degradation of their readers. 'The business of protecting souls from 
dangerous literature belongs properly to the Church' she contends (149), even if this 
involves forbidding the reading of the writer's work (the same draconian censorship 
advocated by Weil). In such instances the Catholic author should be grateful for this 
'service' because it 'means he can then limit himself to the demands of his art' 
(149). O'Connor acknowledges that remaining true to the requirements of both art 
and personal vision does not prevent the writer from being 'read by all sorts of 
people who don't understand what he is doing and are therefore scandalized by it', 
and appreciates it 'is very possible that what is vision and truth to the writer is 
temptation and sin to the reader' (187). However, although this is a dilemma for the 
conscientious novelist O'Connor disclaims individual liability by insisting 'to force 
this kind of total responsibility on the novelist is to burden him with the business 
that belongs only to God' (187). Writers only have an obligation to the aesthetics of 
their work, and their best protection against its immoral potential is 'strict attention 
to the order, proportion, and radiance of what they are making' .32 If the writer's 
attention is applied to producing a work 'good in itself, he will take 
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great pains to control every excess, everything that does not 
contribute to his central meaning and design. He cannot indulge in 
sentimentality. in propagandizing, or in pornography and create a 
work of art, for all these things are excesses. They call attention to 
themselves and distract from the work as a whole. (187-88) 
But despite her apparent de~ire to avoid artistic excess, O'Connor acknowledges 
she 'can't write about anything subtle' (lIB 517). Rejecting demands for 'an 
apologetic fiction' which aims to 'make Christianity look desirable', she insists 'if I 
set myself to write about a socially desirable Christianity, all the life would go out of 
what I do' (516-17). 
Limited by both her vision and vocation O'Connor must depict the profound 
realities dictated by her Christian perspective, yet produce dramatic and entertaining 
fictions. Because fiction is a narrative art and 'relies heavily on the element of 
drama' (MM 74), unlike theological or philosophical writings there 'is no room for 
abstract expressions of compassion or morality in the fiction itself (125). 
Consequently, to specifY her religious concerns O'Connor is forced into using the 
alternative forms of lectures and essays. But as subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate this involves a degree of propagandizing which itself constitutes an 
excess. However, despite the undoubted excesses contained in both her fictional and 
non-fictional forms, O'Connor's concept of the writer's role is dependent on 
achieving equilibrium between the contraries of 'principle and fact, judgement and 
observation' which is necessary to maintain 'if fiction is to be true' (53-54), and 
resisting the separations of nature and grace, reason and imagination which are 
'inimical to art' (184). 
O'Connor, like Weil, thinks dialectically yet is compelled to correlate these 
contraries. Before analyzing how this process works in the areas of O'Connor's 
work which are similar to Weil's, it is necessary briefly to outline the final major 
difference that separates the two writers - their disparate attitudes to comedy. As the 
flip side of the terrible (see lIB 105), comedy is part of O'Connor's dialectical 
imagination but not Weil's. As we have already observed Weil resembles Plato's 
severe rather than amusing writer, displaying little evidence of a comic vision,33 
which is compounded by her omission of the comic elements within her chosen 
texts of genius, and concentration on their author'S most harrowing works. In 
contrast, O'Connor insists prophetic vision neither 'precludes comedy' nor 'the 
pleasure taken in producing it' (Wells, CFO 89). In fact being earnest about 
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salvation presupposes a comic vision. It is 'well to realize that the maximum amount 
of seriousness admits the maximum amount of comedy', O'Connor maintains, only 
'if we are secure in our beliefs can we see the comical side of the universe'. (MM 
167) 
Weil's greater religious insecurities may at least partially account for the absence of 
humour in her work, but more likely it derives from her personal disposition and the 
fact that it is not a prerequisite of philosophical forms to entertain the reader. Yet in 
addition to its obvious amusement value, comedy constitutes a vital element in 
O'Connor's armoury of devices for writing on the souls of her audience. Irony, with 
its ability of 'yoking together in a single figure the "most widely separated" 
opposites in such a way that they are seen to belong together without losing their 
contrariness' ,34 comprises a superposed method of connecting comic and terrible, 
sacred and profane in a single vista. While satire permits O'Connor to juxtapose the 
actual with the ideal and ridicule the vices and folly by which the sacred is 
denied.35 
Despite their own very real differences on the value and content of fiction, the 
writer's role, and the function of comedy, Weil and O'Connor share similar notions 
of first, form and its relationship to perception, second, supernatural reason, third, 
language, and finally and most importantly, the redemptive possibilities of texts. 
Like Weil, O'Connor perceives literary forms as organic and ultimately unified, her 
New Critical stance insisting on the cohesion of disparate or contradictory elements 
within the text. In the best narratives form is 'something that grows out of the 
material', a 'piece of fiction must be very much a self-contained dramatic unity' she 
contends (102, 75). But as with Wei1's notions of both philosophical and literary 
form, O'Connor conceives this ultimate unity encapsulating within it both a 
multilayered vertical hierarchy and contradictory elements and realities. Perceptions 
of unity are dependent on cultivating a superposed perception capable of both 
conceiving mUltiplicity and contradiction whilst at the same time correlating their 
different levels and oppositions. 
As we noted earlier, the Judaeo-Christian scriptures provide O'Connor with a model 
for the creation of fictional narratives and prophetic vision. Yet although like Weil 
O'Connor draws spiritual inspiration from these mythic narratives, her conviction 
that the majority of her readers are unfamiliar with biblical texts leads her to refine 
this paradigm with two important strategies. First, she encourages readers to 
cultivate anagogical vision by interpreting her texts using the hierarchical 
infrastructure provided by medieval allegory, and second, O'Connor uses the 
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grotesque genre as a narrative form to emphasise the disparities, yet ultimately 
reconcile both physical and mystical realities within the stories. 
Weil's intellectual ladder of contradictions and the superposed vision it requires is 
similar to O'Connor's notion of anagogical vision and allegory, which relies 
primarily on educating the reader to make the appropriate intellectual responses to 
her texts: ie. progressing from literal to spiritual cognition within the conceptual 
model of a vertical hierarchy.36 As a development of traditional Judaeo-Christian 
notions of God's Word being unambiguously written in both the world and 
Scriptures, medieval allegory allows a more flexible system of textual interpretation, 
while still privileging religious rather than secular readings.37 The literal, 
allegorical, tropological and anagogical readings this exegetical strategy permits, 
allows narrative to escape its temporal horizontality and achieve a tiered structure 
combining literal text and mystical subtext. At the pinnacle of this hierarchy and 
considered most valid are anagogical readings, the 'kind of vision that is able to see 
different levels of reality in one image or one situation', which O'Connor believes 
provides the 'enlarged view of the human scene' essential to great fiction writers 
and great texts (72). 
Accommodating the multilayered perception of both world and narrative O'Connor 
as Catholic writer demands, this medieval aesthetic simultaneously allows a method 
for attempting to control reader response. Despite its apparent openness in 
encouraging readers to search for alternatives to literal readings, edieval allegory 
establishes strictly prescribed interpretative criteria. What is actually made available 
as Umberto Eco notes in The Open Work (1989) 
is a range of rigidly pre-established and ordained interpretative 
solutions, and these never allow the reader to move outside the strict 
control of the author [ ... J The reader can concentrate his attention on 
one sense rather than another, in the limited space of this four-tiered 
sentence, but he must always follow rules that entail a rigid 
univocality. (Eco 6) 
O'Connor's own use of this exegetical framework involves privileging anagogical 
readings through biblical analogies and an equally limited system of signification 
(sun, sky, tree and colour imagery etc) that allows carnal. literal readings whilst 
encouraging readers to accept their spiritual connotations. Operating on a similar 
principle to anagogical vision, symbols, 'while having their essential place in the 
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literal level of the story, operate in depth as well as on the surface, increasing the 
story in every direction', according to O'Connor, the 'truer the symbol, the deeper it 
leads you, the more meaning it opens up,.38 
But the post-Renaissance shift of perspective from vertical to linear concepts of the 
universe, combined with the collapse of automatically accepted relationships 
between signifier and signified post-Freud and Saussure, ensures the religious 
certainties which uphold medieval concepts of humanity, the cosmos, and art are no 
longer easily sustainable.39 As Mircea Eliade observes, for secular man 'the cosmos 
has become opaque, inert, mute~ it transmits no message, it holds no cipher'. 40 As a 
result, O'Connor's sacramental viewpoint and connected allegory and symbolism 
are frequently neither perceived nor accepted by her audience. She was acutely 
aware that the 'model of balance' she believed medieval allegory provided was 
unavailable to the twentieth-century Catholic writer who 'often finds himself 
writing in and for a world that is unprepared and unwilling to see the meaning of life 
as he sees it' (49. 185). Recognizing this problem in 'Novelist and Believer' she 
complains it is impossible to 
have effective allegory in times when people are swept this way and 
that by momentary convictions, because everyone will read it 
differently. You can't indicate moral values when morality changes 
with what is being done. because there is no accepted basis of 
judgement. (166) 
This being so, O'Connor's emphasis on promoting anagogical vision appears a 
flawed method of communicating her religious viewpoint, evidenced by the 
necessity to specify its use in her non-fictional writings. However. O'Connor's 
second major fictional strategy, her employment of the grotesque genre, provides 
her with a more radical method of altering her audience's perspective. 
Just as Wei! considers the scandalous, irrational logos alogos a superior method of 
transcending earthly contradictions and approaching divine mysteries, O'Connor 
uses the grotesque mode as an irrational mediator. By forcing the mind to consider 
shocking relationships (e.g. murderers and tricksters can be agents of grace), she 
attempts to reconcile the dialectical opposites of sacred and profane, comic and 
terrible, at a higher level of cognition; using grotesque physical realities to approach 
divine mysteries by the type of resemblance or transference of the sense of reality 
advocated by Weil. Significantly O'Connor equates grotesque realism with exactly 
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the same type of prophetic vision demanded by her sacramentalism. The writer of 
grotesque fiction is 'looking for one image that will connect or combine or embody 
two points; one is a point in the concrete, and the other is a point not visible to the 
naked eye, but believed in by him firmly' she contends (44). In contrast to Weil's 
dispassionate intellectual method for overcoming contradiction and connecting 
incommensurates, O'Connor's grotesque fiction chiefly relies on sensual 
experience: shock, horror, comedy. She considers these responses essential to 
generating an altered (specifically religious) cognition, because the 'beginning of 
human knowledge is through the senses', and 'you cannot appeal to the senses with 
abstractions' (67). O'Connor's point sheds some light on WeWs philosophy and the 
impact of her work. While her use of contradiction and dialectic is a distinctly 
rational form, the frequently grotesque content of Weil's writings and the often 
shocking figurative language she uses impact on her readers, generating the kind of 
perturbed and horrified (but not comic) reactions from her readers that O'Connor's 
fictions produce (see Chapter Two). 
The powerful. conflicting sensations unleashed by the literary grotesque genre 
ensures it opens up ambiguities which offer multiple perspectives that frequently 
rival O'Connor's own. Aware that the polY"V,alent meanings generated by narratives 
and their readers are an essential element of fictional form, O'Connor maintains a 
good story 'can't be reduced, it can only be expanded'; and a narrative is successful 
'when you continue to see more and more in it, and when it continues to escape you' 
(102). But if fictions (and especially grotesque fictions) are characterised by their 
ability to escape definition, and medieval allegorical frameworks are no longer 
readily sustainable by a mass audience. how can O'Connor's narratives write 
Christian concepts on the soul? This is a crucial problem requiring a combination of 
imaginative perception and belief. If as she claims, in fiction 'two and two is always 
more than four' (102). it requires a suspension of rational belief in order to 'make 
believe' an alternative fictional world. Christian theology necessitates a similar 
deferral of rationality to believe, or have faith in, the paradoxes on which it is based. 
Both fictions and theology demand this kind of imaginative perception, and this is 
also vital to philosophers.41 In its philosophical aspect imaginative perception does 
not require creating or believing in an object, but rather a re·creation of it in the 
mind. (Weil's analogies rely on this process: consider her Hegelian cube.) But what 
is 'seen' in this manner 'goes beyond what is given, in just the way that a fictional 
thought outstrips reality'. it is 'the perceptual equivalent of a fictional thought' 
(Scruton 350·51). 
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Weil's concept of the imagination is useful in illuminating O'Connor's endeavours 
to write Christian concepts on the soul via a fictional form. Weil consistently 
considers the imagination negatively by connecting it with a damaging tendency to 
be fictional that obstructs the intervention of grace in human life and prevents 
superposed vision. 42 Yet as Martin Andic notes, 'imagination in a positive sense is 
constantly implied in Weil's treatment of discernment, reading, and attention,.43 
When combined with attention and love, imagination allows the superposed reading 
and supernatural reason that is essential to faith, writers and texts of genius. At its 
lowest level imagination produces ontological fictionality and at its highest level 
faith, which as a 'gift of reading' which is 'supernatural' (NB 220), goes beyond the 
fictional to perceive a transcendent spiritual reality. This same type of positive 
imagination is shared by writers of genius, who as we have seen, produce texts 
which surpass their status as fictions and in doing so provide the density of the 
rea1.44 
O'Connor's Catholic faith and fictional form are based on similar notions of a 
positive imagination that includes supernatural reason and superposed reading. 
O'Connor's world vision and the content of her narratives are founded on Christian 
paradoxes. She explicitly specifies that the 'assumptions that underlie' her work are 
'those of the central Christian mysteries' (109), and that for her it is 'the virgin birth, 
the Incarnation, the resurrection which are the true laws of the flesh and the 
physical. Death, decay, destruction are the suspension of these laws' (HB 100). This 
necessitates no 'leap into the absurd', rather she finds it 'reasonable to believe even 
though these beliefs are beyond reason' (479). Relying on an imaginative perception 
equivalent to Weil's unnatural reason, O'Connor contends her fiction 'takes its 
character from a reasonable use of the unreasonable, though the reasonableness of 
my use of it may not always be apparent' (MM 109). Like Weil, she applies rational 
criteria to irrational mysteries, insisting that what is contradictory and ridiculous to 
the limited human intellect is resolved at a higher level through faith. and 
ultimately, grace. The depiction of human limitation. absurdity. and the intervention 
of grace within her fictional microcosms is intended to demonstrate to the hostile 
reader his or her own equally parallel limits and absurdities, yet active potential for 
grace in a world where a higher reason operates. 
But the imaginative perception that allows the reader to believe in a fictional world 
and be intellectually and emotionally affected by it does not necessarily equate to 
sharing the author's religious belief system. O'Connor's obsession with her 
audience and the fact her religious philosophy is proclaimed so frequently in the 
non-fictional forms of her lectures, essays and letters, indicates the difficulty of 
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writing specifically Christian concepts on the soul through an innately ambiguous 
medium dependent on reader response. However, sharing with Weil the same 
problem of how to articulate her nonrational beliefs and talk about God within a 
human vocabulary, O'Connor also attempts to connect the contrary aspects of her 
dialectical vision by figurative language. Like Weil she uses unusual analogies, 
metaphors, paradoxes, oxymorons and hyperbole in an attempt to maximise the 
capacity of words to demonstrate both the separations and links between the sacred 
and profane, a tension of opposites Frederick Asals terms 'the language of 
extremity' (Imagination 35). 
Analogies, with their explicit threads of connection, allow O'Connor to exert a 
measure of control over their connotations, and her specifically biblical analogies 
equate to her preferred allegorical vision, suggesting alternative perceptions of 
images and events while operating within a limited scale of (religious) possibilities. 
O'Connor's similes fulfil a similar function, making precise comparisons which 
allow her to constrain their implications yet invoke spiritual meanings beyond a 
literal level. 45 The prevalence of the 'as if construction in her narratives and its 
apparent function of linking human limitation with spiritual potential is particularly 
interesting and will be analyzed in Chapter Three. 
The implicit and consequently more startling comparisons made available by 
metaphor are an integral and vital component of O'Connor's literary vocabulary, 
repeatedly embodying the religious themes of her stories. Their freer suggestion 
ensures they form an important part of her grotesque narratives, and through their 
reliance on a similar perception of the connection between often very dissimilar 
objects, are powerful tools for provoking alternative perspectives.46 As we have 
noted, paradoxes are inherent in her Christian viewpoint, and as 'an apparently 
self-contradictory (even absurd) statement which, on closer inspection, is found to 
contain a truth reconciling the conflicting opposites', are as important to 
O'Connor's fictional form as they are to Weil's philosophical form. 47 Oxymorons 
are equally prevalent in O'Connor's texts, like her paradoxes yoking together 
incongruous elements to defamiliarise stereotypical perspectives and offer 
alternative visions of reality. Hyperbole and its antithetical opposite litotes are also 
regularly featured. In contrast to Weil, who does not possess an ironic vision, these 
linguistic forms are important to the reader's recognition of the narrator's ironic 
perspective, which as we have already noted is an integral part of O'Connor's 
attempt to write on the soul via comedy.48 Finally, one of her most important 
rhetorical devices consists of the repetition of cliches, banalities, and profanities, 
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whose frequency is apparently intended to draw attention to their original literal 
meanings. 
However, a comparison of Weil and O'Connor's vocabularies reveals that while 
they use very similar types of figurative language to convey meaning, they prioritise 
words quite differently, with O'Connor inverting Weil's hierarchy of language. 
Sharing with Wei! a belief that the erroneous use of language betrays (what in her 
view) are equally mistaken philosophies, O'Connor agrees the lowest language of 
the collective: blasphemy, pious cliche, advertisements and propaganda allow words 
to serve any purpose, with men suffering because of them (see the following 
analysis of Wise Blood). Like Weil she is concerned that writers should clarify their 
vocabulary, insisting writing classes 'should not be to teach you how to write, but to 
teach you the limits and possibilities of words and the respect due them' (83). But 
O'Connor is less inteztsted in a Weilean rigorous, rational control of language, and 
more concerned with the imaginative use of words, and their potential to be 
entertaining as well as spiritually revelatory. Consequently she differs to Wei! in not 
separating the lowest vocabulary from the highest, and there is little evidence in her 
work of Weil's intermediate level of language with its properly clarified words 
useful for earthly needs. Most importantly, O'Connor's contention that prophecy 
does not preclude comedy allows her the freedom to use ironically what Weil 
classes the highest language referring to God, truth, goodness, love, justice; 
amalgamating this vocabulary with its opposite, the basest of words. 
As we have noted, for Weil the highest words have a redemptive, revelatory power 
because they cannot be limited to any particular concept and are above mere human 
opinion and understanding. As such when legitimately used they enlighten and 
elevate mankind towards grace, visibly signifying the ungraspable mysteries beyond 
them when perceived with superposed vision. O'Connor's ironic inversion of the 
highest language works on a similar principle, also attempting to both revitalise the 
spiritual dimension of words whilst ensuring they are equally relevant to human life. 
The profanities, cliches and banalities which saturate her grotesque narratives 
debase the highest language yet paradoxically draw attention to it. As Gentry 
observes, O'Connor's use of banality 'licences the expression of radical ideas under 
the cloak of conventionality' as 'the literal meaning of a cliche always threatens to 
break through the conventional meaning'. 49 When read with a superposed ironic 
perspective the literal meaning of the lowest exclamations refers to a spiritual 
connotation that subverts its intended profane or banal intention, pointing beyond 
itself to infer the mysterious, religious meaning above its constrained, merely human 
opinion or prejudice.50 
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O'Connor's inverted vocabulary relies on the 'intelligent' superposed reader to 
perceive the irony and spiritual subtext she intends to convey. The limited secular 
readings she believes most readers perceive corresponds to Weil's theory of 
defective efforts to reconcile contraries by unifying them on a one-dimensional 
plane rather than at a higher level. Just as Weil believes a superposed perspective is 
only acquired through great attention and effort, O'Connor insists art is 'only for 
those who are willing to undergo the effort needed to understand it', because it 
requires 'humility and a real love of the truth to raise oneself and by hard labor to 
acquire higher standards' (189). Thanks to modem society's 'naturalistic bias', the 
reader 'doesn't realize that he has to shift his sights to read fiction which treats of an 
encounter with God' (163) she insists. Even though narrative form and language 
provide multi-layered opportunities for perceiving the sacred through the profane, 
successful religious fiction is ultimately dependent on a capacity to read spiritually 
which is largely lacking in contemporary audiences. 'I don't believe that we shall 
have great religious fiction until we have again that happy combination of believing 
artist and believing society' O'Connor complains in 'Novelist and Believer' (168). 
Despite championing the autonomy of fiction and its independence from any 
utilitarian function, O'Connor's preference for superposed rather than literal readers 
and stress on her own spiritual concerns, leaves no doubt she considers that the most 
competent readers and the greatest narratives have a profoundly religious 
dimension. In this she concurs with Weil, who contends 'the only form of extreme 
attention is a religious one' while 'all art of the first order is, in essence, religious' 
(NB 441-42). 
Using Weil's four criteria for texts of literary and spiritual genius, I want to 
interrogate O'Connor's concept of religious fictions and how they operate. Weil's 
first point: that fictions must accurately represent reality and the force of gravity 
which dominates it, can be found in O'Connor's definition of the Catholic novel. 
While acknowledging the term 'Catholic novel' is 'suspect', she describes it as 
portraying 'reality adequately as we see it manifested in this world of things and 
human relationships', a text 'in which the truth as Christians know it has been used 
as a light to see the world by' (MM 172, 173). The basic theological 'truths' which 
illuminate the Catholic writer's universe are the Fall, Redemption and Judgement, 
requiring a combined belief in sin, 'the value that suffering can have', and 'eternal 
responsibility' (185). This equal stress on a Fallen yet redeemed reality ensures 
O'Connor's Catholic novel sees man 'as incomplete in himself, as prone to evil, but 
as redeemable when his own efforts are assisted by grace' (197). Consequently the 
narrative's 'center of meaning will be Christ, its center of destruction will be the 
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devil' (197): the oppositional relationship between good and evil Weil considers 
essential to moral fictions. 
Weil's second rule for fictions of genius, that they demonstrate a superposed 
structure capable of depicting gravity's multiple levels yet ultimate unity, and in 
doing so transcend their textual status, equates to O'Connor's advocation of the 
medieval allegorical hierarchy and its related anagogical vision as a model for 
narrative form, and the prophetic vision required to see mystical through literal 
realities. Although relying on emotional rather than dispassionate responsest the 
grotesque genre, with its capacity to link dialectical opposites, provides the type of 
'architecture of the abyss' Wei! perceives combining gravity's many forms. 
As O'Connor's primary shock tactic for awakening readers to forgotten spiritual 
truths, the grotesque, both as fictional character and literary genre allows 
O'Connor's narratives to conform to Weil's third condition for genius. The pivotal 
notion that texts must manifest grace intervening violently in human life, causing 
suffering against the will which leads to a redemptive cognition of spiritual truth, is 
as vital to O'Connor as it is to WeiI. Grace 'can be violent' she observes, in 'my 
own stories I have found that violence is strangely capable of returning my 
characters to reality and preparing them to accept their moment of grace' (lIB 373, 
MM 112). The 'notion that grace is healing omits the fact that before it heals it cuts 
with the sword Christ said he came to bring' (lIB 411) O'Connor claims, and her 
stories, by to some extent reproducing the crucial experiential relationship between 
violence, affliction and grace, qualify as Weilean redemptive texts - fictions which 
transcend their fictionality and write on the soul. But although recognizing that her 
philosophy is not always accepted by readers, Weil's literary criticism frequently 
neglects to ,anticipate the kind of negative reader response which obstructs 
O'Connor's efforts to produce redemptive fictions that attack what she perceives as 
her own audience's ontological fictionality. Part of contemporary man's propensity 
to be fictional is an inability to recognise the concept of violent grace. 'Our age not 
only does not have a very sharp eye for the almost imperceptible intrusions of grace, 
it no longer has much feeling for the nature of the violences which precede and 
follow them'(MM 112), O'Connor complains. 
This constitutes a significant problem for O'Connor, because she endeavours to 
fulfil the last of Weil's criteria for fictional genius: rendering the beauty as well as 
bitterness of the world by portraying brief epiphanic instants of grace when men 
manage to rise above the strictures of gravity and find their souls. 'There is a 
moment in every great story in which the presence of grace can be felt as it waits to 
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be accepted or rejected, even though the reader may not recognize this moment', 
according to O'Connor (118). The vital moment which 'makes a story work', is 
when a character makes an action or gesture towards this presence and makes 
contact with mystery (111). This act is 'unlike any other in the story, one which 
indicates where the real heart of the story lies' (111). It would have to be 
an action or a gesture which was both totally right and totally 
unexpected; it would have to be one that was both in character and 
beyond character; it would have to suggest both the world and 
eternity. The action or gesture I'm talking about would have to be on 
the anagogicallevel, that is the level which has to do with the Divine 
life and our participation in it. (111) 
These sublime interludes in the midst of a Fallen world equate to WeB's notion that 
great narratives must represent the beauty as well as the bitterness of the universe. 
O'Connor perceives this combination of gravity and grace as the axis around which 
her fictions revolve: 'my subject in fiction is the action of grace in territory held 
largely by the devil' she insists' (118). But in an important distinction with Weil's 
insistence that fictions must depict an oppositional relationship with good and evil, 
O'Connor's Catholic perspective ensures (despite her insistence on the dialectical 
opposition of Christ and the devil), that evil is often part of the anagogical gesture: 
'frequently it is an action in which the devil has been an unwilling instrument of 
grace' (118) she contends. 
O'Connor and Weil's (often contradictory) concepts of good and evil will be 
discussed in Chapter Two, as will how Weil's first two guidelines for literary genius 
can be applied to O'Connor's stories, with Chapter Three examining how her third 
and fourth precepts illuminate The Violent Bear It Away. In this chapter I want to 
proceed with a reading of O'Connor's first novel, Wise Blood, focusing on how 
Weil's concepts of immoral fictional content, and the writer's function can 
interrogate O'Connor's role as Christian prophet. 
Michael Kreyling claims O'Connor's novel 'looms as one of the most significant 
religious novels in American literary history'. 51 If this is a valid statement 
O'Connor's role as prophetic writer has been successful despite (and perhaps 
because of) the immoral and grotesque content of the narrative. Despite Weil's 
objections, it appears possible to write on the soul with material that makes evil 
interesting and displays little evidence of morality. Is this because O'Connor's 
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hostile and/or inept readers have been persuaded by her fictional devices to 
recognise the religious context through which the content of Wise Blood should be 
filtered? Or is the text actually failed prophecy, only considered religious because 
O'Connor tells us it is? With its 'Author's Note' to the second edition, depiction of 
several immoral and grotesque 'prophets', and inversion of Christian symbolism, 
Wise Blood provides an important early test case of how O'Connor explores the 
problem of how to talk about God, and how her work can be illuminated by 
Weilean concepts. 
O'Connor uses her 'Author's Note' to instruct her readers how to read the novel. 
'That belief in Christ is to some a matter of life and death has been a stumbling 
block for readers who would prefer to think it a matter of no great consequence', she 
complains. 52 For these secular readers who are unable or unwilling to perceive 
Hazel Motes as 'a Christian malgre lui' and erroneously consider his 'integrity' 
consists of trying to rid himself of Christ, the author's corrective position is 
unambiguously specified Wise Blood is, she claims, a comic but serious novel about 
the 'mystery' of complex human free will. Haze's 'integrity' inheres in his inability 
to escape 'the ragged figure who moves from tree to tree in the back of his mind'. 
But are O'Connor's extra-fictional statements here and in her letters and lectures 
supported by the text? To examine this question I will divide my analysis into three 
sections. First, a discussion of the Fallen world depicted in the novel, second, 
whether the ending manages to balance this gravity with grace, and third, how 
Weil's concepts of immoral fictional content and the writer's role assist in 
interrogating O'Connor's mission to recall readers to forgotten spiritual truths in 
both Wise Blood and her comments about it. 
In Wise Blood O'Connor presents a world where' Jesus been a long time gone' (WB 
21). Populated with the 'stone souls' Haze's grandfather insists Jesus died to redeem 
(15), Taulkinham, as a microcosm of a Fallen universe dominated by gravity and 
yet displaying little evidence of grace, offers an unrelenting vision of man trapped 
in a carnal, unredeemed world. The 'dark sour-looking sun' hangs in a sky that leaks 
over an equally unenlightened wasteland of vacant lots, empty warehouses, and 
trailer camps, which gives Haze 'the feeling that everything he saw was a broken-off 
piece of some giant blank thing that he had forgotten had happened to him' (62, 68). 
Recollections form part of the narrative structure of the novel, which unfolds as 
frame within a frame flashbacks that combined with repetitive imagery, is designed 
to encourage readers, like biblical exegetists, to interpret later events as revelations 
of significant truths symbolically foreshadowed earlier. But what these memories 
and dreams retrieve is not spiritual truths but images of confinement which intersect 
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with, and reinforce the depiction of a carnal world in which men and beasts share 
the same (vacant) lot and are indistinguishable. As William Rodney Allen argues, 
these images intensify Wise Blood's theme that 'the world without its spiritual 
dimension, is merely a prison for an odd collection of inmates - a zoo for the human 
animal,.53 Haze's 'coffin' berth on the train leads him into the half-waking dreams 
of the funerals of his grandfather, father, two brothers (13-14), and his mother, 
whose coffin he sees from inside 'closing, coming closer closer down and cutting 
off the light and the room' (21). The association of his mother's casket with the 
woman in the 'lowered place' of the 'box lined with black cloth' in the carnival tent 
(56-57), links to the other mummy exhibited in its 'coffin-like' case in the museum 
(91). Appropriately at the centre of the park which is itself 'the heart of the city' 
(74), is a shrunken dead man whose eyes are 'drawn almost shut as if a giant block 
of steel were falling down on top of him' (92). This literal embodiment of human 
limitation and mortality shares its place in the park with the zoo, whose imprisoned 
animals literally bear human characteristics. The two bears who are 'like two 
matrons having tea, their faces polite and self-absorbed' (87), have more dignity, 
and appear more human than Enoch Emery, who, as 'a hound dog with light mange' 
with a 'fox-shaped face' torments them (77, 32), and who eventually evolves into 
Gonga, a human beast (191). These episodes form part of the series of symbols and 
motifs that interweave men and creatures throughout the novel: from the three 
women in the train dining car 'dressed like parrots' (9), to Mrs Flood, who has 'got a 
place' in her heart for Haze but whose heart is 'shaking like a bird cage' (221). But 
Taulkinham offers 'no place' for anything other than dehumanised men, and the 
question of how Haze, and humanity, can be saved from this spiritual displacement 
forms the basis of O'Connor's treatment of prophecy and Christian symbolism in 
the novel. 
'Where you come from is gone, where you thought you were going to never was 
there, and where you are is no good unless you can get away from it' Haze declares, 
'Where is there a place for you to be? No place' (159). But if Taulkinham is a no 
place, a spiritual void, what are the alternative truths offered by its prophets? The 
question of who is 'true', what is the 'truth' and how is it found? is central. Onnie 
Jay HolylHoover Shoats boasts 'I can get prophets for peanuts' (153), and the 
various false prophets in the novel offer merely the same kind of enlightenment 
provided by the signs and lights Haze sees advertising peanuts and detergent that 
'blinked frantically' as he arrived in the city (23). Onnie Jay's 'The Holy Church of 
Christ Without Christ' is an inversion of an inversion (145). Plagiarising Haze's 
'Church Without Christ', and adapting it via his usual marketing techniques, his 
(un)Holy variant of how to talk about God offers a purely human salvation that 
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mixes sentimentalism, commercialism, and the prejudices of his audience. Working 
on the principle if 'you want to get anywheres in religion you got to keep it sweet' 
(151), he refutes the reality of Fallen man that exists everywhere around him, 
insisting every human being 'is born sweet and full of love', and offers 'Soulsease' 
through three doctrines. First, demystification: his disciples 'don't have to believe 
nothing you don't understand and approve of. If you don't understand it, it ain't true. 
and that's all there is to it' (146). Second, consumer choice: 'your own personal 
interpitation of the Bible' (147). Third, contemporaneity and status: 'This Church is 
up to date!' he claims, 'you can know there's nothing or nobody ahead of you, 
nobody knows nothing you don't know' (147). His side-kick employee Solace 
Layfield, 'the True Prophet', proclaims the only consolation apparently available in 
a world of untrue prophets: 'The unredeemed are redeeming themselves [ ... ] Help 
yourself to salvation' (161). 
Asa Hawkes offers more evidence that God's Word has been corrupted by human 
words. by asking for money not to disseminate his version of prophecy. 'Wouldn't 
you rather have me beg than preach?' he asks (34). But unlike Gnnie Jay Holy, he 
appears to believe in the reality of a Jesus he now flees. At the instant when he had 
attempted his self-blinding 'he saw himself standing there as he was' and fancied 
he saw Jesus 'standing there too, beckoning to him; and he had fled out of the tent 
into the alley and disappeared' (108). Consequently through his knowledge that 'you 
can't run away from Jesus. Jesus is a fact'. the fake blind man has some insight into 
Haze's inverted desire for salvation. Recognising 'the urge for Jesus' in Haze's 
voice, he correctly identifies that 'some preacher', Haze's grandfather, 'has left his 
mark' on him (44, 45). In a direct reference to the parable of the sower and its 
explanation by Christ (Matthew 13: 4-23), Hawkes tells the appropriately named 
Haze Motes: 'I can see more than you! [ ... ] You got eyes and see not, ears and hear 
not, but you'll have to see sometime' (48). 
It was what Haze 'saw' as a boy which ensures, like Hawkes, his attempts to cure 
himself of Jesus stem from his belief in the reality of Christ and the fear this causes. 
After witnessing his grandfather preach 'Jesus wasn't going to leave him ever. Jesus 
would never let him forget he was redeemed [ ... ] Jesus would have him in the end'. 
Haze 'saw Jesus' (16). Afraid to follow the 'wild ragged' Christ who moves 'from 
tree to tree in the back of his mind'. motioning him to 'come off into the dark where 
he was not sure of his footing, where he might be walking on the water and not 
know it and then suddenly know it and drown', as a child Haze only decides to 
become a preacher because he believes 'the way to avoid Jesus was to avoid sin' 
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(16). But when no one is interested in his soul, he attempts to be 'converted to 
nothing' (18), and advocates a doctrine that parodies and denies the Incarnation. 
Haze's Church without Christ, where 'the blind don't see and the lame don't walk 
and what's dead stays that way' is founded on the principle that 'there was no Fall 
because there was nothing to fall from and no Redemption because there was no 
Fall and no Judgement because there wasn't the first two. Nothing matters but that 
Jesus was a liar' (99). His call for a human saviour, a 'new jesus' that 'would speak 
plain' (134), is a demand for a literal not mystical reality, and when he proclaims he 
is 'peaceful' because 'my blood has set me free', and recommends his prospective 
flock 'take counsel from your blood' (135), he suggests humanity has an inherent 
ability to approach the truth independent of God. In the central concept of 'wise 
blood' O'Connor attempts to show the absurd consequences which develop from 
such humanism, and before analysing how she tries to convince the reader Haze's 
blasphemy eventually leads to his salvation, I will briefly examine this central motif. 
and its links to the depiction of Fallen man, prophecy, and the search for 
redemption in the novel. 
Enoch Emery claims he has 'wiser blood' than Haze (53). He 'had wise blood like 
his daddy', who significantly 'looks like Jesus' (53, 75, 45). But Enoch's 'daddy' 
has deserted him, and his attempts to 'justify his daddy's blood' (123), and find 
redemption in the Fallen world of Taulkinham are mercilessly parodied by 
O'Connor. Enoch searches for the sacred level of reality that Haze strives to deny, 
and erroneously considers he has discovered it when he believes the mummy in the 
museum has spoken, and his mission is to be Haze's disciple. Undergoing a comic 
version of a mystical experience he 'rolled over and lay stretched out on the ground, 
with an exalted look on his face. He thought he was floating' (93). But his 'secret 
blood' which 'had been beating drum noises' (94, 90), and eventually prompts him 
to steal the mummy/new jesus, is not the conveyor of the sacred Word which has 
been issued from a new Messiah, but is instead the animal instinct that finally 
culminates in his transformation into the manlbeast Gonga (192). By being 'in 
communication with his blood' and not his reason· the part of his divided brain 
which is 'stocked up with, all kinds of words and phrases' (81), Enoch doesn't think 
'in broad sweeps', he only 'thought what he would do next' (123), and after taking 
counsel from his blood and impulsively stealing the new jesus, he believes it 'was 
going to do something for him in return for his services' (185). Appropriately 
receiving his revelation through the comic papers • the advertisement for Gonga' s 
visit to the 'Victory' theatre - Enoch receives his remuneration for being the disciple 
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of a purely human saviour, when wearing the gorilla outfit, his momentary 
happiness is due to the fact his 'god had finally rewarded him' (187, 192). 
In Wise Blood O'Connor satirises what she considers contemporary man's 
separation from grace. and through Haze's humanism she attacks what she considers 
the misguided belief in mankind's ability to be its own saviour, through an 
egocentric denial of God. I will now examine how she explores this issue further 
through Haze's attempt to find a purely human redemption based on his doctrine 
that 'the only way to truth is through blasphemy' (142). 
'In yourself right now is all the place you've got. If there was any Fall, look there, if 
there was any Redemption, look there. and if you expect any Judgement, look there' 
her argues, 'because they all three will have to be in your time and your body and 
where in your time and your body can they be?' (160). Yet initially, Haze's denial of 
another level of reality is based on his subconscious desire to provoke a reaction 
from Asa Hawkes which will countermand this denial. Crowds gathered to watch his 
grandfather preach 'because he seemed to dare them to', and operating on the same 
principle as a child, by walking with rocks in his shoes, Haze tried to incite a 
response to his guilt from God and if 'a stone had fallen he would have taken it as a 
sign' (15, 58). But he received no sign then, and when his expectation of a 'secret 
welcome' from Hawkes, in which the preacher will try to save his soul, does not 
materialise and he realises Hawkes is a fake, it leaves him with 'a deeper blankness' 
(102. 156). 
Haze's nihilism is intensified after this episode, preaching that 'there are aU kinds of 
truth, your truth and somebody else's, but behind all of them, there's only one truth 
and that is that there is no truth' (159). His belief in this total absence of truth as 
paradoxically 'the only truth there is!' is what causes him to destroy the new 
jesus/mummy (183, 182). He brutally murders Solace Layfied for the equivalent 
reason. As preacher for the Holy Church of Christ Without Christ Solace pretends 
not to believe in Jesus, when he actually does, and so he 'ain't true' to his false 
prophecy (197). He must be destroyed in Haze's logic because he is both untrue to 
his personal beliefs and 'mocks what is' true - that there is no truth (198). Haze 
argues that he 'had only a few days ago believed in blasphemy as the way. to 
salvation, but that you couldn't even believe in that because then you were believing 
in something to blaspheme', yet immediately afterwards he begins to 'curse and 
blaspheme Jesus' with 'conviction' (200). O'Connor would convince her readers 
that Haze's inner conflict is resolved by a kind of Pauline conversion, when on the 
road to preach his message to the 'new city', his car, which he considers a 
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'lightening bolt couldn't stop', is arbitrarily destroyed by a patrolman (199, 201). 
'Nobody with a good car needs to be justified' he had claimed (107), and when this 
symbol of his self-justification, his 'place to be' (109), is destroyed, O'Connor aims 
to suggest his reply to the question 'Was you going anywheres?' with a 'No' marks 
some spiritual instead of physical progression (203-04). 
Haze's self-blinding, and his walking with broken glass and rocks in his shoes in 
order to 'pay' (216), connects his behaviour to his earlier self-mortification when he 
waited for a sign. His assertion that the barbed wire he wraps around his chest is 
because he is 'not clean', implies the loss of the car has been perceived by him as 
some kind of a sign which provokes an altered perspective, because it leads him to 
revoke his earlier assertion 'I AM clean' (218. 85). When Mrs Flood alleges such 
asceticism means he 'must believe in Jesus', he significantly does not deny it (219). 
But is Haze really 'going backwards to Bethlehem' as Mrs Flood imagines? (213). Is 
the 'pushing look', the 'straining toward something' she identifies in his blind face 
(208), actually indicative of some kind of spiritual in-sight attained by Haze? Or is 
it rather O'Connor as Christian writer-prophet pushing her readers - both 
insider/intelligent and outsider/average too hard towards an eventual interpretation 
of his spiritual redemption which strains the text too much to accept? 
Mrs Flood is herself established by O'Connor as a secular reader of events who sees 
literally: 'she took every word at its face value but all the faces were the same' 
(204). Yet her fascination with Haze leads her to imagine 'the whole black world in 
his head and his head bigger than the world, his head big enough to include the sky 
and planets and whatever was or had been or would be' (212). To understand how it 
would be possible for him to know in which direction he was travelling, she 
envisages 'it was like you were walking in a tunnel and all you could see was a pin 
point of light' which she sees 'as some kind of a star, like the star on Christmas 
cards' (212-13). Again O'Connor employs her own kind of typology to recall the 
reader to an earlier event and imply added significance to the current episode. This 
mystical idea of Haze's head becoming a microcosm of the universe evokes the 
description of the night sky over Taulkinham given at the beginning of Chapter 
Three, in which there were 'depth on depth' thousands of stars which were moving 
very slowly 'as if they were about some vast construction work that involved the 
whole order of the universe and would take all time to complete' but 'no one was 
paying any attention to the sky' (31). The fact that Mrs Flood fastens all her 
'attention' on Haze because 'she wanted to penetrate the darkness behind it and see 
for herself what was there' (219), seems to demonstrate at least the desire for a 
profounder vision which neither she, nor the other inhabitants of Taulkinham 
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displayed earlier in the novel. When Haze is returned to her dead by the patrolmen, 
the narrator informs us 'the deep burned eye sockets seemed to lead into the dark 
tunnel where he had disappeared', but Mrs Flood 'couldn't see anything' when she 
stared into his face (225). But when she shuts her eyes she sees: 
the pin point of light but so far away that she could not hold it steady 
in her mind. She felt as if she were blocked at the entrance to 
something [ ... ] and felt as if she had finally got to the beginning of 
something she couldn't begin, and she saw him moving farther and 
farther away, farther and farther into the darkness until he was the pin 
point of light. (225·26) 
In her 'Author's Note' O'Connor admonishes her readers for their 'stumbling block' 
in not being able to believe that belief in Christ is a matter of life and death. and 
consequently understand Haze's true integrity, and by implication, that of her novel. 
But I would argue that what blocks, or should block, O'Connor's readers from 
perceiving the anagogical light at the end of this particular tunnel, is not an 
incapacity to be an intelligent reader, and see spiritually, but that the narrative, 
unlike the night sky over Taulkinham, is not underpinned with sufficient scaffolding 
to support the weight of an unambiguously spiritual interpretation. 
The heavy handed symbolism in which O'Connor prepares the reader to accept the 
loss of Haze's car acts as a catalyst for an epiphany leading to his conversion, is 
difficult to accept, because the evidence for a vital change of perspective is minimal. 
even though she attempts to prefigure it when he tells his audience 'they needn't to 
look at the sky because it's not going to open up and show no place behind it' (159). 
Although his face 'seemed to reflect' the distance over the embankment, and he 
slumps down onto it, there is nothing to suggest Haze's expression implies he has 
seen any alternative 'place' behind the 'blank' grey sky overhead (204). His 
demeanour is too similar to his expression when he discovered Hawkes was a fake 
and was converted to a deeper nihilism. That deeper blankness also 'reflected 
something' (156). In the later episode Haze's 'face didn't change and he didn't turn 
it toward the patrolman. It seemed to be concentrated on space' (205). But there is at 
least as much evidence here to suggest he is merely shocked by the bizarre way in 
which he has lost his most valued material possession, as there is to assume he 
recognises the error of his sinful ways. As Asals maintains, Wise Blood is 'a book of 
many nightmares but no visions' (Imagination 53), and although Haze's blinding 
and self-punishment suggests atonement, what this is for remains ambiguous. Even 
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he does not specifically connect it to either his earlier blasphemy or the murder of 
Layfield, informing Mrs Flood it 'don't make any difference for what' (216). This 
self-mutilation is not in itself sufficient to suggest that Haze has now become an 
anti-anti-Christ,54 and those readers who claim he is spiritually saved coalesce 
atonement with redemption. As Satterfield rightly observes, such readers 'mistake 
his acts of penance' for 'the goal they are employed to achieve; they mistake the 
means for the end. But atonement is not redemption and should not be confused 
with it' (Satterfield 34). 
But even if Haze's conversion and atonement are accepted, there remains a problem 
with associating his redemption with the tunnel, star, and pinpoint of light 
symbolism used by O'Connor, because this imagery is itself ambivalent. Not enough 
distinction is evident between Haze's star apparently guiding him backwards to 
Bethlehem and the point of light he becomes, and the more frequent use of the 
symbol with profane connotations. The several other stars who appear in the novel 
suggest either no, or at best a warped redemption is attained. The white woman in 
the black, coffin-like box at the carnival is its star display (24), and the distinctly 
unholy Onnie Jay is 'a radio star' (150). When he visits the movies Enoch proceeds 
Haze-like down a dark tunnel towards the celluloid movie stars at the end of it 
(132), and when his desire to become the 'Great Star' Gonga (171) is eventually 
achieved, the comedy dilutes rather than strengthens the case for Haze's redemption 
through almost equally bizarre events later in the novel. 
Mrs Flood 'thanked her stars' every day that she 'was not religious or morbid' (204), 
and although the star imagery may be unsuccessful in communicating her own 
religious beliefs, O'Connor is more successful in recalling the reader to Christian 
concepts via some of the other themes she employs in the narrative. Haze's exodus 
in the wilderness of Taulkinham, and the stress on his Augustinian desire to find a 
physicaVspiritual 'home' a heavenly city or 'place' to be, and the distortion of the 
good Samaritan parable, when the patrolmen find Haze lying afflicted in a ditch by 
the road and help him on his way to a different 'place' through the brutality that 
kills him. 55 Equally, the inversion of Christian symbolism is if anything too 
obviously delineated: the new jesus as a parody of the Incarnation, its residence in 
Enoch's 'tabernacle-like' washstand (125) while he waits for it to give him a sign, 
and Enoch's reading of his comic strips 'every morning like an office' (187). The 
blood symbolism and its connection to Christ's crucifixion likewise work through 
ironic reversal. Declaring 'Where has the blood you think you been redeemed by 
touched you?' (98) Haze unconsciously indicates a truth: that the Fallen inhabitants 
of Taulkinham show little evidence of having been redeemed. His attempt to escape 
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the fact he has been personally saved by Jesus leads him to create a church 'that the 
blood of Jesus don't foul with redemption' (99), yet his call for a 'new jesus' that is 
all man 'without blood to waste', points through inversion to the deeper truth that 
Christ's agony appears to have had little impact on the amoral universe in which 
Haze exists (134.35). Similarly, the crucifixion imagery which surrounds the death 
of the True Prophet, Solace Layfield: the repeated call of 'Jesus hep me' (199), and 
the large amount of blood that 'was coming out of him and forming a puddle around 
his head' (198), is successful in alerting the reader to the Christian truths which 
O'Connor attempts to prophesy. 
But these successes are unable to countermand the overwhelmingly grotesque and 
immoral content of the novel. Ultimately the world exhibited in O'Connor's 
fictional carnival tent is 'so SINsational' it fails to recall readers to an 'EXclusive' 
Christian truth (54). While she aims to prophesy like Haze's grandfather, make the 
reader 'never forget he was redeemed' and intends to 'have him in the end' (16), we 
are left with the fact that behind all the distorted versions of 'truth' offered by her 
fictional prophets the only truth may be there is little Christian truth in this novel. 
O'Connor as writer·prophet finds it extremely difficult to balance God's Word with 
her own words in fictional form. Like the new jesus/mummy, the narrative 'ain't 
anything but a way to say something' (152), but the mystery it contains is too great 
to be confined in fictional form. Wise Blood and its 'Author's Note' is like the 
mummy and its tag. The text remains 'a mystery' although it is 'right there in a glass 
case for everybody to see' with 'a typewritten card over it telling all about it' (75). 
But there is something the 'Author's Note' 'couldn't say and what it couldn't say 
was inside' [O'Connor], 'a terrible knowledge without any words to it' (75). 
Referring Weil's theories on the value of fictions, their immoral fictional content, 
the writer's role, and O'Connor's responses to them to Wise Blood offers some 
interesting insights into the novel and O'Connor's proclaimed role as Christian 
prophet. First, Wise Blood does refute Weil's bias against the autonomous value of 
fictions, by offering an intriguing text, which independent of its limited ability to 
write Christian truths on the soul, is both interesting and entertaining. But second, 
Weil's insistence that to escape being fictitious and communicate religious truths 
successfully spiritual narratives must demonstrate the experiential reality of an 
opposition between good and evil is borne out by Wise Blood. Despite O'Connor's 
defence that she needs to emphasise the reality of a Fallen world for readers too 
stupid or desacralised to recognise it, in Wise Blood she makes the corruption 
believable but fails to make the grace meaningful. Its unrelenting physical and moral 
corruption is not balanced by a sufficient amount of goodness or beauty, and 
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consequently the narrative is too deeply embedded in the devil' s territory to make 
the action of grace plausible. Unable adequately to balance the incommensurates of 
her theology and fiction, 56 O'Connor succeeds in making evil interesting but in 
doing so she dilutes her religious imperative, and consequently. it is difficult for her 
readers to accept that such well delineated Fallen characters can be, have been, 
redeemed. 
O'Connor does not need to possess sanctity to write religious truths on the souls of 
her readers, but her habit of art, and aim to make fictions good in themselves are not 
sufficiently well executed in this novel to bridge the gaps between her religious 
intentions and the content of the narrative. Where O'Connor has most success in 
writing prophetically and linking the incommensurates of sacred and profane is 
where she differs most from Weil: the uses of comedy, and the inversion of the type 
of linguistic hierarchy Weil advocates.57 While Enoch Emery's comic sub-plot 
obscures rather than illuminates her main subject, it is the ironic uses of language, 
profanity especially, which refer the reader back to the original, sacred meaning of 
specific words. 'Jesus' is the curse constantly on the lips of the characters 
throughout the novel, and like the boy at Slade's used car lot where Haze buys the 
car which he wrongly thinks offers him justification, the repeated refrain of 'Jesus 
on the cross', 'Christ nailed', and 'Sweet Jesus', refers to what is spiritually, rather 
than physically 'wrong with him' (64,66). 
But even this form of O'Connor's attempts to recall her readers to an alternative 
sacred reality is problematic, because as Northrop Frye notes, irony requires not 
merely understanding but 'overstanding' to communicate meaning,58 and therefore 
to perceive the religious inferences beyond the literal blasphemy requires some kind 
of awareness of what is being abused. Consequently if O'Connor is to convince her 
readers the endemic profanity in the narrative is actually meant to suggest spiritual 
rather than carnal interpretations, she requires an insider reader willing to perceive 
latent connotations, rather than an outsider reader who accepts only the literal 
signification. So finally, despite the two sets of eyes and added dimension O'Connor 
claims her allegiance to the Catholic Church provides her with as prophetic writer, 
because Wise Blood is so grotesque she does need to overcome its fictional form in 
order to make her theological intent manifest. 
Only O'Connor's process of aural circumcision provides the means to find the 
equilibrium between principle and fact, judgement and observation, nature and 
grace which she believes necessary to make fictions true prophecy, but which is 
difficult to find in Wise Blood's narrative. This does entail an element of 
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sanctimoniousness in her extra-fictional writings and the kind of usurpation of 
spiritual guidance that Weil condemns. From the book's publication onwards 
O'Connor ensured her own interpretation of the novel was vigorously disseminated. 
Haze's car we are informed is 'a kind of death-in-life symbol, as his blindness is a 
life-in-death symbol', and he 'does not really escape his predicament until the car is 
destroyed by the patrolman' (MM 72). His 'nihilism leads him back to the fact of 
his Redemption', she insists, 'which is what he would have liked so much to get 
away from' (HB 70). 'The fact that these meanings are there makes the book 
significant' she contends, the 'reader may not see them but they have their effect on 
him nonetheless. This is the way the modem novelist sinks, or hides, his theme' 
(MM72). 
Even though O'Connor's Christian themes are well submerged in the narrative, her 
aural circumcision has proved extremely successful at inducing spiritual 
interpretations of Wise Blood. Jonathan Baumbach claims that at the novel's ending 
'Haze immolates himself, re-enacting, in effect, the redemption of Man'. 59 Carter 
Martin insists Mrs Flood 'undergoes conversion progressively' and even claims she 
'lives to pursue greater knowledge of herself and ultimately God' (True Country 
117). Dorothy Walters believes Haze returns 'to God through acts of extreme 
expiation', yet uses O'Connor's 'Author's Note' as her evidence, insisting it 'should 
dispel any final doubts as to Haze's intentions,.60 As Josephine Hendin argues, the 
religious argument that Haze blinds himself to atone for his earlier disbelief is 'a 
simplistic view that can best be maintained by readers with dogmatic glasses. It is, I 
feel, their glasses and not the text that suggests this' (Hendin World 54-55). 
However, as Lewis A. Lawson claims, 'if one cannot create the perfect form perhaps 
the next best thing is to create the perfect deformity', 61 and I will now proceed in 
Chapter Two to interrogate how both Weil and O'Connor find connections between 
monstrosity and spiritual revelation. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
1. Plato, Phaedrus and the Seventh and Eighth Letters, trans. by Walter Hamilton 
(London: Penguin, 1973), (276) p.98. Due to the large number of other editions of 
Plato's texts available, to enable readers to locate quotations easily further 
references to The Phaedrus refer to the standard pagination to be found on the 
margins of most texts of Plato, and are given after quotations in the thesis text. 
2. For useful and concise discussions of Plato's concept of recollection and its 
connection to the soul, knowledge of the Forms and dialectic, see Christopher 
Janaway, 'Ancient Greek Philosophy I: The Pre-Socratics and Plato', in Philosophy: 
A Guide Through the Subject, ed. by A.C. Grayling (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), pp.336-97 (pp.366-69). See also: David E. Cooper, World 
Philosophies: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp.107·15; and 
Richard Tamas, 'The Philosopher's Quest and the Universal Mind', in The Passion 
of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World View 
(London: Pimlico, 1996), pp.41-47 (pp.42-44). 
3. See Mark 4. 13-20 in The Jerusalem Bible: New Testament, general ed. Alexander 
Jones, 4th edn (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), p.78. Further references to 
biblical passages are given in the standard pagination after quotations in the text. 
Whilst Christian notions of writing on the soul and how to express them are 
influenced by Platonic philosophy, it is important to note that Christianity insists the 
revelation of ultimate reality is not possible by intellectual effort alone, but is 
dependent on divine grace and faith. For an analysis of Plato's concept of the soul, 
use of dialectic to approach spiritual knowledge and its similarities to and 
distinctions from Christian theology see Diogenes Allen, 'Plato: This World Is Not 
Our Home', in Philosophy for Understanding Theology (Atlanta, Georgia: John 
Knox Press; London: SCM Press, 1985), pp.39-59. 
4. 'Plato's Pharmacy' in Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson, paperback edn 
(London: Athlone Press, 1981, 1993), pp.63-171 (p.149). See this essay for Derrida's 
use of the Phaedrus to examine the function of writing as both remedy and poison, 
and specifically his analysis of writing on the soul: pp.63-171 (pp.148-SS); 
translated here as writing 'in' the soul, p.148. 
5. Figurative imagery is a crucial part of the form of her phiJosophicaJ writings and 
as the following quotation demonstrates, is inseparable from her reasoning. 
'The use of reason makes things transparent to the mind. We do not, 
however, see what is transparent [ ... J We see either the dust on the 
window or the view beyond the window, but never the window itself. 
Cleaning off the dust only serves to make the view visible. The 
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reason should be employed only to bring us to the true mysteries, the 
true undemonstratables, which are reality. The uncomprehended 
hides the incomprehensible and should on this account be 
eliminated'. (GG, p. 119) 
The most famous precedents for this philosophical use of figurative imagery and 
narratives are found in Plato. See the similes of the Sun, Divided Line and the Cave, 
and the Myth of Er in The Republic, trans. by Desmond Lee, 2nd edn, rev. (London: 
Penguin, 1974, 1987), (507-21), pp. 305-25; and (614-16) pp.447-50. 
6. Weil's unfinished play is composed of both verse and prose, see Venise sauvee, 
tragedie en trois actes (Paris: Gallimard, 1955). See SWR, pp.408-09 for two of 
Weil's poems 'Mitten in 1938: 'The Threshold' (trans. by William Burford, first 
publ. in The Phoenix, 3.1 (1970), 86-87); and 'The Stars' (first publ. as 'La Porte' in 
'Les Astres', Poemes, suivis de 'Venise sauvee' Lettre de Paul Valery (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1968). Most of the lectures and essays in Mystery and Manners are as 
much theological and philosophical as they are literary, in both their didactive form 
and spiritual content. O'Connor consistently discusses her fiction and role as author 
within a specifically metaphysical framework, using theological vocabulary to refer 
to literary issues. See for example 'Novelist and Believer', MM, pp.154-158. See 
also The Presence of Grace and Other Book Reviews for O'Connor's critiques of 
relevant theological and philosophical writers and issues. 
7. Her essay 'The Fiction Writer and His Country' (1957) provides an example of 
how O'Connor specifies her Christian viewpoint and successfully reorientated the 
critical debate towards her anagogical perspective which had not been widely 
recognised previously. For discussions of this process see Carol Shloss, pp. 13-14, 
and Satterfield, p.42. 
8. In Wells, CFO, p.89. O'Connor makes the same point in her review of Bruce 
Vawter's The ConsCience of Israel: 'Twentieth-century biblical criticism has 
returned the prophets to their genuine mission which was not to innovate but to 
recall people to truths they were already well aware of but chose to ignore', PG. 
p.141. 
9. See Mark Edmundson, 'Prologue: An Ancient Quarrel' in Literature Against 
Philosophy, Plato to Derrida: A Defence of Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp.1-29 for a discussion of Plato's argument and its 
implications for both philosophy and literature. For an excellent contemporary 
analysis of the interconnection between philosophy and literature which also 
respects each discipline's distinctiveness, see H.P. Rickman. Philosophy in 
Literature (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1996), 
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10. See Aristotle's Poetics: Chapter Six on tragedy as the 'arousal of pity and fear 
effecting the katharsis' of the emotions; and Chapter Nine which contends 'poetry is 
more philosophical and more serious than history, since poetry speaks more of 
universals, history of particulars'. In The Poetics of Aristotle, trans. by Stephen 
Halliwell (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1987), p.3?, p.4l. 
11. See 'Fiction', in Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and 
Society, rev. edn (London: Fontana, 1983, 1988), pp.134-35 and 'Fiction' in A 
Dictionary of Modern Critical Terms, ed. by Roger Fowler, rev. edn (London: 
Routledge, 1973, 1987), pp.94-96. See also 'Fictions', and 'Literary Fiction and 
Reality', in Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of 
Fiction (London: Oxford University Press, 1966, 1967), pp.35-64, pp.127-52. 
12. Weil's 'Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love 
of God', WFG, pp.105-16 provides a succinct clarification of her concept of 
attention. See Chapter Three of this thesis for an analysis of attention's crucial role 
in man's preparation for contact with God. 
13. 'Paradox' in Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy: A Survey (London: Mandarin, 
1996), pp.397-412 gives a detailed analysis of the term which acknowledges its 
place in philosophical and theological thinking. 
14. 'Contradiction, Mystery and the Use of Words in Simone Weil', Religion and 
Literature, 17.2 (1985), 1-16 (p.4). 
15. See 'Towards a Poetics of Faith', in T.R. Wright, pp.I-40 and 'Talking about 
God' in Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.20-31. 
16. For detailed discussions of how figurative language produces alternative 
perceptions see On Metaphor and Thought, ed. by Andrew Ortony, 2nd edn 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also 'Identity and Metaphor', 
in Northrop Frye, Words With Power: Being a Second Study of 'The Bible and 
Literature' (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, 1992), pp.63.96. On 
Weil's figurative language and imagery see: Jeffrey Eaton, 'Simone Weil and the 
Problem of Analogy', Theology, 87 (1984), 13-19; and 'Analogies' in David 
Anderson, Simone Weil (London: SCM Press, 1971), pp.99-115. See also: Ann 
Loades, 'Eucharistic Sacrifice: Simone Weil's Use of a Liturgical Metaphor', in 
Religion and Literature, 17.2 (1985), pp.43-54. and Van Herik, pp.260-82. 
17. SWR, p.295. It is significant that to describe the inspirational quality of texts of 
genius Weil borrows this image from Plato's allegory of the charioteer and his 
horses in the Phaedrus (246-57). Nourished by beauty, wisdom and goodness, the 
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wings of the soul defy gravity allowing the soul to follow the Gods who travel 
outside the vault of the universe to perceive the 'plain of truth' where resides the 
absolute reality of the Forms (248). Evil and ugliness perish the soul's wings, and it 
may eventually sink 'beneath its burden of forgetfulness' (anamnesis), and fall to 
earth to be incarnated in a human being. Although the soul forgets its pre-physical 
vision of ultimate truth, through a combination of reason, intellect, and the 
reminders of the Forms provided by the sensible world, it is possible to unconceal 
and re-collect this epiphany (alelhia). It is by the 'right use' of 'aids to recollection, 
which form a continual initiation into the perfect mystic vision that a man can 
become perfect in the true sense of the word' (249). It is in this context that WeiI,s 
texts of genius should be understood as mediums for writing spiritual truths on the 
soul. 
18. See IC, p.119 and Weil's list of images of Christ in FLN, pp.321-22. 
19. See the essays 'God in Plato', 'The Symposium of Plato', and 'The Republic' in 
IC, pp.74-88, pp.106-31, pp.132-50. 
20. The Book of Job is 'a mutilated and adapted translation of a sacred book 
concerning an incarnated God who suffered, was put to death, and resurrected', and 
'Job is the suffering just man of Plato, so just that he appears unjust' SL, p.160, 
FLN,p.256. 
21. For an excellent examination of Weil's prejudice towards Judaism, its causes 
and consequences see 'A Stranger unto Her People: Weil on Judaism', in Nevin, 
pp.235-59. 
22. See Weil's comments on art, literature and music in her essay 'Forms of the 
Implicit Love of God', in WFG, pp.137-215. 
23. See Weil's article 'Antigone' and her essays 'God's Quest for Man', 'Zeus and 
Prometheus' and 'Prometheus' in Ie, pp.l-l0, pp.18-23, pp.56-73. See also: Loades, 
'Simone Weil and Antigone' in Bell, pp.277-94. 
24. See Ie, pp.24-55 for Weil's essay, and also Michael K. Ferber, 'Simone Weil's 
Iliad', and Joseph H. Summers, 'Notes on Simone Weil's Iliad', in Simone Weil: 
Interpretations of a Life, ed. by George Abbott White (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1981), pp.63-85, pp.87-93. 
25. On this point see Rickman, pp.23-31 and 'Literature and Philosophy: A 
Conversation with Bryan Magee', in Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: 
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Writings on Philosophy and Literature, ed. by Peter Conradi (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1997), pp.3-30. 
26. Perrin and Thibon, p.142. Mark Edmundson also recognises the relationship 
between philosophy and fiction. It 'is manifestly the case that philosophers, even 
those in the much-maligned metaphysical tradition, aren't always solidifying or 
developing key terms'. Often 'philosophers are propounding myths, fictions that are 
open to broad interpretation [ ... ] They move away from definitions, from truth', ie. 
fact. Edmundson, p.14. 
27. See 'Myth', in Williams, pp. 210-12, 'Myth', in Fowler, pp.153-55, and 
'Concern and Myth', in Frye, Words With Power, pp.30-62. 
28. However it is important to note that God is present within the universe and in 
what Weil terms the 'supernatural' part of man's soul. See the following brief 
discussion, and my more detailed analysis of Weil's concepts of necessity and the 
soul in Chapter Two, and her notion of the bridges between God and man within the 
universe in Chapter Three. 
29. The highly complex nature of Christian concepts of grace prevents me from 
adequately defining my terminology here. See my discussion of Christian grace and 
its relevance to Weil and O'Connor's writings in Chapter Three. 
30. NB, p. 376. On God's secret presence within the world, descent into the human 
soul, and seizure of the soul by violence, see Weil's important essays, 'Forms of the 
Implicit Love of God', in WFG, pp.137-215~ and 'The Love of God and Affiiction', 
in SWR, pp. 439-68. See also my examination of how Weil conceives both God and 
mankind's part in the action of grace, in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
31. NB, p.471. Weil's concepts of void and decreation are central to her 
understanding of how God and man are both separated and reconciled. See her 
comments in 'Void and Compensation', 'To Accept the Void', and 'Decreation', in 
GG, pp. 5-9, pp. 10-11. pp. 28-34. 
32. MM p.189. O'Connor draws her concept of the interrelation between aesthetics 
and authorial morality from St. Thomas Aquinas, whose Summa Theologica she 
read regularly, and whose work she also studied via Jacques Maritain's Art and 
ScholastiCism With Other Essays. See Aquinas' statement on beauty to which 
O'Connor refers (Summa: I q.39 art.8), and her marginal lining of the relevant point 
in her copy of Art and ScholastiCism, trans. by J.P. Scanlan (New York: Charles 
Scribner'S Sons, 1930). p.20, in Kinney, Library, pp.93-94. See also: 'The Formal 
Criteria of Beauty' and 'The Theory of Art', in Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of 
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Thomas Aquinas, trans. by Hugh Bredin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1988), pp.64-121, pp.163-89. 
33. However it is necessary to make some distinction between WeiI's personality 
and her work. Her brother Andre insists his sister 'had an excellent sense of 
humour', in Malcolm Muggeridge, 'Andre Weil, a Scientist, Discusses His Sister 
with Malcolm Muggeridge', Listener, 24 May 1973, pp.673-79 (p.674). See also 
Gustave Thibon's comment that Wei! 'knew how to joke without bad taste and 
could be ironical without unkindness', in his 'Introduction' to GG p.x. 
34. Robert D. Pelton, The Trickster in West Africa: A Study of Mythic Irony and 
Sacred Delight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p.259. Quoted in 
Ruthann Knechel Johansen. The Narrative Secret of Flannery 0 'Connor: The 
Trickster as Interpreter (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994), p.152. 
35. See Chapter Two of this thesis for an analysis of how O'Connor's use of irony 
provides incisive means of demonstrating a character's ontological fictionality, 
implicates the reader in the protagonist's subsequent humiliation, and in doing so 
aims to provoke her audience into re-viewing their own vision of what is fictional, 
what real. 
36. See Robert Fitzgerald's observation that the 'true range of the stories is vertical 
and Dantesque in what is taken in. in scale of implication', 'Flannery O'Connor: A 
Memoir', in The Third Kind of Knowledge: Memoirs and Selected Writings, ed. by 
Penelope Fitzgerald Laurans (New York: New Directions, 1993), pp.105-24 (p.122) 
(first publ. as 'Introduction', in Flannery O'Connor, Everything That Rises Must 
Converge (New York: Noonday Press-Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1966». On 
O'Connor's medievalism see J.O. Tate, 'Flannery O'Connor's Counterplot', 
Southern Review, 16.4 (1980), 869-78. For discussions of her allegory see Thomas 
M. Lorch, 'Flannery O'Connor: Christian AUegorist'. Critique: Studies in Modern 
Fiction, 10.2 (1968), 69-80; and J. Robert Baker. 'Flannery O'Connor's Four-Fold 
Method of Allegory', FOCB, 21 (1992),84-96. 
37. On the four levels of Medieval allegory see St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa: 
I q.l art. 10, and Dante's 'Letter to Can Grande', in The Theory of Criticism: From 
Plato to the Present A Reader, ed. by Raman Selden (London: Longman, 1988). 
pp.292-93. 
38. MM, pp.71-72. See T. R. Wright on literary and theological symbolism: 
There is always an element of mystery surrounding a symbol. an 
opacity, a surplus of meaning, an enigma which no interpretation 
should attempt to eradicate. The deeper meaning to which the symbol 
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points remains inexhaustible and ultimately inexpressible. In 
theology as in literature symbolism involves a rejection of the 
positivist belief that reality can be dis-covered, laid bare by language. 
(Wright, p. 140) 
39. On this reconstruction of the cosmos see Mikhail Bakhtin in Rabelais and His 
World, trans. by Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968, 
1984): 
The Renaissance destroyed this hierarchical picture of the world; its 
elements were transferred to one single plane, and the higher and 
lower stratum became relative. The accent was placed on "forward" 
and "backward". This transfer of the world from the vertical to the 
horizontal was realized in the human body. which became the 
relative centre of the cosmos. And this cosmos was no longer moving 
from the bottom to the top but along the horizontal line of time. from 
the past to the future. In bodily man the hierarchy of the cosmos was 
reversed and canceled; he asserted himself outside it. (pp. 363-64). 
40. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. by Willard R. Trask 
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1959, 1987), p.178. See also: 'Modem nonreligious 
man assumes a new existential situation; he regards himself solely as the subject and 
agent of history, and he refuses all appeal to transcendence' p.203. 
41. See 'Imagination' in Scruton, pp.341-54; and Weil's comments on imagination 
and perception in LPY, pp.49-57. 
42. 'What comes to us from Satan is the imagination', Wei! claims in NB. p.218. 
'Men exercise their imaginations in order to stop up the holes through which grace 
might pass, and for this purpose, and at the cost of a lie, they make for themselves 
idols, that is to say, relative forms of good', ibid., p.l45. The imagination as 
fictional filler of voids 'does away with multiple relationships', ibid., p.160. 
43. 'Discernment and the Imagination', in Bell, pp.1l6·149 (p.139). See this article 
for a balanced analysis of both the negative and positive aspects of the imagination 
as conceived by WeiI, and how they relate to her theory of literary fictions. 
44. The most positive imaginative faculty is also an important part of spiritual 
genius, which provides the basis for moral action. See WFG, pp.l48-149 for how 
imagination, attention and love combine on the rare occasions when the victim of 
affliction is assisted. 
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Risen Sons: Flannery 0 'Connor's Vision of History (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1987), pp.16-31; and Shloss, pp.58-65. For a detailed discussion of the 'as ir 
construction, see 'The Virtue in As If, in Edward Kessler, Flannery 0 'Connor and 
the Language of Apocalypse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
pp.51-73. 
46. See Kessler, pp.7-17 and passim for O'Connor's use of metaphors. 
47. 'Paradox', in J.A. Cuddon, The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and 
Literary Theory, 3rd edn (London: Penguin, 1992). p.677. For O'Connor's use of 
paradoxes and other figurative language see Robert Detweiler, 'The Curse of Christ 
in Flannery O'Connor's Fiction" Comparative Literature Studies, 3.2 (1966), 
235-45. 
48. See Asals: 
The litotes of the plain style and the hyperbole of gesture and action, 
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disturbing power. (Imagination, p.131) 
On O'Connor's irony see Judith F. Wynne, 'The Sacramental Irony of Flannery 
O'Connor', Southern Literary Journal, 7.2 (1975), 33-49 
49. Religion, p.117. See also Fred R. Thiemann, 'Usurping the Logos: Cliches in 
O'Connor's "Good Country People"', FOCB, 24 (1995-96), 46-56. 
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52. Wise Blood (London: Faber, 1952, 1980). Further references to this edition 
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Wise Blootf, American Literature, 58.2 (1986), 256-70 (p. 257). 
54. As John Burt observes, finally 'we cannot distinguish Haze's piety from his 
impiety, his experience of grace from his punishment'. See 'What You Can't Talk 
About', in Modern Critical Views: Flannery 0 'Connor, ed. by Harold Bloom (New 
York: Chelsea House, 1986), pp.125-43 (p.143). 
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Press, 1977), pp. 108-122 (p.112, p.113). 
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CHAPTER TWO; INTERESTING MONSTROSITIES: 
AFFLICTION, GROTESQUERIE, AND THE STRANGENESS 
OF TRUTH 
If anyone wants to be a follower of mine. let him renounce himself 
and take up his cross every day and follow me. For anyone who wants 
to save his life will lose it; but anyone who loses his life for my sake, 
that man will save it. 1 
This is the central Christian paradox which fonns the core of both Simone Wei! and 
Flannery O'Connor's theologies: loss of self as ultimate being founded on Christ's 
crucifixion as logos alogos. As I noted in Chapter One. such contradictory Christian 
statements are dependent on an irrational reason which offends secular notions of 
normality. The violation of reason, exorbitant demands made, and the incredulous or 
repulsed responses generated. qualify this and other Christian paradoxes as a kind of 
monstrosity.2 
Simone Weil's infamous New York 'prayer' constitutes a horrifying version of the 
central Christian paradox. 
Father, in the name of Christ grant me this. That I may be unable to 
will any bodily movement, or even any attempt at movement. like a 
total paralytic. That I may be incapable of receiving any sensation. 
like someone who is completely blind. deaf and deprived of all 
senses. That I may be unable to make the slightest connection 
between two thoughts. even the simplest. like one of those total idiots 
who not only cannot count or read but have never even learnt to 
speak. That I may be insensible to every kind of grief and joy. and 
incapable of any love for any being or thing. and not even for myself, 
like old people in the last stages of decrepitude [ ... J Father. since thou 
art the Good and I am mediocrity. rend this body and soul away from 
me to make them into things for your use, and let nothing remain of 
me. for ever. except this rending itself, or else nothingness. 3 
Apparently conscious of the monstrous nature of her plea Wei! maintains 'One does 
not voluntarily ask for such things. One comes to it in spite of oneself (FLN 244). 
Yet this notion of unfree will intensifies rather than dilutes the offensive content of 
her prayer. 
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In his essay 'Prophet Out of Israel' Leslie Fiedler identifies a connection between 
Christian and Weilean offensiveness: 
The outrageous (from the natural point of view) ethics of 
Christianity, the paradoxes on which it is based. are a scandal to 
common sense; but we have protected ourselves against them by 
turning them imperceptibly into platitudes. It is Simone Weil's 
method to revivify them, by recreating them in all their pristine 
offensiveness. [ ... ] Sometimes the primary function of her paradoxes 
is to remind us that we live in a world where the eternal values are 
reversed. 4 
Fiedler's observation is important to readings of both Weil and O'Connor's work 
because it encapsulates their motivation for, and method of writing on the soul. 
Each writer shares Fiedler's view that mankind shields itself from Christianity's 
unnatural and inherently horrifying paradoxes, and that writing Christian ethics on 
the soul requires reactivating their innate offensiveness. 
Against this background, and motivation, of the fictional fallen world both writers 
are writing in and for, this chapter will analyse how Weil and O'Connor's theologies 
and forms startlingly converge. The starting point is their theology, interrogated in 
two major theological areas. First, is there a God? and is the universe benevolent or 
malevolent? Second, what is the nature of man and human existence? Both writers' 
answers to these questions lead by way of the crucifixion to Joss of self as ultimate 
being. This is Weil and O'Connor's shared paradoxical Christian truth. Both writers 
attempt to revivify this truth, to write it on the sou1. Chapter Two will examine the 
soul to be written on. The second part of this chapter will focus on how Weil's 
monstrous concept of affliction and O'Connor's use of the grotesque genre attempt 
to jolt secular man in the direction of the sacred. Finally. I will add a Weilean 
reading of O'Connor's short stories 'The Life You Save May Be Your Own' (1953), 
and 'Good Country People' (1955). 
Weil and O'Connor both conduct a crusade against what they perceive as the 
monstrous desacralisation of contemporary society. 'Never since the dawn of 
history' has 'Christ been so absent as today' complains Weil, the 'separation of 
religion from the rest of social life, which seems natural even to the majority of 
Christians nowadays would have been judged monstrous by antiquity,.5 O'Connor 
concurs. In a lecture delivered in 1960 she envisions a monstrous audience hostile to 
her Catholic perspective. 'When I sit down to write, a monstrous reader looms up 
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who sits down beside me and continually mutters "I don't get it, I don't see it, I 
don't want it'".6 
To reinvigorate offensive Christian paradoxes and write them on the souls of their 
readers, both writers concentrate on the least acceptable and most unattractive 
elements of reality and the human condition. Weil's core concept of malheur,1 
arbitrary and appalling affliction suffered without consolation, and O'Connor's 
grotesque fiction populated with incomplete bodies and tortured souls focus on 
man's limitation. For each writer a realisation of mankind's constrained and fragile 
form is vital to countermand the erroneous fictionalisation of reality by which 
humanity's egocentrism precludes the sacred. 
According to Wei! 'men can only appear to elevate themselves above human misery 
by disguising the rigours of destiny in their own eyes, by the help of illusion, of 
intoxification, or of fanaticism' (IC 54). This tendency to be fictional is arrested by 
affliction, which 'contains the truth about our condition' and 'compels us to 
recognise as real what we do not think possible': that man is limited (SWR 463, GG 
73). O'Connor shares this belief 'that the basic experience of everyone is the 
experience of human limitation', and as in Weil's schema, the egocentric denial of 
this reality is itself part of man's affliction: 'we are afflicted with the doctrine of the 
perfectibility of human nature by its own efforts' (MM 131, 133). 
Finding that her stories are primarily 'about people who are poor, who are afflicted 
in both mind and body, who have little-or at best a distorted-sense of spiritual 
purpose' (32), O'Connor perceives her concentration on this grotesque physical and 
spiritual impoverishment as a consequence of her Christian beliefs. Writers 'who 
see by the light of their Christian faith will have in these times, the sharpest eyes for 
the grotesque, for the perverse, and for the unacceptable' she insists (33). Secular 
humanism's monstrous inflation of man's status at the expense of God's, constitutes 
a grotesque defonnation of reality which can only be remedied by an equally 
grotesque fictional form. Literary fictions can address, and to some extent redress, 
experiential fictionality by using distortion to jolt readers into recognising the 
existence of the sacred. 
I have to bend the whole novel-its language, its structure, its action 
[ ... ] Distortion in this case is an instrument; exaggeration has a 
purpose, and the whole structure of the story or novel has been made 
what it is because of belief. This is not the kind of distortion that 
destroys; it is the kind that reveals, or should reveal. (162) 
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To interrogate the relationship in Wei! and O'Connor's work between distortion and 
spiritual revelation, offensiveness and the revivification of Christian truths I will 
analyse first, each writer's concepts of God and reality, and second, their theories of 
the nature of man and human existence. First, and most basic: is there a God? 
Second, what is the nature of reality: is the cosmos subject to a rational governing 
order which is benevolent, or is the universe under the jurisdiction of an arbitrary 
and malevolent force? 
Weil's answer to the first question unites her concept of contradiction as a method 
of approaching truth, and her notion of being fictional. 
A case of contradictories which are true. God exists: God does not 
exist. Where is the problem? I am quite sure there is a God in the 
sense that I am quite sure my love is not illUSOry. I am quite sure 
there is not a God in the sense that I am quite sure nothing real can be 
anything like what I am able to conceive when I pronounce this word. 
But that which I cannot conceive is not an illusion. (GG 103) 
This contradictory concept of God is dependent on WeWs view that man's attempts 
to comprehend God's reality involve an element of fictionalisation. There 'is 
nothing real which bears a resemblance to what I am able to conceive when I 
pronounce that name, since I am unable to conceive God' she argues.8 Because 
attempts to define God's inexpressible reality culminate in distortion, knowledge of 
God is approached by apophatic description. 'We can only know one thing about 
God - that he is what we are not' (GG 110). Mankind must 'believe in a God who is 
like the true God in everything, except that he does not exist, since we have not 
reached the point where God exists' she concludes (103). This philosophical method 
of provisional negation ensures that Wei! considers 'atheism is a purification' (104). 
Her amalgamation of the contraries of atheism and theism, the assumption that 
God's existence can be refuted without denying his reality, provides Wei! with a 
method of approaching the theological question: whether reality is benevolent or 
malevolent. Characteristically she insists on the equal power of both. Wei!' s 
creation theory allows the cosmos to be subject to both a rational governing order 
and an arbitrary force, because it is based on the paradoxes that God is 
simultaneously omnipotent and impotent in the world, personal and impersonal, 
Being and non-Being. This unification of incommensurates is possible, because 
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although God caused the universe to exist, he voluntarily consented not to rule it 
despite having the power to do so. 'The true God is the God we think of as almighty, 
but as not exercising his power everywhere' she contends (WFG 144). In this act of 
self-renunciation God abandons mankind's 'whole entire being-flesh, blood, 
sensibility, intelligence, love-to the pitiless necessity of matter and the cruelty of the 
devil,.9 But Weil's negative theodicy amounts to a religious atheism in which God's 
absence paradoxically testifies to his presence. 'The apparent absence of God in this 
world is the actual reality of God [ ... ] This world, in so far as it is completely empty 
of God, is God himself (NB 424). Consequently, as Susan Anima Taubes notes. 
'Wei! has universalised the historical experience of the death of God into a 
theological principle'. 10 
Weil's absence/presence theory is dependent on a redefinition of the Christian 
concept of Providence. 1 1 Finding absurd the notion of God's personal intervention 
in the world to achieve alterations to this original schema, Weil insists it is necessity 
itself which is providential.12 The Christian theory of Providence is a fiction. 
'What we call the design of designs, the plan or plans, of Providence, are only 
imaginings invented by ourselves' (IC 104). But it would be equally erroneous to 
consider the blind and brute forces of necessity which appear to govern the universe 
actually do so. There is a difference between appearance and reality: 'the infinite 
superabundance of the divine mercy [is] secretly present here below' (WFG 90). 
Therefore despite its ostensible dominance of temporal reality, necessity is actually 
constrained by its perfect obedience to external parameters imposed by God. 'What 
is sovereign in this world is detenninateness, limit. Eternal Wisdom imprisons the 
universe in a network, a web of detenninations. The universe accepts passiveli. and 
the 'truth which bites at our hearts' is that 'necessity. through obedience. is a mirror' 
of God's love (NR 272, SWR 463). 
As if this were not sufficient it is essential to understand and love the superposed 
reality of necessity, which is both a horrifying and sovereign force in nature, yet 
equally a reflection of God's benevolence. 13 Affliction makes this possible because 
'it is in affliction that the splendour of God's mercy shines, from its very depths, in 
the heart of its inconsolable bitterness' .14 Weil's notion of the relationship between 
the apparent contraries of gravity and grace is reinforced by her unorthodox (to a 
Christian viewpoint) concept of the symbiotic connection between the creation and 
Christ's crucifixion. While Christian theology traditionally perceives the 
relationship between the Creation, Incarnation and Passion as a linear historical 
progression, Weil believes Christ's crucifixion coincides with the Creation and 
explains it. The Creation is itself a crucifixion because first, in the fonnation of the 
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universe God is agonisingly separated from himself - Father and Son are severed 
from the beginning of time not just at the Incarnation. 'The crucifixion of God is 
something eternal', God 'has abandoned God. God has emptied himself. This means 
that both the Creation and the Incarnation are included with the Passion'. 15 Second, 
by permitting human autonomy God is lacerated. 'My existence crucifies God', she 
insists (NB 564). 
Weil's concept of a linkage between the contraries of God and man, the necessary 
and the good, is predicated on her conviction that both God and humanity are 
afflicted, and that agonising suffering and love are integrally connected rather than 
mutually contradictory. The love between the different divine persons within the 
Trinity, and the love between God and man, their separation and movement towards 
union presupposes affliction. 
Weil's central concept of affliction illuminates, and provides a framework for 
interrogating the second major area of her theology: the nature of man and human 
existence. Discussion of this section will be divided into three topics. First, an 
examination of her criteria for defining what affliction is. Second, Weil's theoretical 
response to the question of how to equate human affliction with an omnipotent and 
benevolent God. Third, Weilean affliction's relationship to the question, what is the 
self? will be analysed by relating it to initially. the offence of being, and next the 
virtue of non-being. 
Weil is careful to distinguish between mere suffering and her more intense notion of 
affliction. I6 'In the realm of suffering, amiction is something apart, specific and 
irreducible. It is quite a different thing from simple suffering' (SWR 439). Although 
the degree and type of affliction endured by its victim varies depending on 
individual sensibility and circumstances, Wei! identifies four criteria which are 
crucial components. First, although physical pain is essential to amiction because 
'nothing else has the power to chain down our thoughts' (440), what makes 
affliction distinct is that in addition to corporeal suffering and social humiliation 
there must be spiritual torment. Affliction is 'physical pain, distress of soul. and 
social degredation, all at the same time' (450) she insists. A 'corrosive force, a 
mutilation or leprosy of the soul', affliction 'takes possession of the soul and marks 
it through with its own particular mark, the mark of slavery' (332, 439). Second, 
affliction is randomly, arbitrarily inflicted and must be endured against the will. The 
'pulverisation of the soul by the mechanical brutality of circumstances', it is 'the 
essence of affliction that it is suffered unwillinglt (462,454). The third feature of 
affliction is that in addition to repelling the non-afflicted, it causes a terrible 
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self-loathing in its victim which is 'the very thing one must consent to' (462). What 
defines affiiction 'is the horror, the revulsion of the whole being, which it inspires in 
its victim' who is 'transformed in his own eyes, into a sort of animal, almost 
paralysed and altogether repulsive' (462, 456). Fourthly, affiiction must be borne 
entirely without consolation. 
This final point is absolutely vital to Weil. In his agony the victim of amiction 
understandably pleads 'Why must I suffer?'. But the afflicted's 
question "why?" does not mean "By what cause?" but "For what 
purpose?" And it is impossible, of course, to indicate any purposes to 
him; unless we invent some imaginary ones [ ... J There can be no 
answer to the "Why?" of the afflicted, because the world is necessity 
and not purpose. If there were finality in the world, the place of the 
good would not be in the other world. Whenever we look for final 
causes in this world, it refuses them. But to know that it refuses one 
has to ask. (466) 
The silence of the afflicted's question, the reality that there is no answer to why 
human tribulations occur, is not considered evidence of humanity's futile and 
wretched condition. Rather, 'the contemplation of human misery wrenches us in the 
direction of God' (GG 70). Although there is neither a remedy nor purpose in it, 
affliction ultimately has a spiritual use as an 'ingenious device' to coerce man into 
experiencing the full horror of gravity, the 'immensity of force, blind, brutal, and 
cold', which dominates human reality.17 Only by feeling the horrifying force of 
necessity is man coerced into confronting his 'almost infinite fragility' (455). A 
reality he flees when unamicted, but an acceptance of which is vital to spiritual 
development. 18 
Finding goodness and mercy in extreme suffering is an innately offensive idea, yet it 
is precisely this concept which forms the basis of the most difficult theological 
question: if there is a God who is both good and omnipotent. how can this be 
reconciled with the existence of suffering, and the problem of evil in the world? 
Consistent with her notion that the greatest mysteries are those in which 
incommensurates, whilst impossible to comprehend, demonstrate a mutual 
dependency; instead of attempting to solve the problem of how to equate ontic and 
moral evils with God's existence by negating one of the contraries, Weil changes the 
equation. Rather than considering either that human torment precludes the reality of 
an omnipotent and merciful God, or that the existence of God explains and offers 
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consolations for mankind's agonies, she insists on the simultaneous reality of both a 
benevolent God and inconsolable affliction. The mystery of human tribulation 
adheres not in its existence, or whether the harrowing traumas of the innocent prove 
God is dead. 19 Instead the mystery resides in the capacity of ontic and moral evils 
to be man's primary route to the divine. In her seminal essay 'The Love of God and 
Affliction' Wei! contends it is not astonishing 
the innocent are killed, tortured, driven from their country, made 
destitute or reduced to slavery, put in concentration camps or prison 
cells, since there are criminals to perform such actions. It is not 
surprising either that disease is the cause of long sufferings, which 
paralyse life and make it into an image of death, since nature is at the 
mercy of the blind play of mechanical necessities. But it is surprising 
that God should have given affliction the power to seize the very 
souls of the innocent and to possess them as sovereign master. (SWR 
441) 
Her unconventional approach to humanity's distress disputes the notion affliction is 
a problem to be either overcome or justified. It is not affliction but man's 
perspective of it which is problematic. Reversing the assumption suffering is an 
obstacle to understanding the human condition and its relation to God permits man 
to perceive necessity and affliction as links between, rather than separations of 
mankind and the divine. Like Pascal, Wei! believes man's misery is his greatness.20 
'It is my misery itself that makes me the receptacle of the Holy Spirit. To become 
something divine I have no need to get away from my misery. I have only to adhere 
to it' she argues (FLN 83). 
Weil's theory of affliction is integrally connected to her concept of what the human 
self is. 'Affliction contains the truth about our condition' she claims (463), and to 
answer the question 'What is a manT in her theology, it is important to analyse how 
being human is offensive. Man's greatest and most common offence is being 
fictional, and this innate fictionality is a direct consequence of fleeing affliction and 
its shocking message that human life is essentially precarious because man is unable 
to prevent external circumstances from impinging on his interior being. When 
confronted with affliction man 'takes immediate refuge in lies. like a hunted animal 
dashing for cover' (457). Unless constrained by affliction humanity finds it 
impossible to believe that everything in the soul - all its thoughts and 
feelings, its every attitude towards ideas, people, and the universe, 
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and above all, the most intimate attitude of the being towards 
itself-that all this is entirely at the mercy of circumstances. (457) 
When unaffected by affliction, man's self-knowledge and awareness of his true 
relation to God and the world is blocked by an illusory self created by a combination 
of imagination and egocentrism. 'We play at imagining we have chosen what is 
forced upon us'; man mistakenly 'imagines he is situated in the center of the world' 
(456, WFG 158). Egoism is in fact 'not love of self, it is a defect of perspective' (Ie 
133), and this faulty solipsism and consequently warped view of self and world is 
the catalyst for the creation of an execrable ersatz divinity which, rather than 
suffering, is man's greatest affliction. 'Two conceptions of hell: the ordinary one 
(suffering without consolation); mine (false beatitude, mistakenly thinking oneself 
in paradise)' (GG 72). 
It is 'affliction that reveals, suddenly and, to our very great surprise that we are 
totally mistaken' (SWR 462). Man's salvation from his monstrously defective 
viewpoint requires an assault on the three facets of the human being which only 
affliction can effect. 
All three sides of our being are always exposed to it. Our flesh is 
fragile [ ... ] Our soul is vulnerable [ ... ] Our social personality upon 
which our sense of existence almost depends, is always and entirely 
exposed to every hazard. These three parts of us are linked with the 
very centre of our being in such a way that it bleeds for any wound of 
the slightest consequence which they suffer. Above all, anything 
which diminishes or destroys our social prestige, our right to 
consideration, seems to impair or abolish our very essence-so much is 
our whole substance an affair of illusion. (454) 
Experiencing a 'shock of horror' at this revelation of the illusory self and revolted 
by his altered state, the afflicted's perspective of the world is poisoned by hatred and 
there is 'a privation of beauty, and an invasion of the soul by ugliness' (332, FLN 
139). This is increased by a 'poison of inertia' in the soul, caused by affiiction 
establishing itself 'like a parasite', ensuring that the amicted, bizarrely, desire to 
plunge themselves further into affliction (SWR 443,444). The self-loathing felt by 
the afflicted radiates outwards to contaminate the non-affiicted. who find it virtually 
impossible to voluntarily contemplate the hideous nature of affliction in a fellow 
human being. Like animals who attack a maimed member of their species. this 'law 
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of sensibility' ensures that society wounds the afflicted individual further by 
unreasonably directing all its revulsion onto its victim.21 
Alienated from both the rest of the community and each other, the afflicted desire to 
communicate the intolerable distress they are experiencing. Yet due to a 
combination of society's indifference and the impossibility of articulating the awful 
reality of affliction to those who have not yet experienced it, they are ignored. The 
'afflicted are not listened to. They are like someone whose tongue has been cut out 
and who occasionally forgets the fact. When they move their lips no ear perceives 
any sound' (332). In a terrible re-enactment of society's insouciance, affliction's 
victim, 'constrained by the general indifference, strives by means of 
self-forgetfulness to become deaf to his own self (333). The amicted becomes a 
non·person. Affliction is 'above all anonymous; it deprives its victims of their 
personality and turns them into things' (445). But paradoxically humanity'S ultimate 
limitation is simultaneously its supreme possibility in Weil's schema, because 
non-being and impersonality is man's true self and source of contact with God. 
After analysing affiiction's relation to what constitutes the self via the offence of 
being, it is important to now examine its connection to the virtue of impersonality 
and non-being. A useful starting point is Weil's essay 'Human Personality\22 in 
which she identifies a significant distinction between the concept of the human 
person, and what is man's essential, sacred self. 'There is something sacred in every 
man, but it is not his person. Nor yet is it the human personality', which is 'the part 
of us which belongs to error and sin' (314, 318) she argues. In contrast to the fake 
divinity attained by man's egocentrism, it is everything which 'is impersonal in man 
that is sacred, and nothing else' (317). The good, true and beautiful exist at an 
anonymous level, and it is mankind's unquenchable desire for these realities despite 
its experience of affliction which constitutes its sacrality. 
At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest 
infancy until the tomb, there is something that goes on indomitably 
expecting, in the teeth of all experience of crimes committed, 
suffered, and witnessed. that good and not evil will be done to him. It 
is this above all that is sacred in every human being. (315) 
But access to goodness and truth requires 'one's own annihilation; through dwelling 
a long time in a state of extreme and total humiliation' (331). This amounts to a 
'death of the soul'. Although not literally made extinct, it is essential to recognise 
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the soul 'is a dead thing. some thing analagous to matter' (458). To accept this 
'death' is impossible unless 'one possesses another life in addition to the soul's 
illusory life', which consists of placing the soul outside everything knowable 
(personality, thoughts and feelings) in God (458). Those who have successfully 
achieved this mystical relocation of the soul are 'no longer anything except a 
two-fold obedience-on the one side to the mechanical necessity in which their 
earthly condition involves them, and on the other to the divine inspiration' (458). 
This intersection of nature and grace is their vocation, made possible by non-being, 
in which there is 'nothing left in them which one could call their own will, their 
person, their "1''' (458). Affliction provides both the ability to annihilate the self and 
the humiliating knowledge that man is powerless to prevent it. 'To be aware of this 
in the depth of one's soul is to experience non-being' which is the condition for 
acquiring truth. For Wei! the pinnacle of human existence constitutes annihilation of 
the self(including free will). 
To fully comprehend Weil's position on affliction and the necessity of non-being it 
is essential to next analyse her complex concepts of the soul to be written on, good 
and evil, and the cross as logos alogos correlating affliction and God. In a letter 
written to Fr. Perrin in January 1942, Weil distinguishes 'three domains' (WFG 43). 
First, what is 'absolutely independent' of humanity and 'in accordance with the will 
of God': ontic and moral evils through which man must feel and love 'the reality 
and presence of God' in all external things (43, 44). The second domain comprises 
'the rule of the will', what man's intelligence and imagination can understand and 
act upon, the natural duties he is obliged to perform and is capable of carrying out to 
achieve fixed and finite results. Finally, the third sphere is neither independent of, 
nor ruled by the human will. Instead man experiences 'the compulsion of God's 
pressure' (44) in direct proportion to the extent the soul concentrates its attention 
and love on God. It is essential to 'abandon ourselves to the pressure' yet 'we must 
do nothing more than we are irresistibly impelled to do' (4S). Man is required to 
constantly increase his focus of attention and love on God, who responds by 
intensifying his pressure on, and possession of the soul. In the soul's spiritual 
development Weil acknowledges an 'oscillating progress' in which it rises and falls 
through its internal architecture (FLN 310). 
External physical realities make a similar impression on man's interior, sacred self. 
'The body is a lever for salvation', I 'can push my body further towards the good 
than the point my soul is at; so the body pulls the soul after it' (FLN 330, 289). This 
physical-spiritual connection extends to the soul's internal organisation, which Weil 
divides into carnal and spiritual elements. 'The body is a prison. The spiritual part of 
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the soul should use it to imprison the carnal part' (320). In her notebooks and major 
essay 'The Pythagorean Doctrine' she expands her theory of the will's triple 
domains, adopting her familiar hierarchical metaphor to describe the soul's 
infrastructure. In what she terms 'the soul's internal architecture' (122), Weil 
identifies three layers corresponding to the three domains. 'The idea of vertically 
superimposed levels in the life of the soul, the highest of them being above 
consciousness and the psychological-there is nothing more important' she claims 
(179). The lowest level constitutes the soul's natural or 'animal part' which is 
permanently and totally subjected to mechanical necessity (IC 194). Above this is 
the intennediate level in which 'the opposition of good and evil must have all 
possible force' (194). Obligations demanding virtuous action23 raise the soul to a 
higher level. The superior plane in the soul consists of 'supernatural love' • allowing 
the irrational, impulsive action necessary to realise moral obligations, and a parallel 
'contemplative facility' required for intensive attention (194). The existence of 
supernatural love within the soul cannot alter the severe effects of necessity and 
affliction on the individual, but it does change the equation. It 'constitutes a new 
factor of the mechanism and transforms it', because this kernel of love and attention 
at the soul's core constitutes 'the Spirit of God in us,.24 
Weil describes the universe as 'a compact mass of obedience' which is 'sprinkled 
with points of light. Each one of these points is the supernatural part of the soul of a 
reasonable creature who loves God and who consents to obey' (IC 193). Weil's view 
of souls which contain no supernatural love and commit immoral actions is that 
the beings gifted with reason who do not love God are only fragments 
of the compact and obscure mass. They are wholly obedient but only 
in the manner of a falling stone. Their soul is also matter. psychic 
matter, humbled to a mechanism as rigorous as that of gravity. Even 
their belief in their own free arbitration, the illusions of their pride. 
their defiance, their revolts, are all simply phenomena as rigorously 
determined as the refraction of light. Considered thus, as inert matter. 
the worst criminals make up a part of the order of the world and 
therefore of the beauty of the world. Everything obeys God, therefore 
everything is perfect beauty. (Ie 193·94) 
Both moral and immoral actions are apparently subject to necessity, and man's only 
freedom is to choose which form of determination to comply with. 'Men can never 
escape from obedience to God [ ... ] The only choice given to men as intelligent and 
free creatures. is to desire obedience or not to desire it' she insists, men are 'like 
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plants which have the one choice of being in or out of the light' (SWR 448). Those 
who do not choose to obey the light of grace are perpetually consigned to submit to 
the laws of natural necessity. The man who does desire obedience is equally at the 
mercy of ontic and moral evils, but becomes susceptible to an additional, 
supernatural level of force. 
He is still subject to mechanical necessity, but a new necessity is 
added to it, a necessity constituted by the laws pertaining to 
supernatural things. Certain actions become impossible for him; 
others are accomplished by means of him, sometimes almost in spite 
of himself. (448) 
Apparently the pinnacle of man's freedom is to enjoy unfree will. 
This blurring of obedience into determinism leads to a failure by Wei! adequately to 
differentiate between ontic and moral evils. She considers that the interconnection 
of sin and suffering is part of humanity's wretched reality. Sin 'makes us suffer and 
suffering makes us evil, and this indissoluble complex of suffering and sin is the evil 
in which we are submerged against our will. and to our horror'. 25 As a symptom of, 
as well as a catalyst for suffering, moral evil is part of the fictionalisation process by 
which the illusory self attempts to evade the forces of necessity. The human mind 
takes 'refuge in lies, like a hunted animal dashing for cover' and this almost always 
generates immorality because 'the evil which is in a man is protection against the 
external evil which attacks him in the form of pain' (457, 467). 
This contradictory yet finally reductive view of human life in which suffering and 
sin replicate themselves. unless via self-loss and unfree will grace intervenes, is 
evident in Weil's theories of good and evil. Her innate Platonic dualism ensures that 
she conceives a vertical hierarchy which divides good and evil into two types: 
natural and supernatural. In The Needfor Roots Weil claims 
above the earthly. carnal sphere in which our thoughts habitually 
move, and which on every side is an inextricable mixture of good and 
evil, there is another, spiritual sphere, where good is only good, and 
even at the inferior level. produces only good; where evil is only evil 
and can produce nothing but evil. 26 
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Although in the natural world good and evil are opposed they are also connected, 
earthly good is both 'the opposite and correlative of evil', according to WeiI,27 
because absolute good only exists outside the world. 'God alone is pure good. 
Creation being both God and other than God is essentially good and evil' (NB 414). 
But Wei! identifies a significant linkage between the natural and supernatural 
realms. The transcendent good is not merely superior to its earthly counterparts. it 
includes them, being 'the unique, total good, which comprises within itself in a 
superlative degree all forms of the good' (NR 192). Because all goods, truths and 
beauties in the natural realm are fragments of, and participate in this ultimate good, 
it is important that they are arranged in the correct order and perceived as a related 
structure. 'Taken all together, viewed from the right point and rightly related, they 
make an architecture. Through this architecture the unique good, which cannot be 
grasped, becomes apprehensible' (FLN 98). 
Similarly, when Weil's fragmentary observations are structured, her concept of the 
good/evil relationship is recognisably both more inclusive and finally more positive 
than her isolated comments suggest. Despite its fundamental opposition to the pure 
good, supreme evil is itself circumscribed by absolute goodness. 'Evil is limitless 
but it is not infinite. Only the infinite limits the limitless' (GG 62) she argues. Just as 
the apparently arbitrary mechanism of necessity is ultimately under God's domain, 
despite 'its being the opposite of good, evil is constrained to include its image. For 
everything witnesses to the good' .28 The 'supreme consolation for evil' is no evil 
'does harm to God' (Ie 147), because it 'is not good which evil violates, for'good is 
inviolate: only a degraded good can be violated' (GO 63). 
In her complex theory of good and evil Weil is tom between a Manichean dualism, 
or Protestant Fundamentalism which polarises these contraries, and a Catholic 
impulse to consider them symbiotically related. In 'Human Personality' she 
maintains in 'all the crucial problems of human existence the only choice is between 
supernatural good on the one hand and evil on the other' (SWR 327), and in her 
London notebook she criticises st. Augustine's 'blasphemy' in 'asserting that evil 
can produce pure good, or that pure good can produce evil' .29 But in accordance 
with her theory that legitimate mysteries are those which display a mutual 
dependency between incommensurates, Weil perceives a vertical hierarchy of evils 
which allows the potential, at its highest level, to transform evil into good. 'Perhaps 
everything which is evil has another aspect, which is a purification in the course of 
progress towards good, and a third one which is the higher good (cf. higher up)'; 
yet she insists it is 'very dangerous for thought andfor the effective conduct of life 
to confuse them' (NB 126-127). Both Fundamentalist and Catholic, Weil's natural 
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and supernatural good and evil are opposed, but ultimately evil is circumscribed by, 
and forced to testify to the good. 
Her impoverished view of mankind, ensures that Weil believes humanity to be 
reliant on supernatural intervention to effect good in the natural world. 
A necessity as strong as gravity condemns man to evil and forbids 
him any good, or only within the narrowest limits and laboriously 
obtained and soiled and adulterated with evil; except when the 
supernatural appears on earth, which suspends the operation of 
terrestrial necessity. (SWR 291) 
This phenomenon is apparent on the extremely rare occasions when the 
non-afflicted have compassion for the victim of affliction. Such moments of charity 
are 'instinctive and immediate' (459), involuntary actions devoid of conscious 
intent. Constituting an unnatural act of self-sacrifice (the impossibility of 
compassion for the afflicted at the expense of the fictional, egocentric sel!), when it 
occurs this pity is 'a more astounding miracle than walking on water, healing the 
sick, or even raising the dead' (441). One 'becomes capable under God of 
establishing someone else by a creative affirmation. One gives oneself in ransom for 
another. It is a redemptive act' (WFG 147-148). This requires 'a point of eternity' in 
the non-amicted's soul 'which is proof against any contagion by affliction' (FLN 
97). Significantly it is not human goodness but God in man that makes this 
redemptive action possible. Each act of mercy for the afflicted is truly selfless, a 
re-enactment of Christ's sacrifice on the cross, an intervention of supernatural love, 
of saving grace in the profane world. 'Every moment of pure compassion in a soul is 
a new descent of Christ upon earth to be crucified' (97). 
It is Christ's cross and humanity's participation in it which Wei! offers as the 
solution to the fundamental dilemma of how to reconcile human amiction and evil 
with a merciful God. Uniting nature and grace, temporal and spatial dimensions, the 
Cross constitutes the supreme logos alogos. Weil's crucified Christ is the 
scandalously irrational mediator who through the paradoxical force of weakness,3D 
acts as a fulcrum, raising man from the gravity of human misery to God's grace. 
'When the whole universe weighs upon us there is no other counterweight possible 
but God himself. she contends. explaining how 'on the balance of the cross a body 
which was frail and light but which was God, lifted up the whole world' (85). By 
enduring the agonies of necessity the crucified Christ is like man, at the furthest 
136 
distance from God the Father. But as a perfectly pure being who consents to his 
suffering whilst continuing to love God he triumphs over the separation and is 
reunited with God in the Trinity. Vitally for man, by absorbing evil Christ is an 
exemplar of how humanity may break the destructive cycle by which affliction 
generates immorality. 
On one level the cross is a paradigm of how mankind may resist being corrupted by 
its wretched condition and consent to its sufferings. There is 'only one thing that 
enables us to accept real affliction, and that is the contemplation of Christ's Cross. 
There is nothing else. That one thing suffices' (SWR 464). But what makes man's 
affliction bearable is not merely this intellectual meditation on Christ's cross, but 
the recognition that humanity shares it. More than a historically specific event, and 
constituting part of the eternal nature of reality. the cross is the 'supreme and secret 
truth' of all human activity (465). 'Our country is the Cross', that 'is the whole of 
that necessity by which the infinity of space and time is filled and which, in given 
circumstances, can be concentrated upon the atom that anyone of us is, and totally 
pulverize it' (457, 455). This knowledge of humanity's precarious state only 
becomes acceptable when human tribulations are considered as man's kinship with 
God, a participation in the perpetual crucifixion. 
The effects of misfortune upon innocent souls are really 
unintelligible unless we remember that we have been created as the 
brothers of the crucified Christ. The absolute domination throughout 
the whole universe of a mechanical, mathematical, absolutely deaf 
and blind necessity is unintelligible, unless one believes that the 
whole universe, in the totality of space and time, has been created as 
the Cross of Christ. (IC 198) 
Weil here veers towards a Fundamentalist perspective in which individuals are 
confronted by their innate weakness while it is demanded that they com~it 
themselves to Christ. But to be the brother of a humanity made wretched by its 
sufferings requires an agonised Christ, and WeWs Christ is not glorious but 
afflicted: physically stricken, spiritually traumatised. and socially humiliated. 
Acknowledging this reality is crucial. because perceiving the crucified Christ 
resplendent is another of man's damaging fictionalisations. 'It was not the body of 
Christ, hanging on the wood, which was accursed, it was his whole soul' she 
controversially asserts. and it is this 'absence of prestige, and not the physical 
suffering, which is the very essence of the Passion' (137). 
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A serious error made by the Christian Church is to efface the degrading reality of the 
crucifixion and replace it with Christ as triumphant martyr. Only focusing on the 
unpalatable reality of the cross prevents mankind worshipping the fictionalised 
appearance rather than the reality of Christ, a glorious impostor 'who veils from us 
the Christ who was made a malediction' (143). But does WeWs emphasis on the 
cross, not the Resurrection, the horrifying affliction of both God and man, and the 
equation of love and grace with violent annihilation of the individual self, amount to 
the type of distortion which reveals Christian paradoxes or destroys their impact due 
to monstrous masochism? Horrifying statements claiming relentless 'necessity, 
wretchedness, distress, the crushing burden of poverty and of labour which wears us 
out, cruelty, torture, violent death, constraint, disease· all these constitute divine 
love'; the insistence that affliction is 'the face of love' and 'the most precious 
evidence of God's tenderness', and that affliction must be borne entirely without 
consolation, ensure the question of whether Weilean theology is masochistic must 
be addressed, and is by Weil herself (GG 28, SWR 463). 
Although she maintains one must love 'what is intolerable. Embrace what is made 
of iron, press one's flesh against the metallic harshness and chill' Weil insists that 
this 'is not any kind of masochism. What excites masochists is only the semblance 
of cruelty, because they do not know what cruelty is. In any case what one has to 
embrace is not cruelty, it is blind indifference and brutality' (FLN 260). Although an 
important element of Weilean theology is concerned with the implicit love of God 
through less horrifying means (see Chapter Three), this distinction remains 
unconvincing and difficult to accept due to the disproportionate emphasis on pain 
and suffering in the rest of her work. In 'The Love of God and Affliction', after a 
prolonged argument using imagery dominated by nails, prison cells and chains to 
argue the necessity ofloving both God and affliction, Weil somewhat belatedly asks 
her readers to accept that it 'is wrong to desire amiction~ it is against nature, and it 
is a perversion' (SWR 454). What is legitimate to long for is the possibility of 
affliction, and that when encountered 'it may be a participation in the Cross of 
Christ' (454). Yet as we have seen, the offensiveness of Weil's pathological New 
York 'prayer' provides ample evidence of a morbid gratification in, as well as desire 
for affliction. While she argues that suffering has a value 'so long as one makes 
every (legitimate) effort to escape it', the only purpose of this avoidance is to ensure 
'the affliction we do meet with may be absolutely pure and absolutely bitter' (FLN 
3, NB 294). 
It is this uncompromising refusal to search for an antidote to affliction which Wei! 
considers to be Christianity's finest asset. 'The extreme greatness of Christianity lies 
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in the fact that it does not seek a supernatural remedy for suffering but a 
supernatural use for it' (GG 73). Rather than representing an unhealthy 
preoccupation with suffering, the centrality of affliction in Christianity is what 
enables the accomplishment of the two-fold commandment to love God and our 
neighbour. 'What we are commanded to love first of all is affiiction: the affliction of 
man, the affliction of God' (SWR 462). But Weil's innate masochism ensures that 
she overstates the requirement to love affliction rather than its transcendence. This 
distortion of Christian doctrine is evident in her emphasis on Christ's cross rather 
than the Resurrection.31 'If the Gospel omitted all mention of Christ's resurrection, 
faith would be easier for me. The cross by itself suffices me' she insists, the 'death 
on the Cross is something more divine than the Resurrection, it is the point where 
Christ's divinity is concentrated' (LP 55). By concentrating on the Cross without 
balancing it with the Resurrection, Weil demonstrates a failure to achieve the type 
of superposed reading which is a crucial element of her philosophical rationale, and 
vital to Christianity's sacramentaIism. 
However as Flannery O'Connor observes, 'Ideal Christianity does not exist because 
anything the human being touches, even Christian truth, he deforms slightly in his 
own image' (HB 516). And although WeiIean notions of God and man are warped 
by her morbidity, it is exactly this monstrousness, the excessiveness and distortion, 
rather than the objectively balanced aspects of her thinking, through which Weil 
most unforgettably writes her ideas on the souls of her readers. As Susan Sontag 
notes some writers 'have their authority with us precisely because of their air of 
unhealthiness. Their unhealthiness is their soundness, and is what carries 
conviction,.32 Distortion plays its part in the revelation of truth. According to 
Sontag: 
an idea which is a distortion may have a greater intellectual thrust 
than the truth; it may better serve the needs of the spirit, which vary. 
The truth is balance, but the opposite of truth, which is unbalance, 
may not be a lie. (92) 
In 1963 O'Connor wrote to her friend 'A', 'Simone WeiJ is a trifle monstrous, but 
the kind of monstrosity that interests me' (lIB 522). Weil's unbalanced 
concentration on amiction and the crucifixion epitomises the type of monstrosity 
that fascinates O'Connor and is equally vital to her own efforts to reveal truth 
through distortion. 
139 
Before examining the integral connection in each writer's work between distortion, 
exaggeration, spiritual beliefs and their revelation, it is important to clarify briefly 
my vocabulary regarding 'distortion', 'monstrosity' and the 'grotesque'. Throughout 
this chapter I use 'distortion' as an umbrella term to encompass discussion of both 
monstrosity and the grotesque. As both literary genre and fictional character the 
grotesque is defined in detail later. But to prevent any misrepresentation by 
over-generalisation with 'monstrosity' it is necessary at this point to note a major 
difference between the two terms, and how this is relevant to a comparative analysis 
ofWeil and O'Connor's writings. 
The three criteria for monstrosity: unnatural or abnormal structure. excessiveness, 
and horrified reactions generated, are all equal,ly part of the grotesque. But crucially 
the grotesque amalgamates the monstrous with the comic. Essentially more 
ambivalent than monstrosity in its forms and the responses it provokes, as Philip 
Thomson observes, in the grotesque we find 'the comic inexplicably combined with 
the monstrous, the interweaving of totally disparate elements, producing a strange 
and often unpleasant and unsettling conflict of emotions'. 33 Offensive in both 
horrifying and humorous ways, as Mikhail Bakhtin affirms, the grotesque genre's 
'comic monsters' constitute an essential element of its ability to be revelatory 
(Rabe/ais, 39). 
This concept of comic monstrosity is important to a study of Weil and O'Connor 
because it highlights both a connection and a difference between them. As the 
Introduction to this thesis demonstrates it is precisely this type of humorous 
monstrosity, the combination of the comic and terrible, which O'Connor finds both 
fascinating in Weil, and equally important to her fictions. 'Simone Weil's life is the 
most comical life I have ever read about and the most truly tragic and terrible' she 
maintains (HB 105). Acknowledging a link between her wish to write a comic novel 
about such a grotesque woman's reluctant journey towards God and her 
Weilean-type fictional philosopher Hulga Hopewell in 'Good Country People', 
O'Connor notes 'My heroine 'already is, and is Hulga', but Weil's existence 
'parallels what I have in mind' (106). Anthony Di Renzo rightly perceives that 
'O'Connor's ambivalence toward WeB, her ability to see the agnostic saint as both 
admirable and laughable, is a key to understanding her strange fiction', in which she 
'applauds the religious convictions of her characters but also shows how their flaws, 
obsessions, and prejudices distort and compromise those convictions,.34 It is this 
kind of distortion which Weil unintentionally displays. yet which is an important 
part of the revelation of her monstrous and never deliberately comic theology. In 
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contrast to O'Connor, comedy is not a vital part of her world view or the form of her 
work. 
Before analysing in detail the relationship between Wei! and O'Connor's various 
forms of distortion and the revelation of their theologies, it is important initially to 
contextualise their writings by examining some precedents for using distortion and 
monstrosity as revelation in first their aesthetic, and second, moral manifestations. 
As Chapter One demonstrated, in classical, and especially Platonic notions of form, 
unity and proportion are regularly equated to beauty and goodness in both human 
and textual bodies. At this point I propose to explore some examples of considering 
deformity beautiful, and perceiving physiological monstrosity as either a warning of 
the consequences of human immorality, or conversely, as a sign of the divine. 
Etymologically derived from the words monitum (to warn) and more obviously 
monstrum (monster), monstrosity retains its significance as a demonstration or 
admonition.35 In its aesthetic connotation, as Baldick notes, monstrosity uses 'the 
directly physical notion of deformity to illustrate certain problems of the relation of 
parts to the whole in works of art,.36 This concept of aesthetic (dis)unity is 
considerably influenced by medieval linkages of aesthetic wholeness with the 
conceptual form of the human body. As Umberto Eco notes in The Aesthetics of 
Thomas Aquinas: 
The aesthetic experience of a thing is regulated by the concept of the 
thing; it involves a judgement regarding the degree of conformity 
between thing and concept. In the case of a mutilated person the 
judgement is instantaneous, because the concept of bodily integrity is 
so familiar to us. (Eco 101) 
Yet as Aquinas himself observes we 'notice that an image is called beautiful if it 
represents a thing, even an ugly thing, faithfully' (125). Fidelity to offensive forms 
renders the object's violation of natural laws less offensive, the graceless can 
achieve a kind of grace. 
Analysing monstrosity's ethical implications reveals a theological history of 
interpreting transgressive physical forms as warnings of the consequences of moral 
gracelessness. 'In a world created by a reasonable God, the freak or lunatic must 
have a purpose: to reveal visibly the results of vice, folly, and unreason, as a 
warning' to an errant humanity}7 Such medieval and Reformation usages of 
monstrosity are primarily concerned with moral rather than corporeal aberration, 
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and by the Renaissance this shift of emphasis is intensified. The monstrous figure 
embodies a particular vice and becomes 'a moral advertizement' (Baldick 12). 
But physical malformation can be more than a moral warning, it can positively 
manifest the divine. As Mircea Eliade argues, alienation from the norm 'does not 
merely isolate, it elevates. Thus ugliness and deformities while marking out those 
who possess them, at the same time make them sacred'. 38 It is the essential 
Otherness of the abnormal that is frightful, and this includes the unnaturalness of 
perfection, which whilst apparently opposite to the monstrous, generates similar 
rather than contrasting responses. 'Perfection in any sphere is frightening' because 
this 'same fear, this same scrupulous reserve, applies to everything alien, strange, 
new - that such astonishing things should be present is the sign of a force that, 
however much it is to be venerated, may be dangerous' (Kinney 77). Therefore the 
unknown and extraordinary 'are disturbing epiphanies' because they 'indicate the 
presence of something other than the natural', or 'at least the call of that something' 
(77). 
Weil recognises the dual fear of Otherness identified by Eliade. 'When the soul 
flies from anything it is always trying to get away, either from the horror of ugliness, 
or contact with what is truly pure' she maintains (WFG 174). Dominated by a 
repulsion for, and attraction to the absolute, the ugliness of moral vices is linked to a 
desire to manifest beauty and purity. In 'the search for carnal pleasure [ ... ] the 
movement of running toward pure beauty and the movement of flying from it are 
indistinguishably tangled' (175). Immoral actions are part of the world's beauty in 
Weil's schema, and as such are themselves made dreadfully attractive. The 
'universe is beautiful, even including evil, which, as part of the order of the world, 
has a sort of terrible beauty. We feel it' she argues (FLN 329). Like Aquinas, Wei! 
acknowledges a linkage between mutilation and concepts of aesthetic unity and 
believes ontic evils can be rendered beautiful when accurately depicted. 'Our first 
idea of unity comes from ourselves. The idea of mutilation [ ... ] goes together with 
that of unity' she maintains, and 'in proportion to the hideousness of affiiction is 
the supreme beauty of its true representation' (LP¥ 52, SWR 333). 
The redefinition of what is monstrous, what beautiful, and its representation in art, 
the relationship between physical and spiritual ugliness and writing on the soul are 
crucial to O'Connor as writer-prophet. In her copy of Jacques Maritain's Creative 
Intuition in Art and Poetry she underlined the passage: 
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Art endeavours to imitate in its own way the conditions peculiar to 
the pure spirits: it draws beauty from ugly things and monsters, it 
tries to overcome the division between beautiful and ugly by 
absorbing ugliness in a superior species of beauty, and by transferring 
us beyond the (aesthetic) beautiful and ugly. 39 
Discussing The Violent Bear It Away, O'Connor acknowledges her own preference 
for a kind of virtuous abnormality which she associates with truth. Observing she is 
'much more interested in the nobility of unnaturalness than in the nobility of 
naturalness', she contends 'it is the business of the artist to uncover the strangeness 
of truth' (HB 343). The incomplete nature of goodness in human affairs is part of 
this noble unnaturalness and strange truth. Few people have observed goodness 
'long enough to accept the fact that its face too is grotesque, that in us the good is 
something under construction' O'Connor contends (MM 226). In a fallen world the 
good is disturbing because it indicates an alternative reality, the Otherness of the 
sacred. Agreeing with Eliade that moral and physical irregularity is disturbing 
because it is alien, O'Connor claims 'the grotesque is naturally the bearer of 
mystery' and consequently 'is dangerous,.40 
Maintaining she is 'interested in making up a good case for distortion, as I am 
coming to believe that it is the only way to make people see' (lID 79), O'Connor's 
use of the offensiveness of the grotesque genre is founded like Weil's concept of 
affliction, on the strange truth that Christ voluntarily died for a grotesque humanity 
disfigured by its ontic and moral impairment. The Catholic writer 'will feel life 
from the standpoint of the central Christian mystery: that it has, for all its horror, 
been found by God to be worth dying for' she insists (MM 146). Significantly 
O'Connor also shares with Weil the central ideas that first, a constituent part of 
man's affliction is to be unable to understand why he suffers and second, both 
mankind's affliction and God's intersect through the cross. 
There is certainly no reason why the effects of redemption must be 
made plain to us and I think they usually are not. This is where we 
share Christ's agony when he was about to die and cried out 'My 
God, why have you forsaken me?'. (lID 118) 
Applying Weil's concepts of God and reality, the nature of man and human 
existence to O'Connor's work reveals both similarities and distinctions between 
each writer's theologies. The Weilean approach to the questions 'Is there a God?' 
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and 'How can this be known?' provides a useful perspective to analyse O'Connor's 
response to the same theological problems. 
Both writers agree that God cannot be comprehended, but they place a different 
emphasis on how the mystery of God's existence may be approached. O'Connor 
accepts that man is unable to conceive the reality of God: 'how incomprehensible 
God must necessarily be to be the God of heaven and earth. You can't fit the 
almighty into your intellectual categories', a 'God you understood would be less 
than yourseJr (HB 477, 354). She also approaches God apophatically: 'I measure 
God by everything that I am not I begin with that' (430). But unlike Weil's rational 
dialectic and use of contradiction, she considers faith the means of approaching the 
mystery of God's existence. Believing like Pascal in 'the "God of Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob and not of the philosophers and scholars"', O'Connor insists faith 'is 
what you have in lhe absence of knowledge', requiring 'trust not certainty' (lIB 477, 
354). Yet there is a crossover point in that Weil acknowledges gnosis is only 
achievable after the limits of intellectual reasoning have been exceeded, and despite 
her stress on fai~ O'Connor admits the uses of questioning belief via disbelief. 
'Peter said "Lord I believe. Help my unbelief." It is the most natural and most 
human and most agonising prayer in the gospels, and I think it is the foundation 
prayer of faith' she argues (476). But whereas Weil insists that the attainment of 
truth relies on intellectual freedom which is itself dependent on the ability to reject 
Christian precepts and Church doctrines when required, O'Connor considers 
disbelief is only constructive within the limits of Christian faith. 'Christian 
scepticism will set you free - not free to do anything you please, but free to be 
formed by something larger than your own intellect' (HB 478). While both writers 
agree that the nature of God is essentially mysterious, O'Connor's notion of who 
and what God is has no room for Weil's philosophical ambiguity. Distinct from the 
Weilean concept of God as simultaneously omnipotent and impotent, personal and 
impersonal, Being and non-Being, O'Connor's God, while mysterious, is a more 
identifiable, personal entity. 
This is an unlimited God and one who has revealed himself 
specifically. It is one who became man and rose from the dead. It is 
one who confounds the senses and sensibilities, one known early on 
as a stumbling block. There is no way to gloss over this specification 
or to make it more acceptable to modem thought. This God is the 
object of ultimate concern and he has a name. (MM 161) 
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Despite their differences, God is the ultimate concern of both writers, and they 
provide similar answers to the major theological question on how it is possible to 
reconcile suffering and evil with a merciful God, and whether reality is malevolent 
or benevolent. O'Connor agrees with Weil that ontic and moral evils do not 
discredit the actuality of a good and merciful God. 'One of the tendencies of our age 
is to use the suffering of children to discredit the goodness of God, and once you 
have discredited his goodness, you are done with him' she complains.41 This 
inability to accept both God's goodness and the affliction of the innocent amounts to 
a loss of the prophetic vision which faith generates. 'If other ages felt less, they saw 
more, even though they saw with the blind, prophetical, unsentimental eye of 
acceptance, which is to say of faith' (227). Clearly Weil's distinctly unsentimental 
acceptance of suffering and the superposed perspective which allows her (at least 
theoretically) to balance the contraries of affliction and love demonstrates the type 
of prophetic vision O'Connor conceives here. 
Weil's uncompromising insistence that the awful reality of affliction must not be 
avoided or fictionalised, that the cosmos is both malevolent and benevolent, is 
shared by O'Connor, although she reaches her conclusion from a diametrically 
opposite starting point. In contrast to Weil's absent God, who except for rare 
occasions abstains from intervening in the brutal mechanism of necessity, 
O'Connor's notion of God as omnipotent, and her Catholic concept of Providence 
ensures that she considers God is much more actively engaged in governing the 
world Consequently the relatively mechanistic, inevitable forces that dominate 
Weil's creation are less evident in O'Connor's world view, in which arbitrary 
interventions of grace are more frequent, ensuring a less predictable, more 
mysterious environment. The creation is 'made and sustained by God', ensuring that 
while subject to the tribulations of necessity and affliction the 'physical, sensible 
world is good because it proceeds from a divine source' (lIB 126, MM 157). 
Because of this providential divine input, moral evils are not evidence of God's 
non-existence, and may themselves contribute to the creation's good. 'God can 
make any indifferent thing, as well as evil itself, an instrument for good' (174). Yet 
although O'Connor's concept of the cosmos is based on her 'ultimate faith that the 
universe is meaningful' (178), this same faith reveals the monstrous truths which are 
equally part of the cosmic order. 'The truth does not change according to our ability 
to stomach it emotionally', she contends, 'there are long periods in the lives of all of 
us, and of the saints, when the truth as revealed by faith is hideous, emotionally 
disturbing, downright repulsive' (lIB 100). 
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Accepting the reality of both the suffering of the innocent and God's love constitutes 
a particularly monstrous truth, and equally disturbing is the notion that this consent 
is gained by belief in the crucified Christ's divinity and sharing in his cross. Christ 
enables mankind to accept both the beauty and horror of the universe. If 'you 
believe in the divinity of Christ you have to cherish the world at the same time you 
struggle to endure it' O'Connor argues (90). Like Weil's logos alogos O'Connor's 
Christ is abased rather than glorious, an irrational mediator between gravity and 
grace, man's misery and God's love. She also acknowledges a link between man's 
amiction and God's, and the necessity for an 'acceptance of the crucifixion, Christ's 
and our own' as the key to man's kinship with God (124). 'We lost our innocence in 
the Fall, and our return to it is through the Redemption which was brought about by 
Christ's death and by our slow participation in it' she claims (MM 148). 
Approaching Weil's notion that man's country is the cross, O'Connor also demands 
that as brothers of a crucified Christ mankind must make a radical commitment to 
him: 'personal loyalty to the person of Christ is imperative, is the structure of man's 
nature, his necessary direction' (JIB 290). 
But there are two important differences between O'Connor's concept of Christ and 
Weil's. First, O'Connor links the importance of Christ as logos alogos with his 
solitary rather than mUltiple intervention in history, and second, although she 
emphasises Christ's suffering and degradation, it is the Resurrection rather than the 
crucifixion which is most vital to O'Connor and her fictions. The scandalous reality 
of the Word made flesh inheres in 'the fact that there has been a unique intervention 
in history' (290). Equally important, the Resurrection of Christ is 'the high point in 
nature' (100), because her view of a linkage between the cross and the creation is 
based not on Weil's concept of a cyclic, perpetual crucifixion, but on a Catholic, 
linear model of eschatological hope beyond the afflictions of human life. 
Both Weil's concept of affliction and O'Connor's notion of human grotesquerie and 
its representation in fiction are dependent on the theory that mankind's limitation is 
a bearer of divine mystery, the medium through which contact with God can be 
made. If for Weil all humanity is affiicted, O'Connor insists 'We're aU grotesque' 
(MM 233). Yet while both writers agree that all men are physically and spiritually 
debilitated, due to the differences between their creation theories they differ on the 
causes of ontic and moral evils. Weilean affliction is ultimately caused by the 
absence of God allowing the indifferent mechanism of necessity to ensure that all 
suffer, but for O'Connor it is humanity, not God, that is responsible for mankind's 
grotesque state. Human weakness is a direct consequence of original sin, and the 
'serious writer has always taken the flaw in human nature for his starting point [ ... ] 
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Drama usually bases itself on the bedrock of original sin. whether the writer thinks 
in theological terms or not' she claims (167). 
O'Connor does think in specifically theological terms and maintains that because 
what the Catholic novelist 'sees at all times is fallen man perverted by fallen 
philosophies'. this involves writing 'about people in a world where something is 
obviously lacking, where there is the general mystery of incompleteness' (177, 167). 
Such a profound writer 'tries to give you, within the form of the book, a total 
experience of human nature at any time' (167). For the Christian writer man is both 
fallen and redeemed, subject to both gravity and grace, and consequently if fictional 
microcosms are accurately to depict human life they must represent the dramatic 
extremes in which the soul's eternal fate pivots: 'the greatest dramas naturally 
involve the salvation or loss of the soul' (167). 
Such an apocalyptic theological view suits the requirements of fiction to be dramatic 
and entertaining. But to consider such narratives both interesting fictions and 
profound depictions of man's actual existence requires some kind of religious 
perspective, a recognition that man has a soul and its fate is crucial. 'Where there is 
no belief in the soul there is very little drama' O'Connor observes, acknowledging 
she does not 'believe we shall have great religious fiction until we have again that 
happy combination of believing artist and believing society' (167, 168). 
To communicate with the monstrous unbelieving reader and produce profound yet 
entertaining fiction by revealing religious truths via the distortions of the grotesque 
genre is O'Connor's primary concern. I now want to examine this strategy in detail 
by first, establishing a critical consensus on what the main features of the genre are, 
before second, comparing O'Connor's version to it, and third, analysing how Weil's 
theological concepts and philosophical forms help to illuminate O'Connor's work. 
Although the 'grotesque' does not possess a fixed and stable meaning there is 
critical agreement on the recurring elements which distinguish the genre, and I will 
analyse these by dividing my discussion into three sections. First, the aesthetics of 
the grotesque, second, how it is experienced by its audience, and third, its functions, 
purposes, and effects. 
The grotesque's aesthetic is an anti-aesthetic. Distinguished by an unresolved 
collision of incommensurates, as Philip Thomson maintains it is marked by a 
'flinging together of disparate and irreconcilable things' .42 Essentially contradictory 
and ambivalent, the grotesque holds incommensurates in tension, transgressing 
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logical and generic boundaries. Animate and inanimate, beautiful and monstrous, 
comic and terrible co-exist. Yet to appreciate the 'abnormality' of the grotesque 
requires a concept of 'normality'. Grotesque forms are only recognisable as 
irrational. deformed, transgressional, within the context of what is perceived 
reasonable, beautiful, proportioned and limited. It is precisely the trace of form 
within the deformed which is the catalyst for its offensiveness. Although the 
warping of established categories verges on the fantastic.43 if grotesque forms are 
so unprecedented that they become unintelligible they present no threat to the 
audience's frame of reference, losing their ability to be truly shocking. As Geoffrey 
Galt Harpham observes, they 'are grotesque not because they are hideous [. .. ] but 
because, in the midst of an overwhelming impression of monstrousness there is 
much we can recognise, much corrupted, or shuffled famiIiarity,.44 
The jolt induced by this perception of deviancy as deranged normality, the 
interweaving of the ordinary and extraordinary, reassuring and alienating, leads to a 
parallel unresolved clash of contradictory emotions experienced by the reader or 
viewer of the grotesque. As 'a species of confusion' that is 'defined and recognised 
in common usage by a certain set of obstacles to structured thought' (xxi), the 
grotesque disorientates thought processes by several essential features: distortion, 
abnormality, disharmony, exaggeration and the confluence of the terrifying and 
comic, leading to incongruous yet simultaneous feelings of horror, disgust and 
laughter. Such an initially ambiguous reaction is followed by either a gleeful 
fascination in perceiving the unnatural. or alternatively moral outrage and aesthetic 
condemnation, which constitutes a psychological defence-mechanism created as 
protection against the disturbing effects of confronting the grotesque.45 
The two major critical discourses on the grotesque: first 'carnival', best expounded 
by Mikhail Bakhtin, and second, the 'uncanny', defined by Sigmund Freud and 
applied to the grotesque by Wolfgang Kayser.46 demonstrate markedly different 
approaches to grotesque forms. The medieval and Renaissance carnival grotesque 
form stresses the comic potential of the grotesque, emphasising its capacity to renew 
society by liberating it from terror through communal laughter. 4 7 Grotesque 
'realism' is based on the debasement of ideal forms. a 'bringing down to earth' 
which actively celebrates the physical. According to Bakhtin, the 'essential principle 
of grotesque realism is degradation, that is the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, 
ideal. abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, to the sphere of earth and body 
and their indissoluble unity' (19-20). The sacred is irreverently parodied, travestied 
and profaned in a kind of 'inverted transubstantiation' in which the spiritual is 
transformed into the corporeal (379). These abuses do not involve merely a negation 
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of the ideal, but rather a regenerative ambivalence: 'while humiliating and 
mortifYing they at the same time revived and renewed,.48 This combination of 
disparate competing elements amounts to 'moral amorality',49 liberation from 'the 
prevailing point of view of the world, from conventions and established truths, from 
cliches, from all that is humdrum and universally accepted' (34). Acting as a 
catalyst for a new perspective, according to Bakhtin the carnival grotesque 'liberates 
the world from all that is dark and terrifying; it takes away all fears and is therefore 
completely gay and bright. All that was frightening in ordinary life is turned into 
amusing or ludicrous monstrosities' (47) 
While Bakhtin maintains 'the id is uncrowned and transformed into a "funny 
monster'" by the communal laughter generated by medieval grotesquerie (49), in 
contrast the second major discourse on the grotesque emphasises its psychological 
dimension, focussing on the interior, individual, alienating and alarming. 
Monstrosity is here not tempered by comedy. Freud's concept of experiencing the 
'uncanny', which emphasises fear, alienation, repression, and the connection 
between the at once familiar and terrifyingly other, SO opens up an alternative 
method of interpreting the experience of grotesque forms which has dominated 
nineteenth and twentieth century readings of the genre, and is epitomised by the 
work of Wolfgang Kayser. The main factors in contemporary receptions of the 
grotesque are a kind of existential angst which merges fear and alienation. Kayser 
argues that we are 'so strongly affected and terrified because it is our world which 
ceases to be reliable, and we feel that we would be unable to live in this changed 
world' (184-185). The liberating function of genial, bawdy comedy is replaced by a 
satirical world view. 'Laughter originates on the comic and caricatural fringe of the 
grotesque. Filled with bitterness, it takes on characteristics of the mocking, cynical, 
and ultimately satanic laughter' (187). 
Satirical and ironic uses of the grotesque rely on largely intellectual responses which 
conflict with the genre's primarily emotional impact. As Thomson notes 
the satirist who uses the grotesque as a tool, a shock-weapon, must be 
careful. There is a danger that the didactic point he wishes to make 
may be obscured for the reader by the nonplussing, disorienting and 
generally overwhelming effect of the grotesque. (Thomson 42) 
There are two connected points which are important here. First, the innate 
ambivalence and emotive effects of the grotesque resist the imposition of any single 
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viewpoint, including those of either the two major discourses on the grotesque. The 
grotesque consists of 'the unresolved clash of incompatibles in [both] work and 
response' (Thomson 27). Second, subjectivity is an essential feature in the creation 
of grotesque forms and responses to them. Despite identifiable and recurring 
categories, the grotesque is constructed by its audience. As Lewis A. Lawson 
observes, 'the viewer must proclaim that the object is grotesque. The grotesque is 
not objectively verifiable,.51 Ultimately what is grotesque depends on individual 
perspectives which are themselves influenced by cultural hegemonies. It 'is up to 
the culture to provide the conventions and assumptions that determine its particular 
forms. Culture does this by specifying which categories are logically and generically 
incompatible with which others' (Harpham xx). This leads to inconsistencies and 
confused terminology due to the fact the label 'grotesque is 'often applied by 
members of one cultural group to the work of another cultural group, which is a 
sub-culture, if not a distinct culture' (Lawson 173). 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the grotesque genre's central concept of the 
grotesque body or 'freak,.52 'Often referred to as a "freak of nature", the freak, it 
must be emphasised, is a freak of culture' as Susan Stewart argues. 53 The freak is 
defined by cultural and political categories of what is Other, abject, abnormal (via 
sexual, racial and religious criteria) which are themselves dependent on notions of 
'normality'. 54 Subjective cultural categories of what is freakish are central to 
interpretations of the physiological freak, which as a site of contradictions 
problematises the boundaries between self and other, male and female, animal and 
human. As we noted in our earlier discussion of monstrosity, medieval concepts of 
the grotesque body celebrate the transgression of classical aesthetics of what is 
beautiful (unity, closure, separation), and celebrate carnality. Freakishness is part of 
a positive communal experience, abnormality is considered within a religious 
context. As Howard Bloch observes, 'bodily mutilation was almost always treated in 
larger than physical terms and is linked implicitly to the field of sacramental 
theology and its relation of each Christian to the Church and to the body of 
Christ'. 55 
In contrast to this concept of the freak as sacred mediator and participant in the 
communal body, nineteenth century freak shows separated the freak from the rest of 
society which viewed it as a spectacle, an object of Otherness. Yet simultaneously 
the metaphors used to describe the freak's difference operate to render it more 
familiar and therefore less threatening. As Stewart argues: 
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the body of the cultural other is by means of this metaphor both 
naturalised and domesticated in a process we might consider to be 
characteristic of colonisation in general [. .. ] On display, the freak 
represents the naming of the frontier and the assurance that the 
wilderness, the outside, is now territory. (Stewart, Russo 80) 
This naturalisation process is intensified via twentieth century medical discourses in 
which the freak becomes genetically explicable, a diseased and therefore real rather 
than sacred monstrosity. Yet as Leslie Fiedler contends, art may function to change 
perspectives of what is monstrous or grotesque, and in doing so retrieve the freak 
from its contemporary desacralization. Discussing the 1970s counter-culture cinema 
audience for Freaks (1932) he claims the film provides 'creatures capable of 
providing the thrill our forebears felt in the presence of an equivocal and sacred 
unity we have since learned to secularize and divide' (Fiedler, Freaks 19). 
Altering viewpoints through the shock induced by depicting offensive forms is 
agreed to be one of the primary functions of the grotesque genre, which is 'used to 
bewilder and disorient, to bring the reader up short, jolt him out of accustomed ways 
of perceiving the world and confront him with a radically different, disturbing 
perspective' (Thomson 58). By foregrounding the marginalised and transforming the 
abject into the dominant image. the freak, and more generally the grotesque genre, 
forces a re-cognition of what is beautiful and ugly, normal and abnormal. What this 
new perspective is dePends on emotive responses which are either comic, horrifying, 
or most frequently both. Thomson claims that the most profound meaning of the 
grotesque is to merge comedy and tragedy, while Di Renzo accords with Bakhtin's 
notion of the carnival grotesque, maintaining its 'ultimate purpose is therapeutic: it 
is a comic shock treatment. Even at its most menacing, it seeks to liberate (Di Renzo 
5). Kayser perceives this liberation in artistic representations of the grotesque, 
insisting 'thus we arrive at a final interpretation of the grotesque: AN ATTEMPT 
TO INVOKE AND SUBDUE THE DEMONIC ASPECTS OF THE WORLD' 
(Kayser 188). 
The implied moral judgement in Kayser's notion of controlling the 'demonic' is 
important because it highlights the problem of whether the grotesque should, and 
can, be successfully used for moral instruction. As we noted earlier, satirical and 
ironical uses of the grotesque risk having their intellectual didacticism obstructed by 
the emotive power of grotesque forms. Bakhtin makes this point in arguing that the 
grotesque is essentially contradictory and is therefore warped by the imposition of 
abstract ideals. 'The abstract distorts this [ambivalent] nature of the grotesque 
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image. It transforms the center of gravity to a "moral" meaning. Moreover it submits 
the substratum of the image to the negative element' (Bakhtin 62). He insists on the 
ultimate power of the grotesque to escape such authorial control. 'The grotesque 
images selected to serve an abstract idea are still too powerful; they preserve their 
nature and pursue their own logic, independently from the author's intentions, and 
sometimes contrary to them' (63). 
Bakhtin's argument has important implications for O'Connor's attempts to use the 
grotesque to write Christian truths on the soul. Although aware of the tension 
between abstract ideals and the grotesque's innately emotive power, she is insistent 
that 'when the grotesque is used in a legitimate way, the intellectual and moral 
judgements implicit in it will have the ascendency over feeling' (MM 43). 
O'Connor's attempt to circumscribe what is the 'legitimate' way to interpret her 
grotesque fictions is dependent on outlining (in non-fictional forms) the corrective 
beliefs which justify her use of distortion as revelation. 
I am not and never have been interested in the grotesque for its own 
sake or in freaks and abnormal people because of their freakishness 
or their abnormalities. It seems to me that the grotesque can have no 
meaning at all in fiction unless it is seen or felt in relation to what is 
right and normal. My own belief about what is (morally) right and 
normal comes from Christian orthodoxy; comes from believing that 
Christ should be the center of life and the individual soul. Writers 
who do believe in religious realities and propose to get them across in 
fiction have to cope with a deaf. dumb. and blind reader; and the 
grotesque may be one of our desperate answers. 56 
O'Connor's defensive justification for her use of the grotesque as a necessary 
strategy in her dialogue with the monstrous reader reveals the extent to which 
theology and form are interconnected in her work. Fictional grotesquerie is 
considered a consequence of experiential grotesquerie, which in O'Connor's moral 
universe constitutes being secular. But despite her clarification of her own concept 
of normality and abnormality, if O'Connor's audience do not share her 
Christocentric concept of rightness, can they perceive the 'religious realities' she 
attempts to communicate? Will her use of distortion prove destructive rather than 
revelatory? To analyse O'Connor's 'desperate answer' to this problem I will now 
examine how her concept of the grotesque compares to the typical features of the 
genre. 
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Aware of the gap between her own notions of reality and those of her non-Christian 
readers, O'Connor insists that the Christian writer 'may well be forced to take ever 
more violent means to get his vision across to this hostile audience' (33-34). The 
recalcitrance of such monstrous readers ensures 'you have to make your vision 
apparent by shock - to the hard of hearing you shout, and for the almost blind you 
draw large and startling figures' (34). Such exaggerated and distorted forms are a 
prerequisite for an aesthetic founded on balancing contradictions. The appearance of 
grotesque fiction 'is going to be wild' and 'it is almost of necessity going to be 
violent and comic, because of the discrepancies it seeks to combine' O'Connor 
claims. (43). The grotesque genre's ability to connect contraries: religious and 
secular, comic and terrible, facilitates access to 'deeper kinds of realism' which 'do 
not hesitate to distort appearances in order to show a hidden truth' (39, 70). Her 
literary and religious perspectives converge here. O'Connor's Catholic 
sacramentalism is evident in her notion that successful grotesque narratives use 'the 
concrete in a more drastic way', allowing 'strange skips and gaps' which provide 
intimations of mysteries beyond surface realities (42, 40). 
But what type of grotesque realism does O'Connor employ in this drastic use of the 
concrete: that exemplified by the uncanny, the carnivalesque, or both discourses? 
Her concept of the prophetic Christian writer penetrating physical reality and 
forcibly recaIling an irreligious audience to known but neglected sacred truths 
ensures that her work involves two essential features of the uncanny grotesque. First, 
a connection between the familiar and terrifyingly Other, and second, the notion that 
the fear and dread associated with this dual experience is connected to the 
recurrence, or recollection of repressed, in this case religious knowledge. 57 
O'Connor's central concept of the interconnection of the concrete and mystery 
ensures she considers fiction 'should be both canny and uncanny' (79). This strategy 
involves her utilising two other features of the uncanny grotesque discourse: first, 
several of her major characters demonstrate the type of existential angst, the 
combination of fear and alienation which Kayser attributes to the problem of living 
in a world at once familiar and unfamiliar.58 Second, O'Connor's fictions provide 
evidence of a satirical world view. with narrators who apparently encourage the kind 
of cynical, mocking, and debatably satanic laughter which Kayser identifies as an 
integral element of the contemporary uncanny. 59 However. the uncanny grotesque's 
most important feature, focussing on a psychological dimension, exploring the 
individual and interior, is not well developed in her work. O'Connor offers no 
in-depth explorations of her character's psyches, their inner life remains largely 
uninvestigated Instead her protagonists subsist as types. the sort of medieval 
exemplars which the carnival grotesque employs in fabliaux. 
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O'Connor's version of the grotesque genre demonstrates greater similarities with the 
carnivalesque than the uncanny because ftrst, her notion of grotesque realism 
conforms to the carnival grotesque's central principle of degradation: the 
debasement of ideal forms and simultaneous celebration of the physical. In 
'Catholic Novelists and Their Readers' she quotes from Baron von Hugel: 'The 
highest realities and deepest responses are experienced by us within, or in contact 
with, the lower and lowliest' (176). Christ's Incarnation in the physical, the 
Church's mediation of sacred truths within human history are all evidence to 
O'Connor of this principle, and relevant to the fiction writer whose primary concern 
is 'with mystery as it is incarnated in human life' (176). Her links to the carnival 
grotesque are also demonstrated in the fact that second, an important part of her 
narrative strategy includes using parody, travesty, and profanity of the sacred typical 
of the bawdy moral amorality of the genre (see my later discussion of 'Good 
Country People'). Third, because in her schema it is both comic and terrible that 
man sees himself at the centre of the universe, O'Connor uses her own type of 
ludicrous monstrosities: agnostic, atheist, and cliche-ridden protagonists, in an 
attempt to 'jar the reader', to make him 'feel in his bones if nowhere else' a sense of 
the sacred (162). 
O'Connor is in harmony with critical consensus on the major purpose of the 
grotesque, when she considers that generating a radically different and disturbing 
perspective constitutes the genre's primary function. The aesthetic features of the 
carnival grotesque theoretically provide her with the form she requires to reconcile 
the physical and mystical realities essential to her prophetic vision, and jolt her 
readers into both recognising and ultimately accepting this superposed perspective. 
Yet the inherent equivocality of fictional narratives and the grotesque genre's 
reliance on conflicting emotional responses, ensures her ambiguous fictions 
generate the subjective, sharply divided critical opinion typical of audience reactions 
to grotesque forms.60 O'Connor's own subjectivity. her insistence on a Christian 
and specifically Catholic world-view, and her obsession with the 'demands' of her 
monstrous secular reader is vital to her creative impulse.61 These religious and 
authorial preconceptions. and audience reactions to them, intersect in O'Connor's 
notion of the 'freak', and I will now examine how this crucial central concept 
compares to the genre's established criteria and responses to it. 
As we noted earlier, the SUbjectivity essential to the creation and experience of 
grotesque forms is concentrated on the freak, with notions of what is 'freakish' 
dependent on individual perspectives and political categories influenced by cultural 
hegemonies. As O'Connor's personal notion of normality is dependent on Christian 
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orthodoxy, abnormality consists of an inability to acknowledge the sacred, the 
monstrosity she associates with her recalcitrant readers. Her fictional freaks with 
their physiological, moral, and psychological aberrations, are intended to be 
synechdoches for secular man's dislocation from the divine. The 'writer who 
produces grotesque fiction may not consider his characters any more freakish than 
ordinary fallen man usually is', she argues, yet it 'is when the freak can be sensed as 
a figure for our essential displacement that he attains some depth in literature' (43, 
45). O'Connor claims 'to be able to recognize a freak, you have to have some 
conception of the whole man' (44), which for her includes a spiritual as well as 
physical dimension. While she believes this is possible in the South, because the 
Southerner's concept of humanity remains predominantly theological, the otherwise 
prevailing secular humanist hegemony ensures that the rest of her readers are 
incapable of recognising the religious function of her fictional freaks. 'I have found 
that anything that comes out of the South is going to be called grotesque by the 
Northern reader, unless it is grotesque, in which case it is going to be called 
realistic' she complains (40). It is difficult enough for such a 'modem reader' to 
'suspend his disbelief and accept an anagogicallevel of action at all, harder still for 
him to accept its action in an obviously grotesque character', because he 'has the 
mistaken notion that a concern with grace is a concern with exalted human 
behavior' (204). 
In placing her concept of the grotesque so firmly within a religious context, 
O'Connor marks her difference from twentieth century notions of the freak as a real 
rather than sacred monstrosity, aligning herself instead with medieval concepts of 
human grotesquerie. She too celebrates the transgression of classical aesthetics of 
what is beautiful and celebrates carnality. But as a site of contradictions her freaks 
are intended to be not merely physiologically ambiguous, problematising notions of 
male and female, animal and human, but also Fallen and redeemed, holding in 
tension the physical and mystical, sacred and profane. Because her concept of 
wholeness is both spiritual and physical, O'Connor's corporeal freaks, tricksters and 
prophets are intended to function as the type of moral advertisements, the warnings 
of the consequences of moral gracelessness yet simultaneously signs of the divine 
favoured by the medievalists. 'The freak in modem fiction is usually disturbing to us 
because he keeps us from forgetting that we share in his state. The only time he 
should be disturbing to us is when he is held up as a whole man' she insists (133). 
Interestingly O'Connor expands this notion of identification with the freak to 
include herself as writer-prophet, maintaining that when the religious writer 'has a 
freak for his hero, he is not simply showing us what we are, but what we have been 
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and what we could become. His prophet-freak is an image of himself (117-118). 
'The writer has to judge himself with a stranger's eye and a stranger's severity. The 
prophet in him has to see the freak' she claims (81-82). O'Connor's comments are 
perplexingly unclear here. Is her perception of her freakishness a reference to her 
own experiential limitation, her limitations as writer of prophetic fictions, or the 
limits of her audience - does being a religious writer in a monstrously secular world 
make her both prophet and freak? O'Connor's concept of freakishness is clearly 
complex, demonstrating the typical subjectivity and balancing of incommensurates 
such as self and Other which is characteristic of the freak's role in the grotesque 
genre. It is significant that O'Connor's freaks also demonstrate the characteristic 
quality of grotesque forms to generate irresolvably contradictory critical responses 
of either gleeful fascination or aesthetic condemnation and moral outrage,62 
illustrating Bakhtin's assertion that imposing authorial value systems on the 
grotesque is extremely problematic. 
O'Connor's use of the grotesque genre uncompromisingly to link the apparent 
contraries of physical monstrosity and immorality with God's grace, and the often 
horrified reactions that this produces in her audience, parallels Weil's attempts to 
connect what she perceives as a hideously afllicted humanity with God's 
benevolence via the philosophical form of balancing incommensurates - and her 
readership's reactions to them. 
A comparison of Weil's criteria for affliction with O'Connor's notion of human 
grotesquerie is informative in both its differences and similarities. Weil's first point, 
that what distinguishes aflliction is its terrible, lacerating spiritual and social 
torment, manages to explain with greater clarity than O'Connor's own comments 
the predicament of the 'maimed souls' (43) which it is O'Connor's primary effort to 
explore in her fictions. Yet Weil's view that physical pain and loss of social prestige 
must co-exist with spiritual agony to qualify as affliction is not shared by O'Connor. 
Disfigurement of body and soul without prolonged pain is what differentiates 
O'Connor's notion of man's grotesquerie, and whilst many of her characters 
experience permanent or temporary social humiliation, their very disabilities 
frequently increase their social prestige. Weil's second element of affiiction. that it 
is arbitrarily inflicted and must be endured against the will, closely corresponds to 
O'Connor's plot structures and protagonists, which frequently bring to life WeWs 
concept of the terrifying and indifferent force of gravity more persuasively than 
Weil's philosophical rationales, and O'Connor's own concept of Providence. 
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Where the two writers differ most markedly is in their ideas on the impact of human 
suffering on inter-personal relationships. Weil's third criteria for amiction, that its 
attack on the individual's body, soul, and social status leads to a shock of horror 
causing an invasion of the soul by ugliness, a consequent hatred of others, 
self-loathing, complicity, and the repelling of the non-amicted, is only partially 
attributable to O'Connor's vision. Her maimed souls are in most cases steeped in an 
ugly resentment if not hatred for others, and are to a certain extent accomplices in 
their own fate. But rather than self-loathing they demonstrate self-absorption. In a 
major difference to Weil's afflicted, O'Connor's grotesques glory in their 
disfigurement, and instead of provoking a disgusted reaction from the other 
characters which increases their alienation and anonymity, their impairment actively 
attracts interest, even admiration from the rest of the community. However, 
ambivalent responses to grotesque fictions ensures that O'Connor's community of 
critics is divided between a Weilean type loathing for her amicted characters, and 
an O'Connoresque attraction to them. 63 
O'Connor's camivaIesque concept of comic grotesquerie ensures that unlike Weil's 
fourth criterion for affliction - that it must be borne entirely without consolation -
she does allow a degree of mitigation. Although she too provides no answer to the 
question posited by her most philosophical protagonists: 'Why must man suffer?', 
and the consolatory epiphanies O'Connor claims for her fictional characters in her 
non-fictional writings are at best equivocal in the stories, at least some of her 
protagonists are compensated for their sufferings by an absurd pride in either their 
physical deformity or sinfulness. (See my following readings of 'Good Country 
People' and 'The Life You Save May Be Your Own'.) Like Weil, O'Connor 
believes in the power of suffering to force man into an acknowledgement of his 
fragility and limitation. Yet in contrast to Weil's uncompromisingly severe notion of 
affliction as an intolerable, isolating and repulsive agony, she considers that 
humanity's suffering is as ridiculous as it is horrifying. As a fiction writer interested 
in entertainment not just moral instruction, the horrors she envisions in human life 
are at least partially moderated by her perception of man's ludicrous monstrosity. 
Indeed it is the undeniably comic elements in O'Connor's fictional freak shows 
rather than their debatable moments of grace which provide the most consolation for 
the dehumanising effects of necessity and affliction she unleashes. 
To examine what O'Connor's notion of the human self is, and its connection to 
necessity and affliction, I will proceed to apply Weil's theories of man and his need 
for roots to O'Connor's equivalent concepts. As we have seen, Wei! considers there 
are three different but connected dimensions of the human being: first, the physical 
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body, second, the soul, and third, a social personality, which she believes is the 
primary source of mankind's fictionality, a fake persona distinct from man's sacred, 
impersonal self. In Weil's schema this creation of a false personality through 
illusion, intoxification, fanaticism, constitutes an attempt to escape the brutal reality 
of necessity and affliction and is a consequence of modem humanity's deracination, 
the absence of social and spiritual roots. The consequences of such rootlessness are 
spiritually and socially damaging. 
For people who are really uprooted there remain only two possible 
sorts of behaviour: either to fall into spiritual lethargy resembling 
death [ ... ] or to hurl themselves into some form of activity necessarily 
designed to uproot, often by the most violent methods, those who are 
not yet uprooted, or only partially so. (NR 45) 
Rootedness 'is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human 
soul' she contends (41). 'Every human being needs to have multiple roots. It is 
necessary for him to draw well-nigh the whole of his moral, intel1ectual and spiritual 
life by way of the environment of which he forms a natural part' (41). In The Need 
for Roots she considers the primary causes of deracination to be the separation of 
the physical and spiritual in human experience. Industrial technology and its 
oppression of the factory worker, and agricultural work devoid of any relevance to 
the beauty of the world, neither provide nor encourage a connection between man's 
daily labour and his essential spiritual life, when what 'is required is that this world, 
and the world beyond, in their double beauty, should be present and associated in 
the act ofwork,.64 
Although O'Connor does not share this stress on the importance of spiritualising 
labour,65 Weil's theories constitute a demand to integrate what in O'Connor's 
terminology amounts to mystery and manners, and both writers overlap in their 
concern to examine how the need for roots and the consequences of rootlessness are 
connected to distinguishing between man's real and fictional self. 
As a fiction writer interested in 'mystery that is lived', with 'ultimate mystery as we 
find it embodied in the concrete world of sense experience .. O'Connor IS 
'concerned with the mystery of personality' (MM 125, 198). She insists identity 
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is not to be found on the surface; it is not accessible to the poll-taker~ 
it is not something that can become a cliche. It is not made from the 
mean average or the typical, but from the hidden and often the most 
extreme [ ... ] It lies very deep. In its entirety, it is known only to God. 
(58) 
In accordance with Weil she believes that man's essential selfis closely bound up in 
his need for roots. As her frequent non-fictional statements maintain, O'Connor 
constructs her own sense of identity from her association with specific cultural 
groups: Catholic, Southerner, fiction writer, and she derides the celebration of 
modem man's existential rootlessness she perceives in contemporary fiction. 
Alienation was once a diagnosis, but in much of the fiction of our 
time it has become an ideal. The modern hero is the outsider. His 
experience is rootless. He can go anywhere. He belongs nowhere. 
Being alien to nothing, he ends up being alienated from any kind of 
community based on common tastes and interests. (199-200) 
As my readings of 'Good Country People' and 'The Life You Save May Be Your 
Own' will show, O'Connor's fictions more graphically demonstrate the 
consequences of the Weilean concept of deracination: the fictional social 
personalities, spiritual lethargy and violence, than Weil's philosophical arguments. 
But as each writer's emphasis on the necessity to lose either (or both) one's fictional 
or physical life in order to gain spiritual life is offensive, I will first analyse to what 
extent Weil's concepts of the soul and unfree will can highlight O'Connor's 
equivalent theories and their depiction in her fictions, and whether O'Connor's work 
can illuminate these Weilean concepts. 
Initially I want to compare Weil's concepts of the three domains and the soul's 
internal architecture to O'Connor's notions of free will, and the extent to which 
man can approach the sacred via the physical. O'Connor's fictions, packed with 
human defonnity, accidents, immorality and bizarre events, aptly demonstrate the 
first of Weil's domains and the lowest level of the soul, which are concerned with 
man's SUbjection to the ontic and moral evils of mechanical necessity, and are 
beyond the control of humanity yet (apparently) are in accordance with God's will. 
But it is Weil's concepts of the second and third domains and intermediate and 
highest levels of the soul which offer the most valuable insights into O'Connor's 
work, by providing a philosophical framework for how to analyse O'Connor's 
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primary concern: to demonstrate the mechanics of how mystery operates through 
manners, grace through nature. 
At the second stage in Weil's hierarchy of free will and the soul, man must feel the 
full force of the good/evil opposition, yet is able to have a beneficial impact on his 
environment and achieve specific results through obligations to perform virtuous 
actions. O'Connor theoretically shares Weil's belief in this process by which the 
body acts as a lever for the soul, and can pull the soul after it to a higher spiritual 
level. 'Our salvation is worked out on earth according as we love one another, see 
Christ in one another, etc., by works' (lIB 336). She too acknowledges that such 
virtuous actions can be compelled, and operate in a world coexistent with evil. 
Influenced by St. Thomas Aquinas on this point, she insists in some instances 'an 
act proceeds from Charity in the sense of being commanded by it', but recognises 
that this type of 'natural grace [ ... J operates surrounded by evil' (335, 144). Yet her 
fictions are marked by the absence of virtuous actions, first, due to her concern with 
depicting man as deeply flawed by original sin, and second, because of the 
difficulties inherent in representing the action of grace in fictional form. It is 
therefore necessary 'to approach it [grace] negatively'. she insists (144). 
Consequently frequently in O'Connor's fictions the body acts as a lever for the soul 
through the impact of violence rather than charity, through immoral rather than 
virtuous actions. This process is intended to demonstrate a positive reawakening of 
the soul to at least the possibility of an alternative (sacred) reality. O'Connor is 
adamant that the apparent disparity between her Catholic beliefs and the content of 
her fictions is evidence of her acceptance of man's free will rather than his 
depravity. Admonishing the critic who demands a more positive fiction that 
corresponds to her theological credo, she maintains that the Catholic novelist 'does 
not write about general beliefs but about men with free will. and that there is 
nothing in our faith that implies a foregone optimism for man so free that with his 
last breath he can say No' (MM 182). 
O'Connor is considerably more interested in the impact of good and evil on the soul. 
and the dramatic moment when its fate is decided than she is in understanding and 
developing the type of capacity for virtuous action which preoccupies Weil (see 
Chapter Three). But importantly both writers share the opinion that a hazardous 
environment is vital to humanity's spiritual development. 'Risk is an essential need 
of the soul' according to Weil.66 As 'a form of danger which provokes a deliberate 
reaction' it does not 
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go beyond the soul's resources to the point of crushing the soul 
beneath a load of fear. In some cases, there is a gambling aspect to it; 
in others, where some obligation forces a man to face it, it represents 
the finest possible stimulant. (NR 32) 
The 'permanent presence of a certain amount of risk in all aspects of social life' is 
essential because the absence of such hazards 'produces a type of boredom which 
paralyses' (33, 32). Both theologically and fictionally O'Connor is interested in 
replacing this kind of paralysis with risk, and her fictions bring to life this Weilean 
concept, which is an integral part of the broader notion that the body may act as a 
lever for the soul. Preoccupied as she is with free will and the drama of the soul, 
which presupposes an element of risk in man's potential for salvation or damnation, 
O'Connor believes it 'is the extreme situation that best reveals what we are 
essentially'; and she acknowledges as fiction writer her 'dramatic need is to know 
manners under stress' (MM 113,208). 
Both in her theology and fiction free will is essential and determinism unacceptable 
because first, her view of the reality of human liberty ensures that she considers 
man's salvation is not inevitable and actively open to hazard, and second, her 
obligation as fiction writer to entertain her audience precludes obviously predestined 
actions and requires the high drama of risk, the most hazardous moment when grace 
is accepted or rejected. According to O'Connor her 
view of free will follows the traditional Catholic teaching. I don't 
think any genuine novelist is interested in writing about a world of 
people who are strictly determined. Even if he writes about 
characters who are mostly unfree, it is the sudden free action, the 
open possibility, which he knows will illuminate the picture and give 
it life. So that while predictable, predetermined actions have a comic 
interest for me, it is the free act, the acceptance of grace particularly. 
that I always have my eye on as the thing which will make the story 
work. (115) 
It is in Weil's examination of this mysterious interaction between nature and grace, 
human freedom and God's action in the soul that her concepts of the three domains 
and the soul's internal architecture are most illuminating in analysing O'Connor's 
equivalent ideas here. 
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Wei!' s third domain is neither independent of nor ruled by the human will. Vitally 
man experiences the compulsion of God's pressure, in proportion to the amount of 
love and attention he concentrates on God. The highest level in the soul enables this 
contemplative faculty because existing above consciousness. it consists of 
supematurallove, which allows the irrational impulsive action required to realise 
moral obligations. Again Wei! is much more concerned with promoting the qualities 
of intellectual attention and virtuous action than O'Connor, whose fictions only 
demonstrate these attributes obliquely via inversion: inattention, and at best a 
sub-conscious love of God. Yet as my examination of her non-fictional work has 
already shown, O'Connor's use of distortion is primarily designed to reorientate the 
attention of her monstrous readers towards God. 
Crucially Weil's notion of God's pressure on the soul, man's requirement to 
abandon himself to it, and the irrational impulsive action this makes possible 
parallels O'Connor's core concept of the anagogical gesture, the sudden pivotal 
action which mysteriously unites nature and grace and forms the heart of every great 
story.67 The writer who acknowledges the mystery in human life 
will be interested in what we don't understand rather than in what we 
do. He will be interested in possibility rather than in probability. He 
will be interested in characters who are forced out to meet evil and 
grace and who act on a trust beyond themselves - whether they know 
very clearly what it is they act upon or not. (42) 
Because Catholic fiction assumes that man is prone to sin but redeemable when his 
own efforts are assisted by grace. 'it will see this grace as working through nature, 
but as entirely transcending it, so that a door is always open to possibility and the 
unexpected in the human soul' (197). A story 'does not begin except at a depth 
where adequate motivation and adequate psychology and the various determinations 
have been exhausted'. she claims. (41-42) 
As my analysis of O'Connor's stories will examine. her fiction does display various 
determinisms. The unfree will apparent in Weil's theories stems from her stress on 
the divine at the expense of the human: human autonomy is offensive because it 
places a barrier between the persons of God and God, the highest level of human 
attainment is to enjoy the unfree will generated by God's presence in man's soul. 
Even this highest level of God's compulsion on the soul is at least partly predictable, 
part of the process in the soul's hierarchy. O'Connor is theoretically not as 
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schematic as WeiI: there are not necessarily three stages to go through in the soul's 
development, the process by which the soul attains salvation is neither as rigid nor 
predictable. Because she is interested in possibility rather than probability, human 
identity, the soul, the action of grace are more mysterious. Although she believes 
man is a temple of the Holy Spirit and 'is created in the image and likeness of God' 
(HB 104), because O'Connor actively celebrates the physical not just the divine, she 
at least conceptually achieves a greater integration of nature and grace than Weil. 
Human liberty plays a more active role in man's relationship with the external 
world. Although she maintains free will 'has to be understood within its limits; 
possibly we all have some hindrances to free action', O'Connor is insistent that this 
is 'not enough to be able to call the world determined', and humanity lives 'as 
beings existing in a created order to whose laws we freely respond' (488, MM 41). 
While the intervention of grace in the physical world and God's compulsion on the 
soul are as vital to O'Connor as to Weil, her greater emphasis on human freedom 
ensures that these incommensurates are more balanced, a crucial part of the action 
of grace is its free-willed acceptance: 'God rescues us from ourselves if we want 
him to' (H8 118). 
But interestingly O'Connor's concept of the integrity of man's complex free will to 
some extent intersects with, and is useful in illuminating WeWs theory of man's 
obedience to supernatural necessity. The Weilean notion that those souls who 
choose to obey God, although they remain at the mercy of mechanical necessity 
also become susceptible to supernatural laws, and consequently some actions 
become impossible and others are achieved against the will, finds an echo in 
O'Connor's 'Author's Note' to the second edition of Wise Blood (1962) 
Does one's integrity ever lie in what he is not able to do? I think that 
usually it does, for free will does not mean one will but many wills 
conflicting in one man. Freedom cannot be conceived simply. It is a 
mystery and one which a novel, even a comic novel, can only be 
asked to deepen. 
Although more complex, mysterious and unpredictable than Weil's concept of a 
kind of virtuous unfree will, O'Connor's notion of human liberty also acknowledges 
that the inability to fulfil one's own desires is paradoxically part of man's dignity 
rather than antithetical to it, because positive actions can be achieved in spite of the 
self.68 This concept is vital to both O'Connor's theology and fiction. But due to 
O'Connor's greater stress on human freedom and its mystery, her version of man's 
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capacity for exposure to a supernatural necessity is permanently available despite 
man's consistent choice to disobey God; and the immoral behaviour this generates is 
frequently a crucial part of the process by which grace intervenes in human life.69 
Comparing O'Connor's notions of good and evil with Weil's theories reveals 
interesting differences and similarities between them. First, due to their different 
creation theories and O'Connor's more developed concept of free will, she 
considers sin a consequence of human liberty and not part of the mechanical forces 
of necessity in which suffering and sin are connected. 
The Christian novelist is distinguished from his pagan colleagues by 
recognizing sin as sin. According to his heritage he sees it not as 
sickness or an accident of environment, but as a responsible choice of 
offence against God which involves his eternal future. Either one is 
serious about salvation or one is not. (167) 
O'Connor is very serious about salvation, which she envisions as 'a drama played 
out with the devil, a devil who is not just generalized evil, but an evil intelligence 
determined on its own supremacy' (168). She claims 'we need a sense of evil which 
sees the devil as a real spirit who must be made to name himself, and not simply to 
name himself as vague evil' (117). 
O'Connor insists that her 'Devil has a name, a history and a definite plan. His name 
is Lucifer, he's a fallen angel, his sin is pride, and his aim is the destruction of the 
Divine plan' (BB 456). She acknowledges the distinction between natural and 
supernatural evils which Wei! considers important. Such an evil intelligence bent on 
destroying the highest good is different to the habitual but comparatively minor sins 
committed by man. 'Sin is interesting but evil is not. Sin is the result of an 
individual's free choice, but evil is something else' she argues.10 But ultimately 
O'Connor's notion of evil is more mysterious, less capable of being clarified and 
explained than in Weirs philosophy: 'evil is not simply a problem to be solved, but 
a mystery to be endured' (MM 209). 
There is consensus between the two writers in their belief that despite the necessity 
to endure evil the natural world is finally good. In fact 'only when the natural world 
is seen as good does evil become intelligible as a destructive force and a necessary 
result of our freedom' according to O'Connor (IS7). But because like Weil, 
O'Connor thinks in ultimates: gravity and grace, sacred and profane, with each of 
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these elements frequently conceived in antithetical pairings, she too is torn between 
a Manichean dualism, or Protestant Fundamentalist urge to consider good and evil 
radically opposed; and a Catholic desire to perceive them symbiotically related. 
However the emphasis is different in each writer. Although Weil is convinced that 
evil is ultimately circumscribed by good, she appears more attracted to, and is more 
convincing in her arguments concerning their distinctions. Conversely, while 
O'Connor is obviously drawn to the concept of a radical opposition between good 
and evil, she is finally convinced by the Catholic notion of their linkage. 
'J think evil is the defective use of good' she maintains (HB 129), and equally, the 
good and specifically grace can make use of the defective. 'Grace, to the Catholic 
way of thinking, can and does use as its medium the imperfect, purely human, and 
even hypocritical' (389). The positive uses of evil include the devil's inadvertent 
assistance in the action of grace. According to O'Connor 'the devil teaches most of 
the lessons that lead to self-knowledge', and in her narratives 'the reader will find 
that the devil accomplishes a good deal of groundwork that seems to be necessary 
before grace is effective' (349, MM 117). While this is important spiritually and 
increases the dramatic nature of the fictions, in a combination of the kind of 
ludicrous monstrosity which Bakhtin identifies, and the integrity of unfree will both 
she and Wei! acknowledge; O'Connor insists that the devil's unwitting contribution 
to goodness is also comic. 'In general the Devil can always be a subject for my kind 
of comedy one way or another. I suppose this is because he is always accomplishing 
ends other than his own' she concludes (HB 367). 
But is it part of O'Connor's own integrity as a fiction writer that she manages to 
accomplish other ends in her narratives than she too intends? Torn between her 
theological beliefs and the requirements of fictional form, does her work 
demonstrate a kind ofWeilean dualism, with two sets of ethics, one for her theology 
and one for her fiction? There is some evidence for this in that despite believing 
humanity is both fallen and redeemable, O'Connor's fictions more successfully 
depict Weil's impoverished view of man than her own more optimistic concept of 
human liberty. Her characters appear subject to the machinations of a Weilean type 
necessity which condemns them to evil and forbids them anything but the most 
limited goods, and therefore these indifferent or disobedient souls provide minimal 
evidence of the free will and permanent capacity for grace which O'Connor 
considers so important. None of her characters escape gravity, but most appear to 
escape grace. Some of her protagonists do manage to show the compulsion of God's 
pressure on, and the impulsive actions available to the soul, but despite her stress on 
the mysterious interaction between nature and grace, within the context of her 
165 
oeuvre these events are themselves as predictable and schematised as Weil's 
conceptual hierarchies. Repetitive themes, character types, plots and narrative 
structures become probabilities rather than possibilities, diluting their shock effect. 
Consequently after the weight of determined and grotesque characters and events 
which precede them, O'Connor's climactic denouements, which she insists 
represent epiphanic moments of grace, the intervention of a supernatural necessity 
in human affairs, are frequently difficult to accept. 
Both writers agree that such supernatural interventions actually occur, and have the 
crucial capacity to alter the mechanism of natural necessity. Maintaining that 
successful fictions represent this experiential reality, O'Connor claims 'all good 
stories are about conversion, about a character's changing', insisting the 'action of 
grace changes a character' (275). But while all her 'stories are about the action of 
grace on a character who is not very willing to support ie, she complains that due to 
the inability of her audience to recognise grace when they see it, 'most people think 
of these stories as hard, hopeless, brutal' (275). Yet rather than her reader's 
monstrous incapacity to recognise grace, the problem of accepting O'Connor's 
proclaimed moments of supernatural intervention in the fictions stems from their 
reliance on minor, inconclusive, or non-existent evidence of altered behaviour in her 
characters, and the resultant difficulty in accepting that such well delineated fallen 
characters can be, have been, redeemed. The Weilean notion that such rare moments 
of grace are accompanied by compassionate and instinctive acts of charity for the 
affiicted, a redemptive self-sacrificing of the self which amounts to a new descent 
of Christ on earth is barely visible within the fictions. 
At the core of both writers' theologies is the monstrous Christian paradox that man 
must lose his life to save it by sharing in Christ's cross. As writer-prophet O'Connor 
attempts to revivify its central Christian truth and write it on the souls of her secular 
audience in her short stories 'Good Country People' and 'The Life You Save May 
Be Your Own'. Both texts draw the reader's attention to the biblical reference, but 
ultimately revivify the paradox in different ways in the narratives. Each story also 
demonstrates how fictional beings can analyse the problem of being fictional and its 
consequences - the egocentrism and immorality, fake identity and distorted worship 
• that both Weil and O'Connor associate with spiritual deracination, and which they 
consider affliction and the grotesque have the capacity to expose. My analysis of 
'Good Country People' will focus on how Weil's central concept of affliction and 
the afflicted body as a lever for salvation offers useful new interrogations of 
O'Connor's attempt to revivify the Christian paradox that man must lose his life to 
save it. The important Weilean notion of being fictional, and its links to social and 
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spiritual deracination, shall be used to offer productive insights into the character of 
Mr Tom T. Shiftlet and his response to the question what is a man? in 'The Life You 
Save May Be Your Own'. How successfully O'Connor writes the Christian paradox 
on the souls of her readers in this story will be examined, and my reading of both 
narratives will conclude with a brief examination of to what extent both stories 
demonstrate Weil's first two criteria for texts of genius. 
Weil's concept of amiction is central to her notion that external physical realities 
have an impact on the soul, that the body is a lever for salvation. Her analysis of 
how amiction annihilates the fictional self, returns man to the reality of his fragile 
condition, and through such redemptive suffering offers access to grace, helps 
interrogate O'Connor's attempt, in 'Good Country People', to revivify the paradox 
that man must lose his life to save it, through the central character of Joy-Hulga 
HopeweU. 
Applying Weil's philosophical criteria for amiction to the fictional character of 
Joy-Hulga reveals how closely Weil and O'Connor's thinking converges on how the 
grotesquely affiicted human body can be a mediator for salvation. Weil's core point, 
that the three facets of the human being: body, soul, and social personality, are 
permanently exposed to affiiction, corresponds closely with the characterisation of 
10y-Hulga. Physically diseased through her 'weak heart', and mutilated after having 
her leg 'literally blasted orr in a hunting accident (CS 276, 275), Joy-Hulga 
embodies Weil's claim that man's flesh is fragile due to its susceptibility to being 
'pierced or tom or crushed', or having 'one of its internal mechanisms [ ... J 
permanently deranged' (SWR 454). Weil's theory that the soul is vulnerable because 
it is 'pitifully dependent upon all sorts of objects, inanimate and animate, which are 
themselves fragile and capricious' (454), equates to Joy-HuIga taking care of her 
artificial leg 'as someone else would his soul' (CS 287), and its eventual theft by 
Manley Pointer. Finally, Weil's idea that the 'social personality' upon which man's 
fictional self is almost totally dependent, and which when its prestige is diminished 
or destroyed seems to abolish man's essential self, is evident at the end of the 
narrative, when the self-created identity on which Joy-Hulga bases her belief in her 
difference to the rest of the community has been humiliatingly dismantled by 
Pointer. 
Weil's emphasis on affliction being distinguished from mere suffering by its 
degradation of the social personality (the fictional self), and a necessary spiritual 
torment that mutilates the soul, offers insights into Joy-Hulga, who takes refuge 
from the reality of her limited and precarious condition by recreating herself, and 
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who constitutes one of O'Connor's 'maimed souls,.71 Joy-Hulga's fictional self is 
founded on her absurd pride in what she believes is her uniqueness through first, her 
physical deformity, second, her assumption of an alternative identity by renaming 
herself, and third, the atheism through which she assumes intellectual superiority. In 
a secular version of the Christian paradox that man must lose his life to save it, she 
tries to lose her life as Joy and to redeem herself through her new existence as 
Hulga. Initially, her social prestige is increased rather than decreased, thanks to 
Pointer and Mrs Freeman's fascination with the three elements of her new identity. 
Pointer informs Joy-Hulga that the artificial leg 'is what makes you different. You 
ain't like anybody else' (288). Although his later revelation that he has stolen other 
prostheses demonstrates he does not think she is unique, and consequently at this 
point he is probably cynically pandering to Joy-Hulga's own sense of difference and 
linkage of her physical abnormality with her mystical self, Pointer is genuinely 
devoted to her deformity. He is 'entirely reverent' as he uncovers the 'ugly jointure' 
where the prosthesis is attached to the stump, and pays homage to Joy-Hulga's 
physical abnormality in a pseudo-religious ritual. The profane sacraments of 
obscene playing cards, whiskey, and condoms which he produces from his 
counterfeit bible are laid out in front of Joy-Hulga 'like one presenting offerings at 
the shrine of a goddess' (289). He clandestinely thinks that she is 'some girl!' 
because he admires her nihilism, and Freeman's relish for furtively calling 
Joy-Hulga by her adoptive name, and similar fascination with the younger woman's 
deformity, amounts to another form of distorted adulation which associates 
10y-Hulga's ugliness with her inner being. Freeman's secretive use of the 'Hulga' 
name disturbs Joy-Hulga 'as if her privacy had been intruded upon', because she 
senses Freeman's potential to delve 'far enough behind her face to reach some secret 
fact' (282, 275). 
Joy-Hulga's own reverence for this 'secret' connection between her external 
ugliness and notion of her inner mystery is the motivation for her name change. 
'One of her major triumphs was that her mother had not been able to tum her dust 
into Joy, but the greater one was that she had been able to turn it herself into Hulga', 
and this parody of God's creation of humanity ensures that Joy-Hulga's 'highest 
creative act' is to become her own profane deity (275). Literally idolising 'the full 
genius' of her self-created ersatz divinity, she envisions her new name 'working like 
the ugly sweating Vulcan [ ... J to whom presumably, the Goddess had to come when 
called' (275). That Joy-Hulga conceives her self in pseudo-religious terms is 
significant. The passionate nature of her nihilism could be indicative of the spiritual 
torment, the distressed soul, which Weil considers an essential element of the 
afflicted's trauma. It is noticeable that when she imagines seducing Pointer 
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Joy-Hulga envisions redeeming him, taking 'all his shame away', and instead of 
negating the meaning of experiential existence, changing his remorse 'into a deeper 
understanding of life' (284). Her insistence that she has attained her own salvation 
through nihilism: 'We are all damned [ ... J but some of us have taken off our 
blindfolds and see there's nothing to see. It's a kind of salvation'; is subverted by 
her implicit acknowledgement that some sort of salvation is required, and the 
Christian terminology she uses to express this (288). Her outburst that 'God! [ ... J 
Malebranche was right: we are not our own light. We are not our own light!' 
ironically undermines her notion of secular salvation, as does the narrator's 
description of Joy-Hulga having 'the look of someone who has achieved blindness 
by an act of will and means to keep it' (276,273). 
Weil's second criteria for affliction, that it is randomly, arbitrarily inflicted and 
endured against the will, corresponds closely to the plot and protagonists of 'Good 
Country People'. The unexpected arrival of Pointer, who uses 'a different name at 
every house [he] calls at and don't stay nowhere long' , and his unpredictable theft of 
the leg, forces Joy-Hulga to submit to yet another indiscriminate infliction of 
physical limitation. In addition to the hunting accident, her heart defect has thwarted 
Joy-Hu]ga's desire to leave the farm, and she 'had made it plain' that if it had not 
been for her heart condition, 'she would be far from these red hills and good 
country people' (276). Although this resentment of others demonstrates that 
Joy-Hulga's perspective of the world has been to some extent poisoned by her 
unwanted experience of affliction, and that her soul has been invaded by ugliness, at 
this point she only partially qualifies for the third of Weil's constituent features of 
affliction. Her egocentrism and self-idolisation, the worship and fascination 
Joy-Hulga incites in Pointer and Freeman, are markedly different to the self-loathing 
and the repeIIing of the non-afflicted that Weil identifies. However, even at this 
point of greatest difference between O'Connor's camivalesque grotesquerie - the 
celebration of the physical, and depiction of ludicrous monstrosity which contrasts 
with WeiI's notion of the terrible alienating agony of affliction· there is some 
evidence of consensus between the writers provided by the characters depicted in 
the story. Despite their attraction to Joy-Hulga, Freeman's voyeurism and Pointer's 
fetishism exploit her affliction, and in doing so approach the type of cruelty of the 
non-afflicted towards the afflicted which WeB specifies. 
There is also some scope for considering that Pointer's annihilation of the props 
which support Joy-Hulga's fictional self lead to the shock of horror which is the 
initiator of the afflicted's self-revulsion in Weil's schema. His removal of the earlier 
solaces for her subjection to necessity, force her to feel the full horror of her 
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exposure to gravity and qualify Joy-Hulga for WeWs definitive characteristic of 
affiiction, that it must be borne entirely without consolation. Despite her previously 
absurd pride in her deformity, the 'cry of alarm' and 'pleading sound' which 
accompany Joy-Hulga's realisation of her predicament, and her 'churning face' 
when she is left motionless in the barn without her leg (289,290,291), offer some 
indication that she has now been transformed in her own eyes into the paralysed and 
detestable victim of affliction that Wei! envisions. Pointer's final gaze at his victim 
'with a look that no longer had any admiration in it', negates the previous glances 
with which he had regarded her as 'the fantastic animal at the zoo' (291,286); and 
his concluding verbal assault demonstrates the law of sensibility by which, like 
animals who attack a maimed member of the species, the revulsion of the 
non-afflicted is directed towards the victim of affliction. At the end of the story he 
totally destroys each facet of Joy-Hulga's fictional being, and she suffers the 
crippling loss of prestige that Weil considers pivotal. By stealing her artificial leg 
Pointer exposes both Joy-Hulga's physical fragility and the vulnerability caused by 
her soul's reliance on precarious objects. When he informs her he has obtained 'a lot 
of interesting things', in the same manner, uses her new name 'as if he didn't think 
much of it', and reveals she 'ain't so smart' because he has 'been believing in 
nothing ever since [he] was born!' (291), Pointer annihilates Joy-Hulga's social 
personality and the assurance of mystical uniqueness on which it was based. 72 
Pointer provides the form of danger, the element of risk, which both Weil and 
O'Connor consider essential to attack spiritual paralysis, reveal what a human being 
is essentially, and in a vital drama of the soul, provoke a deliberate reaction that 
stimulates the soul's development Joy-Hulga's consent to the removal of the 
prosthesis likened to a 'soul', constitutes just such an elicited response. Her reaction 
to Pointer's request 'was like surrendering to him completely. It was like losing her 
own life and finding it again, miraculously, in his' (289). His refusal to reattach the 
artificial leg, his disclosure of the contents of his counterfeit bible, and disassembly 
of every facet of her illusory person, the egocentric 'I' • leaves Joy-Hulga's assurance 
of secular salvation shattered, and forces her to experience non-being. As Asals 
notes, O'Connor's stories end 'either in literal death or in that violent purging of the 
ego that is the death of the self (Imagination, 205), and it is this elimination of her 
fictional self that provides the opportunity for Joy-Hulga's spiritual development. 
When she sees her artificial leg 'slanted forlornly' across the inside of Pointer'S 
suitcase between the genuine and fake Bibles (CS 290), her amicted body has the 
potential for leverage towards salvation through the total humiliation of perceiving 
her 'soul' as a dead thing, a piece of matter. Joy·Hulga is now physically rather than 
just emotionally 'moved' by Pointer, who literally pulls her artificial leg/fictional 
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'soul' after him through violence not charity, immoral, rather than moral action. It is 
in this sense that Pointer, who Joy-Hulga apparently sees 'struggling successfully 
over the green speckled lake' (291), may as pseudo-Christ become her scandalous 
saviour, the logos alogos who is the agent of her grace and redemption. 
'Matter, which was man's undoing, also procures salvation" according to Weil 
(FLN 230). But while the text plainly supports the interpretation that the undoing of 
Joy-Hulga's artificial leg leads to the enforced loss of her fictional life, has she 
really saved her spiritual life? Is it possible to read her position at the end of the 
narrative as more than a revelation of the limitations of her body and fictional self, 
and consider that she is in some way levered towards grace and salvation? Does 
O'Connor manage to revivify the central Christian paradox that man must lose his 
life in order to save it in this text? 
Ralph C. Wood insists that at the end of the story Joy-Hulga 'is free, if only 
potentially, to hear the call of the Cross, to enter upon the true life of self-losing and 
self-finding', she 'has suffered a blessed loss, a saving devastation,?3 But although 
O'Connor rightly maintains Pointer's theft of the leg 'has taken away part of the 
girl's personality and has revealed her deeper affliction to her for the first time' 
(MM 99); to accept that Joy-Hulga's final (mis)sighting of him as a Christ-like 
figure indicates that she has in some way attained salvation, is dependent on 
ratifying last-minute and insufficient evidence. As William Burke maintains, this 
story 'really presents no Christian or theistic alternative; there is no situation in 
which theistic values are set against the nihilism,?4 Joy-Hulga's final words in the 
text do not support the interpretation that she is saved. 'Give me my leg!' (CS 290), 
does not demonstrate an altered viewpoint which suggests she is capable of making 
contact with mystery and accepting an epiphanic moment of grace. Equally, 
although her 'churning face' registers the trauma generated by her humiliating 
predicament, the fact that she 'saw' Pointer struggling 'successfuJIy' over the 
field/lake is at best an ambiguous endorsement of a changed perspective, given the 
earlier theft of her spectacles (291, 287). While O'Connor insists that all good 
stories are about conversion and grace changes a character, no further evidence of 
altered behaviour is permitted Joy·Hulga, and she is allowed no verbal response to 
Pointer's concluding diatribe. Consequently, O'Connor's tendency not to adequately 
differentiate between the shocking aftermath of violence and the advent of 
redemption, whether her protagonists are merely devastated by the destruction of 
their fictional personalities or do achieve salvation, damages her ability to convey 
sacred mystery through manners. 
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But 'even if it does not breathe the air of salvation, the story at least gasps after W 
(Wood, 'Heidegger', 114), and O'Connor's use of the carnival grotesque genre does 
go some way towards assisting her to 'bend' the text, and jolt her readers into an 
acknowledgement of deeper levels of meaning. She admits that when paraphrased 
the story constitutes 'a low joke' for the 'average reader' (MM 98). But it is 
precisely through using the degradation of ideal forms, the inverted 
transubstantiation and ludicrous monstrosities, that as fabliau, 'Good Country 
People' is most successful in disturbing the reader and suggesting alternative 
perspectives. O'Connor's comic vision of human grotesquerie contrasts with Weil's 
uncompromisingly terrible notion of man's ontic and moral affiiction. In the comic 
absurdity of the reciprocal seduction scene, O'Connor debases the ideals of courtly 
love,15 and in Pointer's perverted worship at the shrine of his goddess, she provides 
a brilliant example of the parody, travesty, and profanity of the sacred typical of the 
carnival grotesque genre's moral amorality. Via the ludicrous monstrosity of 
Joy-Hulga, O'Connor celebrates the physical, yet manages to suggest the 
physiological and psychological aberrations of her comic monsters are at least 
partially connected to their maimed souls. As Bleikasten observes, the 'derangement 
of minds and deformity of bodies point to a deeper sickness, invisible but more 
irredeemably tragic, the sickness of the soul. Gracelessness in all its forms indicates 
the absence of grace in the theological sense of the tenn' (,Heresy', 141). 
O'Connor's narratives do provide conventionally explicable reasons for the 
grotesquerie of her fictional characters.76 But as Bernard McElroy rightly argues, 
she 'always offers the reader an escape hatch while trying to persuade him not to use 
it',77 and through the core symbol of the artificial leg, O'Connor does prompt the 
reader into acknowledging some connection between the physical, psychological, 
and spiritual deficiencies of her characters, a linkage between the sacred and 
profane. Discussing the narrative, O'Connor maintains 'we're presented with the 
fact that the Ph.D is spiritually as well as physically crippled' and 'we perceive that 
there is a wooden part of her soul that corresponds to her wooden leg', and by 
'letting the wooden leg accumulate meaning' this story 'does manage to operate at 
another level of experience' (MM 99). I would agree with O'Connor's comments 
here. In the narrator's stress on the prosthesis' relationship to Joy.Hutga's soul and 
the worship it inspires, the artificial leg does function as an anagogical symbol, by 
being successfully invested with mystical connotations. This connection between 
body and soul is vitally reinforced by the narrator's significant allusion to the 
Christian paradox that man must lose his life in order to save it, when describing 
Joy-Hulga's surrender of her leg to Pointer. This secular rendition of the biblical 
scripture recalls the reader to the earlier reference quoted by Pointer (CS 289, 280), 
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and the juxtaposition and connection of the two versions offensively revivifies the 
original meaning, retrieving it from platitude. 
Although Pointer may not be convincing as the 'missionary' who saves Joy-Hulga's 
soul, his comic yet terrible assault on her fictionality does 'do most' (280), for 
O'Connor's attempt to write the Christian ideals of loss of self and redemptive 
suffering on the souls of her readers through the carnival grotesque. In the complex 
mutual deception of the sham courtship and its outcome, the freakish figure of 
Joy-Hulga becomes a moral advertisement, a warning of moral gracelessness. And 
while she seems more fallen than redeemed, her shocking debasement levers the 
narrative from low joke to moral fable. Yet precisely because 'Good Country 
People' is a grotesque fiction and not a theological treatise, the narrative is not 'that 
simple' and 'never could' be (291), and offers multiple truths, not merely the 
Christian reading that O'Connor as writer-prophet intends.78 The narrative 
structure, and specifically the characterisation of Joy-Hulga, brings to grotesque life 
the Weilean concept of affliction, and the philosophical framework of Weil's 
criteria for affliction assists in exposing Joy-Hulga as the type of maimed soul it is 
O'Connor's primary effort to explore in her fictions, and how through such 
characters, O'Connor attempts to offensively revivify the Christian paradox that 
man must lose his profane life in order to save his spiritual life. 
Bleikasten claims that O'Connor's work 'is not content with illustrating Christian 
paradoxes. It stretches them to the breaking point leaving us with Christian truths 
gone mad, the still incandescent fragments of a shattered system of belier 
('Heresy', 157). But I would argue that, in the same way that WeB's horrifying 
concepts have most impact on the reader through their excessiveness, it is precisely 
because O'Connor stretches Christian paradoxes to their limits through grotesque 
distortion, that they are offensively revivified, and written on the souls of her 
readers. By entitling her short story 'The Life You Save May Be Your Own', 
O'Connor deliberately foregrounds the Christian paradox, and challenges the reader 
to interrogate the meaning of the story by comparing the disparity between the 
biblical scripture and the fictional narrative. In 'Good Country People' the Christian 
paradox is offensively revivified by the loss of Joy-Hulga's fictional life. But in this 
text, I will argue that the paradox is offensively reanimated quite differently, by 
Shiftlet's retention of his fictional life. My reading will focus on first, how Weil's 
crucial concept of being fictional and its relation to social and spiritual deracination 
illuminates the character of Mr Shiftlet, and his response to the question what is a 
man? Second, I will interrogate how O'Connor revivifies the Christian paradox 
through inversion. 
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'The Life You Save May Be Your Own' provides further evidence of how the 
central preoccupations ofWeil and O'Connor coincide. The problem of ontological 
fictionality and its causation by spiritual deracination is central to the story, and is 
embodied by Mr Tom T. Shiftlet, who brings to life the Weilean notion of secular 
man's offensiveness, the egocentrism and immorality by which man strives to 
escape the reality of his affliction and limitation by placing himself at the centre of 
the universe. The issue of being fictional and its links to the ego is explicitly 
foregrounded early in the story by the narrator, who draws attention to Shiftlet's 
self-centred 'pose', when he forms his mutilated body into 'a crooked cross' against 
the sunset, and holds the position 'for almost fifty seconds' (CS 146). The subject of 
ontological fictionality and its consequences is explicitly raised by Shiftlet himself. 
He informs Mrs Crater they live in a world where 'people'II do anything', and 
'people don't care how they lie', and he highlights his own potential fictionality by 
asking her how she can 'know' he 'ain't lying' about his identity and using a false 
name and place of birth (147, 148). This deliberate ambiguity about himself, 
combined with the narrator's reportage of how Shiftlet evades answering questions 
about his identity and his motives through elaborate gestures, silences, and the 
stories he tells to Crater, establish Shiftlet as counterfeit. He forms his theatrical 
cross posture rather than respond to Crater's initial greeting, and he does not reply 
when the old woman questions where he comes from, but protractedly holds a 
burning match 'as if he were studying the mystery of flame' (147). When she asks 
'What you doing around here Mr Shiftlet1', he again ignores her (147). Relating 
how an Atlanta heart surgeon has cut out a human heart, Shiftlet leans forward and 
holds 'his hand out, arm up, as ifit were weighted with the human heart', allowing 
'a long significant pause', before he continues (147). 
Shiftlet's fictionality is linked to his social and spiritual deracination. As Mrs Crater 
claims, 'there ain't any place in the world for a poor disabled friendless drifting 
man', and as an itinerant 'tramp' with 'only halfan arm' who has apparently 'visited 
every foreign land', he personifies the type of deracination that Weil identifies (145, 
148). Rootedness is the most important need of the soul in her schema, because 
man's moral, intellectual, and spiritual life is developed through his environment. 
The primary cause of deracination is the separation of the physical and sacred in 
human experience. Contemporary man is estranged from the natural world and its 
links. to the supernatural, and in a culture in which religion and science are 
separated, man desires material rather than spiritual gain.79 ShiftJet's moral, 
intellectual, and spiritual development appears to have been stunted by his 
experience of a desacralised world in which man is alienated from nature and its 
connection to sacred mystery. Man has to 'escape to the country to see the world 
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whole' and see the sunset 'as God made it to do', because due to mass production 
and consumerism, humanity has lost the capacity to perceive mystery through 
manners. Men have become anonymous and mechanised because no-one takes 'a 
personal interest' in their environment, each other, their work, and consequently 
'it's a man for a bolt' (150). 
Shiftlet's pseudo-philosophical observations on the nature of human existence are 
themselves manufactured, and are undoubtedly part of the trickster's spiel through 
which he aims to, and does, fulfil his own desire for material gain by acquiring Mrs 
Crater's money and stealing the car. But these statements do appear linked to 
Shiftlet's genuine perplexity at man's spiritual deracination, his instinctive 
awareness that man is 'made for' more than the profane world of ontic and moral 
evils that he has himself experienced (148). Shiftlet is acutely aware that in a 
spiritually rootless world 'a man is made for money', yet he consistently stresses the 
gap between man's secular valuation and what he considers his indefinable inner 
mystery (148). Like Weil, he acknowledges a distinction between the human person 
and man's essential self. After his marriage to LucyneU, Shiftlet looked 'morose and 
bitter as if he had been insulted', because he resents the assumption that who he is 
essentially can be ascertained by purely profane indicators (153). He insists that 
there is a difference between the 'paper work and blood tests' by which the 
'Ordinary's office' defines him, and the mystery of who he is, the inner self which 
escapes such easy definition (153). It is the Ordinary, profane law 'that don't satisfy' 
Shiftlet 'at all', because he considers that there is more to a man than his physical 
body (153). 'What do they know about my blood? If they was to take my heart and 
cut it out [ ... ] they wouldn't know a thing about me' he maintains (153). Shiftlet's 
'look of composed dissatisfaction as if he understood life thoroughly' (146), stems 
from his awareness of a frame of reference beyond the physical: man is greater and 
more mysterious than his blood, than his heart, yet Shiftlet's inability to perceive the 
connection between the physical and spiritual, man's body and his spirit, leaves him 
bitter. 
Shiftlet's answer to his question 'what is a man?' (148), is dependent on the 
Manichean vision of humanity with which he rejects the Pauline notion of the body 
as a temple of the spirit. 'Lady, a man is divided into two parts, body and spirit'» he 
insists, the body 'is like a house: it don't go anywhere; but the spirit, lady, is like a 
automobile; always on the move' (152). Weil's concept of spiritual rootlessness and 
its connection to fictionaIity and immorality is useful here in analysing Shiftlet and 
his notion of what a man is. Her contention that secular man, deracinated from the 
sacred, takes refuge from affiiction and avoids the brutal reality of his limited and 
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precarious condition through lies and sin, offers insights into both Shiftlet's claim 
for a moral capacity, and his distinctly immoral actions. 
Resentful of his bodily amiction and low social status, Shiftlet maintains that 
despite being a 'one-arm jackleg' who 'ain't a whole' man, he possesses 'a moral 
intelligence!' (149). But although he is apparently aware that man has the potential 
for moral action, as Kessler argues, 'one is capable of possessing a "moral 
intelligence" without a morality' (Kessler, 145). The typically counterfeit gesture in 
which he taps 'his knuckles on the floor to emphasise the immensity of what he was 
going to say', the narrator's description of Shiftlet's apparent astonishment 'at this 
impossible truth', and his subsequent actions: bartering for a wedding settlement, 
deserting the afflicted LucynelI, and stealing the car, deny Shiftlet's claim for a 
moral faculty. 
A 'man's spirit means more to him than anything else' he contends (CS 153), but 
Shiftlet's spiritual deracination ensures that it is the car which means most to him 
because as John F. Desmond argues, 'Shiftlet converts the car into an idolatrous 
object, a false icon that mirrors his own dualistic sensibility' (Risen Sons, 48). It is 
not merely a car but 'the image of his riven self, which Shiftlet sees 'as an emblem 
of his disincarnated spirit' (48). 'r got to follow where my spirit says to go' Shiftlet 
insists, and rather than his body acting as a lever for his soul, it is his (car)nal spirit 
which pulls his body after it when he steals the automobile and abandons Lucynell. 
Shiftlet shows no evidence that he contains the spirit of God within him, the element 
of supernatural love inside his soul, which in Wei!' s schema would enable him to 
have a moral intelligence and accomplish moral obligations at the expense of his 
egocentric fictional self. Instead of the redemptive attention towards the amicted 
Lucynell that would through self-loss save his soul, and constitute a new entrance of 
Christ on earth, this pseudo-Christ's behaviour towards the deaf and dumb moron is 
motivated by his 'personal interest' in the car, through which he saves his own 
fictional rather than spiritual self. 
In his discourse on the body/spirit dichotomy and assertion of his moral intelligence 
Shiftlet has 'mastered the rhetoric of morality' (Kessler, 142), but he is as fictional 
and egocentric at the end of the narrative as he was at the beginning. His Jie to the 
boy behind the counter of The Hot Spot claiming LucyneU is a hitchhiker, his fake 
sentimental eulogy about his mother and how he abandoned her, accompanied as it 
is by 'a mist of tears' which 'instantly' appears, indicates his continuing dishonesty 
and insincerity, which are most apparent in Shiftlet's final action of the story (CS 
155, 156). That he ostentatiously 'raised his arm and let it fall again to his breast' 
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before he 'prayed': 'Oh Lord! [ ... J Break forth and wash the slime from this earth!', 
suggests that Shiftlet's 'depression' after stealing the car was only temporary, and 
despite being 'so shocked' by the hitchhiker's inSUlt, he saves his fictional rather 
than spiritual life when he races towards his appropriately rootless 'Mobile' 
destination (154, 156). 
Shiftlet provides a definitive example of how none of 0 'Connor's characters escape 
gravity but most escape grace. He represents Weil's impoverished view of man more 
cogently than O'Connor's more optimistic concept of humanity. Shiftlet shows 
minimal evidence of a capacity for conversion, the acceptance of changing grace 
that O'Connor considers essential to both her theology and fictions. As a 
Weilean-type disobedient soul he appears condemned to evil and forbidden good, 
wholly obedient to gravity rather than supernatural necessity. To consider, as 
Hegarty does, that Shiftlet is 'a man unwittingly in the process of being saved'; or 
that his 'prayer', as Quinn claims, may 'be an act of genuine repentance'. and that 
grace 'is treated here with an ambiguity proper to its mystery',80 requires the 
distinctively uncritical conviction of the insider reader. Such assurances are neither 
supported by textual evidence nor O'Connor's own comment on Shiftlet's character. 
If he is in the process of being saved and accepts a moment of grace he must show, 
in O'Connor's own criteria, some evidence of altered behaviour, of losing his 
fictional self. But 'O'Connor abandons him before he can begin the process of 
becoming more than his appearances' (Kessler, 144). There is too much invested in 
a single phrase to consider that Shiftlet's subsequent 'prayer' signifies his 
acquirement of a moral intelligence or a capacity to accept grace. If he had attained 
a moral faculty this entreaty would constitute an awareness that he is the slime that 
should be washed away. But Shiftlet flees contact with the numinous, indicated by 
the 'guffawing' peal of thunder and 'fantastic' raindrops, when 'Very quickly he 
stepped on the gas' and 'raced' the shower into Mobile (CS 156). With the raised 
arm gesture that accompanies his 'prayer' and with 'his stump sticking out the 
window' of the automobile, Shiftlet appears as fictional, egotistical and spiritually 
incomplete as when he formed a crooked cross against the setting sun at the 
beginning of the narrative. 
Crucially, unlike Joy-Hulga, Shiftlet is not forced to lose the object which 
symbolises his fictionality and false worship. Joy-Hulga's enforced loss of her 
artificial leg/soul and with it her fictional self, makes her potential salvation if not 
probable, possible. But in 'The Life You Save May Be Your Own' there is no 
convincing evidence that Shiftlet has either lost his fictional life or saved his 
spiritual life. He keeps the false icon he has stolen and with it his fictionality. 
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O'Connor, as Shiftlet's fictional creator, makes no claim for his salvation in her 
comment on his character. Discussing Shiftlet's similarity with the copper-flue 
salesman in The Violent Bear It Away, she insists Meeks is 'like Mr Shiftlet of the 
Devil because nothing in him resists the Devil' (HB 367). But if Shiftlet is damned 
rather than redeemed, if he retains his fictional life and does not save his spiritual 
life, is it possible for O'Connor to successfully revivify this crucial Christian 
paradox and write it on the souls of her readers? I would argue that in this story the 
paradox is revivified, arguably more effectively than in 'Good Country People', 
precisely because Shiftlet is not saved. The story jolts the reader in the direction of 
the sacred by inversion, and is successful in Fielder's sense, that it 
uncompromisingly reminds the reader of the reversal of eternal values in an 'almost 
rotten' desacralised world, and in this way the paradox is retrieved from platitude 
and revivified in all its pristine offensiveness. 
This works primarily in two ways that are themselves connected. First, the cross and 
car symbolism which marks out Shiftlet's status as a pseudo-Christ figure draws 
attention to the inversion of the Christian truths of self-loss and redemptive suffering 
on which the paradox is based. Second, the road sign combines with this imagery to 
reinforce the relevance of the story's title, and this successfully recalls the original 
meaning of the biblical text, which is retrieved from platitude. When Shiftlet forms 
his incomplete body into a crooked cross, this gesture, established as blatantly 
fictional, both recalls the reader to the paragon of Christ's cross, and draws attention 
to Shiftlet's deviation from it. As Robert Drake contends, 'always in Miss 
O'Connor's fiction, behind the grotesque, as she herself intimated, lies the ultimate 
concept of straightness or "oughtness", without which the grotesque is 
meaningless,.81 What is behind Shiftlet, what is 'indicated' by his cruciform 
gesture is more than 'an expanse of sky' (CS 146), it is the disparity between Christ 
as perfect, 'whole' man, with his cross as icon of self-renunciation and sacrificial 
love, and Shiftlet's negation of these ideals. His fictional cross, a cross devoid of its 
sacred meaning, introduces Shiftlet to the reader as a form without content, a fake 
Christ, and Shiftlet's physical incompleteness, his unwholesome immoral 
intelligence, egocentrism and (car)nal spirit are stressed as the story progresses. The 
notion of Shiftlet as a pseudo-saviour is developed by the narrator, when after 
Shiftlet has started the car he is described as having 'an expression of serious 
modesty on his face as if he had just raised the dead' (151). This juxtaposition of 
sacred and profane symbols, and parodying of orthodox Christian doctrine and its 
discourse, highlights Shiftlet's diversion from the Christian truths of self-loss and 
redemptive suffering. O'Connor's audience is steered towards seeing first, the car as 
a vehicle for Shiftlet's salvation of his fictional self, and second, the 'sign' that 
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'warned: "Drive carefully. The life you save may be your own'" (CS 155), as an 
anagogical symbol whose caution is directed towards both fictional character and 
reader. Although the road sign symbol is not as well developed in the text as the 
artificial leg is in 'Good Country People', together with the crooked cross and 
pseudo-Christ imagery it does remind the reader that the Christian paradox is the 
focus of the story. The grotesque inversion of the biblical scripture jolts the reader 
into recalling the offensive Christian truth which it signifies. 
Weil insists that fictions actively participate in, and contribute to, man's redemption 
when readers re-cognise spiritual truths, and her criteria for texts of genius, the 
philosophical framework through which she analyses the spiritual value of fictions, 
provides an original, and more objective test through which to judge O'Connor's 
aims and success as Christian writer-prophet, than O'Connor's own comments in 
her non-fictional writings. Interpreting 'The Life You Save May Be Your Own' and 
'Good Country People' using Weil's formula reveals that O'Connor depicts the 
reality ofa world dominated by gravity and affiiction, a major requirement of We iI's 
first criteria for texts of genius. But there is little evidence that the force of gravity is 
obedient to the good in these narratives. Consequently the stories do not display the 
adequate balance between gravity and grace, the fallen and the redeemed, that Weil 
considers so essential. The second specification that she advocates for texts of 
genius: the necessity for a superposed structure that represents ontic and moral evils 
and how they are linked, and through which all men are both victims and agents of 
gravity, is evident in both texts. O'Connor adds an extra dimension to Weil's 
superposed framework through her comic vision, which balances Weil's 
overemphasis on brutal force, the monstrous horrors of necessity and affiiction. The 
ludicrous monstrosities of Joy-Hulga and Shiftlet provide a deeper, more profound 
architecture of the abyss, a greater density of the real, through their comic yet 
terrible exploits. 
'Good Country People' and 'The Life You Save May Be Your Own' are not, finally, 
fictions of redemptive genius in the Weilean sense. But despite, and even because 
O'Connor's comic monsters escape grace (if not gravity), these texts are successful 
as Christian prophecy, due to their offensive revivification of the core Christian 
paradox on which they are based. Yet as complex fictions they are 'made for' more 
than religious propaganda, and my readings of the stories would be as 'strained' as 
Shiftlet's voice (156), if I were to argue that the narratives constitute merely 'a 
theology in graphic representation,.82 But it is what makes these and O'Connor's 
other stories so graphic, the offensive distortion and exaggeration of the grotesque, 
which undoubtedly accounts for their ability to write on the soul. In Chapter Three I 
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will interrogate how both Weil and O'Connor's most graphically offensive concepts, 
their theories of violent grace, are essential to their efforts to be prophetic; and I will 
investigate how each writer considers that an encounter between the 
incommensurates of God and man is possible. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
1. Luke 9: 23-25, The Jerusalem Bible, p.132. 
2. 'Monstrous: 1. Deviating greatly from the natural or normal; unnatural in form or 
structure. 2. Of extraordinary size or number; excessive; huge: a monstrous beast or 
multitude. 3. Inspiring abhorrence, hate, incredulity, etc., in a remarkable degree; 
hateful; hideous; incredible; intolerable: a monstrous cruelty.' In The New 
International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language: 
Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition, ed. by S. Stephenson Smith and others (Naples, 
Florida: Trident Press International, 1996), p.824. See also: 'monstrous: out of the 
common course of nature: enormous: wonderful: horrible: outrageous: 
preposterous.' In Chambers English Dictionary, ed. by Catherine Schwarz and 
others (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p.927. 
3. FLN, pp.243-44. Weirs monstrous masochism is an essential component of her 
theology and well documented throughout her writings. For example 'every time I 
think of the crucifixion of Christ I commit the sin of envy', WFG, p.83. See also: 
even if I believed in the possibility of God's consenting to repair the 
mutilations of my nature, I could not bring myself to ask it of him. 
Even if I were sure of his consenting, I could not. Such a request 
would seem to me an offense against the infinitely tender Love which 
has made me the gift of amiction. (Ibid., p.l 00) 
4. 'Introduction' to WFG, pp.3-39 (pp.29-30). 
5. SWR, p.465. See also: 'The errors of our time come from Christianity without the 
supernatural. Secularization is the cause-and primarily humanism' GG, p.104. 
6. Quoted in Kathleen Feeley, S.S.N.D., Flannery O'Connor: Voice of the Peacock 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1972), p.45. 
7. As Weil herself notes: 'Malheur, admirable word, without its equivalent in other 
languages. We haven't got all we could out of it' NB, p.3. Its closest translatable 
equivalent in English is: 'amiction: 1. The state of being amicted; sore distress of 
body or mind. 2. That which causes great suffering or distress; misfortune; 
calamity.' Webs/ers, p. 25. 'Amiction: state or cause of grievous distress'. 
Chambers, p.22. 
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8. NB, p.127. The fictionalisation of God is linked in Weil's philosophy to the 
problem of how to talk about God via a human vocabulary. On this subject see 
Rowan Williams, 'The Necessary Non-Existence of God', in Bell, pp.52-76, and D. 
Z. Phillips, 'God and Concept-Fonnation in Simone Weil', in ibid., pp.77-92. 
9. FLN, p.103. This abandonment excludes the eternal and supernatural part of the 
soul. See my later discussion of Weil's hierarchical concept of the soul for an 
explanation of how this distinction operates. 
lO. 'The Absent God', Journal of Religion, 35.1 (1955),6-16, (p.6). Paul Ricoeur's 
contention that if 'atheism is to have some religious meaning, however, then the 
death of the God of Providence should point toward a new kind of faith, a tragic 
faith' is applicable to Weil's theology. See his article 'Religion, Atheism, and Faith' 
in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. by Don Ihde 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp.440-67. 
11. Encompassing the relationship between nature and grace, divine sovereignty and 
human liberty, Providence is a central Christian concept. See John H. Wright, S.J., 
'Providence', in The New Dictionary of Theology, ed. by Joseph A. Komonchak, 
Mary Collins and Dennot A. Lane (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987), pp.815-18. 
See also: M. J. Lamgford, 'Providence', in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, 
ed. by Alan Richardson and John Bowden (London: SCM, 1983), pp.478-79, and 
Richard P. McBrien, 'Divine Providence', in CatholiCism, 3rd edn (London: 
Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), pp.333-38. 
12. 'The ridiculous conception of Providence as being a personal and particular 
intervention on the part of God for certain particular ends is incompatible with true 
faith' she insists NR, p.269. 'Divine Providence is not a disturbing influence, an 
anomaly in the ordering of the world; it is itself the order of the world; or rather it is 
the regulating principle of this universe', ibid., p.272. This governing principle is 
dependent on neutrality and indifference, and does not prove 'that God's Providence 
is absent; it is by his Providence that God willed necessity as a blind mechanism' 
SWR. p.445. 
13. 'One must tenderly love the harshness of that necessity which is like a coin with 
two faces, the one turned towards us being domination, and the one turned towards 
God, obedience' ibid., p.4SS. The beauty of the world inheres in the fact horrifying 
necessity is 'obedience to a perfectly wise Love', ibid., p.4S6. 
14. WFG, p.89. Weil's narcissistic God 'can only love himself. His love for us is 
love for himself through us' GG, p.28. But man can love God when he recognizes 
God's love in the horrors of necessity. 'Relentless necessity, wretchedness, distress, 
the crushing burden of poverty and of labour which wears us out, cruelty, torture, 
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violent death, constraint, disease-all these constitute divine love. It is God who in 
love withdraws from us so that we can love him', Weil contends, ibid. 
15. NB, p.564, FLN, p.120. Weil's cyclical concept of the interconnectedness of 
Christ's crucifixion and the Creation derives from two sources: first, St. John's 
reference in Apocalypse 8:8 to the 'Lamb slain from the foundation of the world'. 
and second, Plato's notion of a Soul of the World. It is the Platonic concept from 
which Weil's own theory most clearly originates, and which is important to her 
theories of the providential nature of necessity. See her essay 'Divine Love in 
Creation', IC, pp.89-105. 
16. To place Weil's notion of man's redemptive misery and her concept ofaffiiction 
in some relevant philosophical and theological contexts see: John Hick, Evil and the 
God of Love, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1977, 1985), on pain and suffering, 
pp.292-336; Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, eds., The 
Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and Daniel 
Howard-Snyder, ed., The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996). For the relation of physical pain to 
religious belief, the destruction of language, and political power see Elaine Scarry, 
The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985). See Ian Bradley, The Power of Sacrifice (London: 
Dartman, Longman & Todd, 1995), and Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An 
Introduction (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994) for !udaeo-Christian 
approaches to suffering, sin and redemption. For mystic responses to suffering see 
Saint John of the Cross, Dark Night of the Soul, trans. by E. Allison Peers, 3rd edn 
(Tunbridge Wells: Bums & Oates, 1953, 1976); and S0ren Kierkegaard, Gospel of 
Sujforings, trans. by A. S. Aldworth and W. S. Ferrie, paperback edn (Cambridge: 
James Clark, 1955, 1982). See Maurice Friedman, ed., The Worlds of 
Existentialism: A Critical Reader, paperback edn (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: 
Humanities Press International, 1964, 1991) for atheist, humanist, and religious 
existentialist approaches to man's miseI)'. 
17. SWR, p.452. Despite her insistence amiction must be endured entirely without 
consolation, its very excessiveness and ability to affect the soul are themselves a 
form of mitigation. As Nevin observes • Although she writes against all consolation 
or compensation in suffering, it seems that the absolutes she seeks and would have 
us seek amount themselves to a consolation, however recondite'. Nevin, pp.14S-46. 
18. The Weilean notion that accepting human limitation is paradoxically the means 
of transcending it and attaining a sense of the sacred includes surmounting the ego. 
Diogenes Allen describes this process: 
To accept to any degree our status as a piece of matter is, 
paradoxically, to transcend to that extent being merely a piece of 
matter [ ... ] Our spirituality is found and is affirmed precisely in and 
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with the fact that we are material-subject to the grinding wear and 
tear of matter. In facing the material facts of illness, accident, decay, 
and death we can rise above our egotism and discover that we are 
spiritual beings. 
See his article 'Natural Evil and the Love of God', in The Problem of Evil, pp. 
189-208 (first publ. in Re/igious Studies, 16 (1980),439-56), p.194. 
19. Weil's views on the suffering of the innocent take two forms. First, she 
maintains the majority of human beings are not innocent, and so their amiction is 
deserved. Before 'being reduced to impotence by ailliction one has been an 
accomplice, through cowardice, inertia, indifference, or culpable ignorance, in 
crimes which have plunged other human beings into an ailliction at least as great', 
she claims, SWR, p.453. Second, while the suffering of the truly innocent, i.e. 
children, is unaceptable to the rational mind, it is possible to consent to via 
supernatural love. Agreeing with Dostoyevski's Ivan Karamazov Weil insists there 
is no 'reason whatever which anyone could produce to compensate for a child's tear. 
Absolutely none which would make me consent to that tear' GG, p.68. Yet in 
contrast to Dostoyevski, Weil considers such unacceptable affliction does not negate 
God's existence, instead God's existence provides the only vindication. Because 
"'God willed it'" is the sole reason Wei I can accept the unacceptable, and 'would 
consent to a world which was nothing but evil as readily as to a child's tear' ibid. 
20. Pascal insists on the hiddenness of God, and that knowledge of God is little use 
unless it is combined with both an awareness of human affliction and the potential 
for redemption in Christ. 'It is equally as dangerous for someone to know God 
without knowing their misery as it is for someone to know their misery without 
knowing the Redeemer who can heal them', the first 'leads to the pride of the 
philosophers, who have known God but not their misery, the other to the despair of 
the atheists, who know their misery without a redeemer'. Pensees 449, in Pensees 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962), pp.196-97. Quoted in The Christian Theology 
Reader. ed. by Alister E. McGrath (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 
1995), p.19. 
21. SWR, p.443. Weil claimed to have experienced this phenomenon. Writing to 
Perrin she insists, 'all those human beings for whom I have made it easy to hurt me 
through my friendship have amused themselves by doing so [ ... J They did not 
behave like this from malice, but as a result of the well-known phenomenon that 
makes hens rush upon one of their number if it is wounded, attacking and pecking 
it' WFG, p.92. Weil's pessimistic view of human nature is apparent here. She 
overstates affliction's negative, isolating impact on man rather than its ability to 
create communal compassion and moral action in the non-afflicted. As John Hick 
claims, it is the knowledge that amiction is apparently so unmerited and pointless, 
yet common to all mankind 'that creates sympathy between man and man and 
evokes the unselfish kindness and goodwill which are among the highest values of 
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personal life. No undeserved need would mean no uncalculating outpouring to meet 
that need.' Hick, pp.334-35. 
22. Written in late winter and early spring 1942-43 Weil's essay was first published 
in La Table Ronde (decembre 1950), pp. 9-33. Translations of the title vary, but the 
title intended by Weil appears in Londres et dernieres lettres as 'La Personne et Ie 
sacre. Collectivite-Personne-Impersonnel-Droit-Justice', an indication of the 
significance of this essay, which covers several major areas of her philosophy. 
Weil's division between person and sacred self links her to St. Thomas Aquinas' 
dualism between ontological and moral being. See Nevin, pp.347-49. 
23. For explanations of the Christian concept of virtues see the pertinent references 
in the theological works already referred to, and John A. Hardon, S.1., The Catholic 
Catechism (New York: Image, Doubleday, 1981), pp. 193-205. 
24. IC, p.195. Catholicism perceives man as a greater mixture of nature and grace. 
But see the similarity of Weil's concept to that of St. Paul's notion of sanctifying 
grace in Corinthians 3: 16-18: 
Didn't you realise that you were God's temple and that the Spirit of 
God was living among you? If anybody should destroy the temple of 
God, God will destroy him, because the temple of God is sacred; and 
you are that temple. 
O'Connor bases her short story 'A Temple of the Holy Ghost' (1954) on this text, 
and the hermaphrodite's sermon in the carnival tent. See my discussion of Weil and 
O'Connor's theories of grace in Chapter Three. 
25. In Simone Weil, Gateway to God, ed. by D. Raper (Glasgow: Collins, 1974), 
p.76. 
26. NR, p.l92. See Weil's discussion of Plato's Thaetetus (176a) in her essay 'God 
in Plato' for a source of her notion of the division between natural and supernatural 
morality. The Greeks 'knew two sets of ethics, one external, which is human, the 
other, the real one, which is supernatural, being from God, and interchangable with 
the knowledge [ ... ] of the most exalted truth' IC, pp.74-88 (p.78). 
27. See 'A War of Religions', in Simone Weil, Selected Essays, 1934.1943, trans. 
by Richard Rees (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.211-18 (p.214). 
Further references to this edition (hereafter SE) are given after quotations in the text. 
See this essay for an interesting discussion of her hierarchy of good and evil. 
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28. Quoted in Gabriella Fiori, Simone Weil: An Intellectual Biography, trans. by 
Joseph R. Berrigan (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1989), p.249. 
See also: 
We should be indifferent to good and evil but, when we are 
indifferent, that is to say when we project the light of our attention 
equally on both, the good gains the day. This phenomenon comes 
about automatically. There lies the essential grace. And it is the 
definition, the criterion of good. (GG, p. 107) 
29. FLN, p.340. Weil here appears to misunderstand Augustine's concept of evil as 
the privation of good. Although he considers good can be derived from evil, good 
does not produce evil, rather evil constitutes the absence of good. God 'can bring 
good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good' 
he contends. See Enchiridion, 12, in The Essential Augustine, p.65. Despite Weil's 
antipathy to Augustine it is interesting to note there are significant similarities 
between both writers on the subject of good and evil. Weil's insistence that 
individual evils are part of a larger totality in which God made all things good is 
found in Augustine's Confessions, VII, xii (18) - xiii (19), pp.124-25. Also Weil's 
claim for the terrible beauty of evil, and her notion that no evil harms God is also 
part of Augustine's schema: 'the restless and wicked [ ... ] even with them everything 
is beautiful, though they are vile. What injury have they done you?', Confessions, V, 
ii (2), p.72. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between good and evil in 
Augustine see John M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.256-289. 
30. Weil rightly identifies the paradoxical concept of a force of weakness as 
Christian, with the crucified Christ its supreme example. 'It is the Christian idea 
itself, and the Cross is the illustration of it. But it has to do with a force of quite a 
different kind from that wielded by the strong; it is a force that is not of this world, 
that is supernatural', and it is this divine element 'which alone renders the 
contradiction valid', separating it from secular versions of the concept such as 
Marxism. OL, pp.194-95. 
31. For a detailed analysis of Weil's distortion of Christian doctrine see Frenaud, 
O.S.B., pp.349-376. For an extensive examination of the relation between Christ's 
cross and Christian theology, see JOrgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross 
of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (Minneapolis, 
Minnesota: Fortress Press, 1974, 1991, 1993). 
32. See her essay 'Simone Weil'. in A Susan Sontag Reader (London: Penguin, 
1983), pp.91.92. 
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33. The Grotesque (London: Methuen, 1972), p.14. Further references to this edition 
are given after quotations in the text. 
34. American Gargoyles: Flannery 0 'Connor and the Medieval Grotesque 
(Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), p.100. 
Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
35. See Chris Baldick: 'a "monster" is something or someone to be shown. (Cf. 
Latin, monstrare; French, montrer; English, demonstrate.)" In Frankenstein's 
Shadow: Myth, Monstrosity, and Nineteenth-Century Writing (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press,1987),p.1O. 
36. Ibid., p.14. For exceIIent discussions of artistic, theological and biological 
interpretations. of monstrosity, see David Williams, Deformed Discourse: The 
Function of the Monster in Mediaeval Thought and Literature (Exeter: University of 
Exeter Press, 1996); and Leslie Fiedler, Freaks: Myths and Images of the Secret Self 
(London: Penguin, 1981). 
37. Baldick, p.18. The notion of unreason as a kind of intellectual and spiritual 
monstrosity is expressed in Saint Augustine's Literal Commentary on Genesis, IV, 
3.7. Proportion is required not only by the body but 'the dispositions and powers of 
the soul, whereby it is properly gathered in from the deformity of unwisdom to the 
form of wisdom'. Quoted in The Essential Augustine, selected by Vernon J. Bourke, 
2nd edn (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1974), p.l04. 
38. Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans. by Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed 
and Ward, 1958), p.18. The importance of the connection between deformity and 
the divine to O'Connor is evident in her marking of this passage (and those which 
immediately follow it in my text) in her own copy of Eliade's book. Quoted in 
Kinney, Library, p.77 
39. Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (New York: Meridian M8, 1955 (1953), 
p.126. See ibid., pp.20-21. 
40. O'Connor wrote this comment in the margin of her edition ofEJiade's Patterns 
in Comparative Religion, p.14. Quoted in ibid., p.77. 
41. MM, pp.226-27. O'Connor echoes Weil's acceptance of the suffering of the 
innocent here. Rayber's views on Bishop in The Violent Bear II Away present the 
opposite view. See Chapter Three for how both writers' theories of the connection 
between suffering and love provide interesting insights into O'Connor's novel. 
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42. Thomson, p.59. Wolfgang Kayser agrees the grotesque is identified by a 'fusion 
of spheres, the monstrous nature of ingredients, and the subversion of order and 
proportion which characterizes them', in The Grotesque in Art and Literature, trans. 
by Ulrich Weisstein (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), p.29. 
43. For a helpful analysis of the fantastic, its links to and differences from the 
grotesque see Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary 
Genre, trans. by Richard Howard (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1973, 1975). See also Rosemary Jackson, Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1981). 
44. On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), p.5. 
45. As Thomson notes, these secondary responses are psychologically interesting: 
'both involve rationalization and defence-mechanisms, suggesting that the grotesque 
[ ... J is hard to take, and that we tend to try to escape the discomfort it causes', 
Thomson, p.3. This uneasiness stems from the grotesque's powerful presentation of 
abnormality which is responsible 
perhaps more than anything else for the not infrequent condemnation 
of the grotesque as offensive and uncivilized, as an affront to decency 
and an outrage to "reality" and "normality" - or expressed in the less 
obviously moralistic language of aesthetic criticism, as tasteless and 
gratuitous distortion or forced, meaningless exaggeration. (Ibid., 
p.26) 
46. See Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny', in Art and Literature, ed. by Albert 
Dickson, trans. by Angela Richards, The Penguin Freud Library, 15 vols (London: 
Penguin, 1990), XIV, pp. 339-76. See also Jackson, pp.63-72 and Todorov, pp. 
41-57 on the 'uncanny', and also Mary Russo on the 'uncanny', Freud and Kayser, 
in her The Female Grotesque: Risk, Excess and Modernity (New York: Routledge, 
1995), pp.7-1O. 
47. According to Bakhtin, medieval and Renaissance culture was 'familiar with the 
element of terror only as represented by comic monsters, who were defeated by 
laughter', and such laughter 'is not an individual reaction to some isolated "comic" 
event. Carnival laughter is the laughter of all the people'. Bakhtin, Rabelais, p.39, 
p.ll. 
48. Ibid., p.16. This regenerative ambivalence is typical of the medieval fabiaux in 
which sacred and profane are interconnected. 'Religion takes on a bawdy 
dimension, but bawdiness takes on a religious dimension' , Di Renzo, p.80. 
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49. JUrgen Beyer, 'The Morality of the Amoral', The Humor of the Fabliaux: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Thomas D. Cooke and Benjamin 1. Honeycutt 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974), pp.l5-42 (p.37). Quoted in Di 
Renzo, p.80. 
50. The uncanny 'is undoubtedly related to what is frightening - to what arouses 
dread and horror', and 'is that class of frightening which leads back to what is 
known of old and long familiar'. The recurrence of this repressed knowledge is an 
important factor in experiencing the uncanny, which is 'in reality nothing new or 
alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which 
has become alienated if only through the process of repression'. Freud, 'The 
Uncanny', p.339, p.340, pp.363-64. 
51. 'The Grotesque in Recent Southern Fiction', in Patterns of Commitment in 
American Literature, ed. by Marston La France (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1967), pp.165-79 (p.165). 
52. For useful discussions of the history of the freak and its representation see 
Fiedler's Freaks passim, and Mary Russo, Chapter Three: 'Freaks, Freak Orlando, 
Orlando', pp.7S-106. On the female body as grotesque see Margaret R. Miles, 
Carnal Knowing: Female Nakedness and Religious Meaning in the Christian West 
(Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oates, 1989, 1992), pp.145-68. 
53. On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the 
Collection (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993), p.l09. Quoted in 
Russo, p.79. 
54. The subjectivity inherent in the classification of what is 'normal', what 
'freakish' ensures these terms are continually redefined and appropriated by 
different cultural groups. As Russo observes on the reappropriation of the term 
'freak' by the 1960's counter-culture: 'Anyone could march in some guise under the 
freak flag', ibid., p.76. 
55. The Scandal of Fabliaux (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.61. 
Quoted in Di Renzo, p.80. The scandalous nature of the fabliaux, as Di Renzo notes 
derives from their frequent 'use of theological language to talk about the body and 
its functions', the 'grotesqueness of this language challenges not only the way we 
perceive the body but the way we perceive theology. [ ... ] Theology is like 
pornography. God talk is body talk', ibid., p.8l. For a useful analysis of the links 
between the human body and theological discourse see Paula M. Cooey. Religious 
Imagination and the Body: A Feminist Analysis (New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1994. 
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56. William Van O'Connor cites this passage in Esprit's commemorative edition on 
Flannery O'Connor, 8.1 (1964), re-issued with additional material as Flannery 
o 'Connor: A Memorial, ed. by 1. 1. Quinn, S.l. (Scranton: University of Scranton 
Press, 1964, 1995), p.67. 
57. As I have already observed O'Connor's underlinings of Mircea Eliade's 
Patterns in Comparative Religion demonstrate her interest in the connection 
between familiar human deformity and the Otherness of the sacred. In his The 
Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. by Willard R. Trask (San 
Diego: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1987), Eliade analyses the forgetting or repression of 
religious knowledge and its unconscious resurfacing in secular man. The 'religious 
sense' has fallen 'into the depths of the unconscious; it has been "forgotten"" he 
argues, p.213. Non-religious man has lost the capacity to live a consciously religious 
life but 'in his deepest being, he still retains a memory of it', and 'continues to be 
haunted by the realities that he has refused and denied', ibid., p.213., p.204. 
Therefore 'profane man cannot help preserving some vestiges of the behaviour of 
religious man, though they are emptied of religious meaning', ibid., p.204. 
O'Connor apparently agrees with this point. While discussing the 'Christ-haunted', 
and the Death of God controversy, the collision between religious and secular 
senses, she notes that belief in God has 'gone underneath and come out in distorted 
forms' in Southern Fiction. See 'Recent Southern Fiction: A Panel Discussion', in 
CFO, pp.61-78 (p.72) (first pub!, in Bulletin of Wesleyan College, January 1961). 
Fear of the sacred Other, repression of religious knowledge, and its resurfacing in 
distorted, grotesque forms in secular man is demonstrated throughout O'Connor's 
two novels and the short stories. See O'Connor's fictional characters: Haze, Shiftlet, 
Hulga, Pointer, Francis Tarwater, Rayber et al. 
58. See for example the Misfit's dialogue with the grandmother in 'A Good Man Is 
Hard to Find' (1953), CS, pp.l31-132. 
59. See Hawkes, 'Flannery O'Connor's Devil' in Reiter, pp. 25-37 for an analysis of 
how in his view O'Connor employs 'the devWs voice as vehicle' for her satire or 
what may be termed her 'vision of our godless actuality', p.26. See also Brainard 
Cheney's refutation of Hawkes' position in 'Miss O'Connor Creates Unusual 
Humor Out of Ordinary Sin', Sewanee Review, 71 (1963),644-652. 
60. See for example the difference between Martha Stephens' disgusted response to 
O'Connor's use of the grotesque genre and the contrasting reaction of Anthony Di 
Renzo. Stephens: 'The point, I think is clear. Human beings are ugly in every way; 
the human form itself is distinctly unpleasant to behold; human life is a sordid, 
almost unrelievedly hideous affair'; which leads her to conclude: 'O'Connor's 
Christian faith was as grim and literalistic, as joyless and loveless a faith, at least as 
we confront it in her fiction, as we have ever seen in American letters - even, 
perhaps, in American theology', Stephens, p.l 0, p.4l. However Di Renzo finds both 
comedy and sanctity in the very ugliness which repells Stephens. 'For all its pain 
and horror' O'Connor's 'vision of the world remains comic. not tragic" he argues, 
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Di Renzo, p.161. She can joke about the human body, 'its bulk, its unwieldiness, its 
being subject to diease and decay, because to her it is holy even when it is ugly', and 
therefore he maintains human 'incongruity always serves a religious function in 
O'Connor's satire'. Ibid., p. 92, p.I22. 
61. '1 feel that ifI were not a Catholic I would have no reason to write, no reason to 
see, no reason ever to feel horrified or even to enjoy anything' she insists, HB, 
p.114. In a significantly preoccupied and defensive statement about her response to 
the monstrous reader O'Connor maintains: 
Some writers can ignore this presence, but 1 have never learned how. 
1 know that I must never let him affect my vision, must never let him 
gain contf(~l over my thinking, must never listen to his demands 
unless they accord with my conscience; yet I feel I must make him 
see what I have to show, even if my means of making him see have to 
be extreme. (Quoted in Feeley, p. 45) 
62. According to Paulson, 'her work encourages readers to laugh at themselves and 
thus to sympathize with her "prophet. freaks" by identifying with them', Short 
Fiction, p. x. Yet Andre Bleikasten maintains nothing 'suggests "spirituality": the 
word is too smooth, too polished, too blandly civilized to apply to the compulsions 
and convulsions of these savage souls', and wonders 'whether her Catholicism was 
not, to some extent, an alibi for misanthropy'. See his essay 'The Heresy of Flannery 
O'Connor', in Critical Essays on Flannery O'Connor, ed. by Melvin J. Friedman 
and Beverly Lyon Clark (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1985), pp.l38-58 (p. 144, p.142) (first 
publ. in Les Americanistes, ed. by Ira D. and Christine Johnson (Port Washington, 
New York: Kennikat Press, 1979), pp. 53-70). 
63. Isaac Rosenfeld considers Haze Motes 'is nothing more than the poor, sick, ugly, 
raving lunatic that he happens to be', in his review of Wise Blood, 'To Win by 
Default', New Republic, July 7 1952, 19·20 (p.l9). But Robert H. Brinkmeyer Jr. 
believes that 'in O'Connor's fiction, wounding and bodily hurt announce and make 
known the divine'. See his essay "'Jesus, Stab Me in the Heart!": Wise Blood, 
Wounding, and Sacramental Aesthetics', in KreyIing, pp.71-89 (p.85). 
64. NR, p.91. Weil believes this dissonance between mankind's physical and 
spiritual life is part of a wider problem in which science and religion are distanced 
from each other, and both of them are starved of truth. 'The modem phenomenon 
of irreligion among the population can be explained almost entirely by the 
incompatibility between science and religion' she claims, ibid. p. 248. 
The spirit of truth is almost absent from religion and from science 
and from the whole of thought. The appalling evils in the midst of 
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which we struggle, without even managing to understand quite how 
tragic they are, are due entirely to that. (Ibid.) 
This need to reconcile religion and science preoccupied Weil. See 'Fragments, 
London 1943' in OL, pp. 156-168 (p.168). 
65. However she is concerned with the effects of technological developments and 
materialism on society, which she considers part of the desacralisation process Wei! 
identifies. See O'Connor's vigorous response to the Life editorial 'Who speaks for 
America today?' in her essay 'The Fiction Writer and His Country'. Replying to the 
demand for a more positive literature to represent America's 'unparalleled 
prosperity' and status as 'the strongest nation in the world' she maintains both 
Christian and non-Christian writers: 
will begin to wonder at this point if there could not be some ugly 
correlation between our unparalleled prosperity and the stridency of 
these demands for a literature that shows us the joy of life. He may at 
least be permitted to ask if these screams for joy would be quite so 
piercing if joy were really more abundant in our prosperous society. 
(MM,p.30) 
66. NR, p.32. The other needs of the soul she identifies are order, liberty, obedience, 
responsibility, equality, hierarchism. honour, punishment. freedom of opinion, 
security, private property, collective property. and truth. See Weil's analysis of these 
needs in ibid., pp.3-38. Note the typical balancing of contraries, which Wei! 
acknowledges as vital: 
Needs are arranged in antithetical pairs and have to combine together 
to form a balance. Man requires food, but also an interval between 
his meals; he requires warmth and coolness. rest and exercise. Like 
wise in the case of the soul's needs. (ibid., p. 12). 
67. See my analysis ofWeil's concept of God's compulsion on the soul. and how it 
offers valuable insights into O'Connor's theology and readings of The Violent Bear 
It Away in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
68. O'Connor's concept of complex, conflicting free willes) is distinctively 
Augustinian. Augustine's thought is based on the dualities of spiritlbody, grace/sin, 
God/man, earthly/spiritual cities. See his Confessions Book VIII: 'my two wills, one 
old, the other new, one carnal, the other spiritual, were in conflict with one another, 
and their discord robbed my soul of all concentration'; and his conclusion that 'in 
the process of deliberation a single soul is wavering between different wills'. (10) 
and (23), in Confessions, pp. 140, p.149. 
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69. O'Connor's belief in the uses of sin as an instigator or preparation for grace and 
revelation are apparent if not convincingly rendered throughout her fictional 
narratives. See Manley Pointer's theft of Joy/Hulga Hopewell's leg, Francis 
Tarwater as murderer of Bishop and victim of homosexual rape, CS, pp. 289-291, 
VB, pp.214-216, ibid., pp.230-232. In considering immorality can have a 
paradoxically moral result O'Connor is distinctively Catholic. See Hardon: 'God 
penn its evils in order that he may bring good out of them. Take away all evil and 
much good would go with it', Catechism, p.81. This notion of the utility of evils is 
linked to the Catholic concept of Providence. St. Thomas Aquinas explains this 
connection in his Summa Contra Gentiles Chapter LXXI: 
If evil where taken away from certain parts of the universe, the 
perfection of the universe would be much diminished, since its 
beauty results from the ordered unity of good and evil things seeing 
that evil arises from the failure of the good, and yet certain goods are 
occasioned from those very evils through the providence of the 
govenor, even as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant. 
Therefore, evil should not be excluded from things by the divine 
providence. 
Quoted in Nelson Pike, 'Hume on Evil' in Adams, The Problem of Evil, pp.38-52 
(pAS) (first publ. in The Philosophical Review, 72 (1963), pp.180-197). 
70. lIB, p.199. Adopting a kind of Weilean hierarchy of evils in a letter to John 
Hawkes O'Connor distinguishes between different types of devils. 'He's one of 
those devils who go about piercing pretensions, not the devil who goes about like a 
roaring lion seeking whom he may devour. There is a hierarchy of devils surely' 
(CW 1151). 
71. When discussing Joy-Hulga in a letter to 'N (24 August 1956), O'Connor insists 
that she shares Allen Tate's assessment of her fictional character as a 'maimed 
soul': 'I stick neither with you nor with that gent here but with Mr Allen Tate. A 
maimed soul is a maimed soul'. HB, p. 171. 
72. An important way in which Pointer reveals Joy-Hulga is not unique is through 
his own cliched nihilism, when he responds to her bitter accusation that he is a 
Christian hypocrite. As Asals notes: 
if the values here are the nihilistic ones the girl has professed, the 
idiom is the folk cliche so dear to Mrs Hopewell, and the wedding of 
the two exposes with resonant finality how closely identified mother 
and daughter in truth are. (Imagination, p.53) 
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Fred R Thiemann agrees, observing that Joy-Hulga 'suffers the additional 
humiliation of being shown how close her language and thought are to her mother's 
simplistic views, which she has despised'. See Thiemann, p.53, 
73. See 'Flannery O'Connor, Martin Heidegger, and Modern Nihilism: A Reading of 
"Good Country People"', FOCB, 21 (1992), 100-18 (p.113, p.114). 
74. In 'Protagonists and Antagonists in the Fiction of Flannery O'Connor', Southern 
Literary Journal, 20.2 (1988), 99-111 (p.l06) 
75. See 'Courtly Love' in Cuddon, pp.202-04. 
76. This is primarily due to the fact that as Melvin J. Friedman argues, 'O'Connor is 
always patient enough to explain the source of the moral, physical or spiritual 
discomfort and has a way of building her story upon it [ ... ] the grotesqueness and 
oddity of character are not suspended in a vacuum'. See his 'Introduction', in 
Friedman and Lawson, pp.I-31 (p.17). The ambiguity this generates makes 
O'Connor's attempt to Mite specifically Christian truths on the souls of her readers 
more difficult. For example, 'Good Country People' supplies fertile ground for 
psychological interpretations, and as Inez Martinez notes when discussing her own 
reading of the story: 'a psychological perspective can free readers from acceding to 
particular religious interpretations, such as the idea that God's grace is carried 
through symbolic rape'. See her article 'Flannery O'Connor and the Hidden Struggle 
of the SeW, FOCB, 16 (1987), 52-59 (p.59). For a helpful survey of the major 
critical responses applicable to O'Connor's fictions, including interpretations of the 
characters in 'Good Country People' and 'The Life You Save May Be Your Own', 
see Morrow Paulson, pp.151.223. 
77. In Fiction of the Modern Grotesque (London: Macmillan, 1989), p.139. 
78. Bacon argues that O'Connor was herself intent on suggesting more than a 
Christian reading in this narrative. 'O'Connor does make a political statement with 
this story, though in the form of political allegory', he claims, '''Good Country 
People" translates the debate between O'Connor and the author of the Life editorial 
into the struggle between the characters of Joy·Hulga and her mother'. See Bacon, 
pp. 46-60 (p. 54, p. 46). 
79. See my previous discussion of Weil's concept of the need for roots and its 
connection to the disparity she perceives between religion and science. Weil's 
comments on contemporary man's alienation from the natural world and desire for 
material gain are especially relevant to the character of Shiftlet, and his concept of 
what a man is, and what a man is made for. According to Weil, in a culture 'very 
strongly directed towards and influenced by technical science', man is 'entirely 
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deprived both of contact with this world and, at the same time, of any window 
opening on to the world beyond' (NR 43). In a society in which 'piece-work obliges 
each workman to have his attention continually taken up with the subject of his pay' 
the 'disease of uprootedness is most acute', and one of the 'major poisons at work 
spreading this disease' is money (42, 43, 42). 'Money destroys human roots 
wherever it is able to penetrate, by turning desire for gain into the sole motive. It 
easily manages to outweigh all other motives' (42). 
80. See Charles M. Hegarty, S.J., 'A Man Though Not Yet A Whole One: Mr 
Shiftlet's Genesis', FOCB, 1 (1972), 19-30 (p. 29), and M. Bemetta Quinn, O.S.F., 
'Flannery O'Connor, a Realist of Distances" in Friedman and Lawson, pp.157-183 
(p.170). 
81. In Flannery O'Connor: A Critical Essay (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1966), p. 23. 
82. Jacques Maritain contends that the two conditions necessary to religious art are 
first, it must be intelligible: it is there above all/or the instruction o/the people, it is 
a theology in graphic representation'. Second, the 'work must be finished [ ... ] It is 
in the highest degree fitting that nothing shall enter the house of God but work 
which is well done, accomplished, clean, permanent and honest'. In Art and 
Scholasticism, p. 144. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DARK AND DISRUPTIVE GRACE; 
SPIRITUAL MECHANICS AND THE VIOLENT SEED 
Critical of the inability of her monstrous readers to develop the anagogical vision 
which would enable them to see profound spiritual levels beyond the surface of her 
grotesque texts, Flannery O'Connor complains 'what you find is a misunderstanding 
of what the operation of grace can look like in fiction. The reader wants his grace 
warm and binding, not dark and disruptive' (CW 862). In her second novel, The 
Violent Bear It Away, O'Connor attempts to convey this type of grace, asking her 
readers to believe that arson, child murder, and homosexual rape prepare Francis 
Marion Tarwater to recognise and accept a climactic moment when grace is 
proffered to him, and consent to his prophetic mission. Commenting on the 
controversial rape scene, she insists in her narratives that the action of grace is 
prepared for by the intensity of the evil which precedes it. 'It is the violation in the 
woods that brings home to Tarwater the real nature of his rejection. I couldn't have 
brought off the final vision without it' (HB 368). Simone Weil shares O'Connor's 
vision of dark and disruptive grace, and uses parallel imagery to express it. 'Death 
and rape - two metaphors for describing the action of the Holy Spirit on the soul' 
she claims (NB 390). 'If our present suffering ever leads to a [moral] revival', Weil 
writes in her essay 'The Responsibility of Writers'; 'this will not be brought about 
through slogans but in silence and moral loneliness, through pain, misery, and terror, 
in the profoundest depths of each man's spirit' (SWR 289). 
My discussion of Weil and O'Connor's concepts of the nature of God, reality, and 
man in Chapter Two demonstrated how each writer considers that the horrors of 
necessity and the human condition do not preclude the existence of a good and 
merciful God. Chapter One established how both writers maintain the linkage of the 
apparent contraries of violence, affliction and grace is vital if narratives are to 
successfully write spiritual truths on the soul. In this chapter I will bring together 
and expand on the issues discussed previously by interrogating first, how each writer 
considers a relationship, specifically an explicit encounter between the 
incommensurates of God and man is possible, primarily through violent grace. 
Second, by analysing the language, imagery, symbolism and narrative forms used by 
Wei! and O'Connor to express this concept, especially their use of the biblical 
parable of the sower, I will investigate how successfully they manage to write these 
ideas on the souls of their audience. My reading of The Violent Bear It Away will 
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also analyse to what extent WeWs final criteria for texts of genius are achieved: 
whether O'Connor's violent grace successfully prepares fictional character and her 
monstrous readers for brief moments of epiphany in which men find their souls. 
Finally, Tarwater's wrestling with his prophetic vocation within the text will be 
compared to O'Connor's mission as writer-prophet. 
However before beginning my comparative study of how Weil and O'Connor 
consider an encounter between God and man is possible through the action of grace, 
it is important to briefly analyse the concept of theological 'grace' and my own 
terminology regarding it. I use the term 'grace' restricted to its Christian, New 
Testament sense of God's gratuitous self-communication of himself to man, which 
enables a relationship between them, by permitting a transformation, or deification 
of humanity. Grace: 'consists of God giving himself to men, so that they can know 
him and love him, so entering into a relationship with him which totally exceeds the 
relationship of creature to Creator, and is therefore totally undeserved'. 1 At the core 
of Christian theology, grace is an extremely complex concept, and is inter-connected 
with seven significant notions of how the incommensurates of God and man are 
reconciled.2 To understand both the Christian theory of grace and how Weil and 
O'Connor's concepts relate to it, it is necessary to provide a concise explication of 
these seven areas of Christian theology. 
First, 'justification': if sinful man is to be reunited with God after the Fall and the 
original sin which resulted from it, man must be made just. This justification is 
made possible by second, the 'redemption', in which God's compassion for sinful 
man ensured humanity was rescued, or literally bOUght back from the bondage of sin 
into the grace of God through Christ's Incarnation and crucifixion. Justification 
makes possible third, 'sanctification': 'the state of holiness by reason of the 
presence of God within oneself (CatholiCism, 250). Sanctification allows humanity 
to progress towards fourth. its 'salvation': mankind's ultimate reunification with 
God after death. 'To be saved is to be "made whole" and etemal1y united with God 
and one another in God' (12S0). Linked to this progression from sin to salvation are 
the notions of 'conversion', 'revelation', and 'prophecy'. Conversion is the 
'fundamental change of heart (metanoia) by which a person turns away from a 
former mode of life and accepts Jesus as the Christ and orients his or her whole life 
around Christ and the Kingdom of God,.3 Revelation, as 'the disclosure of what 
was previously unknown, or only uncertainly apprehended' is in theological terms 
the action by which God makes 'known hidden aspects of the character of God, of 
humanity in its relationship with God and of what is to occur in the future through 
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the providence of God,.4 This unveiling of God's purpose to man is connected to 
prophecy, which 
is a kind of communication from the world of the supernatural to the 
world of the human. It presumes that these two worlds are quite 
distinct and separate from each other and require some kind of 
intermediary to bring them together. 5 
While these seven concepts form the essential framework within which Christianity 
conceives the relationship between man and God operates, because Weil and 
O'Connor's theologies demonstrate both Catholic and Protestant features, it is 
necessary briefly to point out the most significant distinction between Catholic and 
Protestant approaches to the nature/grace relationship. 6 
Specifically Catholic doctrines of grace derive predominantly from St. Augustine's 
response to Pelagianism, the doctrine in which human nature is considered sufficient 
to acquire salvation itself, without the further gift of God's grace.7 Augustine's 
reply stressed man's depravity due to original sin, and need for gratuitous grace to 
achieve justification and salvation. 8 But although Augustine considers both the offer 
of grace and its operation within the sinner is reliant on God not man, he does 
believe after man's initial conversion he is permitted to cooperate with God in the 
soul's progression towards salvation. 
Having achieved the conversion of the sinner, God now collaborates 
with the renewed human will in achieving regeneration and growth in 
holiness. Having liberated the human will from its bondage to sin, 
God is now able to cooperate with that liberated will (McGrath, 
Introduction, 379) 
Augustine understood 'grace as the real and redeeming presence of God in Christ 
within us, transforming us; something that was internal and active' (375-376), and 
St. Thomas Aquinas develops this notion of grace as both God in man and man's 
cooperation with God, in his theories of 'actual' and 'habitual grace', and the axiom 
very influential to Catholic doctrines of grace: 'Grace builds on nature'. 9 
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The Protestant position on the nature/grace connection differs from its Catholic 
counterpart in two ways. First, it places more stress on the human corruption caused 
by sin. According to McBrien, Protestantism 'so emphasized the depravity of the 
natural human condition apart from the grace of God that the natural order could 
only be viewed in thoroughly negative terms' (Catholicism, 169). Consequently 
second, Protestantism emphasises that justification is entirely due to God - the 
passive acceptance of a gift that is external to man's nature, rather than a process in 
which an internal righteousness allows humanity to cooperate with grace through 
good works and sacraments. 1 0 
Luther insists that God provides everything necessary for 
justification, so that all that the sinner needs to do is to receive it. 
God is active and humans are passive [ ... ] even faith itself is a gift of 
God, rather than a human action. God himself meets the precondition 
for justification. (McGrath, Introduction, 385) 
Unmediated faith, rather than human actions and Church dogma is vital to 
Protestant ideas of how man's relationship with God - a radical union between 
believer and Christ - and ultimately humanity'S salvation, is achieved. I I 
The central concern of We iI's mystical philosophy is to enquire how a relationship 
between the contraries of God and man can be forged, and constitutes part of her 
immense struggle to understand and actualise the connection she believes exists 
between the natural and supernatural realms, the necessary and the good, gravity and 
grace. 'Harmony is the union of opposites. The primary pair of opposites, and the 
one between which lies the most unfathomable gulf, is that separating the Creator 
from the creature' she observes (NB 460). It is the enormity of this distance which 
ensures that contact between God and man is only effectively possible by God's 
gratuitous grace. 
The infinity of space and time separates us from God. How can we 
seek for him? How can we go towards him? Even if we were to walk 
for endless centuries we should do no more than go round and round 
the world. Even in an aeroplane we could do nothing else. We are 
incapable of progressing vertically. We cannot take one step towards 
the heavens. God crosses the universe and comes to us. (SWR 450) 
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Man's soul is subject to moral forces derived from, and equivalent to, those of 
physical necessity, unless grace intervenes to alter the equation. 'The wretchedness 
of our condition subjects human nature to a moral fonn of gravity that is constantly 
pulling it downwards. towards evil, towards a total submission to force'. she arsues 
(OL 166-167). 'All the natural movements of the soul are controlled by laws 
analogous to those of physical gravity. Grace is the only exception' (GG 1). But 
although humanity is reliant on God's grace to achieve a higher level of being and 
make contact with the divine, Weil insists human action is also required. Man's 
primary effort should be to locate, understand, and use the bridges, or metaxu, 
which God has pennitted to span the breach between himself and mankind. 12 
Her core concept of the metaxu is essential to understanding how she attempts to 
reconcile the contraries of God and man, but what exactly are these mediators? 
Above all seeking 'bridges to relate human misery and divine perfection' (Ie 75), 
like her beloved ancient Greeks, Weil considers art, poetry, philosophy, and the 
sciences (when as we saw in Chapter One they are divinely inspired to levels of 
genius) constitute structures which lessen the distance between the sacred and 
profane. But she claims unlike the Greeks, modem man no longer conceives how to 
use these cultural causeways. 'We have erected skyscrapers on them to which we 
ceaselessly add storeys. We no longer know that they are bridges. things made so 
that we may pass along them, and that by passing along them we go towards God' 
(GG 132-133). However Wei! considers the arts and sciences constitute only a small 
portion of the metaxu available to humanity. Demonstrating her profound 
sacramentalism. she contends 'there is 'not any department of human life which is 
purely natural. The supernatural is secretly present throughout', and consequently 
'the essence of created things is to be intennediaries' (WFG 175, NB 496). 
Paradoxically this 'world is the closed door. It is a barrier, and at the same time it is 
the passageway' (492). 
The universe in its entirety is a metaxu. In addition to its imposition of necessity 
and amiction on man - which are themselves crucial metaxu, allowing the 
opportunity to perceive and achieve links between mankind and God's love - the 
physical world also operates as a bridge by providing a focus for humanity's implicit 
love of God. This is important because the implicit love of God itself affords the 
opportunity to prepare for the explicit contact with God that violent grace provides. 
In her important essay 'Fonns of the Implicit Love of God', Wei! maintains it is 
impossible for the soul to love God before any direct contact with the divine has 
been achieved, and therefore the soul's love is motivated towards the three major 
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metaxus in this world in which God is secretly present. These are loves of religious 
ceremonies, other human beings, and the combined order and beauty of the world, 
and when attained, each 'has the virtue of a sacrament' (138). Destined eventually to 
become the explicit love of God, irrational love is their common denominator, 
because grace operates beyond human reason. 
These kinds of love are supernatural, and in a sense they are absurd. 
They are the height of folly. So long as the soul has not had direct 
contact with the very person of God, they cannot be supported by any 
knowledge based on experience or reason. They cannot therefore rest 
on any certainty'. (209) 
This phenomenon is demonstrated in religious rites such as the Christian sacrament 
of the Eucharist. The notion that God is present in a piece of bread is rationally 
ridiculous. Yet because certain religious practices such as the Eucharist are 
'conventions' ratified by God, they function on superposed levels which combine 
both the natural and supernatural. 13 As 'special tangible things, existing here below 
and yet perfectly pure', they are both 'unconditioned and perfect, and at the same 
time real' (186, 187). Therefore although they remain ultimately incomprehensible 
and mysterious, it is possible to approach religious mysteries through intensive 
intellectual attention, which in WeWs schema is synonymous with prayer. 14 'One 
might in a sense say by analogy that Christ is present in the consecrated host by 
hypothesis, in the same way that a geometrician says by hypothesis that there are 
two equal angles in a certain triangle', Wei! concludes (188). Moreover, by 
concentrating intently on something tangible which is also perfectly pure - the host, 
the words of the liturgy, or the prayer 'Our Father' - it becomes possible for man 'by 
a process of transference, to destroy a part of the evil that is in him' (189). The 
attention devoted to such religious conventions is therefore salvific, imitating in 
miniature Christ's redemptive crucifixion, which transferred the burden of 
humanity'S sin to the cross in order to absorb it. 
God is 'the reality inspiring all indirect loves, the reality of which they are as it were 
reflections' according to Wei! (213), and man's love for his neighbour is the 
mirror-image of God's love for his creatures. By giving his attention to what did not 
previously exist God, created mankind, and analogously, man's love for other 
human beings is comprised of this same type of 'creative attention' (149). 
lllustrating this idea by referring to the Good Samaritan parable, Wei! maintains that 
the afflicted individual lying by the roadside is actually devoid of humanity, and 
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therefore when the Samaritan focuses his attention on this person, it amounts to a 
creative affirmation of the stranger's existence. Believing the sympathy of the strong 
for the weak is unnatural, she consequently considers man's love for his neighbour 
is supernatural. As I noted previously when discussing Weil's concept of affliction, 
such a love involves a degree of self-loss which constitutes a redemptive act that 
imitates Christ's sacrifice on the cross. Weil's notion of friendship, conceived as 
another type of man's love of his neighbour, is based on a similar supernatural 
balance and union of opposites, but in this instance she takes the Trinity as her 
paradigm. Quoting Christ's 'Where there are two or three gathered together in my 
name there am I in the midst of them', Weil interprets pure human friendship as an 
image of 'the original and perfect friendship that belongs to the Trinity and is the 
very essence of God' (208). The combination of personal and impersonal, one and 
many that comprises both the Trinity and friendship, resembles the parity achieved 
by charitable love between subordination and equality, necessity and liberty. IS 
Love of the order and beauty of the world is analogous to the love between humans 
expressed in friendship and the love of our afflicted neighbour, because it is also 
founded on a self-abnegation which has positive results. I6 This 'creative 
renunciation' (158), is the complement of the creative attention with which both 
God produces, and humanity affirms the existence of what is Other. WeB's 
absence/presence creation theory combines with her theory of man's egocentric 
fictionality here. God provides man with the capacity to freely renounce his 
imaginary, ersatz divinity, imitating God's own voluntary renunciation of self in 
creating the cosmos, and permitting humanity's autonomy. 'In a sense God 
renounces being everything. We should renounce being something. That is our only 
good' Weil contends (GG 29). The impact of necessity on human life is not 
lessened by this action, but mankind has the facility to transform its relationship 
with the universe from a negative into a positive spiritual experience. 'The beauty of 
the world is not an attribute of matter in itself. It is a relationship of the world to our 
sensibility, the sensibility that depends on the structure of our body and our soul' 
(164). Deciding to love the very force which inflicts agonising affliction, and 
reinforcing the autonomy of other human beings amount to self-destructive loves 
that are absurd yet also divine, and which, 'if they are sufficiently strong and pure, 
will be enough to raise the soul to any height' (182). 
By demonstrating how attention, consent to affliction and self-loss can act as 
leverage towards grace, the implicit loves provide evidence of what Weil terms 
'spiritual mechanics', whose 'supernatural mechanisms are at least as dependable as 
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are the laws of gravity' (FLN 287, NR 252). This notion is crucial to understanding 
how Weil conceives that a relationship between God and man is possible, as 
spiritual mechanics constitutes an umbrella term which covers several of her core 
metaxu, that can usefully be divided into two groupings. First, the paradoxical 
concepts which are all based on Weil's pivotal use of logos aJogos and positive 
inversion: passive activity, and negative virtue, experience of void considered as 
plenitude, and loss of self or decreation as ultimate being. Second, and 
interconnected with these states, Weil's concept of grace as a seed which is sown in 
the soul as a trap by which the individual is able to make explicit contact with God, 
almost in spite of his will rather than because of it. 
Both these two groups of ideas are based on Weil's premise that the 'strictly 
scientific study of supernatural mechanisms' is possible, because 'the mechanism of 
this world' is 'a reflection of the supernatural mechanism' (NR 252, 90). 
Consequently, just as the natural world is subject to rigorous laws of necessity 
dominated by gravity - this action will inevitably generate this result unless grace 
intervenes - so is the interior mechanism of the human soul. When grace enters the 
soul it works via laws analogous to natural necessity but they operate inversely. So 
paradoxically, to 'lower oneself is to rise in the domain of moral gravity. Moral 
gravity makes us fall toward the heights,)7 I will now analyse Weil's concept of 
this 'supernatural physics of the human soul' (NR 254), by first, examining her 
theories of passive activity and negative virtue. 
The very idea that the soul operates mechanistically is problematic, and seems to 
compromise Weil's concept of human liberty. As I have already argued, her work 
displays a consistent conflict between an acceptance of the reality of man's free 
will, and a parallel attraction to determinism. However, in the distinction she makes 
between human will, and its superior counterpart of 'passive activity' (WFG 194), 
Weil goes some way towards explaining her apparently contradictory concept of 
human freedom. The first is required to respond to specific obligations and has a 
minor role in the redemptive process, while the latter is vital to salvation. 'The will 
is on the level of the natural part of the soul. The right use of the will is a condition 
of salvation, necessary no doubt but remote, inferior, very subordinate and purely 
negative', she insists (WFG 193). Despite this apparently reductive idea of free will, 
Wei! is actually not denying its efficacy, but typically. redefining it in her own 
terms. Her demand for a rigorously accurate vocabulary that can effectively, and 
truthfully represent the relationship between mankind and God is evident in Weil's 
clarification of what 'will' actually means. The word is totally inappropriate for the 
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concept it purports to represent, because 'what Janguage designates as will is 
something suggestive of muscular effort', she argues, while the 'effort that brings a 
soul to salvation is like the effort oflooking or of listening' (193). 
Such passive activity is vital to the endurance of inconsolable affliction and the 
experience of a void that it induces, and requires concentrated obedience rather than 
frenetic human action: 'there is only waiting, attention, silence, immobility, constant 
through suffering and joy' (194). Waiting patiently. with a supremely focussed 
attention on, and desire for, God is the catalyst which 'draws God down', Weil 
claims (111). Rejecting the traditional Christian metaphor of a search for God 
because it suggests 'efforts of muscular will'. she insists that her outwardly inactive 
counterpart - 'waiting for goodness and truth' - is actually 'something more intense 
than any searching'. 18 Yet she uses a traditional Christian analogy - bread as the 
body of Christ and eternal life - to represent this passive activity. 'A conception of 
the relationship between grace and desire. The conviction that had come to me was 
that when one hungers for bread one does not receive stones'. 19 Ultimately it is this 
kind of passive activity and intensive desire, not muscular will, that is redemptive. 
There are people who try to raise their souls like a man continually 
taking standing jumps in the hopes that, ifhejumps higher every day, 
a time may come when he will no longer fall back but will go right 
up to the sky [ ... ] We cannot take a single step toward heaven. It is 
not in our power to travel in a vertical direction. If however we look 
heavenward for a long time, God comes and takes us up. He raises us 
easily. (194) 
According to Weil there 'is an easiness in salvation which is more difficult to us 
than all our efforts', and it is her stress on the importance of passive activity as an 
instigator of supernatural intervention which leads her to maintain that 'true virtue 
in every domain is negative, at least in appearance' (197). This concept of negative 
virtue does not deny the importance of human virtues, charitable actions which in 
fact train the soul to orientate itself to the highest level of its architecture: 
supernatural love and intensive contemplation. But once again it displays her 
disturbing tendency to justify the diminution of human liberty for the greater good 
which she considers only achievable through God's compulsion on, and place in the 
soul. Those who accomplish virtuous actions are unable to do otherwise, because of 
the supernatural love within them. 'Good achieved in this way, almost in spite of 
ourselves, almost shamefacedly and apologetically is pure. All absolutely pure 
204 
goodness completely eludes the will. Good is transcendent. God is goodness' (GG 
40). Negative virtues provide further evidence of the supernatural physics of the soul 
because they are the result of acting 'not on behalf of a certain object, but as a result 
of a certain necessity. I am unable to do otherwise. This is not action. hut a sort of 
passivity. Non-active action' (NB 124). 
The logos alogos of passive activity, negative virtue, and (un)free will, lead to the 
most paradoxical elements of Weil's spiritual mechanics: void and decreation. True 
to her theory of the inverted nature of spiritual mechanisms, Weil's concept of 
void is paradoxically at the core of her metaphysics, the central point at which the 
seed of violent grace and decreation as ultimate being intersect. It is consent to the 
experience of void which enables the climactic encounter in which the soul breaks 
free from natural gravity and makes explicit contact with God. According to Weil 
man only escapes from the laws of this world in lightening flashes. 
Instants when everything stands still. instants of contemplation, of 
pure intuition, of mental void, of acceptance of the moral void. It is 
through such instants that he is capable of the supernatural. (GO 11) 
It is violent grace that creates these gaps which interrupt the mechanism of physical 
necessity. 'Grace fills empty spaces but it can only enter where there is a void to 
receive it', WeiI claims, 'and it is grace itself which makes this void' (10). This is a 
traumatic procedure in which 'there must first of all be a tearing asunder, 
something of a desperate nature, so that a void may first of all be produced' (NB 
135). I will interrogate how the violent seed of grace makes this possible later. But 
at this juncture it is important to clarify Weil' s concept of void and how it relates to 
both spiritual and human mechanics.20 
Man's consent to a void within himself is a more extreme version of the element of 
self-loss which charitable actions require, and is like them supernatural, because it 
refuses the normal human inclination to demand a recompense for energy expended, 
or vengeance for hanns suffered. 'The acceptance of a void in oneself is a 
supernatural thing. Where find the energy for an act without any counterpart? The 
energy has to come from elsewhere' Weil argues (135). Not exercising all the power 
at one's disposal is 'contrary to all the laws of nature. Grace alone can do it' (GO 
10). But the 'desire for equilibrium' (6), which dominates human mechanics leads to 
attempts to fill voids. This phenomenon is seen in the afflicted, who try to equalise 
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their agony by communicating it to others: 'either by ill-treating another or by 
provoking pity' (NB 122). This desire to escape the experience of void is the 
primary cause of immorality. 'It is the void which makes men capable of sin', Weil 
maintains, 'all sins are attempts to fill voids' (GG 21). Fictionality is the greatest sin 
and leads to all others, because the egocentric imagination 'is continually at work 
filling up all the fissures through which grace might pass' (16). As the most 
damaging attempt to find equilibrium on a human rather than spiritual level, being 
fictional offers erroneous consolations which prevent the soul experiencing the 
reality of its profound limitation, the bitter' dark night' which is the first stage in the 
soul's spiritual regeneration.21 
Interestingly Weil merges her unusual technological metaphors for spiritual realities 
with classic mystical imagery here. In addition to conceiving her concept of void as 
a dark night of the soul she borrows the notion of spiritual nakedness from the 
mystics,22 to describe how it is imperative that man fully recognises the reality of 
his creaturely status by being denied all consolations for affliction and void. Weil's 
proximity to the mystics, her preoccupation with how to attain direct contact with 
God largely unmediated by institutional religion, is demonstrated by the fact that 
her refusal of all mitigation includes denying Christianity's traditional solaces for 
the horrors of human life. She acknowledges that the soul understandably flees its 
dark night, and 'a desperate revolt' follows (137), in which man's imagination 
attempts to occupy the vacuum with illusory beliefs that dilute the void's horrifying 
reality. But Wei! insists humanity 
must leave on one side the beliefs which fill up voids and sweeten 
what is bitter. The belief in immortality. The belief in the utility of 
sin: etiam peccata. The belief in the providential ordering of events • 
in short the 'consolations' which are ordinarily sought in religion. 
(GG13) 
Yet although she is adamant that the 'fathomless bitterness' of the void must be 
endured entirely without consolation (FLN 159), what appears a monstrously 
nihilistic creed does provide some scope for optimism if Weil's concept of 
superposed vision is applied to her ideas here. As my examination of other areas of 
Weil's metaphysical philosophy has shown, what often appears at first sight to be 
. extreme negativity is frequently only one facet of a larger, more positive whole, 
providing we perceive how each dimension of her thought is connected and indeed 
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interdependent. In this instance, a vital change of perspective can transform the 
void's incalculable vacuity into a conception of it as 'supreme plenitude' (161), and 
equilibrium is thus achieved on a different, supernatural plane. Wei! insists 'the void 
serves for nothing except grace' (159). and when considered as a vehicle for divine 
assistance rather than a vindictive Nemesis, experience of void becomes one of her 
most crucial metaxu, a bridge between humanity and God, rather than a chasm that 
separates them. 
Weil's interrelated notion of decreation is intended to operate on an equivalent 
principle but due to its more intense offensiveness to concepts of human autonomy, 
is even harder to accept than her theory of void. Experience of affliction and void 
coerces man into an agonising awareness of his essential fragility and constrained 
status. But despite his vulnerability, Weil believes man's endemic fictionality 
manages to construct a barrier preventing God from making contact with himself -
the supernatural part of the human soul which is divine. This overemphasis on 
mankind's depravity yet the contradictory idea that God is present in a portion of the 
soul, leads to an appallingly narcissistic concept of God, and a reductive view of 
man. 
God can only love himself. His love for us is love for himself through 
us [ ... ] Our existence is made up only of his waiting for our 
acceptance not to exist. He is perpetually begging from us that 
existence which he gives. He gives it to us in order to beg it from us. 
(GG 28) 
It is this warped view of human autonomy which leads Weil to consider 
annihilation, the virtue of non-being, to be humanity's most positive act.23 The 
ultimate negative virtue and passive activity is completely to cease to be. Man is 
annihilated 'in God which confers the fulness of being upon the creature so 
annihilated, a fulness which is denied it so long as it goes on existing' (NB 471). 
The soul's reward for consenting to the intensely traumatic suffering of affliction, 
void, and decreation is a brilliant, but merely momentary epiphany. The 'instant of 
death is the center and object of life' Wei! argues, 'for those who live as they 
should, it is the instant when, for an infinitesimal fraction of time, pure truth, naked, 
certain, and eternal enters the soul' (WFG 63), before it is totally annihilated. This is 
characteristically a more severe version of the Christian concept of a beatific vision 
at the instant of death in which individuality is preserved, and the justified soul's 
reward is to see God 'face to face' as St. Paul tenns it.24 In Weil's notion of an 
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explicit encounter with the divine, 'the soul must finally cease to be, through total 
assimilation to God' (FLN 310). 
As disturbing and problematic as this vision of the human/divine encounter is 
Wei!' s indistinct terminology on such a crucial element of her theology as the 
salvation of the soul. Although she contends that the individual soul is completely 
exterminated through the process of decreation, WeiI attempts to differentiate 
between decreation and destruction. 'Decreation: to make something created pass 
into the uncreated. Destruction: to make something created pass into nothingness. A 
blameworthy substitute for decreation' (00 28). But this intended distinction 
between 'nothingness' and its superior counterpart of 'uncreation' is blurred when 
Weil describes this state of nothingness as itself divisible into either ultimate being 
or total loss. Considering the highest attainment available to the soul is to become 
part of pure good, Wei! argues that 'in that nothingness which is at the limit of good 
we shall be more real than at any moment of our earthly life. Whereas the 
nothingness which is at the limit of evil is without reality' (FLN 311). She permits a 
limited amount of free will in the soul's ultimate transformation into non-existence, 
offering a type of fundamentalist choice 'between travelling towards nothingness 
through more and more good or through more and more evil' (310). In a Weilean 
version of the salvation/damnation divide, she contends 'it is not a matter of 
indifference whether one arrives at nothingness through good or through evil. On the 
contrary, it is the only thing that matters and everything else is indifferent' .25 But 
despite this discrimination, even the most successful soul's remuneration for a 
lifetime of enduring the horrors of necessity consists of being merely a positive 
rather than a negative type of nothingness. Consequently the type of nihilistic 
salvation envisaged by Weil, the monstrously high price she demands for it, and the 
seriously restricted nature of human liberty make the validity of this advanced 
example of negative virtue extremely difficult to accept. 
If Weil's theories of void and decreation are problematic, so is her concept of the 
action of grace which leads to these states. because it too relies on the idea that 
union with God requires violent loss of self and limited free will. Her concept of 
spiritual mechanics is founded on the notion that it is vital to let 
that which is base in us go to the bottom in order that that which is 
noble in us may go to the top. For we are reversed beings. We are 
born like this. Re-establishing order means unmaking the creature in 
us. (NB 241) 
208 
Because humanity lives in this 'inverted fashion', the first stage in its spiritual 
renewal 'is one of reversal- Conversion', according to Weil (GG 30). The catalyst 
for this change of direction, and potential salvation is the operation of grace within 
man In Letter to A Priest, Weil maintains salvation is not possible without 'a "new 
birth", without an inward illumination, without the presence of Christ and of the 
Holy Spirit in the soul' (LP 46). To explain how this action of grace operates 
within the soul, she borrows from the Gospels the central motif of the seed as the 
Word of God, and amalgamates it with readings of Greek myths and her concept of 
the cross, to create a distinctively mystical, yet characteristically original concept. 
Just as Weil's adoption of the Pythagorean notion of the logos alogos proved 
revelatory to both the content and fonn of her theology. the central metaphor of a 
seed of grace is crucial to her concept of spiritual mechanics and the means by 
which she attempts to articulate it. The technological figurative imagery she uses to 
analyse the supernatural physics of the soul is paralleled by Weil's perception of an 
equivalent mechanism in the natural world that operates on the same principle. Her 
central premise that lowering is paradoxically the condition for rising, expressed by 
scientific analogies using levers and fulcrums, is developed in her concept of grace 
through two important images. First, the idea that an infinitely small amount of 
natural energy can act as a catalyst for major changes is offered as an analogy for 
how the supernatural intervention of grace fundamentally alters human mechanics. 
Second, the 'double mechanism of growth' by which plants grow from seeds 
through absorbing sunlight is considered a model for 'the gennination of grace' in 
the soul (NR 90, 252). Both these aspects of how the natural mechanism parallels 
and interacts with the supernatural mechanics of grace is seen in her observation 
that 'just as the catalysts of bacteria, such as yeast, operate by their mere presence 
in chemical reactions, so in human affairs the invisible seed of pure good is decisive 
when it is put in the right place'; and assertion that 'the purely human virtues would 
not spring up out of man's animal nature without the supernatural light of grace', 
which itself has a 'chlorophyll-like virtue' (SWR 337. OL 167, FLN 70). 
There are two methods by which Wei! believes this seed of grace tears open the 
human soul and begins the process by which it returns to God. First, through the joy 
generated by loving the beauty of the world, and second, and most importantly. 
through the violent suffering induced by ailliction. Although she claims these 'are 
the only two ways and they are equivalent', Weil's preference for the route provided 
via affliction is indicated by the comment that immediately follows this statement: 
'but the way of ailliction is the way of Christ' (IC 199). This consistent demand that 
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humanity must share Christ's cross, and predilection for affliction as the superior 
mode of rending the soul is made explicit in the Notebooks. When discussing the 
need for affliction totally without consolation she insists it 'is thus, and not in any 
other way, that the soul makes the return journey which God has made to come to it' 
(NB429). 
Through both beauty and affliction the soul is trapped by a combination of divine 
deception and the type of Weilean unfree will in which consent is at best 
ambiguous. In her essay 'God's Quest for Man', Wei! describes how as the 
manifestation of divine love within the cosmos, the beauty of the world functions as 
'a snare for the soul' by which 'God seizes the soul in spite of itself' (IC 3). 
Although this initial contact with God is instantaneous it proves decisive, the soul is 
forever afterwards fundamentally changed. Weil explains this process by an 
intertextual linkage of the New Testament parable of the mustard seed with Greek 
myths.26 Reading the Persephone myth as itself a narrative about the action of 
grace, Wei! contends that 'by surprise and by strategy' God 'furtively' gives the 
soul a pomegranate seed to eat (3). 
If the soul eats this, it is captured for ever. The pomegranate seed is 
that consent which the soul gives to God almost without knowing it, 
and without admitting it to itself. This is an infinitely small thing 
among all the carnal inclinations of the soul, and nevertheless this 
decides its destiny for ever. This is the grain of mustard seed to 
which Christ compares the Kingdom of Heaven, the smallest of the 
seeds, but which later shall become that tree wherein the birds of 
heaven alight. (3) 
The extent to which Weil's concept of grace is dependent on this kind of seizure of 
the soul by a combination of God's trickery and man's limited freedom is shown in 
her interpretation of the myth of the labyrinth as another representation of how the 
divine/human encounter operates. The beauty of the world is comparable to the 
mouth of the labyrinth, in which once inside man is lost, unable to retrace his steps, 
and eventually arrives at the centre of the maze 'where God waits to devour him' 
she argues (4). Later man will leave the labyrinth, 'but he will be changed, he will 
have become different, after being eaten and digested by God' .27 This startling 
image of the soul being devoured by God is in keeping with Weil's concept of 
decreation being the summit of human attainment, and I will now analyse how her 
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predisposition towards this mystical loss of self is crucial to Weil's notion of how 
the violent seed of grace operates. 
She locates 'two successive acts of violence to which God subjects the soul, one 
which is pure violence, another to which the soul's consent to God is indispensable 
and upon which its salvation depends' (IC 4). This first act of violence occurs when 
the soul is initially seized by God through either beauty, or more dramatically, 
through subjection to affliction. Yet despite God's crossing the universe to make 
contact with man, Weil contends the soul has 'the power to consent to receive' God 
'or to refuse' (SWR 450). Consent to the implantation of grace requires a second, 
self-inflicted type of violence, man's violent compulsion on his own free will. In her 
Notebooks Wei! describes how this secondary violence functions. 
As one has in oneself a principle of violence, namely, the will, one 
should also, in a limited measure, but to the fullest possible extent of 
that measure, make a violent use of this violent principle; compel 
oneself by violence to act just as if one had not that particular desire 
or aversion; without attempting to persuade the sensibility, but by 
forcing it to obey. (NB 424-425) 
Such violent methods directed against the self 'are only admissible either when they 
emanate directly from the reasoning faculty, or else when they are forced upon one 
by some irresistible impulsion' she argues, 'but then it is not from the self whence 
the violence actually proceeds' (425). Man's violence to himself is a result of the 
impact of supernatural necessity on the soul, the compulsion of God's pressure. In 
its initial stage this self-violence makes charitable actions possible. 'The first and 
most necessary form of violence done to the self consists of carrying out, in fact, 
what one clearly represents to oneself as being one's duty'. (425-426). As I noted 
when discussing the architecture of the soul, such moral actions elevate the soul 
towards its highest level of supernatural love. This sort of violence to the self 
constitutes an apprenticeship for the greater self-violence which is required to 
accept affliction, the seed of grace, and the total self-loss required in decreation, and 
therefore each 'time we do ourselves violence in this sense we make genuine 
progress, be it much or little, in the task of training the animal in oneselr (425). 
It is this interconnected notion of self-violence, loss of self, and complex (un)free 
will which helps to explain Weil's monstrous New York 'prayer', and her equation 
of rape with the action of grace. After her infamous plea to be subjected to all 
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manner of appalling affiictions, she insists it is only possible to accede to such 
horrors against the will, not voluntarily. 
In spite of oneself, yet one comes to it. One does not consent to it 
with abandon, but with a violence exerted upon the entire soul by the 
entire soul. But the consent is total and unreserved, and given by a 
single movement of the whole being. (FLN 244) 
This contradictory concept of violent consent is the source for WeiI's use of the 
metaphor of rape to represent the soul's union with God. Characteristically she 
exaggerates the analogies of courtship and marriage traditionally used by mystics to 
explain the divine/human relationship, adopting more violent figurative imagery to 
describe the same contact. 'Marriage is a consented rape. And so is the soul's union 
with God', she insists (244). Any element of assent given to this violent seed of 
grace is temporary and wrenching. but Weil claims if the soul 'allows a pure and 
utter consent (though brief as a lightening flash) to be tom from it, then God 
conquers that soul' (GG 80). 
After this initial violent impregnation of grace God abandons the soul, and man's 
role is to not regret the consent he has given, which 'is not as easy as it seems, for 
the growth of the seed within us is painful' she claims (SWR 451). The mechanism 
by which the seed of grace germinates requires further acts of self-violence, but is 
largely automatic. 
We cannot avoid destroying whatever gets in its way, pulling up the 
weeds, cutting the grasses~ and unfortunately they are part of our very 
flesh, so that this gardening amounts to a violent operation. On the 
whole, however, the seed grows of itself (451) 
Yet although God gratuitously makes contact with humanity, and 'wears himself out 
through the infinite thickness of time and space in order to reach the soul and to 
captivate it' (GG 80), how exactly is it possible, after God has abandoned the soul, 
for man to be reunited with him? Weil contends that it is man who must go to God. 
The soul must 'cross the infinite thickness of time and space in search of whom it 
loves. It is thus that the soul, starting from the opposite end, makes the same journey 
that God made towards it' (80). But how is this achievable if humanity is as 
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absolutely incapable of rising above gravity and traversing the immense gulf 
between creature and Creator as Weil insists it is? 
Her answer is that the violent seed of grace germinates through acceptance of 
amiction into the same cross as Christ's, the supreme mefaxu between gravity and 
grace, God and man. 
It was the seed of this tree that God placed within us, without our 
knowing what seed it was. If we had known, we should not have said 
Yes at the first moment. It is this tree which has grown within us and 
has become ineradicable. Only a betrayal could uproot it. (SWR 451) 
Just as the crucified Christ acts as a logos alogos between God and man by 
consenting to his agonising affliction and not faltering in his love of God, the seed 
of this same cross sown in the human soul constitutes man's bridge back to God. In 
this reworking of the traditional Christian concept of bearing the cross and 
following Christ, the other major areas of Weil's spiritual mechanics: passive 
activity and negative virtue, experience of void and decreation, violent free will, 
and the violent seed of grace; coalesce. 
Passive activity and negative virtue are crucial to ensuring that the soul stays 
focused on God while enduring the agonies of affliction. By concentrating the whole 
of necessity like a nail through the soul, amiction pierces the egocentric screen 
which previously separated man from God. If like the crucified Christ man's soul 
'remains oriented towards God while a nail is driven through it' man 'finds himself 
nailed to the very centre of the universe; the true centre [ ... J which is God', Weil 
argues (452). In this 'totally other dimension' without 
leaving the time and place to which the body is bound, the soul can 
traverse the whole of space and time and come into the actual 
presence of God. It is at the point of the intersection between creation 
and Creator. This point is at the point of intersection of the two 
branches of the Cross. (452) 
The cross brings necessity 'into contact with the lowest and the highest part of us; 
with our physical sensibility by its evocation of physical pain and with supernatural 
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love by the presence of God' (465). It is only participation in the crucifying 
affliction of Christ's cross, borne entirely without mitigation, that has the capacity to 
rend the soul, and only acceptance of the void it opens up enables man to perceive 
this chasm between God and man as paradoxically the central metaxu by which 
creature and Creator are reunited, not separated. 
In its torment afflicted mankind seeks a meaning for its agony, an answer to the 
question 'Why must I suffer?'. We 'must have real words. We cry out for them. The 
cry tears our very entrails. All we get is silence' according to Weil (GG 102). It is 
through this total absence of consolation that man is forced to confront the void. If 
in this vacuum, through passive activity the soul continues to love and wait with 
desire for God it eventually hears 'not a reply to the question which it cries, for there 
is none, but the very silence as something infinitely more full of significance than 
any response, like God himself speaking' (Ie 199). In this mystical state the human 
element in the soul diminishes and its supernatural part is reconnected to God: 
Our soul is constantly clamorous with noise, but there is one point in 
it which is silence, and which we never hear. When the silence of 
God comes to the soul and penetrates it and joins the silence which is 
secretly present in us, from then on we have our treasure and our 
heart in God; and space opens before us as the opening fruit of a 
plant divides in two, for we are seeing the universe from a point 
situated outside space. (SWR 467) 
Affliction therefore does not provide evidence for denying God's existence, but 
rather is the primary means by which man transcends gravity and makes explicit 
contact with God. It is 'God himself holding his hand and pressing it rather hard', 
and if the afflicted remains constant, 'what he will discover buried deep under the 
sound of his own lamentations is the pearl of the silence of God' (468). 
Eventually passive activity, acceptance of affliction and void, the combined violence 
of the seed of grace and violent free will, leads to the stage when the soul is not only 
linked to God but belongs to God through decreation. Man becomes nothing more 
than a passageway through which God makes contact with God. The love within 
the soul 
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is divine, uncreated, for it is the love of God for God which is passing 
through it [ ... ] We can only consent to give up our own feelings so as 
to allow free passage in our soul for this love. That is the meaning of 
denying oneself. We were created solely in order to give this consent. 
(451) 
The supreme state of decreation occurs with man's physical death and reabsorption 
into the divine. But in its earlier stages the self-diminishment through which some 
individuals manage to accept affiiction and the void opened by violent grace, and in 
doing so encounter God, leads to brilliant but only brief epiphanies, after which 
these souls must continue with their lives whilst striving to maintain states of 
passive activity and negative virtue. If God 'reveals himself in person, it is only for 
an instant', before once again these souls must 'remain still, attentive, inactive, 
calling out only when their desire cannot be contained' (WFG 211). But the decisive 
change in the soul caused by direct contact with God ensures an increased level of 
supernatural grace in human affairs. The implicit loves 'become infinitely stronger' 
(138), and fundamentally different, because they have become the explicit love of 
God. The life-changing meeting of creature and Creator ensures that man's 'love in 
all these forms has become a movement of God himself, a ray merged in the light of 
God' (209). 
Through this type of symbolism and rhetoric of illumination Wei! demonstrates her 
affinity with the Christian mystics,28 and offensively reinvigorates the central 
Christian paradox that man must lose his life to find it. Christ, as the ultimate logos 
alogos who makes this redemptive process possible, is the paradigm for her 
concepts of spiritual mechanics and the implicit loves. Christ's life is Weil's model 
for the implicit loves which generate charitable actions. But most importantly, the 
crucified Christ as man's greatest metaxu, is a paragon of passive activity, negative 
virtue, endurance and acceptance of affiiction, void and decreation. However 
although locating metaxus is both a major theme in Weil's theology and a 
constituent part of the form of her writings via startling figurative imagery and 
analogies, Wei! objects to Catholicism's most important earthly mediator - the 
Church. lfas Christocentric mystic she is preoccupied with the union of the affiicted 
human body with Christ's tortured body on the cross, a significant element of her 
theological writings are concerned with criticising, and finally rejecting, the 
collected corpus of the Catholic Church. Consequently it is important briefly to 
analyse why a writer so concerned with locating metaxus that connect tangible 
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realities and sacred mysteries does not consider the Church admissible as such a 
bridge. 
Weil's principle objection to the Church, as I noted in my Introduction, is founded 
on her belief that it prevents the type of 'intellectual honesty' that she associates 
with the objective, superposed vision in which 'thought should be indifferent to all 
ideas without exception' (85). She considers institutionalised Catholicism promotes 
an intellectual malaise 'due to the way in which the Church has conceived its power 
of jurisdiction and especially the use of the formula anathema sit' (LP 62). Equating 
the Church with the same type of dangerous abuse of authority and erosion of 
language she associates with other collectivities, Weil maintains the Church 'is 
guilty of an abuse of power when she claims to force love and intelligence to model 
their language upon her own' (80). 
The disequilibrium she perceives between individual and collective is harmonised 
when the intelligence acts as a metaxu between them, but this is only possible when 
the intellect is not subject to unwarranted restrictions.29 In her 'Spiritual 
Autobiography' Weil claims the 'special function of the intelligence requires total 
liberty, implying the right to deny everything, and allowing of no domination' (78). 
Considering unequivocal adherence to Church dogma the epitome of intellectual 
subjugation, she is totally opposed to what she believes is St. Thomas Aquinas' 
affirmation 'that he who refuses his assent to a single article of faith does not 
possess the faith in any degree'. 30 Escaping such intellectual suffocation requires 
that religious laws should not be affirmed, but instead contemplated with attention. 
'We owe the definitions with which the Church has thought it right to surround the 
mysteries of the faith, and more particularly its condemnations ( ... anathema sit) a 
permanent and unconditional attitude of respectful attention, but not adherence' she 
maintains (LP 60). Associating adherence with muscular will rather than faith in the 
Weilean, passive activity sense, she proffers a traditional mystical alternative. The 
metaphor of a 'veil' or 'reflection' applied to faith in Weil's opinion enables the 
mystics to escape intellectual constraints, and 'accept the Church's teaching, not as 
the truth, but as something behind which the truth is to be found' (39). 
Equivalent to her superposed vision, this dual perspective enables Weil to attribute 
to the Church an 'indispensible' role as 'collective keeper of dogma' • not because its 
doctrines are irrevocably true, but because it cultivates the necessary 'discipline of 
the attention' (61), through and beyond which, spiritual realities can be ascertained. 
As Weil's inclusion of certain Catholic religious practices in her implicit loves 
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demonstrates, the Church's duty is to preserve key doctrines and rites of worship 
which, when concentrated on with intuitive attention, offer direct access to grace. 
'The Church is only perfectly pure under one aspect' she claims, 'when considered 
as guardian of the sacraments. What is perfect is not the Church; it is the body and 
blood of Christ upon the altars' (44). Only in this sense does the Catholic Church 
legitimately function as a metaxu. 
What distinguishes Weil's antagonistic writings on the Church is her rejection of the 
pre-eminent Catholic concept of a community of faith in which the Church and all 
its sacraments and doctrines act as crucial hridges between God and man. Instead 
Weilean theology, with its stress on an individual divinelhuman encounter is not just 
mystical, but displays a distinctively Protestant emphasis. According to Wei!, 
'dogma is an object of contemplation for love, faith, and intelligence, three strictly 
individual faculties' (WFG 79). Likewise, the implicit loves are dependent on 
developing individual responses to religious ceremonies, and the order of the world. 
Even the moral obligation derived from loving our neighbour, although indirectly 
improving communal life, is primarily a reaction to a solitary vocation. 
This preference for sole communication with God unmediated by the Church is 
evident in the array of alternative 'sacraments' and methods of worship Wei! 
advocates. Her close reading of the Bible is distinctively Protestant, as is her 
profoundly individualised concentration on her own alternative Scriptures: the 
Greek, European, and Eastern philosophical, theological and fictional texts I 
analysed in Chapter One. Equally, and personally significant is Weil's solitary 
reading and repetition of the prayer the 'Our Father' in Greek, and George Herbert's 
poem 'Love', which acted as a catalyst for the mystical experiences which were 
more significant to her than any Church rituals. Despite the sacramental perspective 
in which she perceives the world as metaxu, Weil's superposed vision balances this 
with the contradictory radical disparity she considers exists between the human and 
divine. This division, and the inability of the human mind to grasp the reality of God 
are all characteristically Protestant, as is the form of Wei!' s writings: her dialectical 
reasoning and use of affirmation and negation to approach the mystery of a God 
radically separated from humanity. 
Three major principles of Protestantism, 'sola fide' ('by faith alone'), 'sola gratia' 
('by grace alone'), and 'sola Scriptura' (by Scripture alone),31 are based on the 
problem of how to achieve a relationship between the type of transcendent God and 
his miserable creatures Wei! envisions. Her theology conforms to these three 
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principles in three ways. First, although she does consider good works and some 
Catholic sacraments part of the redemption process, Weil's emphasis on the fact that 
to achieve salvation it is imperative for man to desire God, have faith as a negative 
virtue, is distinctively Protestant. 'To long for God and to renounce all the rest, that 
alone can save us' she insists (196). Second, her repeated emphasis on humanity's 
inability to escape the limitations of its creaturely status without the gratuitous 
intervention of grace emphasises God's sovereignty, diminishing the element of 
human freedom in the process of salvation. Mankind can only progress towards God 
after it has been called, or in Weilean imagery impregnated with grace in an explicit 
contact with God, and significantly, this 'movement comes from above, never from 
below; it is a movement on God's part, not on ours. We cannot bring about such 
intercommunion except when God decrees it' (GG 42). Third, the Protestant 
preoccupation with God's Word being communicated directly to man via solitary 
meditation on sacred Scriptures rather than mediated through collective Church 
dogmas is as I have shown, replicated in Weil's own antagonism to institutional 
doctrines and insistence that contemplating texts with attention is spiritually 
revelatory. 
At the extreme edge of her Protestant thinking Wei! veers towards Calvinism and 
Lutheranism.32 The pronounced separation between good and evil that is so 
prevalent in Calvinist and Lutheran teachings is evident in Weilean notions of these 
two forces being fundamentally opposed. Equally, Calvinist concepts of 
predestination and the existence of an elect, are apparent in Weil's claim that the 
'word of God is the secret word. He who has not heard this word, even if he adheres 
to all the dogmas taught by the Church, has no contact with truth' (WFG 80). The 
dual problem of how to hear God's Word, and how to articulate spiritual realities in 
human language is vital to Weil, and encompasses the central dilemma of how to 
bridge the gap between gravity and grace, God and man, human liberty and divine 
compulsion. Wei! struggles with God in her desire to preserve her individuality and 
free will, yet demonstrates a contradictory urge to be reconciled with the divine 
through being conquered and consumed: 'Isn't it the greatest possible calamity. 
when you are wresting with God. not to be beaten?' she contends.33 
Commensurately Weil battles with the problem of how to hear God's Word and 
communicate the action of grace, the reality of the mystical encounter, within a 
human vocabulary. Despite her dynamic mixture of technological, biblical and 
natural symbols she is similarly defeated. 'The speech of created beings is with 
sounds. The word of God is silence' (SWR 467). Only in silence, the failure, or void 
in human vocabulary, can man hear God's Word as a melaxu. 
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As Denys Turner observes, 'no partial, restricted vocabulary is adequate to express 
the inadequacy of theological language [ ... ] It is in the profusion of our affirmations 
that we encounter the limits of language, and then break through them into the dark 
silence of the transcendent'.34 As writer-prophet Flannery O'Connor is like Weil 
primarily concerned with considering how a relationship between God and man is 
possible, how to communicate God's Word via a human vocabulary, and 
specifically, how to make fictions plausible as successful spiritual metaxus. The 
relationship with a supreme being recognised through faith 'is the experience of an 
encounter. of a kind of knowledge which affects the believer'S every action', she 
insists. and the 'problem of the novelist who wishes to write about a man's 
encounter with his God is how he shall make the experience - which is both natural 
and supernatural - understandable, and credible, to his reader' (MM 160. 161). By 
using the Weilean concepts I have just analysed I will now interrogate first, 
O'Connor's theological approach to the human/divine encounter, before second, 
analysing how her written forms correspond to or diverge from both Weil's theories 
and her own theology. 
In both her theology, fictions and non-fictional writings O'Connor shares Weil's 
concern with understanding how God and man communicate, and in accordance 
with Weil she considers man's encounter with God is principally a consequence of 
God making contact with man through the gratuitous intervention of grace in 
human life. Due to her Catholic belief in mankind's Fall, and the original sin she 
believes resulted from it, O'Connor shares Weil's concept orman subject to a moral 
gravity which tends towards evil unless grace intercedes. Yet her Catholicism also 
ensures she considers mankind a mixture of both nature and grace, and therefore 
O'Connor agrees with Weil that for man to achieve a relationship with God requires 
human effort and not only gratuitous grace. 'It is true that grace is the free gift of 
God but in order to put yourself in the way of being receptive to it you have to 
practice self-denial' she maintains (HB 336). Also interested in locating bridges 
between nature and grace, mystery and manners, O'Connor's sacramentalism 
ensures she shares Weil's superposed perspective of the universe as a bridge to a 
sacred reality. O'Connor's 'point of view is Catholic in the widest sense of the 
term', and consequently she 'reads nature the same way the medieval commentators 
read Scripture' (128). Reading O'Connor's theology superposed with WeWs 
implicit loves, reveals some significant differences to, as well as similarities with, 
Weil's metaxu. 
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The love of religious practices is even more vital to O'Connor, as member of the 
Catholic Church, than it is to Weil as individuaVoutsider. Both women share a 
profound love of the sacrament of the Eucharist, because they consider it 
constitutes a real, not merely symbolic metaxu between God and man. '''Well, if it's 
a symbol, to hell with it"', O'Connor argues, 'it is the center of existence for me~ all 
the rest oflife is expendable', 'I believe the Host is actually the body and blood of 
Christ, not a symbol' (HB 125, 124). But a difference between O'Connor as 
Catholic insider and Wei! who refused membership of the Church is apparent in 
Weil's emphasis on paying intense attention to the sacrament as a means of 
purification, rather than participating in it as literally an act of communion with 
God. Unlike O'Connor, who believes the sacrament of baptism is as crucial as the 
Eucharist (see my reading of The Violent Bear It Away), Weil considers baptism at 
best a symbol of purity and not a metaxu.35 
Not surprisingly considering its centrality to Christianity as well as Weil's implicit 
loves, there is a correspondence between Weil and O'Connor on the need for man to 
love his neighbour. Weil's notion of the creative affirmation of the afflicted being 
an irrational and supernatural redemptive act that imitates Christ, and in which only 
Christ within man can recognise Christ in what is so outwardly monstrous, 
articulates with greater clarity O'Connor's concept of the motivating force 
responsible for charitable actions, and her attempt to define it. 'Satisfy your demand 
for reason always but remember that charity is beyond reason, and that God can be 
known through charity' she claims (480). Commenting on how humanity's salvation 
is worked out on earth according to how men love and perceive Christ in each other, 
O'Connor observes this is 'one reason I am chary of using the word love, loosely, I 
prefer to use it in its practical forms such as prayer, almsgiving, visiting the sick and 
burying the dead and so forth' (102). However Weil's stress on the importance of 
loving both the order and beauty of the cosmos is not evident in O'Connor's 
theology. She parallels Weil in her conception of a world dominated by the terrible 
reality of necessity and affiiction, yet despite her sacramentalism any discussion of, 
or emphasis on beauty is conspicuously absent from O'Connor's thinking. Weil's 
extension of her theory of the self-renunciation required by moral actions to 
encompass an acknowledgement of the beauty of the world and man's relationship 
to it, ensures her supposition is effectively more Christian and sacramental than 
O'Connor's position here. 
As I have already noted Weil's implicit loves, through their reliance on attention 
and self-abasement act as levers by which the soul rises higher, and form part of her 
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larger concept of the metaxu incorporated in the important notion of spiritual 
mechanics and the supernatural physics of the soul. I want to now compare Weil's 
first group of spiritual mechanisms, her crucial logos alogos of passive activity and 
negative virtue, void and decreation, to O'Connor's theology. 
O'Connor's conviction that receptivity to grace requires self-denial, and her belief 
that acts of charity form part of the salvation process, correspond to the 
fundamental principle of Weil's spiritual mechanics and theory of moral gravity -
that rising morally requires a lowering or debasement of the physical, and 
egocentric self Some kind of spiritual mechanism, or supernatural physics of the 
soul is implied in O'Connor's notion that a concern with grace is 'simply a concern 
with the human reaction to that which, instant by instant, gives life to the soul. It is a 
concern with a realization that breeds charity and with the charity that breeds action' 
(MM 204). The degree to which she considers such interventions of grace in the soul 
are required to aIter the type of human mechanics ordinarily dominated by immoral 
gravity. is demonstrated in her assertion that 'Catholics believe that all creation is 
good and that evil is the wrong use of good and that without grace we use it wrong 
most of the time' (HB 144). 
Yet the very idea that the interior workings of the soul can be studied scientifically, 
that man's progression towards salvation is to some extent mechanised or 
automated. directly contravenes O'Connor's stress on the reality of human liberty, 
which as I showed in Chapter Two, is a vital component of her concept of man. So 
while she does acknowledge the idea of moral leverage through asceticism and 
God's gratuitous grace, crucially O'Connor differs from Weil in perceiving the 
supernatural physics of the soul as itself considerably less predictable and 
significantly more mysterious. This greater emphasis on human autonomy and the 
curious, often mystifying realisation of a relationship between God and man is 
apparent when comparing O'Connor's theology to Weil's concepts of passive 
activity and negative virtue. 
In contrast to Weil, O'Connor is not preoccupied with establishing a distinction 
between 'muscular' free will and its superior counterpart of passive activity. In the 
complex notion of free will she outlines in her 'Author's Note' to the second 
edition of Wise Blood, O'Connor stipulates man's integrity inheres precisely in a 
Weilean type of muscular free will, which requires an intense struggle to believe in 
God, rather than Weil's more tranquil alternative. It is this kind of muscular rather 
than passive spiritual activity that O'Connor is most fascinated by. Mankind's 
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disobedience, inattention, impatience, wrestling with conflicting urges to believe or 
not believe in God, and frenetic. frequently immoral activity, are what eventually, 
often circuitously lead to salvation in her schema. Man's relationship with God is 
fundamentally more active than passive. 
This Jeads to another important difference in emphasis between Weil and O'Connor. 
Weil's passive activity enables the soul to concentrate all its attention unremittingly 
on God, and vitally man must desire God. This longing is crucial in drawing God 
towards man and effecting an encounter between them, and therefore in Weil's 
thinking incessant yearning for God is essential to the intervention of grace in 
human affairs, and ultimately man's salvation. But while O'Connor recognises that 
'God rescues us from ourselves if we want him to' (118), she does not consider 
intensive desire for God imperative for human salvation. Indeed her more intricate 
notion of free will ensures that humanity's encounter with God/grace is frequently 
made possible by man's inability to rid himself of God rather than a specific urge 
for contact with the divine. Equally, O'Connor's Catholic theory of the utility of sin, 
and her more fundamentalist concept of the Devil's role in the action of grace, 
ensures she allows a confrontation between God and man may, and frequently does 
come reluctantly, suddenly, arbitrarily, it may be undeserved, and neither prepared 
for nor requested. Negative virtue in O'Connor's thinking is not the equivalent of 
the Weilean notion of non-active action that acts as a catalyst for charitable 
behaviour through God's compulsion. For O'Connor man's integrity is also 
conceived negatively, but constitutes having the capacity to refuse a relationship 
with God, to refuse the action of grace. 
However, despite these important differences between O'Connor and Weil, the 
complicated, contradictory virtue of O'Connor's own thought does allow some 
scope for consensus between the two writers through O'Connor's acceptance of 
Teilhard de Chardin's notion of 'passive diminishments' .36 The idea that passive 
submission to human suffering permits spiritual progression corresponds in part 
with Weil's concept of the role passive activity plays in man's required consent to 
affliction, void, and decreation, and I will now examine how O'Connor's theology 
compares to Weil's concepts of experience of void as plenitude and decreation as 
total being. 
When using Weil's theory of void to analyse O'Connor's theology the first and 
most important point to note is that there is in fact no equivalent concept in 
O'Connor's religious thinking. The major reason for this is that in a direct 
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contradistinction to WeiI as mystic, O'Connor's Catholicism ensures she accepts the 
specific religious consolations: man's immortality, the utility of sin, and the reality 
of Providence, that Weil condemns as erroneous palliations for the horrifying 
experience of void, the necessary dark night of the soul essential to spiritual 
regeneration. But although this significant element of Weil's spiritual mechanics is 
not found in O'Connor's theology, Weil's interrelated notion of human mechanics is 
valuable in illuminating O'Connor's concept of human fictionality and immorality. 
In describing how consent to void is supernatural because it requires a refusal of 
human forms of equilibrium, the mechanical process by which man desires revenge 
for his affiiction. and tries to flee an experience of void by egocentrism and 
sinfulness, Weil explains with greater lucidity O'Connor's understanding of secular 
man, his limitations, and their causes and consequences. 
Weil's interconnected concept of decreation is similarly useful for interrogating 
O'Connor's theology because of both its comparability with, and divergence from 
some of O'Connor's most important ideas on the relationship between God and 
man. First, the Weilean concept of decreation offensively revivifies the central 
Christian paradox that man must lose his life to find it, a doctrine which is crucial to 
O'Connor, who insists the 'creative action of the Christian's life is to prepare his 
death in Christ' (MM 223). But second, the greater emphasis on mankind's 
depravity, the diminution of human liberty, and refusal of all consolation for void 
which leads WeiI to insist man's soul completely ceases to exist beyond death and is 
totally annihilated by absorption into God, is fundamentally different to O'Connor's 
Catholic viewpoint. 
The survival of man's individual soul is all important to O'Connor, due to her 
concept of humanity as a more integrated amalgamation of nature and grace, her 
more pronounced notion of the reality of human freedom, and her acceptance of 
the religious consolations WeiI rejects. Her ideas are in accord with Wei! on the 
essential need for man to confront his limitations and decreate his fictional self, 
which as the source of man's egocentrism and immorality does create a damaging 
barrier between God and man. As Jefferson Humphries notes, O'Connor is 
interested above all in 'the distance which humans are at pains to place between 
themselves and the spiritual in themselves, the sacred in and around them, and in the 
terrible violence with which the Holy finally and inevitably erupts into their wilfully 
profane lives,.37 But vitally, the stripping away of this obstruction, and eventually 
the removal of the physical barrier between God and man at the moment of human 
death is not so that God can be reconnected with himself. Instead, in O'Connor's 
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theology it is so that man can make contact with God. The individual soul does not 
completely cease to be, and due to O'Connor's Catholic, and to some extent 
Fundamentalist Christianity,38 she believes when man's soul confronts God it faces 
a climactic judgement which decides its eternal future in either heaven or hell, and 
this pivotal drama of the soul, is irrevocably linked to human free will. Although 
Weil acknowledges the choice available to progress towards individual annihilation 
through either good or evil, the notions of Christian salvation or damnation are 
perceived as imaginative constructs by which humanity understands the difference 
between the type of positive and negative nothingness she envisions. In contrast 
O'Connor considers heaven and hell crucial realities, with human damnation a 
consequence of mankind's freedom. There 'is nothing in our faith that implies a 
foregone optimism for man so free that with his last breath he can say No' she 
insists (182). Writing to a friend in 1959 O'Connor is adamant that 
hell is what God's love becomes to those who reject it. Now no one 
has to reject it. God made us to love him. It takes two to love. It takes 
liberty. It takes the right to reject. If there were no hell, we would be 
like the animals. No hell, no dignity. And remember the mercy of 
God. (lIB 354) 
To achieve salvation requires conversion, and due to O'Connor's concept of original 
sin her idea of the conversion process is similar to Weil's notion that man's status as 
a reversed being requires an unmaking of his creatureliness, the removal of his 
fictionality and reorientation of the soul towards God. 
I don't think of conversion as being once and for all and that's that. I 
think once the process is begun and continues that you are 
continually turning inward toward God and away from your 0'Ml 
egocentricity and that you have to see this selfish side of yourself in 
order to tum away from it. (430) 
But O'Connor maintains 'I don't know if anybody can be converted without seeing 
themselves in a kind of blasting annihilating light' (427). As in Weil's schema, she 
is convinced this dramatic initiation of self-awareness and decreation is reliant on 
man's inward illumination by grace, and I will now apply Weil's theories of the seed 
of grace, violent grace and violent free will to O'Connor's ideas. 
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Weil's central notion of the necessary implantation of, specifically, a seed of grace 
in the soul, and her supposition that this seed includes the germination of grace 
through an appreciation of the beauty of the world, is not found in O'Connor's 
conceptual theory of grace. As I noted while discussing O'Connor in connection 
with Weil's implicit loves, beauty, and its relation to man and the cosmos plays 
almost no part in O'Connor's thinking, despite her sacramentaIism. In her stress on 
the importance ofloving beauty, and particularly in her claim that the seed of beauty 
constitutes a metaxu for grace - grace is literally attained through nature - Weil is 
more sacramental, and more Catholic than O'Connor, offering a greater number and 
variation of bridges to God. 
But absolutely vital to a comparative study ofWeil and O'Connor's work is Weil's 
concept of violent grace and the violent free will connected to it, which together 
provide profound insights into, and interrogation of, O'Connor's equivalent ideas 
and their depiction in the narratives. Interestingly O'Connor's theories also shed 
some light on Weil's ideas here. Due to O'Connor's more powerful notion of human 
liberty, and insistence on the soul's individual immortality, there is little evidence in 
her theology of the type ofWeilean idea of divine deception by which God entraps 
and devours the soul. But Weil's criteria for violent grace are vital to, and help to 
illuminate O'Connor's comparable concept in three ways. First, Weil's belief that 
grace is resisted by man is shared by O'Connor, and therefore in this sense she too 
considers the soul is transformed, if not taken, almost in spite of itself, rather than 
voluntarily. 'All human nature vigorously resists grace because grace changes us and 
the change is painful' she claims (307). Second, WeWs assertion that man's initial 
contact with grace/God is decisive, effecting a fundamental alteration in the soul, is 
also evident in O'Connor's contenlion that grace enables selfless, charitable actions. 
Referring to a previous letter in which she mentioned mankind's capacity to 
demonstrate a concern with other people's affiictions, O'Connor writes to her friend 
'A': 
The kind of concern I mean is a doing, not a feeling, and it is the 
result of a grace [ ... J It doesn't have to be associated with religious; I 
am just trying to isolate this kind of abandonment of self which is the 
result of sanctifying grace. (455) 
Third, and most importantly, Weil's contention that violent grace operates through 
two successive acts of violence to which God subjects the soul: first, pure violence, 
and second a violent compUlsion on man's free will, provides a unique insight into 
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O'Connor's concepts of violent grace, violent love. and complex free will. 
Commensurate with Weil, O'Connor considers experiential violence has a pivotal 
role in stripping man of his fictionality and a correspondingly decisive impact on the 
soul. The 'man in the violent situation reveals those qualities least dispensible in his 
personality. those qualities which are all he will have to take into eternity with him' 
she contends (MM 114). However in a significant dissimilarity with Weil, she 
considers this redemptive violence which is interlocked with the action of grace can 
be achieved through evil actions. Primarily 'interested in the indication of Grace, the 
moment when you know that Grace has been offered and accepted', O'Connor 
believes these instants can be prepared for 'by the intensity of the evil 
circumstances' (HB 367). 'Violence is a force which can be used for good or evil, 
and among other things taken by it is the kingdom of heaven' she claims, 'more than 
ever now it seems that the kingdom of heaven has to be taken by violence, or not at 
all. You have to push as hard as the age that pushes against you' (MM 113, HB 229). 
Interestingly, she makes a Weilean-type connection between this sort of pure 
violence, and the kind of self-violence Weil perceives operating in man's violent 
free will. While discussing the biblical verse from Matthew 11: 12 which provides 
her novel The Violent Bear It Away with its title: 'From the days of John the Baptist 
until now, the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away'; 
O'Connor describes her fascination with the nobility of unnaturalness rather than the 
nobility of naturalness, and maintains: the 'violent are not natural. St. Thomas's 
gloss on this verse is that the violent Christ is here talking about represent those 
ascetics who strain against mere nature. St. Augustine concurs' (343). This violent 
wrestling against the natural will, the human mechanics which incline towards 
gravity. egocentrism, immorality, in order to raise the soul to a higher level and 
make possible supernatural mechanics - the charitable actions by which moral 
gravity makes man fall towards the heights - O'Connor tenns 'the violence of Jove, 
of giving more than the law demands, of an asceticism like John the Baptist's, but 
in the face of which even John is less than the least in the kingdom' (382). In a 
separate comment she specifically relates this type of violent love to violent grace. 
I have got to the point now where I keep thinking more and more 
about the presentation of love and charity, or better call it grace, as 
love suggests tenderness, whereas grace can be violent or would have 
to be to compete with the kind of evil I can make concrete. (373) 
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The similarities between O'Connor's violent grace, violent love, and violent will 
and Weil's concepts are significant, and of great value in providing new readings of 
The Violent Bear It Away. However a conceptual difference in emphasis between 
the two writers worth observing here, is that O'Connor's less determined notion of 
human liberty ensures that her version of violent free will, precisely because it is 
more free, is also more violent. The conflicting forces of man's freedom and God's 
will, human and spiritual mechanics, are more equally balanced, more mysterious 
and more complex. Man grapples with his own will, grace, God's compulsion on the 
soul and also the Devil's, and this struggle is even more intense than Weil's concept 
of the self-violence induced by God's irresistible force. 
Another important distinction is evident when although O'Connor acknowledges 
that humanity resists grace because it changes the soul and the alteration is painful, 
she does not envision this harrowing germination taking place after the soul has 
been abandoned by God. No such desertion occurs, no void is created in O'Connor's 
theological concept of violent grace, and this leads to another significant difference 
between the two writers on how man achieves a relationship with God 
Weil's core idea that the seed of grace grows into the same cross as Christ's, and 
this is the major metaxu by which man retraces God's journey to the human soul 
and is finally absorbed back into God's presence, is not equivalently displayed in 
O'Connor's theology. There are two important points to make on this dissimilarity. 
First, due to their different theories of the Creation, O'Connor's notion of 
Providence ensures that she does not consider man abandoned, or as radically 
separated from God by a terrible void, and therefore her notion of man's encounter 
with God does not require a system for spanning the enormous gulf between them 
that Wei! envisions. Second, O'Connor's Christianity: both the Catholic and 
Fundamentalist areas of her thinking, does ensure she believes the crucified Christ 
is the primary metaxu and logos alogos by which God and man are reconciled, but 
she conceives this vital bridge in a different form to Weil. O'Connor agrees violent 
grace is essential to humanity's conversion, instigating the necessary recognition of 
man's limitations and fictionality, and making it possible through suffering and 
violent love to share in Christ's self-loss through charity and the cross. Bearing the 
cross through an acceptance of the horrors of affliction whilst continuing to love 
God are vital. But crucially, it is not consent to void which eventually nails man to 
the same cross as Christ and transports him across time and space into a personal 
mystical encounter with God. In O'Connor's theology the unification of God and 
man is achieved through personal participation in the sacraments, and adherence to 
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the doctrines of the Catholic Church. Christ and the Church are inseparable, and the 
individual as literally a member of the collective body of the Church, is 
simultaneously part of the body of Christ. 
In contrast to Weil's mystical philosophy, the Church, with all its doctrines, dogmas 
and sacraments, is in conjunction with Christ, O'Connor's major metaxu between 
God and man and the bridge which makes a relationship possible. The 'individual in 
the Church is, no matter how worthless himself, a part of the Body of Christ and a 
participator in the Redemption' she insists (HB 92). This at-one-ment between God 
and man achieved by Christ's Incarnation and death on the cross, and the bridge 
between natural and supernatural realms continuously supplied by the institution of 
the Church requires a faith which is itself crucifying. Faith 'is the cross' in 
O'Connor's schema (354), and interestingly it is to faith rather than the horrifying 
experiential reality of necessity to which she applies a kind of Weilean passive 
activity and negative virtue. 'If you feel you can't believe. you must at least do this: 
keep an open mind. Keep it open toward faith, keep wanting it, keep asking for it, 
and leave the rest to God' she insists (354). It is at this point that O'Connor goes 
some way towards Weil's notion of the dark night of the soul and its acceptance. 
'You arrive at enough certainty to be able to make your way, but it is making it in 
darkness. Don't expect faith to clear things up for you. It is trust, not certainty' 
(354), she contends. 
In a major difference between the two writers, O'Connor's total faith in the Church 
and its dogmas as legitimate metaxu, and therefore her unlimited adherence to them 
as a form of trust if not certainty. is directly opposed to Weil's rejection of the 
Church due to its doctrine of anathema sit, and her subsequent belief this statute 
prevents intellectual honesty and the superposed vision which results from paying 
attention to, rather than affirming Church doctrines. Weil's theology offers a direct 
chal1enge to O'Connor's religion here, by effectively asking why, and how, is the 
Church necessary? O'Connor's defence of the Church is based on her belief that it 
provides a successful causeway between God and man precisely because its dogmas 
preserve religious mysteries and in doing so the Church as an institution has a 
multilayered prophetic vision essential to man's spiritual development. 'For me a 
dogma is only a gateway to contemplation and it is an instrument of freedom and 
not of restriction. It preserves mystery for the human mind' she insists (92). 'The 
Church's vision is prophetic vision' because it 'stands for and preserves always what 
is larger than human understanding' (365). 
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Because unlike Weil, O'Connor believes the Church constitutes a metoxu through 
which, not merely behind which spiritual truths are revealed, she approaches 
differently the central problem beyond human understanding: why must man suffer? 
Weil's lack of faith in the Church as spiritual mediator. ensures the answer to the 
affiicted's cry is supplied by a personal epiphany in which the silent void is itself 
paradoxically God's Word. Although O'Connor's acknowledgement of the 
crucifying struggle to have faith, as part of man's experiential agony is in some ways 
equivalent to Weil's experience of void, in O'Connor's religious thinking God's 
Word is ultimately not heard in this horrifying silence but through the Church. It is 
its dogmas and sacraments which supply the real words of comfort for which 
mankind craves, and through which the Word of God is audible by man, enabling a 
relationship between them. Why Christ found the world worth dying for remains a 
mystery, but it is Christ who 'speaks to us now through the mediation of a visible 
Church' she maintains, insisting that although 'this may seem a long way from the 
subject of fiction' it is not, because 'the main concern of the fiction writer is with 
mystery as it is incarnated in human life' (MM 176). 
The writer of philosophical, prophetic fictions must demonstrate mystery through 
manners, grace through nature and communicate the Word via human words. 1 will 
now analyse how as prophetic writer O'Connor attempts to communicate this vital 
action of grace, man's crucial encounter with his God, through the medium of 
fictional narratives. To achieve this I will briefly use Weil and O'Connor's concepts 
of violent grace to iIluminate The Violent Bear It Away, and Weil's final two criteria 
for texts of genius: violent grace, and the resultant brief moments of epiphany in 
which men find their souls, will be applied to the narrative. 
My analysis of violent grace in the novel will be divided into three sections which 
demonstrate the depiction of: first, the seed of grace as prophecy and its connection 
to violence, second, violent free will, and third, violent love. Using the parable of 
the sower (Matthew 13: 4-9, Mark 4: 1-9) as her basis for representing her concept 
of the seed of God's Word, through repetitive symbolism which interconnects this 
seed with the hereditary blood line of her three major characters: Mason Tarwater, 
Francis Marion Tarwater, and Rayber, O'Connor structures the novel into her own 
form of typology. Mason Tarwater's mission to pass on the seed of prophecy to 
Rayber appears to have failed yet he insists, 'Good blood knows the Lord and there 
ain't a thing he can do about having it. There ain't a way in the world he can get rid 
of it' (VB 59). '1 planted the seed in him and it was there for good. Whether 
anybody liked it or not' he claims, 'it fell in deep' (67). Both Rayber and Francis 
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Tarwater attempt to flee their prophetic heritage yet its compulsion on their souls 
dominates their behaviour. Francis is afraid Mason's hunger for Christ's bread 
'might be passed down, might be hidden in the blood and might strike some day in 
him' and that 'tom by hunger' there would be 'nothing that would heal or fill' his 
stomach but the bread of life' (21) Yet he informs Rayber that it is he who contains 
the seed and there 'ain't a thing you can do about it. It fell on bad ground but it fell 
in deep', whereas with himself 'it fell on rock and the wind carried it away' (192). 
The vehemence of Rayber's reply displays how concerned he is to deny this 
assertion. 'God damn you!' he responds, contending that the seed fell in both of 
them but he can control it. '1 know it's in me and 1 keep it under control. I weed it 
out but you're too blind to know it's in you. You don't even know what makes you 
do the things you do' (192). But reading the novel through Weil's interconnected 
concepts of pure violence, and the violence against the self which is a result of the 
compulsion of a supernatural necessity, after Tarwater's murder of Bishop and the 
(im)pure homosexual rape, Tarwater is forced to consent to the seed of grace within 
him being germinated. When he receives his epiphany, and sees Mason eating with 
the disciples and Christ, O'Connor amalgamates the seed, blood and bread of life 
symbolism which spans the novel. Earlier in the narrative Mason's words, we are 
informed by the narrator, 'had been dropping one by one into him and now, silent, 
hidden in his bloodstream, were moving secretly toward some goal of their own' 
(61). When Tarwater finally consents to the prophetic mission in which he must 
'GO WARN THE CHILDREN OF GOD OF THE TERRIBLE SPEED OF 
MERCY', the words are described 'as silent seeds opening one at a time in his 
blood' (242). 
Violent free will forms an important part of the novel. Defending the text against 
accusations of determinism, O'Connor insists that an 'absence of free will in these 
characters would mean an absence of conflict in them, whereas they spend all their 
time fighting within themselves, drive against drive' (lIB 488), and this contention 
is borne out by the central characters. When Mason 'thrashed out his peace with the 
Lord' he looked 'as ifhe had been wrestling a wild cat' (VB 8) Tarwater struggles to 
free himself from Mason, Rayber, God, and the 'stranger' who informs him 'It ain't 
Jesus or the devil. It's Jesus or you (39). He tries to escape Rayber's rationalist 
control insisting 'I'm free [ ... ] I'm outside your head. I ain't in it and I ain't about to 
be' (111). The compulsion on him to accept his prophetic mission and baptise 
Bishop, and his competing efforts to resist it, are evident when seeing Bishop 
playing in the park fountain he 'seemed to be drawn toward the child in the water 
but to be pulling back, exerting an almost equal pressure away from what attracted 
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him' (145). Yet O'Connor acknowledges the type of compulsion of God's pressure 
on the soul that Wei! identifies. Although 'Tarwater is certainly free and meant to 
be', O'Connor contends that if he does demonstrate a compulsion to become a 
prophet it is not psychological, but rather 'in this compulsion is the mystery of 
God's will for him' (MM 116). 
Rayber's actions also demonstrate this type of violent free will, which veers between 
his inherited seed of violent prophecy and his secular humanist attempt to eradicate 
it. He 'felt afflicted with a peculiar chilling clarity of mind in which he saw himself 
divided in two - a violent and a rational self (VB 139). The family affliction of 
prophecy must be either fought or succumbed to. 'The old man had been ruled by it. 
He at the cost of a full life, staved it off. What the boy would do hung in the 
balance' (114). Rayber considers he has 'turned his destiny as if with his bare will', 
and considering what 'we understand, we can control', he desires to remove 
Tarwater's compulsion to baptise Bishop, 'expose it to the light, and let him have a 
good look at it' (115, 187) He informs Tarwater that he wants to prevent him being 
'driven by a compUlsion you don't understand' because he believes that what 'we 
understand, we can control' (194). 
But Rayber's mysterious, violent love for Bishop, which is connected to the seed of 
grace implanted within him obstructs his rational attempts to control his free will. 
Rushing 'from some inexplicable part of himself, he would experience a love for the 
child so outrageous that he would be left shocked and depressed for days, and 
trembling for his sanity' (113). Bishop is its fountainhead 'but then like an 
avalanche' Rayber's violent love 'covered everything his reason hated', and 
constituting 'a touch of the curse that lay in his blood', in these irrational moments 
he longs to share Mason's prophetic, 'impossible vision of a world transfigured' the 
desire for which is 'like an undertow in his blood dragging him backwards to what 
he knew to be madness' (113, 114). An instance of this illogical violent love is 
shown when Rayber follows Tarwater to a revival meeting and hears the child 
evangelist Lucette Carmody preach. Carmody specifically connects this mysterious 
capacity for irrational love to Christ as the Word of God, and his redemptive 
crucifixion on the cross, insisting the 'Word of God is love and do you know what 
love is you people? If you don't know what love is you won't know Jesus when He 
comes. You won't be ready' (130). Preoccupied with his pity for the girl, and his 
vision of himself as a human saviour 'moving like an avenging angel through the 
world, gathering up all the children that the Lord, not Herod, had slain' so that he 
could 'let the sunshine flood their minds', (132, 133); Rayber is not prepared for the 
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young prophet's accusation that he is 'a damned soul', a 'dead man Jesus hasn't 
raised', whose ear is 'deaf to the Holy Word!' (134). Carmody's words prophesy 
Rayber's response to the drowning of Bishop. when apart from the 'dull mechanical 
beat of his heart' he 'continued to feel nothing' (203). Earlier the narrator notes 
how Rayber can only control his terrifying love if it is concentrated on Bishop, but if 
anything happened to the child 'he would have to face it in himself and comply 
with his love for the world, or 'resist feeling anything at all. thinking anything at all' 
and would 'have to anaesthetise his life' (182). With his reaction to Bishop's death, 
Tarwater appears to have lost the ability to balance the madness of love with 
emptiness, and fulfilled his intention 'to lurch toward emptiness and fall on the side 
of his choice' (115). 
O'Connor maintains that 'Rayber's love for Bishop is the purest love I have ever 
dealt with. It is because of its terrifying purity that Rayber has to destroy it. Very 
interesting' (HB 379). But many critics find no purity in the novel, and although the 
characterisation of Rayber is deemed unsatisfactory because he is unconvincing: 
Bloom considers him 'an aesthetic disaster' who is not 'even minimally persuasive' 
(Bloom, 2); disapproval of the novel as immoral and uncatholic mostly revolves 
around its use of violence. According to a review of The Violent Bear It Away, 
'O'Connor's sophisticated pessimism creates a number of unrewarding moral 
culs-de-sac,.39 Brinkmeyer argues that it is the violent who bear 'if not the kingdom 
of heaven, then at least this novel- away', O'Connor 'was in this novel carried away 
too, her more charitable Catholic vision overwhelmed by her fundamentalist 
fanaticism' (Art and Vision, 131). Weil's final two criteria for texts of literary and 
spiritual genius are useful here in approaching the issue of whether the depiction of 
violent grace in the novel successfully prepares for a moment of grace in which men 
find their souls. 
Tarwater's rape and its impact on his subsequent behaviour does comply with 
Weil's third standard for fictions of redemptive genius, that they must manifest 
grace intervening violently in human affairs, which causes suffering against the will, 
and leads to the redemptive cognition of spiritual truth. The cruciform imagery used 
to describe Tarwater's awakening naked, with his hands tied, and finding himself 
'propped up against a log that lay across a small open space between two very taU 
trees'; combined with his 'twisted' mouth, 'scorched' eyes and the 'loud cry' that 
'tore' out of him, testify to his affliction. (VB 231-32, 232). But the cross 
symbolises redemptive suffering as well as undeserved agony, and combined with 
his burning of the bushes which mark the site of the rape, suggests Tarwater's 
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potential to apprehend sacred truths. This is emphasised by the information that he 
'knew that his destiny forced him on to a final revelation', and that Tarwater's eyes 
'would never be used for ordinary sights again' (232). 
Tarwater's vision of Mason sharing the Eucharist with the 'multitude' he sees 
'seated on the slope' of the field, and his apparition of the 'red-gold tree of fire' 
which appeared 'as if it would consume the darkness in one tremendous burst of 
flame' (241,242), qualifies the narrative for the first feature ofWeil's final criteria 
for texts of genius, that they must render both the beauty as well as the bitterness of 
the world. But most crucially, the conclusion of the novel depicts Weil's most 
important demand for redemptive fictions, that they represent the brief epiphanic 
instant of grace in which men manage to rise above the strictures of gravity and find 
their souls. The command to go warn of the terrible speed of God's mercy, the 
'words which were as silent as seeds opening one at a time in his blood' constitute 
the vital moment of grace in which Tarwater transcends the limits imposed on him 
by the world of necessity, and finds his soul by accepting his prophetic mission 
(242). The final paragraphs of the novel are loaded with imagery that indicates this 
spiritual ascendancy. Tarwater's epiphany begins when his eyes 'lifting' beyond 
Mason's grave 'appeared to see something coming in the distance' (240), and when 
he experiences his hunger as a tide rather than a pain, Tarwater: 
felt it rising in himself through time and darkness, rising through the 
centuries, and he knew that it rose in a line of men whose lives were 
chosen to sustain it, who would wander in the world, strangers from 
that violent country where the silence is never broken except to shout 
the truth. (242) 
I would argue that in this narrative, O'Connor fulfils WeWs criteria for texts of 
redemptive genius, and in doing so, manages to parallel her own role as Christian 
writer-prophet with her fictional character's mission. As Desmond contends: 
O'Connor's novel is prophetic in at least two senses. It dramatizes 
the struggle of young Tarwater over whether to answer the call to 
become a prophet, a bearer of God's word into the world. On another 
level the novel is reflexive; through Tarwater's struggle it dramatizes 
Q'Connor's struggle as prophetic novelist.40 
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To what extent O'Connor is successful at realising a Christian literature, and just 
how my thesis demonstrates how Weil's work assists iIi interrogating O'Connor's 
writings, forms the basis of my following Conclusion. 
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NOTES TO CBAPTER THREE 
1. E. J. Yarnold, 'Grace', in Richardson & Bowden, Christian Theology, pp. 244-45 
(p.245). 
2. Types of Christian grace identified by theologians include: 'uncreated grace': 
God's gift of himself, 'created grace': the transformation of human nature this 
brings about, 'habitual' and 'sanctifying grace': God's supernatural 
self-communication permanently offered, and the permanent principle of new life in 
the Spirit; 'actual grace': required for particular needs and actualised in the act of 
acceptance, 'elevating grace': participation in divine nature, 'healing grace': heals 
the effects of sin, 'prevenient grace': God's grace anticipating man's movement to 
God, and 'efficacious grace': God's offer of grace to which man responds. For 
detailed analysis of grace and its related concepts see the relevant entries in the 
theological works I have referred to in previous chapters: Richardson & Bowden, 
ibid., Komonchak, Dictionary of Theology, McGrath, Introduction, and Reader, 
McBrien, Catholicism. See also: on both Catholic and Protestant doctrines: Henry 
Bettenson, ed., Documents of the Christian Church, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1967). On contemporary Christian theologians, an area I am 
unable to cover here due to constraints of space see: David F. Ford, ed., The Modem 
Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, 2nd 
edn (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997). For detailed discussions of Catholic grace 
and its related doctrines see: Jacques Dupuis, ed., The Christian Faith: In the 
Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, 6th edn (Bangalore: Theological 
Publications in India, 1996), Aidan Nichols, O.P., The Shape of Catholic Theology: 
An Introduction to Its Sources, Principles, and History (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1991), and Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, trans. by Patrick Lynch, 
ed. by James Bastible, 4th edn (Rockford, Illinois: Tan, 1960). 
3. Catholicism, p.1236. Conversion also refers to 'the decision of an individual or 
group to change affiliation from one major religious tradition to another'. See Lewis 
R. Rambo, 'Conversion', in Richardson and Bowden, pp.123-24 (p.123). 
4. David A. PaiJin, 'Revelation', in ibid., pp.503-06 (p.503). See also: revelation is 
'God's self-disclosure (literally, "unveiling") to humankind through creation, events, 
persons, and especially Jesus Christ', CatholiCism, p. 1249. 
5. Diane Bergant, CSA, 'Prophecy', in Komonchak, pp.808-11 (p.808). Prophecy 
involves individuals experiencing personal revelations that deepen their 
understanding of God, man, and the world, and for New Testament prophets such as 
St. Paul this involves deepening their understanding of the gospels. See St. Paul on 
revelation: Romans 16; 25-27, Colossians 1: 26, on the mystery of revelation and its 
witnessing by the Apostles and prophets: 1 Corinthians 2: 7 and Ephesians 3:5. On 
his private revelations, and how others can experience revelations as insights into 
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the gospels see: 2 Corinthians 12: 1-7, Galatians 2: 2, and Ephesians 1: 17, 
Philippians 3: 15. 
6. I use the terms 'Protestant' and 'Protestantism', like Jeffrey Gros FSC, to refer 
to 'those Churches and ecclesial communions of the West that have their origin in 
the sixteenth-century Reformation'. See his 'Protestantism' in Komonchak, pp. 
8tl-15 (p.811). I concentrate here on the traditional distinction between 
Catholicism and Protestantism at the expense of more recent ecumenical 
movements between the two churches for two reasons. First, Weil died long before 
the changes of emphasis in Catholic doctrine heralded by Vatican II (October 1962 
- December 1965), and second, O'Connor's conservative Catholicism, interest in, 
and respect for Protestantism, plus her death in 1964, ensured she was only 
marginally affected by the changing religious climate. 
7. As McGrath observes, Pelagius 'understood grace to be external enlightenment 
provided for humanity by God', which 'informs us what our moral duties are', but 
'does not, however, assist us to perform them. We are enabled to avoid sin through 
the teaching and example of Christ' , Introduction, p.375. 
8. See McGrath: 
Humanity is justified as an act of grace: even human good works are 
the result of God working within fallen human nature. Everything 
leading up to salvation is the free and unmerited gift of God, given 
out of love for sinners. Through the death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ, God is enabled to deal with fallen humanity in this 
remarkable and generous manner, giving us that which we do not 
deserve (salvation), and witholding from us that which we do deserve 
(condemnation). (Ibid. p.376) 
Augustine's notion of 'prevenient grace' maintains 'God's grace is active in human 
lives before conversion', while his theory of 'operative grace' considers 'God effects 
the conversion of sinners without any assistance on their part. Conversion is a purely 
divine process, in which God operates upon the sinner'. Ibid., p.378. 
9. 'Actual grace' constitutes 'a series of divine actions or influences upon human 
nature', while 'habitual grace' is 'a created habit of grace, within the human soul\ 
ibid., p.379. On how grace builds on nature in Aquinas' schema see Me Brien: 
'Grace elevates and transforms human nature, but human nature retains all of its 
characteristics, including its weaknesses [ ... ] Grace presupposes nature; it doesn't 
replace it', Catholicism, p. 176. If 'grace supposes nature, nature in its own way 
supposes grace', and this 'emphasis on the importance of the natural and of the 
natural order is historically and theologically characteristic of Catholicism·. Ibid., 
p.169. 
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to. Augustine argued that justification 'was to be found within believers; Luther 
insisted that it remained outside believers. For Augustine the righteousness in 
question is internal; for Luther it is external.' McGrath, Introduction, p. 385. 
Protestants 'drew a sharp distinction between the event of being declared righteous 
and the process of being made righteous, designating the former ''justification'' and 
the latter "sanctification"', while for Catholicism they were 'simply different 
aspects of the same thing'. Ibid., p.387. For excerpts from the most important 
documents on the Catholic and Protestant debate in the human nature versus grace 
argument, see McGrath's Reader, pp.212-57. 
11. See McGrath: 
Faith is not assent to an abstract set of doctrines, but a union between 
Christ and the believer. It is the response of the whole person of the 
believer to God, which leads in turn to the real and personal presence 
of Christ in the believer [ ... J Faith makes both Christ and his benefits 
- such as forgiveness, justification, and hope - available to the 
believer. (Introduction p.384) 
The Catholic Church's response at The Council of Trent (1545-1563) was to deny 
the supremacy of faith and reinforce the doctrine that faith is not saving without 
good works, hope and charity: 'No one can know with a certitude of faith which 
cannot be subject to error, that one has obtained God's grace', "'You see that one is 
justified by works and not by faith alone". It is this increase in faith that the holy 
Church asks for when she prays: "Give us, 0 Lord, an increase of faith, hope and 
charity"'. Dupuis, Christian Faith, p.754. 
12. See Springstead's analysis of Weil's metaxu in Christus Mediator, pp. 197-219. 
13. See Wei! on 'conventions': 
If it were something other than a convention, it would be at least 
partially human and not totally divine. A real convention is a 
supernatural harmony [ ... J Only a convention can be the perfection of 
purity here below, for all nonconventionaI purity is more or less 
imperfect. That a convention should be real, that is a miracle of 
divine mercy. (WFG p.188) 
14. 'Prayer consists of attention. It is the orientation of all the attention of which the 
soul is capable toward God', ibid., p. 105. 
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15. 'There is no friendship where there is inequality' Weil insists (ibid., p.204), it 
requires the same type of equilibrium of incommensurates achieved when the 
non-afflicted assists the afflicted: 
Through this supernatural miracle of respect for human autonomy, 
friendship is very like the pure forms of compassion and gratitude 
called forth by affliction. In both cases the contraries which are the 
terms of the harmony are necessity and liberty, or in other words 
subordination and equality. These two pairs of opposites are 
equivalent. (Ibid. p.205) 
16. For an analysis of Weil's concept of beauty see Patrick Sherry, 'Simone Wei! 
on Beauty', in Bell, pp.260-76. 
17. GG, p.4. Note the similarity between Weil's concept of moral gravity and 
Christian humility: 'For everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and the man 
who humbles himself will be exalted.' Luke 14: 11. 
18. WFG, p. 195, p.197. Weil's rejection ofa search for God is due to the influence 
of Hinduism on her thinking: 
As the Hindus perceived, the great difficulty in seeking for God is 
that we have him within us, at the centre of ourselves. How can I 
approach myself? Every step I take leads me away from myself. That 
is why we cannot search for God. (FLN p.261) 
19. WFG, p.64. This bread/stone imagery is a motif used frequently by Weil: see 
ibid., p.107, p.220, p.lS7 amongst others. This symbolism is connected to a wider 
concept: the need to look and not eat as an analogy for the requirement to develop 
passive activity/desire for God, rather than a search for him via muscular free will. 
Referring to the biblical Fall narrative in which 'by eating the fruit' Eve 'caused 
humanity to be lost', Weil maintains 'the opposite attitude' should be what saves 
mankind, ibid., p.166. '''Two winged companions", says an Upanishad, "two birds 
are on the branch of a tree. One eats the fruit, the other looks at it". These two birds 
are the two parts of our soul', ibid. 'Man's great affliction, which begins with 
infancy and accompanies him till death, is that looking and eating are two different 
operations. Eternal beatitude [ ... ] is a state where to look is to eat', NB, p.637. This 
concept is apparent in Weil's attitude to the Eucharist. On this subject see Loades, 
'Eucharistic Sacrifice: Simone Weil' s Use of a Liturgical Metaphor', and Van Herik 
on looking and eating imagery. 
20. Weil's notion of void in addition to other areas of her philosophy has both 
similarities with and distinctions from existentialism. On Weil, void, and 
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existentialism see Iris Murdoch, 'Void', in her Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals 
(London: Penguin, 1992), pp. 498-512; 'Knowing the Void' in Existentialists and 
Mystics, pp.157-160 (first publ. in The Spectator, November 1956), and E. W. 
Martin, 'Simone Weil and Existential Commitment', Hibbert Journal, 63 (1964), 
9-12. 
21. See St. John of the Cross: 'The means to a knowledge of God and of oneself is 
this dark night with its aridities and voids' from which: 
the soul draws spiritual humility, which is the contrary virtue to the 
first capital sin, which as we said, is spiritual pride. Through this 
humility, which is acquired by the said knowledge of self, the soul is 
purged from all those imperfections whereinto it fell with respect to 
that sin of pride, in the time of its prosperity. 
See Book I, Chapter XII, (8), in Dark Night, p.75. 
22. To consent to being 'anonymous [ ... ] to renounce prestige, public esteem .. that is 
to bear witness to the truth, namely, that one is composed of human material, that 
one has no rights. It is to cast aside all ornament, to put up with one's nakedness' 
(NB p. 217). 
23. Robert Coles links Weil's concept of decreation to a kind of inverted 
egocentrism: 
there is a terrific (and arguably perverse) willfulness at work in all 
this struggle for paralysis, even as the notion of "decreation" may be 
regarded as an ultimate assertion of the self by means of the very 
effort to assault and demolish, once and for all, its hold. 
See his article 'Simone Weil: The Mystery of Her Life'. Yale ReView, 73.2 (1984) 
309-20 (p.319). However Weirs respect for Hinduism may offer a more positive 
interpretation for her concept of decreation. Discussing the Hindu notion that God is 
within the self, she notes the only way to legitimately search for God is 'to come 
out of oneself and contemplate oneself from outside. Then, from outside. one sees 
at the centre of oneself God as he is', but this requires 'total renunciation of being 
anybody'. FLN, p.261. 
24. See St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 13: 12: 'Now we are seeing a dim reflection in a 
mirror; but then we shall be seeing face to face. The knowledge that I have now is 
imperfect; but then I shall know as fully as I am known. ' 
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25. FLN, p.31O. But her idea that the soul is consumed by the divine ensures that the 
distinction between heaven and hell that is so vital to Christian notions of 
redemption and damnation, is less important to Wei!. The concepts of heaven and 
hell amount to imaginative constructs by which the human mind can understand the 
soul's fate. Mankind cannot conceive the difference between the soul's 
disappearance into the absence or presence of God and that 'is why the 
representations of heaven and hell have been elaborated, so as to have an 
approximation which the imagination can grasp', ibid., 142. 
26. Weil finds this concept in Plato's Phaedrus, the myth of the Cave in Republic, 
and the biblical parable concerning the wedding banquet. See IC, pp. 3.4. 
27. This cannibalistic imagery is apparent elsewhere in WeWs writings. 'Instead of 
loving a human being for his hunger, we love him as food for ourselves. We love 
like cannibals. To love purely is to love the hunger in a human being' she claims 
FLN, 284. Weil appears to consider God's devourment of man is an acceptable 
metaphor for divine love, but when she applies the same type of symbolism to the 
relationship between humans it has a negative connotation. The limitation of human 
love is due to the fact 'one loves only what one can eat. When a thing is no longer 
edible one leaves it to anyone else who can still find nourishment in it', ibid., p. 
322-23. 
28. For excellent analyses of Christian mysticism, its symbolism and language, see 
Denys Turner, The Darkness a/God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), and Evelyn Underhill, The Mystic Way: The 
Role a/Mysticism in the Christian Life (Atlanta, Georgia: Ariel Press, 1913, 1992). 
See also: Grace M. Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), and Mark A. McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The 
Integrity a/Spirituality and Theology (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998). 
29. The position of the intelligence is 'the key to this harmony, because the 
intelligence is a specifically and rigorously individual thing. This harmony exists 
wherever the intelligence, remaining in its pJace, can be exercised without hindrance 
and can reach the complete fulfillment of its function'. WFG, p.78. 
30. LP, p.37. But Aquinas actually demonstrates more flexibility than Weil 
acknowledges. Also concerned to preserve the primacy of individual conscience in 
the face of the possibility of institutionalised error, he maintains: 'anyone upon 
whom the ecclesiastical authority, in the ignorence of true facts, imposes a demand 
that offends against his clear conscience, should perish in excommunication rather 
than violate his conscience'. IV Sentences, dist. 38, q. 2. a. 4, CatholiCism. p.972. 
31. See McGrath, Introduction. pp.379-92 on grace and justification by faith, and on 
sola Scriptura see ibid., pp.66.67. 
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32. See 1. T. McNeill's discussions of 'Calvinism, Calvin', and 'Lutheranism, 
Luther', in Richardson and Bowden, pp.79.81, and pp.342-44. 
33. NB, p.574. This struggling against God can be attributed to both Weil's 
lewishness and ego. See Nevin: 
How Jewish, too, we find her passionate wrestling, often bitter and 
violent, with God. Her attente de Dieu itself barely conceals a plea 
that God issue her a command, make. as it were, a covenant with her. 
This is egotism of the highest order. (Nevin p.390) 
34. Turner, p.32. See Ricoeur on how silence opens up a space for 'hearkening' and 
obedience in his essay 'Religion, Atheism, and Faith', in Conflict of Interpretations, 
pp. 440-67 (pp.449·52). 
35. See Weil's substitution of her favourite metaxu: affiiction, for baptism: 
Baptism contains the symbol of the state of perfection. The 
engagement it involves is the promise to desire that state and to 
beseech God for it - as a hungry child never stops asking his father 
for bread But we cannot know what this promise commits us to until 
we encounter the terrible presence of affiiction. It is only there, face 
to face with affiiction that the true commitment can be made, through 
a more secret, more mysterious, more miraculous contact even than a 
sacrament. 
36. See note 63 in my Introduction on 'passive diminishments'. 
37. See his The Otherness Within: Gnostic Readings in Marcel Proust, Flannery 
o ·Connor. and Francois Vii/on (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1983), 
p.96. 
38. For a detailed analysis of Protestant FundamentaHsm see Kathleen C. Boone, 
The Bible Tells Them So: The Discourse of Protestant Fundamentalism (London: 
SCM Press, 1989, 1990). See William Dinges, 'Fundamentalism', in Komonchak, 
pp. 411-14, and Raymond F. Collins, 'Fundamentalism', in Richardson and Bowden, 
pp.223.24 for the similarities and differences between Catholicism and 
Fundamentalism. See O'Connor's own expressions of the resemblances between 
her Catholic faith and the fundamentalists, including: 'I accept the same 
fundamental doctrines of sin and redemption and judgement that they do', HB, 
p.350. 'Theologically our differences with them are on the nature of the Church, not 
on the nature of God or our obligations to him' she insists, ibid., p.SI8. For a useful 
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discussion of O'Connor's Fundamentalism and its links to her fictional form see 
Robert H. Brinkmeyer Jr., 'A Closer Walk with Thee: Flannery O'Connor and 
Southern Fundamentalists', Southern Literary Journal, 18.2 (1986), 313-21. 
39. 'Review', Times Literary Supplement, 14 October 1960, p.666. 
40. See his article 'Violence and the Christian Mystery: A Way to Read Flannery 
O'Connor', Literature and Beliej, 15 (1995),163-181. 
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CONCLUSION: DEEPER AND STRANGER VISIONS 
In 1964, Flannery O'Connor presented a lecture, later published as 'Catholic 
Novelists and Their Readers' in which she infonns her audience: 
The poet is traditionally a blind man, but the Christian poet, and 
storyteller as well, is like the blind man whom Christ touched, who 
looked then and saw men as if they were trees, but walking. This is 
the beginning of vision, and it is an invitation to deeper and stranger 
visions that we shall have to learn to accept if we want to realize a 
truly Christian literature. 1 . 
As writer-prophet O'Connor aims to inscribe deeper and stranger Christian visions 
on the souls of her 'monstrous' secular readers through fictional and non-fictional 
writings. To conclude my analysis of her attempt to achieve this by correcting what 
she considered her audience's impaired, desacralised vision, I will examine two 
questions. First, how does my thesis demonstrate how Weil's work can assist readers 
to see O'Connor's writings differently, and interrogate her form(s), theology, and 
the relationship between them? Second, how successful is O'Connor at persuading 
her secular audience to read her work differently, recalling them to known but 
ignored spiritual truths, and realising 'a truly Christian literature'? 
To re-view how Weil and her work makes an original contribution to the field of 
O'Connor studies, I will divide my analysis into three sections examining: first, 
WeWs inter-linked concepts of superposed reading and locating equilibrium 
between incommensurates. Second, her four criteria for literature of genius, and her 
notions of the writer's role. Third, her theological concepts of God, experiential 
reality, man, and how they are connected. 
As my Introduction demonstrated, Weil's theory of superposed reading, with its 
central premise that to read, rather than possess merely subjective, inaccurate 
opinions dominated by prejudices, requires intensive attention in which truths may 
be eventually ascertained by balancing many simultaneous interpretations. provides 
a new method o~ approaching both O'Connor and her writings. This superposed 
reading strategy supplies O'Connor's critics with a mode of reading the ambiguities 
and contradictions within her narratives and non-fictional writings, a means of 
balancing the actual content of the fictions with her aural circumcision; a method of 
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finding equilibrium between divergent critical interpretations, and consequently, 
permits her readers to ascertain some truths, if not the truth, contained in 
O'Connor's works. 
Weil's extension of her superposed reading strategy to include the concept of 
finding equilibrium between incommensurates is an extremely useful tool for 
building the kind of critical architecture in, and through which to analyse 
O'Connor's writings and O'Connor studies itself. Weil's notion that the illegitimate 
use of contradiction involves being prematurely satisfied with one-dimensional 
solutions to contraries can be rightly applied to the type of 'Pavlovian critics' 
Satterfield and others have identified: who read the fictions from a single Christian! 
anagogical perspective, because they have been instructed to do so through 
O'Connor's aural circumcision. Such readers ignore both the complexity of the 
fictions, which offer spiritual connotations yet undermine them, and the 
ambivalences within O'Connor's lectures, essays, and letters, which are themselves 
dialogic and subjective. Her critical disciples effectively negate one element of the 
contradiction, the literal, in their search for specifically anagogical textual 
completions, and in doing so fall into the critical trap of reading the fictions as 
theological treatises. 
Yet O'Connor's secular readers are also capable, in their contrary inclination to 
negate anagogical interpretations, of allowing their objections to the aural 
circumcision process perpetuated by O'Connor and her elect, to obstruct their 
reading of the stories, and consequently underestimate the quality of the fictions. In 
his vitriolic castigation of O'Connor and her literary disciples, Satterfield's 
invective is as guilty of the 'didacticism with a vengeance' that he so ardently 
condemns in his critical opponents (Satterfield 41). His conclusion that O'Connor 
'will remain a second rate fictionist' (42), appears founded not on close examination 
of the fictions, but the assertion that if 'the things the sectarian critics have written 
about O'Connor have any validity, then her work is undeniably more concerned with 
doctrine than art', and therefore he argues, she should be placed in the canon of 
American literature as 'a religious propagandist of minor importance who wrote 
didactic fiction, or at least thought she did' (48). Both O'Connor's insider and 
outsider readers are like Weil's critics, subjective.2 But Weil's superposed method 
of finding legitimate equilibrium between contraries by intensive attention, 
detached, objective vision which negates neither element of the contradiction, offers 
a framework for balancing the different readings both O'Connor, her work, and 
O'Connor studies itself 'cries out for'. 
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Yet paradoxically it is Weil's own subjectivity. her outsider's prejudiced 
philosophical bias against the autonomous value of fictions, which leads to the 
second major area in which she illuminates O'Connor and her writings. It is due to 
her belief that the majority of fictional narratives prevent the attainment of spiritual 
truths because they are inherently fictitious, and her opinion that fiction writers, 
unless they have a 'philosophical bent' are unworthy of attention, that instigates 
Weil's establishment of her criteria for texts and writers of genius, -which, as 
Chapter One argued, offer original, and indispensable frameworks for interrogating 
O'Connor's fictions and her role as Christian writer-prophet. 
Sharing O'Connor's concern with how to make narratives mediums for the 
communication of spiritual truths, yet conversely considering this function is only 
achievable by solving the 'problem' of literary fictionality through narratives which 
transcend their fictional status. Weil combines the incommensurates of insider and 
outsider viewpoints to provide a truly different way of reading O'Connor's fictions 
and her comments about them. Her four criteria for texts of genius more 
convincingly explicate O'Connor's aims as anagogical writer than O'Connor's own 
non-fictional writings. and offer a means of judging how successfully O'Connor's 
narratives - separated from her aural circumcision - may. or may not. write 
Christian truths on the soul. Weil's first three points offer more succinctly and 
compellingly. insights into O'Connor's motivation for using the multiple 
interpretative levels offered by fictions, specifically, medieval allegory, and her 
reasons for employing the violent shock-tactics of the grotesque genre as a method 
of communicating her Christian vision, making a story successful. and fulfilling her 
mission as writer-prophet. Yet Weil's fourth criteria, that great spiritual fictions 
must demonstrate both the beauty and afflictions of human life, allied to her stress 
on their requirement to accurately depict the oppositional relationship between good 
and evil that dominates experiential reality. offers some explanation for why the 
moments of grace O'Connor insists occur within the narratives, remain less than 
convincing to her outsider readers. The absence or inversion of beauty in her stories, 
O'Connor's Catholic belief in the utility of sin, and employment of evil as a 
preparation for the action of grace in the narratives, makes the fictions more 
dramatic and interesting, but ultimately dilutes her theological thesis: that such 
grotesque and immoral characters. in such an ugly Fallen world, have the potential 
to be. actually have been redeemed. 
Weil's extension of the (im)morality issue to incorporate the fiction writer's 
function, again based on her philosophical bias - fictions must transcend fictionaIity, 
great writers require sanctity, writing on the soul is connected to the soul of the 
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writer - provides significant illuminations of O'Connor's notion of her role as 
Christian fiction writer, and her preoccupation with how to balance the competing 
demands of her theology and fictional fonn. The contentious Weilean notion that to 
write texts of genius which themselves participate in the redemptive process 
through which readers, as well as fictional protagonists. re-cognise spiritual truths, 
requires rare writers of genius whose sanctity is the only antidote to the innate 
immorality of fictions, offers new methods of interrogating O'Connor and her work 
Flawed though it is by her defective rationale - the equation of genius with sanctity, 
the claim that writers of non-genius are incapable of being inspired by the sacred, or 
communicating spiritual truths - Weil's argument that average writers with 
pretensions to morality are no less immoral than others, have usurped the function 
of spiritual guidance which they do not deserve, and bear a moral responsibility for 
weakening spiritual values by depicting immorality, offers an important new slant 
through which to question O'Connor's concept of her role as Christian 
writer-prophet, and presumption that the grotesque genre assists her to reveal 
spiritual truths. Are her non-fictional proclamations of Christian orthodoxy 
pretensions to morality which are insufficient to countennand the immoral/amoral 
content of her narratives? Is O'Connor's defence of her amoral/grotesque narratives 
as: first, accurate depictions of a Fallen world, second, a necessary strategy for 
demonstrating this reality to readers too stupid or recalcitrant to accept it, and third, 
her somewhat sanctimonious 'habit of art' argument, sufficient to deserve/preserve 
her role as a kind of self-proclaimed literary-spiritual guide? Is it really credible to 
claim that her allegiance to the Catholic Church and its moral guardianship both 
intensifies her prophetic vision and absolves her of any moral responsibility for her 
work? 
Weil's concern with establishing the spiritual function of fictions from a 
distinctively philosophical viewpoint demonstrates her own status as both 
insider/outsider critic of literature, and I would argue, a fertile source for 
interpreting O'Connor and her writings. Weil's religious consciousness without a 
religion, Christianity without a Church, makes her insider/outsider spiritual position 
equally invaluable to interrogating O'Connor's theology and its 
depictiOn/non-depiction in the fictions. As Thomas Merton has observed, Wei! 
'preferred not to be in the middle of the Catholically approved and well-censored 
page, but only on the margin', and remained there as a question mark, 'questioning 
not Christ, but Christians,.3 So how does she cross-examine O'Connor's theology 
and her narratives? 
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As I observed in Chapter Two, Weil's concepts of God, reality, and the nature of 
man, in both their similarities and distinctions from O'Connor's theories otTer 
profitable lines of investigation into O'Connor's work. The WeiIean rational 
philosophical response to how it is possible to approach the mystery of God's 
existence, and the idea that atheism can be a purification. questions O'Connor's 
preference for faith over reason, and her notion that Christian scepticism is only 
constructive within the confines of the Catholic Church. Weil's unorthodox creation 
theory, her idea that God is both omnipotent and impotent, absent and present, and 
her unusual theodicy, which links the incommensurates of terrible affliction and 
human immorality with the existence of a benevolent God, otTer useful 
contradistinctions to O'Connor's Catholic concept of Providence. Equally, Weil's 
ideas provide interesting insights into O'Connor's notion that her fictions can only 
show grace in its absence, and how her Fallen fictional world and its protagonists, 
though saturated with ontic and moral evils, can conceivably also be simultaneously 
redeemed and subject to God's beneficial mercy. 
But it is in her concepts of man, and his relationship with God, that Weil provides 
some of her most significant insights into O'Connor's theology and writings. Her 
central exploration of the problems caused by ontological fictionality, and the 
schema she presents as a solution to overcoming this spiritual damage otTer original 
interrogations of O'Connor's concept of 'monstrous' secular man, and how she 
analyses being fictional with the fictional beings in the microcosms of her 
narratives. The core Weilean concept of affliction, its vital element of spiritual 
torment and capacity to annihilate man's fictional self, explains with greater lucidity 
than O'Connor's 0\\11 comments, the predicament of the maimed souls she is 
primarily concerned to explore in the narratives. 
This idea loss of self is paradoxically man's greatest virtue, leads into Weil's 
complex, interconnected notions of the three domains and architecture of the soul, 
which are highly pertinent to readings of O'Connor's work. Weil's in-depth 
examination of how the body may act as a lever for the soul, the philosophical 
framework she provides to analyse how man is subject to the gravitational pulls of 
his physical environment, yet crucially also subject to the supernatural necessity of 
God's compulsion on, and presence in, the soul, otTers fascinating new avenues of 
exploration into O'Connor's fundamental theory of the interconnection of mystery 
and manners, and how she attempts to depict the action of grace through a 
primarily grotesque nature in her fictions. The type of Weilean (un)free will that 
makes impulsive spiritual actions possible provides a new method of approaching 
O'Connor's notion of humanity's conflicting free willes), and her key concept of 
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the anagogical gesture she claims takes place in her fictions. Weil's theories on the 
links between contemporary man's deracination and desacralisation, and her claim 
that risk is a vital need of the soul, provide rewarding insights into some of 
O'Connor's most important theological beliefs and fictional requirements: her 
preoccupations with modem society's spiritual rootlessness, the reality of man's 
liberty, the free will on which the soul's eternal fate pivots between salvation and 
damnation; and her attempts to reproduce this hazardous drama of the soul in 
fictional form. Even Weil's inconsistencies provide insights into O'Connor's own. 
Weil's blurring of obedience to God into determinism, her failure to adequately 
distinguish between ontic and moral evils, the tension in her thinking between a 
Manichean desire to consider good and evil radically opposed, yet concession they 
may be linked, her claim for man's free will yet impoverished view of humanity 
prone to evil unless grace intervenes, are all demonstrated in the tension between 
O'Connor's Catholicism and the content of her fictions. 
As Chapter Three has established, Weil's notion that mankind is incapable of 
progressing towards God without the intervention of gratuitous grace, yet idea it is 
imperative for humanity to find the bridges, or metaxu which unite the contraries of 
God and man, combined with her criteria for texts of genius that attempt to mediate 
this reality in fictional narratives, provide unique insights into both O'Connor's 
theology, fictions, and aural circumcision. A comparison of Weil's implicit loves 
with O'Connor's emphasis on the institutional Christian metaxu of the sacraments 
at the expense of love and beauty. and the inversion or absence of these mediators 
in the stories, raises questions about just how Christian, how Catholic O'Connor and 
her writings are.4 Weil's important concept of spiritual mechanics offers fascinating 
new approaches to both the interior workings or O'Connor's fictional form, and her 
notions of the relationship between God and man. The central premise that lowering 
leads to spiritual rising illuminates O'Connor's use of the carnival grotesque as 
narrative form and the interior apparatus of her fictions: the plot structures in which 
protagonists must be physically or socially humiliated before they can potentially 
reach a higher moral level, the moral amorality which debases or inverts spiritual 
language, symbolism, and biblical references in an attempt to regenerate their 
original meanings. Weil's important concepts of the necessity to experience void 
and decreation, and her analysis of the human mechanics of fictionality and sin 
through which man tries to escape these ordeals, manage to illuminate with greater 
clarity than O'Connor's non-fictional writings, her understanding of secular man, 
his limitations, their causes and consequences, and how she depicts them in her 
stories. 
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But most significantly, the Weilean core concepts of a seed of grace, violent grace 
and violent free will, allied to her final two criteria for texts of genius, provide 
original and penetrating insights into both O'Connor's theology and attempts to 
depict the action of grace in her fictions. Specifically Weil's analysis of how pure 
violence on the soul is connected to man's self-violence, God's compulsion on the 
soul, and violent free will offers major new avenues of enquiry into O'Connor's 
concept of violent grace, violent love, complex free will, the interaction of nature 
and grace, the encounter between God and man, and how these theories operate in 
her narratives. Commensurately, the concept of violent free will presents a different 
perspective of O'Connor's dialogism: her constant attempt to balance the conflicting 
demands of her theological imperative, yet desire to write great fictions not merely 
dispensed dogma, the collision between her attempts to make her religious prophecy 
manifestly clear in the fictions by aural circumcision, yet textual ambiguities within 
the narratives. 
Weil's rejection of the Catholic Church and its doctrines as a principle metoxu 
between the sacred and profane because she considers it non-essential to the 
personal mystical encounter which eventually unites God and man, and belief 
adherence to Church dogmas would remove her intellectual freedom, offer a direct 
challenge to O'Connor's position. By asking why?, and how?, is the Church 
necessary to fonning a relationship between the incommensurates of God and man, 
Weil's ideas highlight the differences between O'Connor's theological concept of 
how God's Word is mediated through the Church, how she attempts to communicate 
this reality through Fundamentalist characters in her fictions, and the aural 
circumcision by which she endeavours to disseminate the Word to her audience. 
In concluding my discussion of how Weil and her writings both interrogate and 
illuminate O'Connor's work, it is important to note that she sheds new light on the 
whole canon of O'Connor's fictions, not merely the texts I have examined in the 
preceding chapters. Consider for example how Weil's theory of the need to accept 
the superposed reality of aflliction and God's love offers a splendid new approach 
to analysing the hermaphrodite in 'A Temple of the Holy Ghost' (1954). Her 
responses to the questions: Is there a God? And how can this be known?, and Weil's 
concept of void can be usefully applied to the Misfit; and her notions of being 
fictional, the need for risk, and violent grace to annihilate the fictional self, add a 
new dimension to discussion of the grandmother in 'A Good Man Is Hard to Find' 
(1953). The idea the body acts as a lever for the soul, Weil's concept of the 
architecture of the soul, and complex (un)free will, supply alternative ways of 
interpreting 'Parker's Back' (1965). The problems of deracination and 
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desacralisation afford interesting methods of reading 'The Displaced Person' 
(1954), 'A View of the Woods' (1957), and O'Connor's first and last stories, 'The 
Geranium' (1946) and 'Judgement Day' (1965). Equally, Weil's concepts of 
spiritual mechanics, the need for unbiased, objective superposed readings of 
humanity and the world, and her theory of the metaxu, contribute important and 
original opportunities for reinvigorating interpretations of Ruby Turpin and her 
epiphany at the end of the appropriately titled 'Revelation' (1964). The startling 
convergences between Weil and O'Connor's thinking, and the equally interesting 
distinctions, ensure that each of O'Connor's narratives can be read using one or 
several of Weil's concepts to provide significantly different interpretations. 
In keeping with my comparative study of these two very different yet similar writers, 
after analysing how Weil both illuminates and challenges O'Connor and her work I 
will briefly examine four areas in which O'Connor interrogates Wei! and her 
writings. First, agreeing with Sally Fitzgerald's claim that O'Connor 'cannot be 
dismissed in silence. Even those who take a strongly contrary or reductive view 
appear to feel she must be engaged',5 I would argue that in addition to her 
influential aural circumcision, O'Connor's grotesque fictions have the capacity to be 
engaging, to offer profound meanings which write on the souls of her readers, even 
if their ambiguity ensures no single (Christian) truth is automatically conveyed from 
writer to reader. Consequently they refute Weil's claim that fictions have no 
autonomous value beyond Christian prophecy. As Thibon notes of Weil's own 
work, writers of genius both reveal and create, if the literariness of philosophy, its 
symbolic and evocative value, its capacity to be both philosophical and fictional, is 
what provides its ability to be prophetic, I would argue that O'Connor's 
philosophicaI/theological fictions also have this ability to write on the soul. Second, 
part of O'Connor's ability to engage the reader - secular and Christian - is due to the 
comic elements of her vision, which can add an extra dimension to Weil's concept 
of superposed reading and texts of genius. 6 By providing another form of balance, 
linking the incommensurates of comic and terrible, sacred and profane, O'Connor's 
comedy helps to provide a more accurate density of the real, a deeper architecture of 
the abyss, the beauty as well as the bitterness of the world, which Weil considers so 
important. The inversion of Weil' s type of hierarchy of language forms part of this 
process, the uses of profanity and banality, the parodying of biblical references and 
the ironic, satirical narrative voice, can to some extent defarniliarise and make 
strange habitual perceptions and provide a hierarchy of readings, even if not 
O'Connor's specifically Christian interpretation. In contrast to Weil's preoccupation 
with the monstrous, harrowing, repulsive agony of necessity and ailliction, the kind 
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of ludicrous monstrosity envisioned by O'Connor offers not merely consolation or 
entertainment to her readers, but a more balanced method of writing on the soul. 
This conclusion leads to my third point. O'Connor's use of the grotesque genre. and 
its amalgamation of both the comic and terrible, illuminates how Weil personally, 
and her writings particularly, are prophetic. Weil's own ludicrous monstrosity, and 
her unconscious distortions, combined with the shocking figurative imagery and 
emotiveness of her work have as much, if not more success in engaging the reader, 
and writing her concepts on the souls of her audience (whether or not these concepts 
are accepted or rejected), than her rational use of contradiction and dialectic. 7 
Fourth, O'Connor's depiction of both Christ and man in her fictions can illuminate 
and illustrate Weil's equivalent concepts. O'Connor's fictional Christ - the wild, 
ragged, bleeding, stinking, mad creature that demands allegiance from her 
Christ-haunted characters, brings to life Weil's notion of Christ as scandalous logos 
a/ogos, the abased and inglorious fulcrum who paradoxically raises man from 
gravity to grace, and the necessity for man to commit himself to such a god who 
shares his affliction. In addition, O'Connor's plot structures render more 
persuasively than Weil's philosophical rationales, her second criteria for affliction: 
that it is arbitrarily inflicted against the will, and they more graphically demonstrate 
Weil's notion of spiritual deracination and its consequences: the fictional social 
personalities, spiritual lethargy and violence. The philosophical concept of being 
fictional is more cogently explored by fictional beings. 
But if fictions can write truths on the soul, how successful is O'Connor as 
writer-prophet at recalling her secular readers to known but ignored spiritual truths, 
and realising, specifically, a 'truly Christian literature'? To answer this question 
requires analysing how O'Connor endeavours to 'realise' a Christian literature 
through first, a fictional form, and second, her non-fictional forms of essays, 
lectures. and letters. In analysing the fictions, it is important to note the 
development in O'Connor's ability to suggest religious connotations in the 
narratives. While the idea a major division between her early and late work is 
over-stated, 8 there is an evolution in O'Connor's narratives from Wise Blood and 
the A Good Man Is Hard to Find short story collection, to The Violent Bear It Away 
and Everything That Rises Must Converge. 
The Manicheanism of Wise Blood, Haze's physical and spiritual blindness, his need 
to die to escape the unredeemably Fallen world depicted by the novel, and his at best 
highly doubtful and unconvincing salvation, ensures proclamations of epiphany and 
redemption for Haze are reliant, primarily, on aural circumcision. Hulga Hopewell 
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must return humiliated to the world, but her vision is blurred and evidence of a 
spiritual revelation is equivocal. However O'Connor's later stories display a 
profounder integration, rather than collision, between the sacred and profane 
imagery,9 and most importantly, she allows her readers to view what her 
protagonists themselves perceive at the climactic endings of the narratives. In 'A 
Good Man Is Hard to Find' any redemptive vision for the grandmother is not 
conclusively shown, and her death permits no further evidence of altered behaviour 
to be explored, therefore claims for her salvation remain dependent on O'Connor's 
non-fictional utterances. But Francis Tarwater's epiphany towards the end of The 
Violent Bear It Away is revealed to the reader, and his actions afterwards display its 
impact on his conduct. This event, and Ruby Turpin's vision in 'Revelation', are 
therefore more, if not totally, successful at suggesting an anagogical dimension in 
these stories. 10 
I would argue that 'Revelation' is O'Connor's most anagogical text. The superposed 
structure of the story is well established through first, analogies to biblical texts: 
most obviously the Book of Revelation, 11 and second, the successful investing of 
profane symbols with mystical connotations. Deliberate parallels to the Book of 
Revelation are suggested by the use of equivalent symbols, which when combined 
with the story's title, encourage the reader to perceive mystically rather than see 
literally. References to 'a watery snake', an 'earthquake', and a 'wart hog' from hell 
are just some of the imagery used to prompt the reader into recognising the 
correspondences between the fictional narrative and biblical scripture. 12 Most 
interestingly, the last line of the gospel hymn on the radio, which Ruby comically 
supplies: 'And wona these days I know I'll we-eara crown', works anagogically, by 
reminding the reader of the woman crowned by stars in Revelation. 13 As Desmond 
argues, this story 'best demonstrates how O'Connor gathered up the themes of her 
work processively and deepened them through analogical technique'. 14 But while 
these biblical analogies require her 'intelligent', insider reader to make the 
necessary connections between fictional narrative and religious scripture, 
O'Connor's brilliant use of hog, and road/sky symbolism to indicate sacred mystery 
through the profane, ensures that it is not essential to be acquainted with the biblical 
analogues in order to apprehend the apocalyptic dimension of Ruby's final vision. 
The significantly named Mary Orace links these two major clusters of symbols. Her 
eyes are described as lit 'with a peculiar light, an unnatural light like night roadsigns 
give', and it is she who delivers the vital 'message' to Mrs Turpin: '00 back to hell 
where you came from you old wart hog' (CS 492, 500). Ruby's infuriated response 
to this insult: 'How am I a hog and me both? How am I saved and from hell too? 
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(506), itself illuminates the 'message' signposted to the reader: that grace operates 
through nature, that man is both fallen and redeemable. That it is she who is equated 
to a hog and not the 'niggers' and 'white trash' she despises, angers Ruby because it 
repudiates the assurance of superiority that she has gained by formulating her own 
Chain of Being. She literally rails against such an inversion of her carefully defined 
concept of a human hierarchy: 'Call me a wart hog from hell. Put that bottom rail on 
top. There'll still be a top and a bottom!' (507). But when the echo of her 
subsequent challenge to God: 'Who do you think you are?' is 'returned to her clearly 
like an answer', she is significantly silenced. (507, 508). 
As Asals argues, this is a story 'full of demeaning and reductive hogs. but the 
"transparent intensity" of the final landscape is irrevocably apocalyptic, and even 
the despised hogs have a crucial part to play in bringing about Mrs Turpin's 
revelation' (Imagination, 93). This linkage of the hogs to Ruby's apocalyptic vision 
is stressed by the narrator, who immediately after Ruby has been silenced, connects 
her figure as she hoses down the pigs, with the road/sky symbolism. After standing 
with her 'gaze fixed on the highway', she transfers her attention back to the pig 
parlour and stares 'as if through the very heart of mystery' down at the hogs who 
'appeared to pant with a secret life' (CS 508). When Ruby lifts her head, the 
'abysmal life-giving knowledge' she is seemingly 'absorbing' from the hogs, is 
linked to the 'purple streak' of sky that is 'like an extension of the highway' (508). 
The 'hieratic and profound' gesture in which she raises her hands, combined with 
the 'visionary light' in her eyes, suggests that just as her 'vision suddenly reversed 
itself' after she had been hit by the book, thrown by Grace, entitled Human 
Development; Ruby's vision has again been enlarged, and she may now possess the 
capacity to perceive grace through nature. 
The streak in the sky that she sees 'as a vast swinging bridge extending upwards 
from the earth through a field of living fire' acts as a Weilean-type metaxu along 
which Ruby discerns the 'vast horde of souls' which are 'rumbling toward heaven' 
(508). But the apocalyptic epiphany which is mediated through her consciousness is 
itself intended to function as a metaxu between the narrative and its reader, 
O'Connor as Christian writer-prophet and her monstrous secular audience. What the 
'shocked and altered faces' of Ruby's tribe, whose virtues are 'being burned away' 
as they march behind the white trash, niggers, freaks and lunatics reveal to both Mrs 
Turpin and potentially the reader, is that secular notions of 'good order and common 
sense and respectable behaviour' are themselves grotesque (508). That Ruby has 
'absorbed' the 'abysmal' but life-giving' knowledge imparted by this simultaneously 
comic and terrible revelation of how man is both fallen and redeemed, and how the 
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bottom rail will indeed be put on top, is stressed by the narrator's description of her 
ensuing behaviour (508). As she grips the hog pen rail and stares 'unblinkingly on 
what lay ahead' Ruby is left 'immobile', and after her vision has faded it is only at 
'length' that she makes her 'slow way' home (509). Most tellingly, instead of 
hearing the natural sounds of crickets, 'what she heard were the voices of the souls 
climbing upward into the starry field and shouting hallelujah' (509). 
O'Connor's 'carnal' readers may not accept that Ruby attains a 'spiritual' 
redemptive vision,15 or ascribe to the Christian 'message' her apocalyptic epiphany 
mediates. But as John F. Haught maintains, revelation means 'the breaking through 
of the dimension of mystery into our ordinary awareness. And it is especially 
through the intrinsically revelatory medium of symbols that this unconcealment of 
mystery occurs'. 16 I would argue, that primarily through the hog symbolism and its 
close connection in the narrative to the road/sky imagery, in this text O'Connor 
manages to suggest mystery through manners, a connection between the sacred and 
profane, the comic and terrible, and intimate an added, anagogical dimension more 
powerfully than in any of her other stories. 'What' O'Connor 'got to say' to her 
audience was never better revealed 17 
But as my readings of the narratives in the preceding three chapters have 
demonstrated, due to the textual ambiguities, the escape hatches • psychological. 
sexual, socially explicable mitigating circumstances previously embedded in 
O'Connor's narratives - the anagogical gesture and moment of grace she claims for 
her stories are most often debatable, because they rely too heavily on ambivalent. 
inconclusive evidence of an altered perspective or conduct. So why do so many of 
O'Connor's readers prefer to identify latent order behind the manifest in her 
fictions? 
The answer lies in the impact of O'Connor's extra-fictional comments, and I want to 
analyse the part played by this type of communication with her audience in 
promoting the realisation of a Christian literature, by returning to Frank Kermode's 
concepts of outsider and insider, carnal and spiritual readers, aural circumcision, 
and the moment of interpretative divination in which spiritual readers locate an 
impression point that gives sense and structure to a narrative. Discussing insider 
audiences Kermode maintains 'Only those who already know the mysteries· what 
the stories really mean - can discover what the stories really mean' (GeneSis 3), 
O'Connor's insider/Christian readers are predisposed to perceive mystically rather 
than carnally, and while some critics may be sympathetic to O'Connor's religious 
intentions, yet remain unconvinced by the depiction of her beliefs due to the 
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ambivalence of her fictions, too many, as members of O'Connor's elect, are 
prepared to make an act of divination, and find anagogical meanings, even when 
they are not textually apparent. 18 
All O'Connor's critics are susceptible to her persuasive aural circumcision in their 
desire to penetrate to profounder levels in texts and locate narrative coherence, to be 
'intelligent' rather than 'average' readers in O'Connor's terminology. But just as the 
communication of O'Connor's anagogical vision in the narratives is flawed by 
ambiguous signals, her aural circumcision is itself contradictory. Riven by the 
conflicting demands of both her religion and her art, O'Connor is compelled to 
make her monstrous readers see anagogically, yet considers her writing is not 
'primarily a missionary activity', and her fiction must be 'good in itselr (MM 81). 
In 'The Nature and Aim of Fiction' she quotes Joseph Conrad on the writer's role: 
My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the written 
word, to make you hear, to make you feel - it is, above all, to make 
you see. That - and no more, and it is everything. (80) 
O'Connor uses the 'power' of aural circumcision and the grotesque in an attempt to 
make her readers see with her Christian perspective, but this is not 'everything' for 
her. It is O'Connor's commitment to produce good fiction which ensures her texts 
are equivocal, and are ultimately unable to sustain irrevocably anagogical readings, 
and therefore the process of her Christian prophecy is obstructed. Yet this 
paradoxically redeems her fiction. As Kermode insists, 'a text with aU its wits about 
it would see and hear and remember too much', there 'would be no game, only a 
carnal world' (Genesis 14). 
Playing the game of interpretation with O'Connor's texts, both fictional and 
non-fictional, should involve acknowledging their ambivalences because these 
contradictions are what makes her work truly 'spirituaP. Carnal readings, as 
Kermode maintains, are all the sam~, while spiritual readings ofTer multiple 
interpretations. Neither exclusively treatises on grace, nor one-dimensional 
entertainments, they work on numerous levels, but only if O'Connor's readers are 
not deafened by her aural circumcision. Unable to 'leave evangelising to the 
evangelists' precisely because she did a writer's 'duti and attended to her art (MM 
171), O'Connor attempts to enhance the clarity of her insider's theology for an 
outsider audience via her lectures and essays. But failing to impose, even on herself, 
a mono logic viewpoint,19 she acknowledges that a 'story that is any good can't be 
255 
reduced, it can only be expanded. A stOI), is good when you continue to see more 
and more in it, and when it continues to escape you' (102). 
O'Connor's texts are good, because they 'escape' the imposition of any single 
interpretation, including her own. As Fodor argues, 'her stories have engaged 
popular and elite audiences, naturalistic and religious readings, and a variety of 
critical approaches, but in the end it may be their ability to elude all these categories 
that continues to fascinate readers' (Fodor 35). 'To be blessedly fallible'. as 
Kermode argues, 'to have the capacity to subvert manifest senses, is the mark of 
good enough readers and good enough texts' (Genesis 14). To be 'good enough' 
readers to perceive the true mystery in O'Connor's work w the oracular qualities 
which both suggest divine revelation, yet through equivocation obscure it - requires 
a revivified vision analagous to the radical change of perspective O'Connor herself 
demands of her readers. 
If as Victor Shklovsky argues, 'as perception becomes habitual, it becomes 
automatic', and the purpose of art is 'to impart the sensation of things as they are 
perceived and not as they are known',20 after decades of 'knowing' and 
disseminating O'Connor's anagogical interpretations, too large a proportion of her 
critics see her work automatically, rather than perceiving it with acts of critical 
divination. By relying too heavily on aural circumcision rather than textual 
evidence, anagogical readings become themselves carnal. The aurally circumcised 
amongst O'Connor's critics need, to borrow Shklovsky's Formalist terminology, to 
'defamiliarise' or 'make strange' their perception,21 to be jolted out of their 
exegetical complacency, in the same way O'Connor aims to use violence and the 
grotesque to shock both her fictional characters and monstrous readers into 
recognising the action of grace. As Bacon contends, more 'than any other writer, 
O'Connor needs to be repositioned' in the literary history of postwar America, 
because although the 'theological approach has deepened our understanding of 
O'Connor', it 'has also excluded her [ ... ] Even as they have praised her imaginative 
power, her admirers have marginalised O'Connor' (Bacon 5). I agree with Kreyling 
that the 'stubborn tradition of seeing O'Connor's work' as 'theologically 
exceptional - entitled to a truth status over and above that which we accord "mere" 
literature - has overpowered nearly every other approach', and 'it would be a 
mistake to read her work as if all it had to offer was a single-channel 
communication with the Omnipotent' (Kreyling 22). An altered perspective 
becomes possible when O'Connor's elect interpreters allow insider's readings into 
the 'community of the ear' (5). O'Connor criticism enjoys a renewed vitality when 
anagogical interpretations are argued against secular perspectives, and insider's 
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readings differ from O'Connor's own. Critical vigour in readings of O'Connor's 
work, as Rath observes, owes its 'power to the encounter between traditional 
scholars' and 'new scholars who see in O'Connor's writings new horizons of 
relevance and meaning' (Rath 11). 
O'Connor insisted she could wait fifty or a hundred years to have her fiction 
understood,22 but by inundating her audience with explanations of her anagogical 
perspective, she has been remarkably successful in ensuring the 'right kind' of 
readers,23 protect and maintain her authorised interpretations. However, if 
O'Connor's critics are to appreciate the full complexity of her texts they need to 
turn a deaf ear to aural circumcision, whether conducted by outsiders like 
Satterfield, or more ear-splittingly by insiders like O'Connor and her elect.24 As she 
herself acknowledges, art 'requires a delicate adjustment of the outer and inner 
world in such a way that, without changing their nature, they can be seen through 
each other' (MM 34-35), and O'Connor criticism benefits from those occasions 
when insider and outsider readings are focused as transparently. Only by such 
critical equilibrium can the truly brilliant, if not 'truly Christian' nature of 
O'Connor's fiction be fully realised, ifnot definitively explained. 
In Mark's gospel, immediately before the passage describing the cure of the blind 
man, Christ is frustrated by the disciples' inability to understand his parables. 'Do 
you not yet understand? Have you no perception? Are your minds closed? Have you 
eyes that do not see, ears that do not hear?' he demands (8: 17-18). To perceive and 
understand O'Connor's narratives as a specifically Christian literature requires the 
capacity to hear the insider discourse of the elect. As John R. May concedes, due to 
'O'Connor's preoccupation with conversion, the strongest temptation, even among 
the most judicious critics, is to project actual conversion beyond the available 
evidence,.25 Yet he proceeds to do just that, when claiming the 'reader has no 
choice but to hear the universal language of homo religiosus spoken by her 
contemporary parables', and although allowing her 'parables' can not demand 
assent, he insists 'inasmuch as the reader exists between call and response 
O'Connor's word is challenging him to respect the radical mystery of existence; to 
rob her stories of this meaning is to destroy their parabolic art (May, Word xxv, 19). 
While such readers may not see men like walking trees, they can still interpret 
atheist murderers, itinerant perverts, immoral thieves, and homosexual rapists, as 
agents of grace. 
But as 'spiritual' texts, O'Connor's stories resist the imposition of any overriding 
perspective. As Kennode observes, like parables, narratives have a 'radiant 
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obscurity', they both proclaim and conceal truth (Genesis 126). Consequently, 
although acts of divination 'glimpse the secrecy through the meshes of a text', it is 
only ever 'a momentary radiance' from the interpreter's particular 'angle' of vision 
(47, 144). Readings of O'Connor's work should be produced from our own 'angle', 
not because we have been programmed to see through either the 'anagogical 
glasses' O'Connor and her elect provide us with, or the literal ones which her 
outsider readers rely on.26 As O'Connor herself insists: 'Your beliefs will be the 
light by which you see, but they will not be what you see and they will not be a 
substitute for seeing' (MM 91). A good enough reader is not so hard to find as 
O'Connor presumed, providing he or she is not 'thrown off balance' by aural 
circumcision - anagogical or secular, O'Connor's or our own. 
Simone Weil's mystical philosophy provides a necessary balance to O'Connor 
criticism. As both insider and outsider Wei!, and her writings, offer different angles 
of seeing O'Connor and her works, and the ability to defamiliarise and make strange 
existing critical approaches. First, through her rational ideas of superposed reading 
and the equilibrium of incommensurates, second, via her own unbalanced prejudice 
towards literature, and third, with the aid of her brilliant but distorted theology. As 
Sontag has noted distortion may have a greater intellectual thrust than, and 
ultimately reveal truth. In an important letter to her parents written on 4 August 
1943, less than three weeks before her death, Weil recognises the connection 
between her own kind of distortion and the revelation of truth, and is frustrated by 
the inability of her readers to perceive it. 'Everyone knows that a high intelligence 
is often paradoxical and sometimes a bit .wild' she contends (SL 201). Writing of 
how Shakespeare's fools are afflicted and despised she insists 'these are the only 
people who tell the truth. All the others lie', no one 'is aware that their sayings 
deserve the slightest attention - everybody being convinced a priori of the contrary, 
since they are fools - their expression of the truth is not even listened to' (200). The 
truth these fools express is 'not satirically or humorously true, bQt simply the truth. 
Pure unadulterated truth - luminous, profound, and essential' she insists, before 
asking her mother 'do you feel the affinity, the essential analogy between these fools 
and me'? (201). The eulogies of her intelligence 'are positively intended to evade 
the question: "Is what she says true?'" Wei! argues, 'my reputation for "intelligence" 
is practicaI1y equivalent to the label of "fool" for these fools' (201). 
Yet despite considering she was unable to communicate the radiant truth she 
believed it her prophetic function to impart, posthumously, Weil has achieved a 
wide-ranging readership. As Czeslaw Milosz argues, Weil's writings 'are read by 
Catholics and Protestants, atheists and agnostics,.27 Appealing to both the insider 
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and outsider audience O'Connor tries so hard to reach and reconcile, as a brilliant 
but ludicrous monstrosity,28 embodying the nobility of unnaturalness that so 
interests O'Connor, Weil offers original insights into the equally strange truths, the 
deeper and stranger visions, ifnot exclusively 'truly Christian literature' realised by 
O'Connor and her work(s). Ultimately, O'Connor can not be totally successful in 
her mission as Christian writer-prophet because as she well knew, fiction 'escapes 
any orthodoxy we might set up for it' (MM 192). But in 1962 she declared 'I agree 
that I must be seen as a writer and not just a Catholic writer' (HB 464), and her 
work remains both fascinating and admirable, because above all, she could write. 29 
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NOTES TO CONCLIJSION 
1. The biblical parable O'Connor alludes to is Mark 8 23.26, the curing of the blind 
man at Bethsaida: 
Then putting spittle on his eyes and laying his hands on him, he 
asked, "Can you see anything?". The man, who was beginning to see, 
replied, "} can see people; they look like trees to me, but they are 
walking about". Then he laid his hands on the man's eyes again and 
he saw clearly; he was cured, and he could see everything plainly and 
distinctly. 
2. Nevin rightly suggests 'we do well not to grasp her and her thinking in an 
appropriative way, putting her under a house arrest convenient to our own 
sensibility', Nevin, p. 385. But studies ofWeil's work are marked by the same type 
of sectarianism displayed in O'Connor criticism. Weil's critics can be divided into 
two sharply opposed interpretative camps, which interestingly replicate O'Connor's 
aurally circumcised insider reader, and her secular outsider audience. As Thibon 
notes, the first group ofWeil readers produce hagiography, 'causing her message to 
be considered as a kind of infallible revelation of universal import'. and from 'this 
point of view, any reservation appears to be out of place, any criticism almost a 
blasphemy'. Thibon & Perrin, p.5. Meanwhile her outsider readers 'stress everything 
which might be considered as exaggerated or illusory' in Weil's thought 'in order to 
question, not only the deep value, but even the authenticity of her spiritual 
testimony', ibid. Both sets of reductive readings amount to 'totalitarian, and for that 
very reason mutilating, interpretations', Thibon correctly points out. As Heinz 
Abosch maintains some critics 'obscure her declarations .. largely with clouds of 
incense', but the critical backlash against the hagiographers can itself be damaging: 
for example Jean Amery in his Simone Weil • Jenseils Der Legende, has 'rebelled 
against the "Simone Wei! myth" yet in his excessive anger he failed to recognize 
achievement and rejected ideas which were less nostalgic than progressive'. See 
Abosch, Simone Weil: An Introduction, trans. by Kimberly A. Kenny (New York: 
Penbridge Books, 1993), p.3. 
3. See 'Barth's Dream', in his Conjectures o/a GUilty Bystander (New York: Image. 
Doubleday, 1989), pp. 1l·61 (p.40). But Weil interrogates more than theology, more 
than Christians. As Abosch observes: 'We are in a challenging dialogue with her 
thoughts - a dialogue which does not rest, which continuously poses new questions 
and does not end in the quietness of trite certainties', Abosch, p.127. 
4. Bleikasten maintains the 'mediating function associated with Jesus by the 
Christian and particularly the Catholic tradition is hardly acknowledged, and what 
characterizes O'Connor's fictional world is precisely the absence of all mediation, 
of all intercession', leading him to conclude that although a Catholic. 'she was not a 
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Catholic novelist. She was a writer, and as a writer she belongs to no other parish 
than literature'. Bleikasten, p.156, p.l57. 
5. In 'Degrees and Kinds: Introduction', in Realist of Distances: Flannery 0 'Connor 
Revisited, ed. by Karl-Heinz Westarp and Jan Nordby Gretlund (Aarhus: Aarhus 
University Press, 1987), pp. 11-16. 
6. Asals acknowledges O'Connor's 'incorrigible sense of comedy that animates and 
burnishes her creations everywhere, that cannot quite be contained by any thesis 
about the religious dimensions of her fiction. It overflows the borders [ ... ] to 
maintain a life of its own', Imagination, p. 233. 
7. Perrin:, 'Naturally inclined to extremes, she almost automatically provokes 
extreme reactions in others', Perrin & Thibon, p.6. Coles agrees: 'her writings rarely 
leave her readers - let alone her biographers - with a moment's indifference', 
Pilgrim, p.xviii. 'Simone Weil is fascinating even when one does not share her ideas 
- which is frequently the case', according to Abosch, p.121. 
8. Asals particularly, insists Wise Blood is unique in O'Connor's oeuvre, and there 
are 'fundamental differences that constitute almost a reversal in her imaginative 
thinking' between it and The Violent Bear It Away. See Imagination, pp. 9-64 (p. 
24). 
9. See for example the ending of 'Revelation', when the narrator informs us the 
purple streak in the sunset sky is 'leading like an extension of the highway. into the 
descending dusk', and proceeds to describe how Ruby Turpin sees it 'as a vast 
swinging bridge extending upward from the earth through a field of living fire', CS, 
p.508. See also the imagery describing how O. E. Parker 'felt the light pouring 
through him, turning his spider web soul into a perfect arabesque of colors, a garden 
of trees and birds and beasts' in 'Parker's Back', ibid., p.528. The difference in 
emphasis between Wise Blood and the previous stories is apparent. 
10. As Asals notes of the later stories, the early asceticism continues but is modified 
into a more successfully rendered sacramental vision: 
The mortifications that come down on O'Connor's later protagonists 
are cleansings of the doors of perception, purifications not of body, 
but of consciousness. They are returned to a world of matter through 
which spirit gleams: the ascetic action thus comes to reveal the 
sacramental vision [ ... ] Out of the creative tension between the 
ascetic and the sacramental comes that mingled severity and 
radiance, the austere and the visionary, that marks the uniqueness of 
all O'Connor's later fiction. (Imagination, p.205) 
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11. Ruby's outrage is also explicitly linked to the Old Testament Book of Job when 
'Occasionally she raised her fist [ ... ] as if she was defending her innocence to 
invisible guests who were like the comforters of Job, reasonable-sounding but 
wrong'. CS, p.503. On the story's links to the Job narrative, see Michael L. 
Schroeder, 'Ruby Turpin, Job, and Mystery: Flannery O'Connor on the question of 
Knowing', FOCB, 21 (1992), 75-83. In a letter to Maryat Lee (15 May 1964), 
O'Connor claims Ruby is 'a country female Jacob', HB, p. 577. The axis mundi 
imagery in the story, and specifically the cloud depicted as 'a bridge extending 
upwards' in Ruby's fmal vision, CS, p.508, has interesting similarities with Jacob's 
'ladder' in Genesis 28: 12-13, and the 'gate of heaven', 28: 16-17. 
12. CS, p.507, p.499, p.SOO. In addition see the parallels with the persecuted 'who 
have washed their robes white' and who will never suffer again, and how the first 
will be last. Revelation 7:14-17 and 22: 12-15. An interesting indication of why 
O'Connor may have chosen the name Ruby for her major protagonist is found in 
Revelation 4: 2-3: 'the One who was sitting on the throne, and the Person sitting 
there looked like a diamond and a ruby'. 
13. See Revelation 12: 1-2: 'Now a great sign appeared in heaven: a woman, 
adorned with the sun, standing on the moon, and with the twelve stars on her head 
for a crown'. 
14. Risen Sons, p.80. He observes how 
In 'Revelation', the idea of mystical community is developed 
precisely in terms ofa vision of history that unites Old Testament and 
New Testament analogues and is made concrete in the hierophany 
Mrs Turpin has about her place in that community at the end of the 
story. 
See Desmond's reading of the narrative in ibid., pp. 80·82 (p.80). 
15. Satterfield maintains that what Ruby 'sees is in all likelihood caused by the blow 
to her head, and the reader has no reason to believe that Mrs Turpin's life has been 
profoundly changed or that she has received grace or been redeemed', Satterfield, 
p.45. While not a 'carnal' reader Gentry argues that 'there is still much in Mrs 
Turpin's vision to suggest that she produces it', and she 'surely will fall away from 
her moment of redemption as consciousness again asserts itself. See his reading of 
the story in Religion, pp. 42-49 (p.43, p.49). A critical polarity between whether 
Ruby's vision is internally or externally provoked continues. See Sura P. Rath's 
article 'Ruby Turpin's Redemption: Thomistic Resolution in Flannery O'Connor's 
"Revelation"', FOCB, 19 (1990), 1-8. 
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16. See his article 'Revelation' in Komonchak, Dictionary o/Theology, pp. 884-99 
(p.893). For an interesting discussion of The Book of Revelation and the apocalyptic 
genre see Bernard McGinn, 'Revelation' in Alter, Robert and Frank Kermode, eds., 
The Literary GUide to the Bible (London: Fontana Press, 1989, 1997), pp. 523-41. 
On different aspects of the apocalyptic vision see Northrop Frye, The Great Code: 
The Bible and Literature (San Diego: Harvest, Harcourt Brace, 1982, 1983), 
pp.136-37. 
17. CS, p.500. Several critics agree on the excellence of this story. For example 
Joyce Carol Oates considers that Ruby's vision 'is the most powerful of O'Connor's 
revelations'. See 'The Visionary Art of Flannery O'Connor, in New Heaven, New 
Earth: The Visionary Experience in Literature (London: Victor Gollancz, 1974), pp. 
143-76 (p.174~ Di Renzo maintains that 'Revelation' 'achieves a humorous 
grandeur that none of O'Connor's other stories can surpass', and believes that 
Ruby's final vision 'is the most glorious in Flannery O'Connor's fiction'. Di Renzo, 
p.207, p.2IS. 
18. As Shloss observes: 
Those who already belong to the Christian community are able to see 
read this author on her own anagogical terms. But their readings have 
been guided both by O'Connor's comments on her work and by their 
own predisposition to see anagogically and so to fill in what is 
unstated in the text. (Shloss, pp.125-26) 
Carter Martin, as one of the aurally circumcised, demonstrates this tendency: 
To the literary dilettante, to the morally neutral reader, and to those 
who are squeamish or sentimental, Flannery O'Connor's fiction will 
generate a startling range of misconceptions and preposterous 
analytical abuses. But to the reader with a sound background in 
modem literature and an orthodox understanding of Christocentric 
religion, Miss O'Connor's work will be understood for what it is - a 
unique and forceful body of fiction based upon the profound and yet 
simple verities that have been the focal point of Western thought for 
almost two thousand years. (True Country, pp.241-42) 
The benefit of using Weil's superposed reading strategy to arrive at some truth(s) 
about O'Connor's work and O'Connor criticism, by balancing the insider prejudices 
of such a religious dilettante with the equally biased but contradistinctive outsider 
reading presented by Satterfield, and the interpretations within these extremes, is 
obvious. 
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19. O'Connor's dialogism is evident when after discussing 'average' and 
'intelligent' readers she acknowledges 'actually, both these readers are just aspects 
of the writer's own personality' MM, p. 95. 
20. 'Art as Technique', in David Lodge, ed., Modern CritiCism and Theory: A 
Reader (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 16-30 (p. 19, p.20), reprinted from Russian 
Formalism and Criticism (1965), trans. by Lee T. Lemon and Marion 1. Reis. 
21. Quoted in Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (London: Routledge, 
1977), p. 62, p.63. See Hawkes for a useful discussion of Shklovsky and Russian 
Formalism: pp. 59-73. 
22. 'Maybe in fifty years, or a hundred, Catholics will be reading the Bible the way 
they should have been reading it all along. I can wait that long to have my fiction 
understood'. Quoted in Wells, in CFO, p.87. 
23. O'Connor maintains a 'few readers go a long way when they're the right kind. 
There are so many of the other kind'. Quoted in Lochridge, in CFO, p.39 
24. As McMullen argues: 
If we, as critical readers, are able to step back from her counsel to 
acquaint ourselves with the written word on the page, O'Connor 
emerges as a tremendously complex writer despite her concerted 
attempts to appear simple and available to her reading public. 
(McMullenp.143) 
25. The Pruning Word: The Parables of Flannery 0 'Connor (Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press, 1976), p. xxi. 
26. Satterfield claims the 'strings leading up to O'Connor's manipulating hands are 
obvious to readers not wearing those anagogical glasses that screen out all strings' 
Satterfield, p.45. 
27. See 'The Importance of Simone Weil', in his Emperor of the Earth: Modes of 
Eccentric Vision (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp.85-9'8 (p. 98). 
28. Thibon notes 'the elemental flashing brilliance of her thought', Perrin & Thibon, 
p.154, while Mclellan observes that her 'aberrations should not be allowed to divert 
attention [ ... ] or to obscure the fragmentary brilliance of her writings which 
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illuminate so many areas of the human condition', McLellan, p.272. Other critics 
link this brilliance to her absurdity. As Nevin contends, 'by outward account she 
was a failure several times over, yet in her true vocation as a miter she succeeded 
brilliantly' she 'is bound to enthrall or irritate even as her ideas are variously 
strange, penetrating, ridiculous, brilliant', Nevin, p. 387, p. 390. Acknowledging he 
finds 'something monstrous in Simone Weil', Paul West argues 'something crackpot 
emerges alongside what is her evident genius and her almost pernicious goodness'. 
See 'Simone Weil', in his The Wine of Absurdity: Essays on Literature and 
Consolation (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966), pp.141-57 
(p.153). 
29. Alice Walker also applauds O'Connor as miter, not just Catholic miter. See 
Walker, p.46. 
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